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Summary
This thesis poses the question why Spanish young people leave home later than the French and 
it answers it from a socio-economic perspective. In 1992, three quarters of French young 
people had already left home by age 29, while in Spain not even the majority o f their 
counterparts were socially independent. Besides late nest-leaving, most Spanish young people 
connect departure from home with marriage. By contrast, in France young people leave home 
very frequently also in order to live in a hall of residence for students, to live in a one-person 
household or to cohabit with a partner.
The study o f two large national surveys with logistic regression techniques and the institutional 
analysis of French and Spanish social policies reveal the existence of different individual 
strategies to become socially independent in the two countries. French young people have to 
enter a labour market with high unemployment and short-term employment rates, but active 
employment policy, extensive public housing supply and housing allowances, frequent support 
from parents and comparatively high wage levels allow them to set up their own household 
early. Spanish young people face a labour market with even higher unemployment and short­
term employment rates, and the difficult integration into stable employment is not mitigated by 
a supply of public housing nor by extensive and generous public allowances, but must coexist 
with a very crowded housing market with high prices and rents. Spanish young people obtain 
subsistence-level wages comparatively late and they have to rely mainly on parental help r.ot 
only whilst in education but also during the phase of entering the labour market and of 
acquiring a home. Unlike their French contemporaries, Spanish women have much more 
difficulties in pursuing an individual strategy o f household formation, since they depend more 
frequently on marriage and on a spouse with a stable job when leaving home.

CHAPTER I: YOUNG PEOPLE’S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH 
DIFFERENT SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 5
1 INTRODUCTION 5
1.1 Late Nest-Leaving: Social Problem or Social Resource? 5
1.2 Macrosociological Frame And Research Questions y
2 WHY DO SOME YOUNG PEOPLE SHARE HOUSEHOLDS WITH PARENTS MORE THAN
OTHERS? 12
2.1 The Explanandum: Cross-National Household Patterns 12
2.2 Historical Variations 17
2.3 International and Regional Variations 21
3 BECOMING ADULT IN EUROPE IN THE 1980S 27
3.1 Increasing Individualisation of the Life Course? 29
3.2 Expansion of Education: Prolongation of Yo ith? 33
3.3 Employment Crisis and Labour M arket Risks 36
3.4 Social Rights for Young People 42
3.5 H o u s in g  Market Structure .a n d  Offer 45
3.6 Cross-national Differences in Family Values 4 9
3.6.1 l ariations in Norms About Family Solidarity 50
3.6.2 Leaving Home in Order to Get Married? 56
4 CONCLUSION: LACK OF A COMPARATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 59
CHAPTER II: LEAVING HOME: A RESTRICTED CHOICE ABOUT STANDARD OF LIVING 61
5 THEORETICAL MODEL AND MACRO-MICRO LINK 61
5.1 Macro-level Model 62
5.2 Individual Choice Model 68
5.2.1 Status Transitions and Leaving Home 69
5.2.2 Individual Choice through Comparison o f Standards o f Life 70
6 SELECTION OF CASES, OF SURVEYS AND THE STATISTICAL MODEL 72
6.1 Individuals, Regions and Nations as Cases 73
6.2 Statistical Possibilities to  T est the Individual Choice Model 75
6.2.1 Missing: Preferences, Expectations and Time-Varying Variables 75
6.2.2 Reformulating the Model by Starting From Context Differences 78
6.2.3 Cross-sectional Logistic Regression Model at Individual Level 82
7 CONCLUSION 89
1
CHAPTER in : DIFFERENT STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATIONS AND LEAVING HOME 
PROCESSES IN FRANCE AND SPAIN 91
8 WHY DO FRENCH YOUNG PEOPLE LEAVE HOME EARLIER THAN SPANIARDS? 91
8.1 T iming of Status Transitions And Content Differences in Spain And France 9 1
8. 1. 1 High Speed And Son family Destination o f Leaving Home in France 92
8.1.2 Degrees o f Resource Sharing and Types o f Living A rrangements 96
8.1.3 Early Exit From Education And Late Employment Stability' in Spam ! 04
8.1.4 Main Labour Market Features in 1985 to 1992 in Spain and France 10~
8.1.5 Lower Educational Levels in Spain Compared to France I II
8.1.6 Social Class Structures 114
8.1.7 Housing Market Structures: Differences and Similarities 116
8.2 Results of the Logistic Regression Models 120
8.2.1 High Individual Resources Do Not A1ways Encourage to Live Independently1 122
8.2.2 Unemployment, Full-time Education and Short-term Jobs Delay Leaving Home Everywhere 126
8.2.3 Social Class A ffects Students' Living A rrangements in France 12 9
8.2.4 Economically Active Youth and Social Independence in Spain and France 132
. 8.2.5 Is Activity a Good Proxy for Income Level and Stability? The P'rcnch Case 140
8.2.6 Conclusion: Labour Market Difficulties Affect More Spaniards Than French 142
8.3 P u b l ic  Benefits And Market Income Help Leaving Home in France 145
8.4 Test of High Property-Delayed Leaving Hypothesis 153
CHAPTER IV: CHANGING PERSPECTIVE IN ORDER TO TEST THE ROLE OF HOUSING 
MARKETS AND SOCIAL NORMS 155
9 BRINGING THE CONTEXT IN: CULTURE AND OTHER CONTEXT EFFECTS 155
9.1 Regional Variations in Leaving Home in Spain and France 15 7
9.1.1 Regional Differences in France 161
9.1.2 Regional A nd Provincial Differences in Spain 167
9.2 What do regional differences stay for? 170
9.2.1 Explaining Variables 170
9.2.2 Control Variables: Wealth, Consumption Standards, Mobility and Family Norms 173
9.2.3 Theoretical Model for Spanish Regional Analysis And Results 182
9.3 Conclusion: Cultural Mediation of Socio-economic Situations 189
2
CHAPTER V: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL POLICIES IN LEAVING HOME 19|
10 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS CAREERS IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
1985-1992 191
10.1 Degrees of State Intervention into Family Tasks l v 3
10.2 Multiple Social Benefits for Students 20 '
10.2.1 Public-funded Housing fo r  Students in France 20.'
10.2.2 Halls o f  Residence in Spain 20  “
10.2.3 Grants for Students 210
10.3 Public Regulation of Integration into the Labour Market 2 16
10.3.1 Special Employment Contracts for Youth 21 s
10.3.2 Other Employment Measures A jfecting Youth 224
10.3.3 Beneficiaries ofA ctive Employment Policy for Youth in France and Spain 22 ~
10.3.4 Short French Queues: Financial Autonomy at Age 25 230
10.3.5 Conclusion 236
10.4 Young Unemployed and State Support. 1986-1992 236
10.4.1 First-employment Seekers And I ery Short-term Workers 23 7
10.4.2 Unemployed with Entitlement to Contributory Unemployment Allowance 239
10.4.3 Long-term Unemployed Youth 244
10.4.4 Social Security o f  Unemployed 245
10.4.5 Conclusion 246
10.5 Helping Young People on the Housing Market 247
10.5.1 Increasing Income and Rented A ccommodation 24H
10.5.2 (h’erview o f French and Spanish Housing Policies In 1985-1992 249
10.5.3 Converting Young Spanish People into Proprietors and Helping Tenants in France 252
10.5.4 Housing A llowances in France 253
10.5.5 Housing benefits in Spain 258
10.5.6 Social Housing, Construction Incentives, and Regulation o f Private Renting 261
10.6 Conclusion: Differences in Diversification Not in Timing 265
11 CONCLUSION: ALLEVIATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING PROBLEMS THROUGH
SOCIAL POLICIES 271
12 BIBLIOGRAPHY 282
13 FIGURES AND TABLES 293
3
tiftjü w ü  ¿ ita  ii
CHAPTER I:
YOUNG PEOPLE'S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR 
CONNECTION WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
1 Introduction
My research deals with an extended current social phenomenon in Southern Europe which is 
the difficult transition of young people into adulthood. In these societies young people have 
difficulty in finding stable employment and in creating their own independent household, and 
thus the family formation process is delayed and for some young people it will not be possible 
to create a family at all. For most young people, to reach the legal recognition o f  adulthood 
does not mean reaching the social status of adulthood. In 1994, 60% of Spanish employed 
people between the age o f 25 and 30 still lived in their parents' household. An issue which also 
appeared on the first page o f the Spanish newspaper "El Pais" (28 .4.1997) and which has been 
discussed in a commission of the Spanish parliament. At the same time in an Italian newspaper 
(Corriere della Sera 22.4.97) a similar article appeared. O f Italians between the ages of 25 and 
34, 33% still lived with their parents.
h 1 Late Nest-Leaving: Social Problem or Social Resource?
The definition of a social problem is often ambiguous and can change rapidly over time. Often 
the deviant behaviour o f social groups, for example, youth riots in French cities, changes the 
perception o f  a situation, and consequently gives rise to the perception of a social problem 
until then not amply recognised as such. As long as the situation of long-lasting 
intergenerational coresidence is not seen in connection with any other social phenomena which 
most citizens or experts might classify as a social or political problem, these family patterns do 
not constitute a social problem in itself or at least, not a widely recognised social problem.
Delayed emancipation o f young people from their family of origin is seen as a problem espe­
cially because of its consequences for the demography o f  the societies affected. The gross mar­
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riage rate has fallen sharply since the 1960s in all member states of the European Union and it 
is particularly low in Italy and Spain (Jurado/Naldini 1996). As a consequence, the total fertil­
ity rate has also strongly decreased in the last decades. Spain and Italy have, since the mid 
1980s, the lowest birth rates in the European Union (Delgado Pérez/Livi-Bacci 1992). In con­
clusion, the reproduction o f families is in crisis, and it is still not clear what the final results will 
be.
A totally different perspective of the effects of long-lasting cohabitation with parents results 
from the idea that a late transition from the family of origin to the family of destination without 
a phase o f independent nonfamily living contributes to the reproduction of traditional marriage 
and family patterns. Goldscheider and Waite (1987) have found some first evidence that 
women living independently during their youth delay their marriages and that these experiences 
reduce their orientation towards traditional family roles. If  also the contrary is true, then it 
could be argued that an important element in the reproduction o f  the Southern family model is 
the delayed nest-leaving pattern o f  women. Scholars who have analysed the role of strong 
family solidarity and family networks among different generations argue in a similar way.
Strong family networks are supposed to favour gender-specific roles within couples (Bruckner 
et al. 1993).
Delayed home-leaving patterns have demographic and social consequences, but they can also 
affect the well-being o f families in terms o f conflicts and frustration. Some survey data give an 
approximate picture o f the perception o f the long lasting cohabitation of young people with 
their parents by the general public.1 In 1993, Europeans were asked: "Compared to ten years 
ago, grown-up children tend to stay longer in their parent’s home. In your opinion it is quite a 
good thing or quite a bad thing?" Most Europeans said that it is quite a good thing (52%), 
while 20% answered that it is quite a bad thing and 22% said that it is neither one nor the 
other. The divergences between countries are not very pronounced, with the exception of 
Spain and Greece. Only around 30% of Spaniards think that it is “quite a good thing”, while 
about 70% o f Greeks do so. Nearly 40% o f  Spaniards say that it is neither the one nor the 
other and about 30% say that it is quite a bad thing. Contrary to Spaniards, Italians and French 
express opinions which are in line with the European average (Eurobarometer 1993), i.e. these
1 Opinion data of the affected persons only would give a more accurate picture of the problem.
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answers show that a great majority o f the general public in the European Union do not see this 
as a social problem.
Things change if the opinions of people directly affected are surv eyed. In Spain, in 19S5, half 
of the single young people aged 15 to 29 and living with their parents wished to leave the pa­
rental home, a proportion which increases with age. Young people said that the largest obsta­
cle to leaving was that o f economic problems (Valles 1992). In a survey conducted among 
young Basques (1990), the age group between 25 and 29 years showed the highest degree of 
dissatisfaction with living in the parental home, and of those living in the family o f origin 48° o 
wished to leave (Elzo 1990). In 1993, 72% of Spanish young people aged 21 to 24 lived with 
their parents, and of these 42% stated to be satisfied, while 58% expressed dissatisfaction 
(Elzo Imaz et al. 1994). Thus, at least half of the Spanish young people who live with their 
parents are not satisfied with this situation. One could even argue that some o f the young peo­
ple who declare themselves as satisfied say so because they have adapted psychologically to 
this situation. This would mean that it is the result of a process of cognitive consonance with 
an objective situation which does not permit the emancipation from the family o f origin for 
economic reasons. Some young people also seem to feel that dependence on their parents is a 
restriction on their freedom, especially if they seek social independence. In a qualitative re­
search in the United Kingdom Wallace (1988) found that young unemployed people who were 
more dependent upon parental subsidy were also more subject to parental moral control.
Up to this point it has been assumed that if there is a social problem it stems from the excessive 
length of intergenerational coresidence. Not everybody thinks in this way. In the United King­
dom, for example, voices have been raised in the last few years which find the premature leav­
ing of the parental home as just as much o f a problem, because it is seen in connection with the 
increasing homelessness o f young people. In consequence, appeals are made to prevent young 
people from leaving home "too early" (Jones 1995). Other research suggests also that some 
young people living outside a family setting risk loneliness, depression, and illness (Riesman 
and Gerstel 1985 in: Goldscheider/Goldscheider 1993).
The fact that parents accept young adults at home and even favour their long permanence has 
to be seen as a social resource, in particular when young people live with parents who are able 
and willing to support their children financially and emotionally. Emotional help during the
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difficult and often frustrating transition from school to work, during phases o f unemployment 
or of precarious employment can be very important. The family can also protect its members 
from the pressures of the labour market, so that young people can exit from very bad jobs and 
find help at home (Wallerstein 1984). The family can be especially important for women who 
do not want to repeat the role o f their mothers and therefore intend to stay in education for a 
long time with the aim of entering a highly qualified job. To stay for a long period in their par­
ents' home can thus represent an adequate strategy in a context o f difficult employment situa­
tions (Flaquer 1995). A last important function of parents is well-known: the possibility o f liv­
ing in the family o f origin allows young people to save a good part o f their income in order to 
start a family with a relatively high standard o f living. It is important to notice that parents can 
only fulfil these protective and support functions if they have enough emotional and financial 
resources to do so; otherwise they might create more difficulties than offer solutions for their 
children.
Long-lasting intergenerational coresidence can also represent a social resource for society as a 
whole. A high rate o f resources-pooling households lower the overall costs o f social reproduc­
tion and partially prevent the reduction o f consumption standards. Consequently, extended 
coresidence also has to be seen as a societal resource for competition on global markets.
To stay for long time in the parental home and to depend financially on one's parents might 
well cause tension, frustration and drug abuse just as leaving early can increase certain risks 
such as poverty, homelessness, deviant behaviour and illness. There is no biological or natural 
law which appoints the right moment to leave the family o f origin, even if the majority o f hu­
man beings leave their parents in their process o f becoming adults and autonomous individuals. 
The right moment is socially constructed and varies in time and in geographical space. A social 
problem emerges in two cases within a given time and geographical space: first, if leaving the 
family o f origin is not possible at the time it is socially expected, and, second, if the creation o f 
a new family at the socially expected time becomes difficult and ends in a failure. In those cases 
societies can adapt in two ways to the lack o f fit. First, by changing the social definition o f the 
right time o f leaving the parental home, and, second, by helping young people to create new 
families through the specific regulation o f markets and families. Does a common definition o f 
the right time exist within Europe?
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In general, for Western Europe since World War II. some socially legitimised definitions i.bout 
the right time to leave the family o f origin can be found. The most legitimate mode of family 
emancipation, in particular for men, is to first find a job and then to marry in order to create a 
new family. It is possible to marry and still stay on with the parents for some time, but in West­
ern Europe this is always a minority phenomenon because the norm of neolocality is highly 
valued. A young person who is financially independent can also live in the parental home, but 
in these cases legitimacy problems may begin to emerge. These general norms explain why 
research results about young people who are employed but still live with their parents were 
given a particular attention in the newspapers cited before. These young people are beginning 
to go beyond the limits o f legitimised and thus unproblematic behaviour. In consequence, this 
behaviour is discussed as a social problem. If the young person has no partner, staying at home 
is probably more legitimate than if he or she has a partner. If the child helps to finance house­
hold expenditure, his or her permanence might also be more legitimate. However, in some so­
cieties to reach a certain age in conditions of financial independence seems to be more strongly 
linked with leaving the parental home than in others. In general, there is a strong relationship 
between being financially dependent on the parents and living in the parents' household. On the 
other hand, the link between financial dependence and staying at home is weakened in some 
societies for young students. Often parents consider migration to another living place in order 
to pursue studies as a legitimate leave and they finance it. Thus, in those cases, young people 
create their own household, being totally or partially financially dependent on parents.
1.2 Macrosociological Frame And Research Questions
The phenomenon of the transition into adulthood, in particular, the transition from the family 
of origin to the family o f destination displays important cross-national and regional variations. 
These variations have their origin in the way in which the family is institutionalised across so­
cieties, i.e. the social construction o f the division of labour between three societal institutions: 
the family, the market and the state. The theoretical aim o f this research is to contribute to the 
theory on Welfare States by focusing on the family in one southern European and one north­
western European country, and on the construction o f citizenship for young people. The point 
is that in Southern Europe we find a particular model o f social division of labour between the 
market, the state and the family and a specific social construction o f youth.
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The market structure o f Southern Europe, in particular Italy and Spain, is different from that in 
other West European societies and it is characterised by:
1. the subordinate role of these economies in the international division of work,
2. the more intensive economic crisis, that is, higher and structural unemployment (character­
ised by a higher percentage of unemployed women, young people and long-term unem­
ployed people);
3. a labour market with many precarious jobs that affect young people and women in particu­
lar, high employment in agriculture, a high rate of self-employed people as well as a higher 
rate o f workers working in small enterprises and last but not least a high propensity to in­
formal jobs (OECD 1994);
4. few opportunities o f part-time employment in the formal sector; and
5. the concentration o f economic and social disadvantages in some areas and regions.
At the same time social policies are also institutionalised in a peculiar way. In Italy and Spain, 
the entitlement and the level of public social benefits and social services are often related to the 
family unit and to family income. Social assistance, support for agricultural workers, family 
allowances, help for handicapped persons, scholarships, services for the aged, etc. are not in­
stitutionalised as individual social rights, but as social rights related to family income and fam­
ily situation. Unemployment benefits for young people seeking first employment are non­
existent, as they are supposed to be supported by their families (Jurado Guerrero 1995). This is 
also frequently the case in Western European Welfare States, but in Italy and Spain it seems to 
be more frequent. Similarly, family policies in both countries are not well developed, and are 
mainly targeted to families in need and allowances are dependent on family income (Neubauer
1993). In particular, support for children is ‘poor’ in comparison with other Western European 
countries.
The family and kin culture in the south is dominated by the relevance of children and family- 
oriented values, by the importance o f obligations, by the solidarity between generations and by 
the relative importance o f religious norms (cf. 3.6). Despite secularisation processes, southern 
family culture maintains many traditional elements because it adapts well to a context o f a 
long-term employment shortage and a scarce availability o f social services for families.
The research questions are the following:
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1 Which configuration of labour market, housing market, social policies and family norms is 
related to early nest-leaving in France and which to late nest-leaving in Spain'1
2. How far can these cross-national differences in young people’s living arrangements be ex­
plained with a socio-economic model, which does not consider family and other cultural 
particularities?
3. Through which mechanisms does the specific institutionalisation of the state-family relation 
influence young people's living arrangements?
This work is divided into five chapters. In Chapter I figures on cross-national differences in 
living arrangements of youth are presented, the dependent variable is defined and current re­
search results about the process o f becoming adult are reviewed. In Chapter II a theoretical 
model is developed and the empirical application of it is presented. Chapter III shows relevant 
context differences between France and Spain and discusses the results of individual-level sta­
tistical analysis. In Chapter IV regional variations within France and Spain are presented and an 
explanation for Spanish regional differences in intergenerational coresidence is proposed. 
Chapter V offers an explanation o f the mechanisms through which young people's nest-leaving 
is facilitated by public benefits and compares systematically cross-national differences in enti­
tlements, coverage and generosity o f state benefits. Finally, the Conclusion presents the two 
societal configurations in relation to their respective nest-leaving patterns and discusses alter­
natives for the future.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, the chosen definition of what has to be explained is 
presented. Second, the variation o f  the explanandum across time and place, and the relation 
between young people's living arrangements and modernisation, current labour market 
changes, housing market characteristics, Welfare State institutions, and dominating family val­
ues are discussed. This discussion includes a review of existing literature at every step.
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2 Why Do Some Young People Share Households with Parents M ore than O th­
ers?
The research project consists of a comparative cross-sectional analysis o f young people's living 
arrangements within the European Union and in particular in Spain and France. The compari­
son is made for the years 1991 and 1992, because two comparable surveys exist for this time 
for Spain and France. In this section, the dependent variable is specified and its historical and 
cross-national variance is explored.
2.1 The Explanandum: Cross-National Household Patterns
When persons share a household with each other it means that they share at least the house as 
a physical unit and the equipment o f the house. Not always, but very often, they also share 
services (housework) and earnings (symmetrically or asymmetrically). From a societal per­
spective, the consequence of sharing households are economies o f scale in the cost o f social 
reproduction. This means that the labour force can be paid less than if all individuals lived in 
one-person households.
The interest of this analysis lies in the sharing o f households between different generations as 
opposed to one-generation households. Two elements seem to be responsible for the theoreti­
cal difference between these households: the financial and the social dependence of young peo­
ple on their parents. Table 1 shows the four logical combinations o f the two dimensions of 
dependence and their relation to household patterns. This conceptualisation is based on 
Wallace's work (1988) but it has been partially changed. A financially dependent person is one 
whose own resources (from labour market and/or state) cannot assure the personal reproduc­
tion process, while a financially independent person can assure her reproduction and probably 
even that o f a partner and of children. A person who has some income but who additionally 
needs parental financial help is considered a financially dependent person. The concept o f  so­
cial dependence refers in this analysis only to the fact of sharing or not sharing a household 
with somebody o f  an older generation. This conceptualisation is justified by the fact that most 
o f the time the state and the society relate this type of young people's living arrangements with 
immaturity or, which is the same, with the non-attainment o f adulthood status. A young person
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in a two-generation household is also socially dependent because she or he has to accept pa­
rental authority in the last instance.
Most of the empirical cases are contained in the classification shown in Table 1, with the ex­
ception of young people sharing households with other relatives of an older generation, here 
ignored for reasons of clarity and o f the low number of empirical cases. Again, for the sake of 
greater clarity* I have also excluded the dimension of young people’s contributions to the 
household income through the pay o f board money* help in family firm, etc. This dimension is 
important in some societies (e.g. in the United Kingdom) and in some social classes (e g. agri­
cultural workers in southern Spain) (Jones/Wallace 1992, Talego 1995).
Table 1: Types of Households of Young People
Social Dependence
Social Independence
Financial Dependence Financial Independence
Young people without sufficient 




Young people with sufficient per­
sonal resources living with parents
Two-generation independent 
household
Young people without sufficient 




Young people with sufficient own 




What does it mean to live in a two-generation household in comparison to a one-generation 
household? First of all, this household type consists of an asymmetric sharing o f resources, 
because parents normally contribute with income, services, and a completely furnished dwell­
ing, while their children either do not contribute at all or* if they do* they normally have less 
resources (e.g. no savings). This situation is due to the fact that parents and children find them 
selves in different stages o f the family cycle and at different moments in the life cycle. Similar 
asymmetric relations can also exist in living arrangements where a young person (normally the 
woman) lives with a partner of the same generation who has more resources or a more stable 
income.
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It is, however, important to notice that there is a difference between asymmetry among differ­
ent generations and asymmetry within the same generation and that this is due to the phase of 
the family cycle. A young couple where the husband has an income and who wants to create a 
new- household has to accumulate mobile and immobile resources, which the older generation 
has already been accumulating for decades. In many countries this has to be added to the fact 
that there is, in general, a systematic variance between the earnings o f the current parent gen­
eration, which are more stable, accompanied by extended social security arrangements, and 
most frequently these are higher than those o f the current generation of children (OECD 
1996).
The first task of this research is to determine the empirical relevance of each o f the four house­
hold types in Italy, Spain and France. For Spain, it can be estimated for 1992 by using a survey 
conducted among 5000 young people aged 15 to 29 and for France the Enquête Jeune \ 992 
was used (youth aged 20 to 29) (Table 2).
Table 2: Frequency of Household Types of Youth in Spain and France, 1992














One-generation household 66.1 25
Source: for Spam: Navarro/Mateo 1993, 76, 106; for France: own elaboration with variable SOCIAL, Hnquête Jeunes 
1992.2
This table allows only for an approximate comparison due to the given age differences o f the 
disposable samples o f  young people. The Spanish figures o f two-generation households will all *2
2 The Spanish information is based on the self-report of young people when asked to state w hich of the follow ing four 
statements described their situation: I. they lived exclusively from their own income or from the income of the spouse,
2. lived mainly from own income but received family help, 3. lived mainly from the money received from parents with 
some own income or 4. lived exlusively from their parents' money. The French variables instead takes the income 
amount of 3000 FF per month and the type of income source as objective criteria to asses their household type (cf. ap­
pendix 3).
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be overestimated, since younger people than in France are included. The greatest cross- 
national difference we find is the small number of dependent one-generation households in 
Spain, which means that French parents are more likely to maintain their children in spite of 
being in a different household. Even if the real difference would be smaller, if one would com­
pare youth o f the same age, to leave home in Spain seems much more connected to financial 
independence than it is in France. This corresponds with the fact that young Spanish people 
leave more frequently when they marry and very rarely when they start university studies or 
when they move to a nonfamily setting as is shown throughout this work.
One-generation independent households can take four different forms: one-person household, 
married couple, cohabiting couple and peer household. From an economic point o f view, there 
is a difference between the first type and the other three types, because o f differences in the 
degree of resources shared (cf. Figure 1). The last three types, on the contrary, fulfil economi­
cally similar functions while they vary in their social dimensions. In France and Spain we find 
great differences not only in the degrees of resource sharing but also in the social forms of liv­
















The degree o f institutionalisation is normally the highest for a married couple, less for a cohab­
iting couple and even less for peer households, even if the degree of institutionalisation varies 
significantly among countries. In Scandinavian countries, marriage and cohabitation, in par­
ticular, have reached similar degrees o f institutionalisation.
For the concept o f institutionalisation I follow the ideas o f  Jepperson (1991) and Lepsius 
(1995). By degree o f institutionalisation they understand how far a social pattern is reproduced
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by routine, is associated with a system of sanctions, is taken for granted, and how far it struc­
tures behaviour An institution is highly institutionalised if it takes a great effort in collective 
action to change the reproductive process o f the given institution. The interruption of repro­
duction is more difficult if the institution is strongly embedded in a framework o f institutions 
and follows common principles and rules or if it has been in place for long time. If the institu­
tion is seen as the result o f a socially exogenous authority or as a product o f natural laws, it 
will be more stable. Also, a strong taken-for-grantedness o f the institution prevents its change, 
because individuals do not even think about alternatives or if they think about them these ap­
pear as unrealistic or as taboo. Referring to types o f households one has to answer five ques­
tions:
1. How stable over time was the two-generation household for young people? When did 
changes occur and did they diminish the degree of institutionalisation o f such living ar­
rangements? (2.2)
2. Does the institutionalisation of the two-generation household differ across nations? (2.3)
3. Is this form of household sustained by the specific institutionalisation of the family-state 
relationship? (3.4)
4. Is the two-generation household in line with the specific institutionalisation o f the youth 
labour market and o f the youth housing market? (3.3 and 3.5)
5. To what degree is this living-arrangement disputed by given social groups?
The next section will answer the first two questions, but first the operationalisation o f the de­
pendent variable for the historical and cross-national description has to be discussed. There are 
several possibilities to operationalise the living arrangements of young people. The first possi­
bility is to construct two staying home rates, i.e. the proportion o f young people in the age 
group from 20 to 24 years living with at least one parent and the proportion of young people 
doing so in the group o f the 25 to 29 year-olds. These staying home rates would be justified 
for three reasons: first, each o f them capture different social realities o f young people. The age- 
group from 20 to 24 years includes young people who have finished their compulsory educa­
tion and are ready to go into the labour market or to a tertiary education institution. The older 
age group (25 to 29 years) is composed o f people who have mainly finished their formal edu­
cation and who are already on the labour market or are entering it and who have also arrived at 
the average age in which a new family is created. The second reason is based on the pragmatic
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reflection that it is convenient to use the same age groups as are usually used in official statis­
tics so that comparison with them becomes possible. Thirdly, this is a way of controlling to 
some extent for age effects, which is very important in the case of a dependent variable which 
is strongly related to age, as is the case in this analysis.
The second way to operationalise the living arrangements o f young people is to compute sin­
gle-year, age-specific net rates of leaving home, as many demographers do (Yi et al. 1994. 
Desplanques 1994). This method is less synthetic than the first operationalisation, but it can be 
transferred without any problems to the first one. The advantages of single-year, age-specific 
net rates is that the variance within a wider age group can be known and this permits us not 
only to know the average timing o f the event, but also the pattern within the whole youth 
population. A more differentiated and richer interpretation of the data is therefore possible.
The problem with this construction is that most published data exist only for age groups and 
do not differentiate for each single year. This implies that a method o f interpolation has to be 
used to estimate the lacking data. The problem does not exist when using individual data, as 
will be the case for Spain and France for the 1990s. At this stage the first operationalisation has 
been used but later on the more detailed second operationalisation also will be added.
2.2 Historical Variations
The existing data on types o f households for young people over time are scarce, because they 
are not a standard demographic indicator. It is possible to describe the historical development 
for every ten years by using census data, but for this description only data reported in the ex­
isting research will be presented and discussed. In Spain, specific surveys for young people 
have been conducted since 1960 on an average five-yearly interval. Unfortunately, the same 
age groups have not always been interviewed: older young people, i.e. over 25, have only been 
interviewed since 1977 and afterwards not always (Navarro/Mateo 1993).
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Table 3: Young People by Type of Household in % o f Age Group, Spain 1960-1993




Total Married couple Cohabiting couple Other
1960 (aged 16-20) 95 5 - - -
1975 (aged 15-25) 84 16 - - -
1980 (aged 15-20) 92 9 3 0.5 5
1984 (aged 16-29) 70 29 - - -
1988 (aged 16-29) 73 25
1992 (aged 15-29) 75 25 18 7
1993 (aged 17-21) 95 6 2 1 3
Sources. Beltran Villalba et al. 1984. Conde 1985. Navarro López. Mateo Rivas 1993. Elzo el al. 1994. Encuesta Juventud 19X8 in; 
Casal Bataller 1993.
The published data are only partially comparable (Table 3). The figure for 1960 can be more or 
less compared with that of 1980 and 1993. In 1960, 95% o f very young people were living 
with their parents, while in 1980 fewer were doing so (92%), while in 1993 they showed a 
similar percentage as in 1960 (95%). We do not know which part o f  the rate is explained by 
he difference in the denominator, but because leaving the parental home is positively corre- 
ated with age it can be checked if the rate is over- or under-estimated. If  we take the age 
iroup of 1960 as a reference group (16-20) it can be estimated that the percentage o f 1980 for 
he same age group would be somewhat lower than 92 per cent, the figure shown in table 3, 
nd for 1993 it would be somewhat higher than 95 per cent. In conclusion, it might be that in 
960 very young people remained longer with their parents than in 1980 but less compared to 
993, but the differences are rather small. Figures for the more recent period are clearer.
>ata coming from the socio-demographic survey show a trend towards a delayed leaving home 
id show an increase in the proportion of young people living with their parents for the period 
fthe 1980s (16-29 year-old) (Garrido/Requena 1996). This is also confirmed by an analysis of 
bour force surveys o f different years. Among young men aged 25 to 29 family heads repre- 
nted 47 per cent of this age group in 1976. This percentage fell to 43 per cent in 1981, to 39 
f  cent in 1986, to 30 per cent in 1991 and to 26 per cent in 1995 (Garrido/Requena 1996).
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At the same time there is some evidence for a slow pluralisation o f one-generation households, 
even if the figures are scarce and some of these living arrangements are difficult to capture 
statistically Garrido and Requena, in the same study (1996), found an increasing rate of young 
non-married household heads since 1976. In 1976, 4 per cent of young socially independent 
people aged 25 to 29 were in such households, while in 1995 they were 15 per cent.
The same tendency towards a delayed leaving home process is shown by three retrospectiv e 
Catalan surveys among young people (Table 4). The increase is stronger between 1981 and 
1987 and affects women somewhat more than men. All four sources show that the delay in the 
emancipation from the family o f origin became especially relevant from the beginning of the 
1980s. These are the years when unemployment rates of young people and also the general 
unemployment rates began to increase dramatically (Jurado Guerrero 1995).











1977 90 10 81 20
1981 87 14 82 19
1987 98 2 98 2
Source: Casal Batallcr 1993.
In the Spanish case, figures on the development o f first marriage rates can be used as a proxy 
for leaving the family of origin, because consensual unions, living on one's own and living with 
persons of the same generation are minority phenomenona. These data are more easily avail­
able in the literature and permit a more accurate description o f the evolution of the last dec­
ades. In recent research Miret (1996) describes the development of Spanish marriage patterns 
and proposes some possible explanations. The mean age at first marriage for men began to 
increase in 1979 when it reached 26,1 years and 28,7 years in 1992. The development of the 
mean age at first marriage for women is similar’ in 1979, it was 23,7 reaching 26,4 years in 
1992. This trend can be interpreted as the reaction of the marriage patterns to the economic 
crisis which began in the mid-1970s. If this interpretation is right, than there should be a recov­
ery o f the marriage rate after the middle of the 1980s, when there was a rapid growth in the 
employed population and unemployment rates began to decrease. The analysis o f  the prob­
abilities of marrying for every single age shows that in fact there was a significant recovery in
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adult nuptiality. Men over 26 years old and women over 23 experienced hieher probabilities of 
marrying than before. This positive r-.*nd lasted a few years only, because ; JS7 the increase 
in the probabilities o f marrying in these age groups diminished or even became totally absent. 
Only women over 27 years and men over 29 years continued the tendency initiated in 1985. 
This disruption cannot be explained with the development of the labour market because unem­
ployment was still diminishing and employment growing.
Miret points to the housing market as a possible explaining variable o f  this phenomenon. Dur­
ing the 1980s, the Spanish housing market was transformed into one o f  the least regulated 
housing systems o f Western Europe. In addition, with the entrance o f  Spain into the European 
Union ( 1986) massive speculation occured on the housing market and, as a consequence, 
housing prices increased strongly. The increases in housing prices even overlapped increases in 
wages. "Many young people could no longer afford either to buy or to rent an accommodation, 
and the weak Spanish Welfare State did not have as a priority in the political agenda to help 
them" (Miret 1996,8).
In conclusion, in Spain there are variations in the presence of two-generation households over 
time even if they are not very spectacular. This means that two-generation households are not 
very strongly institutionalised in the sense that they are related to socio-economic phenomena 
and vary with time, and are thus not a very stable "cultural" institution. This does not exclude 
that from a comparative perspective two-generation households are more institutionalised in 
Spain than in other societies. It can be imagined that French two-generation households co­
variate also with the socio-economic development, but that differences between the prevalence 
of these types o f  households in Spain and France remains stable over time. Table 5 shows that 
in France also the deterioration o f the employment situation was accompanied by an increase 
of the proportions of two-generation households. The question whether the differences be­
tween the Spanish and the French rates remain stable can only be answered using similar data 
sources such as census information and constructing the probabilities o f staying at home for 
each age for different calendar years.
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Table 5: Living A rrangem ents a t Age 20/24 (in %  of respective age). France 1982. 1990
Men Women
Two-generation household Two-generation household
Year age 20 age 24 age 20 age 24
1982 81 38 62 19
1990 81 47 69 28
Source: Desplanques 1994
In contrast to Spain, it can be stated that in the French case more substantial changes occurred. 
In France, a clear pluralisation of one-generation households can be observed since the 1970s 
with the spread of consensual unions and one-person households among young persons (Leri- 
don/Toulemon 1995, Villeneuve-Gokalp 1990, Leffanc/Thave 1994). This does not affect the 
degree o f institutionalisation o f two-generation households, but only the institutionalisation of 
marriage as the prevalent one-generation household among young people. In short, in.Spain 
and France two-generation households have a degree of institutionalisation which seems to 
permit some short-term changes in order to adapt to changes in the socio-economic context. 
But how important are the international differences in the proportions o f two-generation 
households? At his point, some international and regional variations for 1987 and 1991/92 can 
be presented.
2.3 International and Regional Variations
Until some time ago, international variations in living arrangements could only be studied 
through either national census data or information from international surveys such as Euro­
barometer surveys. Both data sources present problems o f comparability and reliability, as will 
be seen, and thus figures obtained from them have to be taken as rough approximations. Since 
1994 a European Household Panel organised by EUROSTAT has been set up and in 1997 the 
first results dealing with European living arrangements o f young people were published.
Yi et al. (1994) have used census data to compare parental home-leaving patterns across eight 
countries and over a time period. They have taken the proportion of people who are children 
of adults by single years of age and include grandchildren, daughters-in-law and sons-in-law 
from different censuses. The three western countries o f the sample, the United States, Sweden 
and France, show permanence and even a decrease in the proportion o f young persons living
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with parents over the decades from 1960 to 1980. In the United States, the median age for 
leaving home for men and for women remained quite stable from 1950 to 1980', while in Swe­
den it decreased during the 1960s and the 1970s. In France too, young people left their family 
of origin earlier in the mid-1960s, compared to  the end of the 1960s to  mid 1970s.
The French trend observed by Yi et al. was also observed by BIöss et al. (1990) in a study of 
two cohorts o f French women in southern France. The cohort bom in 1959 left the parental 
home on average earlier than the cohort o f women bom in 1947. A study of different German 
cohorts confirms these trends, because they show that the average age of leaving home de­
creased for the cohorts bom in 1929-31, 1939-41 and 1949-51 (Wagner/Huinink 1991). If 
these trends are representative of the other European countries, we can affirm that during the 
period of economic affluence in the 1960s and 1970s young people became independent from 
their parents earlier. This hypothesis would need more data and a deeper time series analysis to 
be tested.
For the time o f the increasing employment crisis o f the 1980s data is available from European 
Youth surveys conducted by Eurobarometer. The published data allow a comparison for the 
years 1982, 1987 and 1990 in the way shown in Table 6. As in Spain, we can observe for most 
European countries a slight increase in the staying home rates o f young people during the 
1980s. The only exception is France, but interpretations have to be made very cautiously be­
cause the French census data is quite different from the Eurobarometer data. Following Des- 
planques (1994), in 1982 around 68 per cent o f young people aged 16 to 24 years were living 
with their parents compared to 75 per cent of the 15 to 25 years in 1990. In addition, figures 
from the French Labour Force Surveys o f 1982, 1985 and 1988 show an increase in the pro­
portion of young people (20-24 years) living with their parents. The German study mentioned 
above also shows an increase of the average age of leaving home for men since the cohort of 
1953-57 and for women for the cohort o f 1958-1962 (Wagner/Huinink 1991). In short, there 
is evidence o f a delay in leaving the parental home in the 1980s in most European countries, 
which suggests once again a correlation between the development o f unemployment and the 
living arrangements of young people. 3
3 This affirmation is based on U.S. censuses (1960,70,80) which exclude people living in college dormitories from the 
category of "living with parents". If these college students are included in the category of staying at home because they 
return home very often (for holidays, on weekends) then a slight increase in the proportion of young people living with
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Table 6: Y oung People (16-24 years) Living with P aren ts . EU 1982, 1987, 1990
in %  of age group 1982 1987 1990
Denmark 48 48 55
France 65 62
United Kingdom 64 67









Sources: Kicman 1986. Commission of the European Communities 1989. 1991. 
Note: The survey of 1982 includes also people aged 15.
For the period between 1980 and 1990, we can classify European countries into different 
clusters on the basis of their staying home rates. For 1982/87 table 6 shows three groups:
1. A first cluster includes Denmark and probably other Scandinavian countries with the lowest 
staying home rate (< 50%);
2. a second cluster is constituted by central European countries, West Germany, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and France, with rates oscillating from around 65 per cent to 70 
per cent;
3. third, there are Southern Europe and Ireland with rates going from 80 to 90 per cent.
In 1990, we can distinguish four groups.
1. The first group is represented by Denmark (<60%);
2. the second by Central Europe without the Netherlands and Belgium (60-70%);
3. the third group by the Netherlands (74%);
4. and the fourth group by the Mediterranean countries, Belgium and Ireland (>=80%).
This classification is based on young people aged 16 to 24, but what happens if we take other 
age groups as a measure?
their parents can be observed since the 1970's. Glick and Lin (1986) interpret existing U.S. census data in this way,
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In table 7, the age group o f young people from 20 to 24 years for 1990 and 1995 is shown 
First, it can be observed that the standard deviation increases (16,8) compared to the rates of 
younger people aged 16 to 20 (11,2). This is the result o f the greater homogeneity o f  living 
arrangements o f very young people across countries due to the fact that most of them still live 
in their families o f origin. Thus, the classification for more adult young people is more accurate 
if we divide the European Union countries of 1990 into five groups:
1. first, comes, once again, Denmark (<30%);
2. second, comes France (40-50%);
3. third Central Europe formed by the United Kingdom, West Germany and the Netherlands
(50-60%);
4. fourth, come Belgium and Portugal (60-70%) and,
5. in final position, once again the Mediterranean group and Ireland (>=70%).
In 1995, nearly all countries display higher staying home rates. France moves into the Central 
European group and Portugal and Belgium move into the Mediterranean group. These classifi­
cations can be summarised into three types in 1995 - Northern Europe (< 40%), Central 
Europe (40-60%) and Southern Europe (60-90%), including the Catholic countries Belgium 
and Ireland. A similar classification is made by Cavalli and Galland. (1993) as a result o f six 
national studies. Fernández Cordón (1997) analyses six European Union countries with 
EUROSTAT Labour Force Survey statistics excluding Denmark for technical reasons and he 
also finds two distinct patterns: a Central European and a Southern European pattern.
showing an increase in the proportions of young adults living with their parents after 1960.
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Table 7: Young People (20-24 years ) Living with Parents in EU, 1990 and 1995
in % of age group 1990 1 1995
Denmark 27.9 -
France 42.2 52
United Kingdom 49.1 47







standard deviation 16.8 16.9
Source: for 1990: own elaboration with survey of Commission of the European Communities 1991: 
for 1995: EUROSTAT 1997.
Fernandez Cordon points to the fact that it is in the 25-29 age group that the largest interna­
tional variations are found and that the gap between Southern European countries and the 
Central European ones has grown. Table 8 reveals that cross-national differences in this age 
group are smaller among women than among men and that they have increased from 1986 to 
1994.
Table 8: Youth Aged 25-29 Living with Parents by G ender, EU Countries, 1986/1994
Countries Women (% of age group) Men (% of age group)
1986 1994 1986 1994
United Kingdom 8.6 10.8 21.9 20.8
Germany 11 12.7 27.4 28.8
France 8.4 10.3 19.3 22.5
Spain 35.3 47.6 53.2 648
Italy 25.5 44.1 49.6 66.0
Greece 23.8 32.1 53.8 62.6
standard deviation 11.1 17.2 16.3 22.3
Source: Fernández Cordón 1997 (Labour Force Survey statistics).
All previous figures show that the degree o f institutionalisation o f two-generation households 
differs across countries, i.e. that these cross-national differences are relatively immune to 
changes in the economic context and are not clearly related to differences in national economic
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wealth as shown by differences between Germany and Denmark for instance. Since the 1980s 
the figures for young people aged 25 to 29 even demonstrate an increasing divergence across 
Europe, which could be the result of diverging answers to the same problem of rising unem­
ployment and employment precariousness. Consequently, the modernisation perspective which 
would foresee a convergence o f different national family patterns to one European pattern does 
not help to understand persisting differences. These have to be related to the specific societal 
configuration o f each country if they are to be understood.
At another level similar conclusions about the importance of differences in the institutionalisa­
tion of two-generation households can be made independently o f socio-economic variations. 
Figure 2 shows Spanish regional differences in the staying home rates o f 25 to 29 year-olds. 
Contrary to the idea o f a correlation between levels of income, degree o f  modernisation, un­
employment rates and living arrangements of young people, the regional staying home rates 
show a complex picture. Catalonia and the Basque Country, regions which from the moderni­
sation perspective and also in terms of economic wealth are the most similar, show the most 
diverging staying home rates, At the same time, Andalusia, a "backward” and "poor" region, 
displays average rates, while Galicia -which also has an important agricultural sector and great 
economic problems- displays high staying home rates (cf. 9). A macrosociological model able 
to explain international and regional differences has still to be constructed. A review o f existing 
studies on leaving the parental home and becoming adult will show the possibilities o f using 
existing models and their shortcomings.
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Figure 2: Staying home rates by Comunidades Autónom as (age group 25 to 29 years),
1991
Noie: Ceuta and Melilla were excluded. Minimum rate: 40.5. Maximum rate: 68.1.
Source: Own elaboration. Encuesta Sociodemografica 1991 (1NE 1993).
3 Becoming Adult in Europe in the 1980s
Emancipation from the family of origin is a relatively new field o f enquiry in European sociol­
ogy. which is by now dominated by quantitative studies referring to one national context. 
There are only a few theories about the phenomenon, especially concerning the macroso- 
ciological determinants such as the labour market, social policies, housing market or other 
features of the regional or national context. This part will address the question o f the theoreti­
cal frame of the research and what existing studies can contribute to understand the interna­
tional differences in the institutionalisation of two-generation households.
Becoming an adult is a process during which a person has to climb different steps o f a ladder 
to arrive at the top. The status of adulthood is reached after passing through a range of transi­
tions which are connected with each other. Galland (1993) divides the transition to  adulthood 
into two. First, the transition from school to work and second, the transition from living with 
the family of origin to living in a couple. Wallace (1988) conceptualises three layers o f transi-
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tion. those from school to work (the school-to-work transition), from the parental home to 
one's own accommodation (the housing transition) and from the family o f origin to the family 
of destination (the domestic transition). Jones and Wallace (1992) also emphasise the impor­
tance of the acquisition o f citizenship rights and duties to reach adult status. Alternatively. Zar- 
raga (1985) differentiates between four transitions: 1. from economic dependence to economic 
independence; 2. from the administration o f resources by parents to self-administration; 3. from 
parental control to personal autonomy and 4. from living in the parental home to the creation 
of one’s own household.
Probably, the school-to-work transition should be better re-conceptualised as a transition from 
economic dependence on the family of origin to financial independence from it, going through 
a stage of half-dependence and half-independence (financial transition). In this way, employ­
ment with wages below the existence minimum, the increasing importance of reincorporation 
into formal education after an employment break, the diffusion o f private formation offers and 
the increasing combination o f employment and studies can more accurately be taken into ac­
count. The empirical study can then focus on the entry into the labour market because of the 
better data available, but theoretically it seems more useful to conceptualise it in terms of eco­
nomic dependence. A further advantage o f this transition concept is that it permits the dimen­
sion of social rights to be incorporated, which can result in a higher degree of independence 
from parents but also dependence on the Welfare State.
The second layer o f transition, the housing market transition following Wallace, can be seen as 
related to the transition from parental control to personal autonomy insofar as it is valid that 
living in the parental home always restricts the autonomy of children even if they have reached 
an adult age. It is often argued that since the end o f the 1960s young people have acquired 
autonomy within the parental home due to the change in authority structures within the family, 
especially related to the increase of tolerance on the parents' side (Cavalli 1993, Iglesias de 
Ussel 1989).4 Probably these changes only reflect an evolution o f social control exerted in an 
open and authoritarian way to more subtle and psychological ways of exerting power. What­
ever the case may be, where there is conflict the family control is higher if a young person lives
4 Findings of the Spanish Youth Survey ofl988 contradict this idea of increasing tolerance, since 78 per cent of the young 
people aged 15 to 29, when asked if they had freedom to "make love at home" answered that they did not, they would 
not be allowed to (Zarraga 1989).
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in the parental home than if she or he lives in an independent dwelling and is also economical is 
independent.
Most o f the time the domestic transition, i.e. the creation o f  a new family, coincides with the 
housing transition, but there is one exception. A young person can marry or cohabit with a 
partner without leaving the family o f origin, but creating a new family within the household of 
her or his parents (patrilocality). Nevertheless, neolocality is still a norm followed by the great 
majority o f European young people when they start out life as a couple.
To conclude, it seems adequate to conceptualise the transition from youth to adulthood into 
two separate transitions, as mentioned already in the discussion of the explanandum.
1. The transition from financial dependence to financial independence, which is related to the 
school-to-work transition and to the transition of indirect citizenship rights to direct citizen­
ship entitlements (financial transition).
2. The transition from social dependence to social independence, which is mainly described by 
the housing transition and most o f the time also by the domestic transition (social inde­
pendence transition).
In short, youth has to be conceptualised as a "series of processes of transition to adult life" 
which take place in different areas o f  society; mainly the education system, the family, the la­
bour market and the housing market. Furthermore, youth means the gradual acquisition of citi­
zenship rights and duties (JonesAVallace 1992). Patterns o f young people's living arrangements 
are a reflection of young people's transition into adulthood. In the next part, changes in these 
transitions will be discussed in relation to current changes and characteristics o f general mod­
ernisation, the employment situation, social rights, housing markets and family values.
3* 1 Increasing Individualisation o f the Life Course?
The changes in family structures and life-courses which have occurred since the 1960s have 
been described by family sociologists as a pluralisation o f  family types and as an individualisa­
tion o f biographies. The decline in fertility and marriage rates, the increase in divorce rates, the 
birth o f children out of wedlock, consensual unions and one-person households have all been 
labelled as the pluralisation o f the family (Roussel 1988). These trends have spread from i.orth-
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em to southern Europe but without reaching a convergence- or at least, still in the 1990s great 
differences in family structures and behaviour persist between southern and northern Europe 
The pluralisation of the family is seen as a result o f  the economic boom, cultural liberalisation 
and the expansion of education during the 1960/70s which have particularly changed the role 
and life of women. The constraints o f former times which pushed women to have a larger 
number o f children, to continue in unhappy marriages and to accept an unequal division o f la­
bour in the private sphere have diminished. Contraceptive methods, the liberalisation of abor­
tion and divorce, and the increasing education and employment participation of women have 
changed their position in society (Kaufmann 1990).
The other side of pluralisation, or even its cause, is seen in the increasing individualisation of 
the family. The state and the market have weakened intermediary instances of social control, 
such as kinship groups, the church and the neighbourhood, as a consequence of the general 
differentiation process o f modem societies. This has resulted in a privatised small family with 
changed functions (loss o f production and education functions) and a higher autonomy and 
self-control. Family members have become more independent o f each other and their individual 
life options have increased. Marriage and family are less important for the economic and social 
security of individuals, because they depend more on a complex net o f  institutions. If  students, 
wives and grand-parents receive public benefits directly instead o f via the family head, they can 
decide to leave households and families and be independent (Mayer/Muller 1989). In modern 
societies individuals acquire citizenship rights which create special ties between them and the 
state. The increasing involvement of most citizens in market mechanisms also enable them to 
become more independent o f social identifications and identity constructions based on mem­
bership in status groups and local communities (Buchmann 1989).
What are the consequences o f these trends for life courses? Have these become more individu­
alised? Buchmann argues further that the life course has become less regulated by the family 
and the community and is instead largely subjected to state regulation. Nowadays, traditions 
and customs constrain an individual's action orientation less, but individual choices have to be 
made within the context o f  standardised life patterns. In this view the modem standardisation 
o f life courses is the result o f the growth o f the Welfare State.
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For over a century now, national Welfare States have emerged and have begun to pro\ ide 
mechanisms to insure citizens against the risks of invalidity, unemployment, illness, old age. 
homelessness and poverty, as well as creating a comprehensive education system The impor­
tance o f state intervention in relation to individuals' lives increases the more social groups are 
included in a uniform social insurance system (Mayer/Müller 1989) The state defines the en­
trances and exists of transitions in people's lives, for example, exit from school, entrance into 
employment, breaks because of illness or family work. This results in some predictability of life 
courses and in public help to secure its continuity. At the same time, the state increases the age 
segmentation, because it offers services and allowances for specific life phases such as child­
care services, care services and old age pensions for the elderly, and scholarships for students 
Nevertheless, the most important consequence of the Welfare State is the reduction of eco­
nomic restrictions so that chances for individual action and social mobility increase This indi­
vidualisation o f the life course finds its limits in the standardisation imposed by the state, but it 
is felt to have reached a high degree if looked at from a historical perspective.
For the last two decades this trend towards a strong standardisation and individualisation of 
the life course has been changing. The Welfare State, the employment system and the educa­
tion system are in crisis so that transitions from one life sequence to another are becoming 
more difficult and less predictable. Also, the family is becoming a more unstable institution 
with less life-long commitments. The tensions inherent in the dynamics of standardisation and 
individualisation are producing a partial destandardisation of the life course regime o f modern 
societies (Buchmann 1989, Mayer 1997). Does this mean that individualisation is reaching its 
highest levels and that social class differences are again becoming more important?
Buchmann compared two cohorts o f American high school leavers The cohort of 1960 
showed much more rapid role transitions and a lower variety in transition patterns compared to 
the cohort o f 1980. For the 1980s, she found a greater complexity and diversity in transition 
patterns into adulthood than twenty years before. The transition from school to work, for ex­
ample, has become more gradual and less clear cut. At the same time sex differences in the 
passage to adulthood have diminished because women's transition patterns have changed so 
much. In general, Buchmann found a greater determination of biographical orientations and 
transition behaviours by social status for the early cohort, while the youngest cohort displayed 
more individually stratified patterns. The socio-economic position seems to have become less
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influential on value and action orientations. In her opinion, this can be partly explained by the 
mediation of the education system in social reproduction. It must, o f course however, be taken 
into account that Buchmann's research refers to a relatively homogenous social group of high 
school leavers and to the American reality, which differs in many aspects from European so­
cieties.
In contrast, other scholars emphasise that social class still strongly determines the probability 
of a young person attending high school, university or college and the position she reaches on 
the labour market (Breen 1998, JonesAVallace 1992, Bourdieu/Passeron 1970). In this socio­
logical tradition education is seen as a mechanism to reproduce social classes and status groups 
in modem societies without really changing the social structure. At the same time, the cutting 
back of social rights for young people has been the case in the United Kingdom, and is rein­
forcing once again, old social class differences. Furthermore, for Southern Europe it can be 
stated that a wide range o f  risks (unemployment, informal work, lack o f  public transfers) are 
higher for women and young people than for male family heads in their forties. In these coun­
tries the Welfare State had not fully developed by the time it went into crisis. Hence, a general 
individualisation o f life courses cannot be spoken o f and even less of an individualisation or 
pluralisation o f the transition into adulthood, because social class, and gender still strongly 
determine the probabilities o f experiencing particular life course patterns, especially in South­
ern Europe.
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3.2 Expansion o f  Education: Prolongation o f Youth?
The expansion o f the participation o f young people in education, especially of young women, is 
one o f the most important developments of the last few decades, and has had a great deal of 
influence on young people's expectations, life styles and their form of transition into adulthood 
However, the effect of young people's enrolment in formal education on their household and 
family formation pattern is contradictory. On the one hand, it delays leaving home and family 
formation because of prolonged financial dependence on the parents (delay hypothesis), but, 
on the other, it has given rise to new living arrangements such as consensual unions, sharing 
households with peers and living in student residences. As a consequence, this has even pre­
cipitated young people's nest-leaving in some countries (acceleration hypothesis). The first 
relationship is more likely to be observed in countries where financial dependence from parents 
is seen as a reason not to leave the parental home, where the state provides little income sup­
port for young people and where leaving home is strongly connected to marriage. Other value 
orientations will instead favour leaving home to study in spite of financial dependence on par­
ents.
Evidence confirming the first relationship comes from different national and cross-national 
studies. In a recent international study of changes in family formation in eight European coun­
tries and the United States, it was found that in seven of the countries the enrolment rate into 
the educational system has a strong and significant negative effect on the rate o f entry into 
marriage (Blossfeld 1995). This means that postponement o f family formation is due to a 
longer transition from youth to adulthood. In countries where leaving the parental home is 
strongly connected to marriage, the increasing participation of young people in education 
might thus be delaying the domestic transition. Desplanques also (1994) argues that the delay 
in leaving the parental home from 1982 to 1990 in France is partly due to the expansion of the 
educational participation o f  young people. Wagner and Huinink (1991) come to a similar con­
clusion for German cohorts bom between 1953 and 1965.
On the micro level, however, some studies have shown that students do leave the parental 
home earlier than other young people or that young people with higher educational levels leave 
earlier than those with lower levels. Both relationships would confirm the idea that these be­
haviours aggregated on the macro level -other things being equal- would suppose that educa-
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tional expansion has lowered the staying home rates Mayer and Wagner (1989) analysed three 
German cohorts (bom in 1929-31, 1939-41 and 1949-51) and found that, especially in the 
older cohorts, young people with high educational levels left the family of origin earlier than 
those with lower levels.
Jones and Wallace (1992) describe for the United Kingdom a trend, where students increas­
ingly lived away from their family of origin from 1920/21 until 1979/80. They argue that these 
student living patterns were possible because o f the introduction of maintenance grants in the 
1960s and because of the construction o f campus universities. This analyses refers to transi­
tions into adulthood from 1920 to 1980 and, hence, does not describe more recent trends. A 
study of a panel survey o f  German "Gymnasiasten" (high school students) who were 30 years 
old in 1984/85 found that university studies precipitate leaving the parental home independ­
ently of the place of the university (Ziegler/Schadt 1993). These results cannot confirm the . 
acceleration hypothesis because the first study refers only to the decades before 1980 and the 
second result is based on an analysis o f the specific population of high school students without 
taking other young people into account.
In contrast, a French study o f the cohort bom between 1963 and 1966 interviewed in 1992 
shows an interesting phenomenon: 64% of young people with a high education level (tertiary 
education) left the parental home before beginning their studies or in the same year. Instead, 
only 13% of young people with the lowest education level (without any professional educa­
tion) left the parental home before finishing their education or in the same year. This means 
that many students left their family of origin to live independently. It was further found that 
persons with a university degree have a higher probability of leaving the parental home at an 
earlier point than the median age. If students leave home before accomplishing their education, 
they leave while being financially dependent on parents or the Welfare State. In France, it is 
quite usual for parents to finance their children even if they have left home. A strikingly high 
percentage of young people live in a dwelling paid for by their parents and this living arrange­
ment has increased from 1983 (10%) to 1992 (18%) by 80% (Galland 1995). Young (1989) 
found similar patterns using an Australian survey from 1982: over one half of men and nearly 
one-third of women left their family o f origin before they completed their education. Hence, 
students have very specific transition patterns and this surely has an effect on the macro level,
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especially in comparison to societies where these student specific transition patterns are less 
frequent.
However, there is also evidence which falsifies the hypothesis of early-leaving patterns of stu­
dents. For Germany, it was found that in the cohorts bom after 1953 young persons with a 
high education level left the parental home later than those with a low level, and in addition a 
survey conducted among German students shows that the number of students living with their 
parents has increased between 1982 and 1986, while before it had continuously fallen (Wag- 
ner/Huinink 1991). For Italy, scholars have found that the lower the educational level the ear­
lier young people marry (Menniti et al. 1994). A French analysis of census data o f 1982 and 
1990 shows that among young people aged 24, students lived more often with their parents 
than the average and than employed persons (Desplanques 1994). Comparative studies done in 
different countries, with different data sources, definitions and methods do not really permit us 
to draw clear conclusions. The contradicting French results o f Desplanques and Galland may 
be due to differences in survey methods. The problem of census data, like those used by Des­
planques, is that often they underestimate children's temporary and informal living away. An­
other problem are the different concepts used: Desplanques uses the rate o f young people aged 
24 as a dependent variable, comparing students with average young people, while Galland uses 
the median age and the quartiles o f the cohort bom between 1963 and 1966, comparing per­
sons with different levels o f education.
To conclude, for a cross-national comparison, two alternative conceptualisations and tests 
seem interesting to follow up.
1. A comparison o f a group of people during the period o f enrolment in university (i.e. 20 to 
24 years) by their activity status (studying, employed, unemployed, inactive) and their living 
arrangements.
2. A comparison o f a group o f people who have already passed the transitions o f finishing 
education and leaving home, e.g. those aged 30, to see if  they left home before finishing 
their studies. This allows conclusions to be drawn about the dominant norms with respect to 
legitimate reasons to leave the family of origin, which than can also be related to social poli­
cies.
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The cross-national question to be answered is whether the fact o f studying accelerates or de­
lays leaving home in all countries in the same way. Figures on effects o f enrolment in education 
on living arrangement probabilities in Spain and France are presented in section 8.2,
3.3 Employment Crisis and Labour Market Risks
The employment crisis which began in the mid 1970s is affecting the possibilities and forms by 
which young people enter the labour market in all European countries. In some countries spe­
cific labour market segmentations following age lines have emerged so that we can even speak 
of “youth labour markets” . Young people are increasingly performing jobs in the periphery of 
the second and tertiary labour market and seem to have problems in entering stable jobs on the 
primary labour market segment. This is to an important degree the product o f state regulation 
in order to solve the problem of youth unemployment. The aim of this section is to describe at 
a general level young people's employment problems and labour market risks in Spain and 
France, the main trends in active employment policy towards young people, and then to ask 
how different activity situations relate to differences in living arrangements.
Young people in Spain have decreased their participation in the labour force over the last dec­
ades. In 1976, 55% of young people between 16 and 19 years were active while this dropped 
to 32% in 1990. In contrast to this, the group aged 20 to 24 years increased its percentage 
from 60% to 67% because o f an increase o f young women in the labour force. French young 
people (15 to 19 years) followed the same trend as the Spanish, but at lower levels. In 1975, 
27% of the age group between 15 and 19 were in the labour force and the rate fell to 11% in 
1990. In contrast to Spain, the evolution o f  the activity rate o f the older age group (20-24) 
increased from 45% in 1975 to 52% in 1990. In the same year, more young people in Spain 
were in the labour force than in France (Meron/Minni 1995). In both countries the incorpora­
tion o f these young persons into the labour market was strongly affected by high unemploy­
ment.
From 1976 to 1990, young Spanish people aged 20 to 24 years had much higher unemploy­
ment rates than the adult group o f 25 to 54 years. In 1976, those aged 20 to 24 had an unem­
ployment rate o f 9% which was four times higher than that o f adults. At the moment o f the 
highest unemployment rates in 1986, this rate reached 44% and it was three times higher than
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the adult rate. Finally, in 1990 it fell to 30% but was still two and half times higher than the 
rate of those aged 25 to 54. For France, if we compare those aged 15 to 24 with those aged 25 
to 49 we can also observe over time a higher unemployment risk for young people. In 1974. 
young people had an unemployment rate of 7%, i.e. three and halftimes higher than the aault 
group, and in 1990 the rate reached 18%, two and a quarter times higher (Dumartin 1994)
French data for 1990, which is comparable to the Spanish figures, show that the 20 to 24 year- 
olds had an unemployment rate of 19%, which meant that it was nearly two and a half times 
higher than the unemployment rate o f those aged 25 to 54 (8%). Thus, the differences between 
the unemployment rates of young compared to older people were very similar for Spain and 
France in 1990, but in 1991 the unemployment rate of the Spanish in the age group between 20 
to 24 was one and half times higher. In the same year, the unemployment rate of the Spanish 
between 25 and 29 years (22%) was even two times higher than the French rate (11%)
(INSEE 1992, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social 1993). More recent figures show that 
the unemployment rate differences by age were still very large in 1996 (EUROSTAT 1997).
For Spain the risk o f being employed in irregular jobs, i.e. without social security, with inade­
quate social security, or receiving unemployment benefits while doing a job, can be estimated 
using data from a survey conducted in 1985. Over 40 per cent o f employed young people (20- 
24) were in irregular employment compared to 20 per cent o f the adult group (25 to 54). An­
other risk which affected young people more than adults is the risk of being in temporary em­
ployment. In 1987, over 30 per cent o f the young had such a job compared to nearly 20 per 
cent of adults. In France too, the risk o f young people having a short-term contract is higher 
than for older people. Three-quarters o f the French employed between 15 and 24 years had 
temporary contracts in 1989 (Dumartin 1994).
An analysis of cohorts of young Spanish people since 1976 show that over successive genera­
tions the numbers of unemployed with employment experience have increased which suggests 
the existence o f  a strong job rotation which could mean that less qualified young people lose 
their jobs in favour o f people who were studying before and then entered the labour market 
with higher qualifications (Toharia Cortes 1994). Similar trends can be observed on the French 
labour market, where the entrance o f young people into an employment situation is increas­
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ingly accompanied by an alternation of periods o f unemployment and short-term employment 
(Dumartin 1994).
Spanish governments since 1978 have tried to solve youth unemployment via the regulation of 
special contracts for young people. First, with the "Pactos de la Moncloa", temporary contracts 
for young people aged 16 to 26 years searching for employment were implemented In 1980, 
the age limit was expanded to 28 years for people with a university degree. The duration o f the 
contracts could oscillate between 16 months and two years and the employer received a sub­
sidy of 75 per cent of the employers social security contribution if the young person was en­
tering his first job. This program ended in July 1981 and was substituted by norms which made 
it possible to conclude contracts for part-time work, for practical training and for vocational 
training (Lorente 1986, cf. section 10.3).
The general employment policy in Spain is based on the worker's statute o f 1980 which regu­
lates the possibilities o f temporary contracts. Over the 1980s, the possibilities for employers to 
use short-term contracts were expanded. Four types of temporary contracts for specific types 
of work, were enacted in 1984. In addition, other forms were prolonged or changed, such as 
temporary contracts as a measure for employment for the unemployed, part-time contracts, 
contracts for practical training, for formation, long-term contracts for young people and meas­
ures for increasing employment in the public sector, etc. (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad 
Social 1988). In 1989 employers could choose between 14 different ways of establishing an 
employment contract, o f which the most popular were the temporary contracts for specific jobs 
("de obra o servicio") for one year, and the contracts for temporarily increased need o f labour 
force (a person can only work for six months a year in a particular job or he has to be taken on 
long-term). Most subsidies are given for the employment of young people between 16 and 25 
years (El Pais 11.2.1990, Segura et al. 1991). The results of this employment policy are very 
high rates of temporary employment among young people. In 1992, 85 per cent of the employ­
ees in the age group between 16 and 19 years had temporary contracts, 70 per cent o f those 
aged 20 to 24 and 47 per cent o f those aged 25 to  29 years, while the adult age group of 30 to 
59 years had a rate of 21 per cent (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social 1993).
In France, special measures to combat youth unemployment have been in force since the mid- 
1970s. As in Spain, the first measures subsidised employers who employed young people by
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diminishing or even eliminating their social security contribution. At the beginning the govern­
ment introduced alternating vocational training programs which enabled young people to gain 
professional qualification at school and in the workplace. Special programs for low qualified 
young people were also enacted and later special labour market entrance measures for young 
people were created. In 1986, a special emergency plan for youth employment was made 
which consisted mainly in subsidising the employment of young people with contracts of alter­
nating vocational training. Since 1988 local measures have been implemented and the contracts 
of jobs o f public interest have been reorganised (cf. section 10.3)
Besides these specific measures, the general flexibilisation o f the labour market has increased 
over the last decades, even if in 1988 the government re-regulated the labour market after a 
phase o f deregulation (Meron/Minni 1994, Lochet 1994, Steinhilber 1995). In 1994, 5 percent 
of young people from 16 to 25 years in the labour force had government subsidised employ­
ment (emplois aidés), 3 per cent were in vocational training (apprentis) and 27 per cent were 
normally employed (Balan/Minni 1994). The percentage o f young people (15-29 years) in sub­
sidised employment, short-term employment and vocational training increased from 9 per cent 
in 1982 to 19 per cent in 1994, while for the older labour force (30-40 years) the increase aent 
from 1 per cent to 4 per cent only (Meron/Minni 1994).
There is some empirical evidence for OECD countries that young people's wages have de­
creased proportionally to adult's wages and remain considerably lower (OECD 1996). In 
France, two-thirds o f the labour force aged 18 to 29 earn less than the median wage of the 
total employed population and the difference is higher for those aged 18 to 25 years (Mon- 
cel/Rose 1995).
How do higher unemployment rates and increasing temporary employment affect the living 
arrangements o f young people in Spain and France? If people's jobs become more precarious, 
they will clearly be less independent financially. This may result in an increased dependence of 
young people on their parents or on the Welfare State. It is thus probable that precarious la­
bour market conditions are positively related to high staying home rates or at least to higher 
financial dependence. The Spanish sociodemographic survey o f 1991 permits us to  analyse the 
situation of young people aged 25 to 29 years. Figure 3 shows the rate o f young people living 
with their parents or parents-in-law by their activity status and by gender.
39
Figure 3: Spanish Staying Home Rates by Gender and Activity Status, 1991
(in %  of aged 25 to 29)
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Source: Own elaboration. Encuesta Sociodemográfica 1991 (INE 1993).
Unemployed women often stay less in their family o f origin than employed women and there is 
hardly any difference between women in a long-term employment and those in short-term em­
ployment. This means that the difficulties young women find on the labour market are not re­
lated in the presumed way to the high staying home rates of Spanish women (44%). In con­
trast, there is a positive relation between unemployment, temporary employment and living in 
the parental home for Spanish men. Sixty one percent o f Spanish men aged 25 to 29 years live 
with their parents, while 71% of the unemployed, 63% of the short-term employed and 51% of 
the long-term employed do so.
Galland (1993) analysed for 1987, French young people aged between 16 and 29 years by so­
cial origin and activity situation and found that in general the highest staying home rates were 
shown by those who were students, those temporarily employed or those unemployed. A more 
differentiated analysis by gender shows similar results to the Spanish. In France, being unem­
ployed (for at least one year) delays -independently o f social or habitat origin and for all edu­
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cation levels- the time of leaving the family of origin, but only for young men.' Unemployed 
women do not necessarily leave the parental home early. Their probability o f leaving early is 
related to the level o f  education, i.e. women with the lowest education level have a high prob­
ability of being among those who leave the parental home the earliest (Galland 1995) Another 
study with a sample o f persons between 20 and 34 years interviewed in 1986/87 confirm the 
difficulties, men who are only temporarily employed have to leave their family of origin They 
leave later, go back more often to the family of origin and some of them live with their parents 
after age 30 (Battagliola et al. 1994).
Two important questions emerge for this research.
1. What does the fact that women's leaving home is not delayed by unemployment and tempo­
rary employment conditions mean? Does it mean that unemployed and short-term employed 
women leave their parents' home because they can rely on a spouse or partner, thus making 
no difference if they leave home with or without a job? There is some French evidence that 
leaving the parent's home in order to marry, instead of for other reasons, is related to a 
weak relationship with employment and is more often followed by a strong occupational 
discontinuity, even if factors related to the family of origin are also important (Marry e: al. 
1995). It seems to be important to differentiate between women who leave their parent's 
home to become independent from their parents without depending on a partner and those 
who become independent o f their parents to become dependent on a male partner.
2. How can the activity situation o f  young people be operationalised in the best way to take 
into consideration not only the current activity situation, but also the activity career since 
the end of formal education. Degrees of instability in their activity career should be distin­
guished in looking at the incidence and duration o f phases o f unemployment and of short­
term employment, as well as combining this with the dimension of the educational creden­
tials the young person is able to exchange on the labour market. The educational level 
strongly influences employment trajectories o f young people and thus connects social origin 
with school to work transition and other transitions to adulthood (Jones/Wallace 1992, 
Marry et al. 1995, Galland 1993). The comparative perspective o f this work and the insuffi­
cient quality o f the Spanish retrospective data have forced the taking o f activity and em- 5
5 This is the result of a logistic regression with a sample of young people bom between 1963 to 1966 and interviewed in 
1992.
41
ployment situation at one point of time instead of activity and employment trajectories as 
independent variables (cf. section 6.2.1)
3.4 Social Rights for Young People
The existing Welfare State literature neglects the question of social rights for young people. 
This is probably due to two reasons: first, young people have not been seen as a special risk 
group because the traditional risks which social security covers are those o f illness, invalidity, 
old age, unemployment and poverty, which do, or rather did not especially affect young people 
(Schultheis 1993). Second, the theory o f the Welfare State was developed by American and 
North European scholars who live in countries where the demographic pressure of young peo­
ple was the highest when the employment crisis was not very deep and where the unemploy­
ment rates of young people were not very high. However, in the last few years English scholars 
have increasingly analysed the topic of social rights for young people (Stewart/Stewart 1988, 
Jones/Wallace 1992, Coles 1995). Coles argues that young people constitute a distinctive so­
cial group because o f the transitions through which they have to pass and that therefore they 
need special rights.
Youth can be regarded as a state o f half-dependence or mixed dependence which reaches its 
end when the individual reaches the typical independence and autonomy o f  an adult. The con­
cept of dependence has a great number o f meanings and is charged with many ideological as­
sumptions. The dichotomy between independence and dependence which is often used in 
Welfare State research is problematic because it hides the fact that modem societies are char­
acterised by relations of interdependence as a result o f the high degree o f division of labour 
(Fraser/Gordon 1994). Youth is a good field to study the relations of interdependence in a 
given society and the institutionalisation o f  the division o f labour between the market, the state 
and the family.
From a comparative perspective it seems useful to create a concept which can be labelled as 
dependence-diversification degree. The lowest degree would be reached when an individual 
depends financially on only one institution -the family, the state or the market. This situation is 
empirically not very relevant in modem Welfare States, because even a male adult with a stable 
full-time job depends normally not only on the market but also on the public social security
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system. The highest degree o f dependence diversification would be reached by an individual in 
employment, with extensive social rights to protect her or him against the loss o f market in­
come, and with the possibility of receiving financial support from other family members in case 
of need. This perspective implies the study of employment possibilities and situations taking 
into account the level of the market income which can be received and the stability o f that 
market income (cfi section 3.3). Furthermore, the willingness and the possibilities o f family 
members to help other family members has to be considered (cf. section 3.6) Finally, the enti­
tlements to public benefits, their realisation in practice and their generosity have to be analysed
Young people can have direct social rights which entitle them to receive state benefits of dif­
ferent types and they can have indirect rights or social rights by proxy which they receive 
through the parents because of their dependence on these (JonesAVallace 1992). The social 
rights situation of young people depends on the social division of family tasks between the 
state and the parents, and on the financial dependence o f the children on the family or on the 
family and the state. This division o f labour influences the living conditions and arrangements 
of young people. I hypothesise that the more the state takes care of children and the more chil­
dren do not depend solely on their parents, the more the early independence o f young people 
from their parents is promoted. Children can leave the parental home earlier if they receive 
generous public benefits on their own right and they will also have higher probabilities o f living 
in a one-person household or financially independent from a spouse or partner. There are three 
areas in which the parents/relatives and the state share the tasks of socialisation and mainte­
nance o f children.
1 Who socialises and educates children?
2, Who maintains children?
3. Who provides social security?
From the perspective o f the children one can ask, on whom are they financially dependent and 
how do these dependence relations change during youth?
Three ideal typical State-Family-Dependence models can be distinguished (Figure 4).
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F igu re  4: S ta te-F am ily-D ependence M odels
1. No Division of Labour and Complete Dependence on Parents
( ^ ^ S t a t e ^ ^ )
socialize
_______  educate _______
security
2. Partial Division of Labour and Relative Dependence on Parents
helps parents.
{ ^ C W ld re n ^ ^
education
3. Strong Division of Labour and Diversified Dependence
supports directly, i.e children re­
ceive social rights independently
I hypothesise that a strong division o f labour between the State and the family and diversified 
dependence (model 3) favour an early independence o f children from parents and also an early 
home leaving.
Like family policy, social policy for young people is a fragmented field o f  very different public 
allowances and services, which makes it necessary to  analyse different public benefits. First, 
young people's indirect benefits have to  be considered:
child allowances
tax benefits for dependent family members
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• entitlement o f dependent family members to health services (in non-universal health sys­
tems)
• consideration o f dependent children in unemployment, housing benefits, and social assis­
tance
Second, young people's direct entitlements to public benefits have to be analysed:
• active employment policy and vocational training measures
• education benefits (public services like universities, residencies and benefits such as scholar­
ships, students' health insurance, subsidies for transport)
• entitlement to social security allowances for young workers (unemployment, health, old- 
age)
• entitlement to health services (in non-universal health systems)
• housing benefits
• benefits for special groups such as allowances for orphans, services for disabled, drug ad­
dicts, etc.
The cross-national comparison o f these different social policy measures for young people has 
to follow three questions. First, how do Welfare Sates define entitlements for young people,
i.e. direct versus indirect entitlement, age limits, and cohabitation in same household as a con­
dition for entitlement? Second, which benefits exist in one society but are lacking in others? 
Third, how much does the state spend on these measures or how generous are the benefit 
rates? Ideally, all these questions have to be answered in the frame of a cross-sectional analysis 
of direct and indirect social benefits for young people. The possibility o f answering the third 
question is determined by the availability of official statistics for the different measures, but this 
question is only relevant when comparing very similar configurations. In chapter V social poli­
cies for young people in France and Spain are compared and the above-mentioned questions 
are answered.
3.5 Housing Market Structure and Offer
The housing transition is the basis for the creation o f a new household, which can be a new 
household in the family-home of origin or in a different house. Leaving the parents' home does 
not necessarily mean that a young person creates a new independent household (Jones 1995).
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First, because the child can continue to depend financially on the parents while living in a sepa­
rate place and, second, because a dwelling can be intermediate and for a given time period after 
which the young person returns to the family o f  origin. Thus, an independent household is only 
attained if a young person is predominantly financially independent and if the household is con­
ceived by this person as the first step into a housing career. Statistically, it is often only ex-post 
possible to know if the household was intermediate or if instead it was an independent house­
hold. Theoretically, an intermediate household can be defined as a young person's dwelling 
separate from the parents' home whose tenant depends mainly financially on the family o f  ori­
gin or who is temporarily independent and conceive this accommodation only as a short break 
from living at home. The intermediate household is from the transition perspective equivalent 
to the one-generation dependent household as defined in section 2.1.
Do the characteristics o f the housing market influence young people's living arrangement . 
choices9 They would not influence young people if these took the decision to leave home first 
and then, in a second step, searched for a dwelling, adapting to the market offer and reducing 
their expectations to realistic possibilities. Chew (1990) assumes such behaviour for migrants 
arriving in cities, because once they have chosen to move, they have to pay sellers’ prices for 
housing. Nonetheless, in most cases and especially at the beginning o f  housing careers, decid­
ing to create a household while simultaneously taking information about housing supply into 
account is likely to be the way the decision making process works. Consequently, household 
formation will depend on housing affordability (which is determined by income level and 
housing price) and on the vacancy rate. American researchers have found that abundant supply 
facilitates the formation o f  households in general (Smith et al. 1984). In addition, a relation 
seems to exist between housing costs and living alone, so that areas with high incomes and 
easily affordable housing supply should show the highest probabilities o f non-sharing house­
holds. For Spain, Leal Maldonado (1997) points to  the importance o f  the housing market in 
leaving home by a comparison of the four Catalan provinces. In all these provinces excepting 
the province o f Barcelona the rates o f young people living independently are among the highest 
in Spain. He sees the lower rate in Barcelona as related to high housing prices. Also Serrano 
Secanella (1997) considers the housing market a basic factor in explaining regional variations 
in living arrangements in Spain.
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Another way in which housing markets influence household formation might be the character­
istics o f the housing tenure, i.e. rented versus owned housing. If for one moment we assume 
that the relation between both forms o f tenure is not determined by demand, then it might be 
supposed that a market with a high supply of owned dwellings might make it more difficu't to 
create nonfamily or informal households (with peers, alone, cohabiting) and by contrast might 
favour only the options o f staying with parents or marrying and buying a dwelling. This as­
sumption has two problems. First, the supply of housing also reacts to demand through public 
regulation and normal market forces; consequently, a high demand for rented housing from 
people who are ready to pay high rents can provoke new offers and change the supply struc­
ture. Second, the decision to create informal households is surely not only determined by eco­
nomic possibilities but also by preferences. It is difficult to analyse to what extent a low rate of 
informal households is due to economic restrictions and to what extent it can be explained by a 
lack o f interest in creating such living arrangements (or social pressure against them), but in
8.1.2 this is discussed further.
Castles and Ferrera (1996) argue that high rates o f home ownership in Southern Europe might 
be a cause of delayed leaving home and family formation o f young people, and o f the strong 
imperative for both partners in a young couple to have a job. This would be due to the fact that 
the acquisition o f a dwelling is a front-end loaded investment in comparison to renting a 
dwelling. The high rate of home ownership in Southern Europe, in its turn, is seen as a conse­
quence o f four factors:
1 high saving rates due to the pooling of resources and needs in families;
2. a scarcity o f alternative investment opportunities;
3 the high rate o f income coming from the informal labour market favouring saving for old 
age through home acquisition instead of through social security contributions;
4. a housing policy directed towards incentives for acquisition of dwellings, failing to promote 
an adequate supply of social housing and establishing rigid systems o f rent control, which 
caused a shrinkage in the housing stock available for renting.
These authors, thus, suggest that the tenure structure is related to the long-lasting family in 
Southern Europe. This high property-delayed leaving mechanism is supposed to be valid not 
only in Southern Europe but in general.
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Existing urban research also points to the importance o f the type of cities for the distribution o f 
young people’s living arrangements. An American analysis o f 145 American metropolitan areas 
with census data of 1980 and 1970 has shown that in information-processing cities (state capi­
tals, centres o f higher education, etc.) high nonfamily household rates (living alone, with peers 
or in consensual unions)were very common. Instead, cities engaged in manufacturing, resource 
extraction or similar activities displayed low nonfamily household rates (Chew 1990). The ur­
ban-rural divide will also probably influence young people's living arrangements due to migra­
tion and immigration, differences in education offer and in social control. The transition from 
living at parents' home to  living independently will probably occur earlier in rural areas and will 
be dominated by leaving for marriage with low proportions o f informal living arrangements. In 
section 9.1.2 some evidence for this as well as some contradicting facts are presented.
To unravel the effects o f  housing affordability and tenure structure on young people’s staying 
home rates different intervening factors such as type o f habitat (rural versus urban, tertiary 
dominated versus secondary dominated cities) and preferences should ideally be taken into 
account. For a cross-national comparison this implies a careful choice o f  the units o f analysis, 
which should probably be towns instead o f regions or nations. A necessary step before engag­
ing in such a comparison is that it has to be tested if in a given society these variables are to 
have explanatory power on the individual level.
In 1991, Spain was one o f the European countries with the lowest rate o f rented dwellings:
15% of the principal residences were rented against 35% in the European Community and 39% 
in France (Cortés Alcalá 1995). Another difference which has to be taken into account is the 
low proportion o f public rented dwellings in Spain in comparison to northern European coun­
tries. At first sight these differences confirm the idea that there is some relation between leav­
ing home patterns and housing market structure, even if this explanation has to be seen in rela­
tion to other context characteristics of a country. A simple descriptive cross-national compari­
son between national home-ownership rates and young people’s staying home rates shows that 
most frequently high home-ownership rates correlate with high staying home rates, but there 
are some countries with high rates of owned dwelling and low staying home rates, as for in­
stance, Belgium, the United Kingdom and the United States (Taffin 1991, Fernández Cordón 
1997).
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In addition to the specific Spanish tenure structure, the Spanish housing market is also charac­
terised by a difficult affordability o f dwellings. First, the interest rates for mortgages in Spain 
exceeded the Union average in 1991: they were almost at 13 per cent in Spain, 10 per cent in 
France and 10 per cent in the European Community (Rodriguez López 1994). From a chrono­
logical point o f view, the Spanish housing market has also made access to first dwellings very 
difficult. From 1985 until 1991 the selling prices for apartments accelerated in Spain, and then 
from 1987 to 1991 the increase o f prices exceeded by far the rise o f wages and in 1991 the 
monetary effort related to the family income (one income) necessary to buy a dwelling was 12 
per cent before taxes and 60 per cent after taxation (Rodriguez López 1994). More details on 
similarities and differences o f the Spanish and French housing markets are presented in section 
8.1.7.
3.6 Cross-national Differences in Fam ily Values
Differences in norms across countries can, theoretically, be due to differences in the socio­
economic contexts or to differences in world views, which themselves originate from religious 
or other ideological constructs. In the last instance it can be argued that even ideologies have 
their roots in socio-economic contexts, or, at least, this is suggested by a materialist way of 
conceiving the social world. Without entering this discussion it can be stated that norms and 
values as part o f ideologies are to some extent independent from the socio-economic context, 
because they have a proper development dynamic and change only slowly. Thus, theoretically, 
it should be possible to find very similar socio-economic contexts with different norms and 
values, at least during a certain period which would last as long as the existing time lag be­
tween socio-economic change and cultural change. If these ideas are correct, it means that 
values and norms have to be taken into account to explain differences in family patterns among 
countries. Some international and national studies on solidarity norms among generations and 
the connection between leaving home and getting married are reviewed in this part.
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3.6.1 Variations in Norms About Family Solidarity
Within European societies divergences in values about inter-generation solidarity seem to exist, 
or ,at least, expressed opinions in international surveys suggest the existence of cross-national 
differences. Ideas about duties between generations can be deduced from two questions o f the 
World Values Survey in 1990-93 (Table 9). First, a question about duties towards parents: 
over three-quarters o f the Spaniards and Italians asked feel attached to their parents, independ­
ently o f their behaviour and attitudes, whereas only about half o f the Danes and West Germans 
asked do. Forty to 50 per cent o f the latter tend to support a more differentiated vision. Italy 
and Spain and, with some distance, France seem to cluster into one group of high inter- 
generation solidarity. This is similar to the values related to children.
Table 9: Love and Respect Parents and Parents* Duties Related to Children, 1990-1993






‘Regardless of what the qualities and faults 
of one’s parents are. one must always love 
and respect them’
82.8 80.8 47 76.9 68.8 61.8 69.7
' One docs not have the duty to respect and 
love parents who have not earned it by 
their behaviour and attitudes’
17.2 19.2 53 23.1 31.2 38.2 30.3
‘Parents’ duty is to do their best for their 
children even at the expense of their own 
well-being’
78 75.7 51.9 80.5 75.4 53.3 69.1
‘Parents have a life of their own and 
should not be asked to sacrifice their own 
w ell-being for the sake of their children’
11.5 15.4 39 19.5 18.8 33.7 23
Neither 10.5 8.9 9.1 0 5.8 12.9 7.8
Source: own elaboration with World Values Survey, 1990-1993. Var. 224.
With respect to the duties o f parents in relation to children, three-quarters o f the Spaniards and 
Italians and even more French expressed a family-oriented opinion.6 The group-average of the 
Central/Northem European is still different. The two questions are not easily comparable, be­
cause the question o f parents' duties related to children includes the possibility of a neutral an­
swer, while the questionnaire did not offer this possibility for the first question. Only for France 
is it possible, because both questions were asked in comparable ways. In France, inter- 
generation solidarity seems to be highly institutionalised in both directions, i.e. from parents to
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children as well as from children to parents. These indicators from 1990-91 point to a higher 
institutionalisation o f inter-generation solidarity in Southern Europe and France compared to 
Central/Northem Europe. The situation o f the United Kingdom is contradictory and has to be 
clarified with further indicators.
It should be mentioned that in this survey different generations were asked and important age 
differences have to be assumed. The same question asked to young people in the Basque 
Country in Spain in 1990 show very different results from the general Spanish results of the 
World Value Survey. Of those aged 15 to 29 years, only 63 per cent said that one has always 
to love one’s parents regardless of their qualities and faults and only 40 per cent answered that 
parents' duties are to do their best for their children. Opposite opinions were subscribed to by 
36 per cent and 26 per cent respectively. For the first question 1 per cent gave a neutral answer 
and 33 per cent for the second question. Very similar answers were given by a general sample 
of Spanish young people, only with somewhat higher approval o f strong inter-generation obli­
gations (Elzo 1990). Even if the answers are not totally comparable to the general Spanish 
figures o f the World Value Survey, a lower degree o f support for strong inter-generation obli­
gations can be observed among Spanish young people compared to all Spanish people.
Another more indirect indicator of the importance o f inter-generation solidarity is the opinion 
about the importance of children for life and for a couple. Europeans were asked how impor­
tant it was for them to have a child. The findings show the central and fundamental role of 
children in most countries but with important differences. The percentage of people aged 15 to 
24 who consider having a child as essential and very important number around 60 per cent in 
Spain, Italy, France, and Belgium; in Portugal and Greece the rate reaches even more than 70 
per cent, while it is under 50 per cent in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland and 
West Germany (Eurobarometer 1993 in. EUROSTAT 1997). In addition, in Spain, Italy and 
France people answered that it was important for them to have children for their marriage to be 
successful (World Values Survey 1990-1993). One possible conclusion is that the Italians, 
Spaniards and French are more child-oriented than the Germans, English and Danes. One could 
also say that Italian and Spanish people attribute to children an important role in increasing
6 French answers are not really comparable to answers from other nationals, because the questions were not formulated in 
an identical way. Only the French had no possibility of giving a neutral answ er ("neither").
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solidarity within the couple, as shown by the higher percentage o f Italians and Spaniards who 
consider having a young child as a good reason for not getting divorced.
Are these differences in values about family obligations related to differences in religious de­
nomination and degree of secularisation? If this was so Spain, Italy and France should cluster 
into one religious group in contrast with the to other European countries. 1 present here a sim­
ple ranking list o f indicators o f religiosity and of the importance of family solidarity (Table 10)







service once a 
week
Church an­











Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Spain
Spam Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Ital\
France United King­
dom
West Germany United King­
dom
France France France
West Germany West Germany United King­
dom







France France France West Germans West Germany United King­
dom
Denmark j Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark West Germans
Sources: World Values Survey 1990-93, Eurobarometer 1993.
With the exception o f the first indicator, France always appears as a strongly secularised soci­
ety in a comparative perspective, while Italy and Spain are representative o f low secularised 
societies. The higher secularisation degree of French society is also shown in other compara­
tive research (Crouch 1998). This suggests that the similarity o f Italy, Spain and France in 
family values cannot be explained by a similar degree o f secularisation. It could only be argued 
that the Catholic denomination as a tradition present in all three countries influences family 
values, There is some further evidence that Catholicism is positively related to strong family 
kinship obligations.
Greeley (1989), using the International Social Survey Project data o f 1986, found for seven 
countries (United Kingdom, United Sates, Australia, Hungary, Germany, Austria and Italy) 
that Catholics do form more intense family networks (frequency o f visits and living close/far 
from relatives) than do other Christians. His results suggest that denominational background 
independent o f social class and education level predict quite good value orientations. For West 
Germany, Szydlik (1995) found differences among people of Catholic denomination and those
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of no religious denomination, the first showing stronger inter-generation relationships than the 
last. Instead, following an American study by Rossi and Rossi (1990), race and religious af­
filiations had no effect on kinship obligations in a sample of Americans living in Boston Simi­
larly, Goldscheider and Goldscheider (1993) found relatively small overall differences in non­
family living arrangements o f American young people among Jews, Catholics and others in the 
non-Hispanic, non-Asian and non-black population. A differentiation of Catholics by Southern 
European origin versus other origins showed differences in the proportions expecting nonfa­
mily living but not in the proportions o f those actually having left home for nonfamily settings 
Those results reinforce other American research which suggested that secularisation had let to 
a homogenisation o f religious denominations with respect to a variety o f family-related behav­
iours. To sum up, Catholicism or a secularised Catholic tradition probably favour strong kin­
ship obligations, but this is a question which still has to be investigated in more detail, in par­
ticular for Europe.
Immigration societies are an interesting case to study the persistence and thus importance of 
specific cultural traditions among social groups. The above-mentioned study of people living in 
Boston found that differences in the ethnic origin o f the Americans of the sample did not show 
great influence on kinship obligations. East and West Europeans, Germans and Italians show 
kinship obligations patterns very similar to the British ones. Only Americans of Irish origin 
display stronger obligations towards kin than British Americans (Rossi/Rossi 1990). On the 
contrary, Clausen (1993) found that family solidarity in the United States was stronger among 
Latin-American and Asiatic than Anglo-Saxon white people. Like Clausen many other Ameri­
can scholars have found that differences among ethnic groups on family norms are often as 
great as those by income or education. Unmarried Hispanics, for instance, are less likely than 
white non-Hispanics to live independently o f their parents (Goidscheider/Goldscheider 1993). 
Again, national studies show a contradictory picture due to the complexity o f interactions be­
tween ethnic origin, religiosity and familism.
A good indicator o f norms o f inter-generation solidarity are monetary transfer flows among 
different generations, but it is difficult to find comparable international figures on this. The 
Luxembourg Income Study provides information o f within family transfer payments only for 
family members living in separate households, but not for those sharing households. In the 
European Household Panel in the individual questionnaire the information is asked in an am­
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biguous way, but in principle it should be available. For the moment, however, the comparative 
information is not yet available. Some national figures on this question for the United King­
dom, Germany, Spain and France can give at least a first idea on cross-national differences.
Jones and Wallace (1992) found that when children reach 17 years in the United Kingdom the 
general flow o f cash payments is from parents to children, but by the age o f 19 the general flow 
is inverted and children pay more board money than they receive pocket money, at least among 
those who are living at home and are not in frill-time education. Furthermore, in the United 
Kingdom young people in employment and living with their parents seem to pay board money 
in the form of a fixed amount for their board, while in the United States this only the case when 
parents' financial situation is very precarious. In addition, British young people in poor families 
pay higher amounts for their board than in wealthier families so that their contribution to the 
family income is very important.
A survey of young people in the region o f Aragón in Spain conducted in 1985 offers some 
information about the financial contribution of young people to their families. From young 
people aged 14 to 25 years in employment, 56 per cent gave all or most part of their income to 
the family o f origin, 13 per cent gave a minor part o f it and 30 per cent kept it all for them­
selves. As in the British study, the results show that the lower the professional category of the 
young person the more he or she contributes to the family income. Young agricultural self- 
employed workers, family helps and agricultural workers contributed more often, i.e. in nearly 
80 per cent of the cases, to the household income. In addition, men contribute more often to 
the family income than do young women, who in turn earn less than their male counterparts 
(Lopéz Jiménez 1987). A more recent Spanish survey (1992) o f young people aged 15 to 29 
years show that o f  those young people who said they lived exclusively or primarily from an 
own income, i.e. described themselves as self-sufficient, 28 per cent gave their income or the 
majority o f it to the family and 57 per cent conserved most or the whole amount for them.7 
Self-sufficient young people represented only 45 per cent of the general sample, while the oth­
ers lived mainly or exclusively from the money received from home (Instituto de la Juventud
1994). These Spanish figures suggest a lower general contribution of young people to their
Unfortunately, the report of this study has not excluded married persons (16%) from the sample to compute the percent­
ages of young people contributing to the family. This means that a number of the young people who give their money to 
the family are married and are thus not contributing to the family of origin but to the new family. An older Spanish
7
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family of origin than that of British young people. If this is confirmed by more comparable fig­
ures. it would explain the greater interest o f young people in the United Kingdom to leave 
home earlier than in Spain and of those from lower social origin compared to those o f higher 
origin.
A German survey o f 300 families in Bamberg, where young people aged 18 to 28 years and 
their parents were interviewed, gives some insights into inter-generation solidarity in German)’ 
Half of the parents supported their children regularly with money transfers, which is quite 
similar to the Spanish percentage, although the Spanish percentage is higher because it also 
includes young persons between 15 and 17 years. The amount German parents spend to help 
their children varies by social class. O f these parents earning low incomes, only 12 per cent 
supported their children, while this figure jumped to 72 per cent if they had high incomes. 
Nearly 40 per cent o f the young people aged 25 to 28 years were not yet financially independ­
ent, of whom 80 per cent were not yet employed, while 20 per cent were employed but their 
earnings were under the minimum existence level. O f all the young people who were financially 
dependent, only 67 per cent were still living with their parents, which also meant that parents 
were supporting children when they were not at home. Most o f the independent young people 
came from families with a good income position and less often from families with many sib­
lings. The results o f two other longitudinal surveys conducted among cohabiting couples in the 
federal state of Bavaria (900) and among married couples in West Germany (1,500) show that 
47 per cent of the cohabiting couples and 61 per cent of the married couples had received large 
presents and financial support from their parents and other relatives when the couple set up 
house together. The most common support was in form of cash presents and of furniture 
(Vaskovics 1993).
A French survey at the beginning o f the 1990s asked young people (25 to 34 years) if they had 
received help from their parents during the year that followed their leaving home. I f  they left to 
study they received, in 35 per cent o f the cases, help to cover all their costs and in 24 per cent 
of the cases monthly help to cover a part of their expenditures. If they had left for reasons of 
employment or to live in a couple they received very little financial help, but received more 
help in kind: 33 per cent of those leaving to live in a couple had received such help (Bo-
youth survey (1988) also found that the majority of young people aged 15 to 29 gave some of their earning to their par­
ents, but that this contribution did not compensate the costs produced by nest-staying (Zarraga 1989).
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zon/Villeneuve-Gokalp 1995). Similar figures are shown by another French survey o f 1992 23 
per cent of the students living in their own household received financial help from their parents 
(Caussat 1995).
The European Household Panel wave o f 1994 provide cross-national data on the rate of young 
households who said that they had received an economic help from parents or friends. Around 
18 to 22 per cent o f young households in Germany, Denmark and Greece affirmed they had 
received support, while in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland only 2 to 9 per cent had benefited 
from help. In France and the Netherlands 13 and 12 per cent respectively had been supported 
by parents and friends (EUROSTAT 1997).
The German and French studies and the European Household Panel figures suggest a weaker 
connection between the financial and social dependence of young people on their parents in . 
northern and central European countries compared to most southern European countries. In 
the latter people leave home late, but once they have created their own households they seem 
to be less dependent on economic support from the older generation. Therefore, the Spanish 
situation, in which one-generation households are good proxies for the financial and social 
independence of young people, is a specific Spanish and southern feature. In this case the 
question is why young people in Spain do not live in one-generation dependent households 
very often? Is it due to a lack o f  desire for independence, to the lower resources o f Spanish 
parents, to difficulties on the housing market, or the lack o f adequate public allowances which 
reduce parents financial efforts in case of dependent one-generation households? These ques­
tions will be answered in the successive parts of this work.
3.6.2 Leaving Home in Order to Get Married?
The assumption that most young people leave home when they marry is in many cases not cor­
rect. Historians found that in the European past many young single people left their family of 
origin to live as servants or lodgers in other households. There is some evidence that in Europe 
the closest link between marriage and leaving home was a phenomenon o f  the short period o f 
time o f the 1960s. Already during the 1970s, young people began to leave their family o f origin 
more often to cohabit before marriage, to live on their own and for educational reasons. This 
weakening of the link between marriage and leaving home can be observed for Europe in gen­
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eral, but there still remain important differences across European societies and among social 
groups (Kieman 1989).
An Australian survey o f 1982 show differences within the country. The young Australian 
adults who were most likely to leave the family of origin in order to mam- were those with a 
strong attachment to religion, with southern European parents, with strong traditional family 
values, coming from a large family, and who had left school young (Young 1989). These .e- 
sults suggest that there could be a connection between Catholicism and a low degree of secu­
larisation in Spain and Italy and the norm of leaving home to marry. Another possibility to fol­
low up are the differences in the proportion of young people with low educational levels and 
from large families, which is also higher in Spain and Italy compared to France.
Two French studies analyse the connection between leaving home and marriage. The first is 
based on a longitudinal survey among 3,000 French people aged 25 to 34 years. O f those men 
who left their parents' home before age 28, 18 per cent did so for educational reasons, 19 per 
cent for employment reasons, 38 per cent to live in a couple, 8 per cent because o f conflicts 
with their parents, and 9 per cent because they wished to be independent. Women show a 
similar behaviour pattern and left only a little more often to live in couple and less often for 
employment reasons (Bozon/Villeneuve-Gokalp 1995). Galland (1995) shows, with data from 
the French Youth Survey of 1992, that two-thirds o f young French people (26 to 29 years) 
followed the transition into adulthood in the following way: they finished their studies, entered 
their first employment, created their independent household and then formed a couple. This 
transition sequence is more frequent among men (72 per cent) than among women (59 per 
cent).
The Spanish sociodemographic survey of 1991 allows for a rough hypothesis on the reasons 
why young people who lived with their parents in 1981 subsequently left this household.* The 
codification does not account for employment but only for family, education and housing. Ap­
proximately 25 per cent of young people aged 20 to 29 years in 1991 had left their parents' 
home at least once and they first left in 90 per cent o f the cases, to form a stable couple (mar- 8
8 The problem with this survey is that a change of dwelling is only classified as such if the newr dwelling became the usual 
residence for more than three months. Residences for more than three months are not accounted for if the individual still 
conserved their permanent residence in another place. Therefore an underestimation of students and young employees 
livmg away for some time has to be expected.
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rying or cohabiting) and in 5 per cent to become independent of the family of origin This lon­
gitudinal information confirms the cross-sectional figures of young people's arrangements in 
Spain, which are dominated by living in the family o f origin or with a spouse Unlike in 
France, the connection between leaving home and marrying is very strong in Spain.
German studies point often to the importance o f getting married as a reason to leave the pa­
rental home. The already-mentioned study o f Mayer and Wagner (1989) found that marriage 
was significantly related to  the leaving rate of young German people from 1944 to 1980.
Weick also (1993) found that marriage was the most influential factor on the leaving age, even 
if this influence has diminished among the younger cohorts.
Norms about legitimate reasons for leaving home, especially the strong link between marriage 
and leaving home, can explain differences in young people's household patterns in Europe,- but 
it is not clear if these norms are explaining variables or, more probably, intervening variables. If 
young people in Spain normally leave home in order to get married it could be a result of their 
preferences, but it could also be related to the difficulties of leaving home for educational rea­
sons, to share accommodation with others or to live in a one-person household. If the possi­
bilities o f receiving public allowances are low, if the offer of students' residences is scarce and 
if the housing market is dominated by an offer of dwellings for ownership instead of rental, 
then these variables could explain to a large extent the strong connection between leaving 
home and marriage and the high rate of young people staying in their parents' household.
In addition, the formation o f more formal partnership relations among young unmarried people 
is related to income. An analysis of Spanish data from 1995 shows that young people with high 
income have more chances to have a regular or formal relationship with a partner than those 
with low income, after the control for gender, age and educational level (Garrido/Requena 
1996).’ ... ,
0 compared to the group which has more informal relationships and taking only young people who do not live with a part­
ner.
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4 Conclusion: Lack of a Comparative Theoretical Framework
The review of the international literature on young people's leaving home patterns has shown 
that nearly all studies focus on one national setting and there is thus almost no theoretical 
frame-work for understanding cross-national differences in young people’s living arrangements 
The individual-level theoretical propositions relate leaving home to other status transitions 
access o f employment, end o f secondary schooling and family formation. Leaving home is dif­
ferentiated according to destinations o f social independence, whereby family formation (mar­
riage and consensual union) is distinguished from nonfamily autonomy. National differences 
result form differences in the timing o f nest-leaving and in the destination o f the latter. In addi­
tion, it was shown that social independence does not everywhere mean financial independence.
Analysts agree on the importance of the employment/unemployment situation of the young 
person on her likelihood to live independently. The effect of long-lasting enrolment in educa­
tion on leaving home timing is sometimes seen as delaying nest-leaving and sometimes as ac­
celerating it. American analysts relate family norms and family formation to religiosity, relig­
ious denomination and ethnic origin, but this perspective is almost absent in studies about 
European societies. The role o f housing markets and social policies for leaving home is ad­
dressed less frequently. The former mainly by analysts studying Southern Europe and the latter 
mainly by British scholars, but again no comparative studies were found.
This research wants to explain cross-national differences in two-generation households without 
differentiating along the dimension o f financial dependence/independence. Thus, the dependent 
variable is residential, or in the term chosen here, social dependence versus independence. The 
comparative perspective o f the present study allows for the analysis of the role o f labour mar­
kets, housing markets, social policies and family norms at once. It aims to develop an analytic 
framework for a macro-sociological theory on leaving home. The great challenge o f this work 
is the application o f this theoretical perspective to an empirical case-study o f cross-national 
differences in household patterns of young people in France and Spain. In the next chapter the 




LEAVING HOME: A RESTRICTED CHOICE ABOUT STANDARD OF
LIVING
5 Theoretical M odel and M acro-M icro Link
A study o f comparative living conditions makes cross-national conceptualisation necessary. In 
cases of applied empirical studies this task presents two challenges: first, a theoretical chal­
lenge consisting in finding concepts which mean the same thing in different social contexts or 
that at least specify the context to which they can be applied. Second, there is the challenge of 
operationalising these concepts in such a way that existing information and data can be used to 
test hypotheses containing these concepts. At the end of the day there is always the danger of 
studying what the data permits us to and not what we were really interested in. To be aware of 
this danger it is therefore very useful to start from an abstract theoretical level and only then 
pass to the concrete empirical method to be used.
A theoretical model has to be found which can explain cross-national and cross-regional differ­
ences in the diffusion of two-generation households in comparison to one-generation house­
holds. This question is asked at the macrosociological level and to prevent an ecological fallacy 
(Flora 1974) it has also to be answered on the same level. Models on a macrosociological level 
always assume given social mechanisms at the micro-sociological level, so that a complete 
model should include both levels. In this case, this means that the explanation of differences in 
household structures has to include and analyse differences in household creation behaviour 
within each macrosociological unit and then determine how the micro-sociological logic of 
action aggregates to these macrosociological structures.
There are two main causes which can explain international differences in social structures. 
Mayer (1997) calls the first causes "proximal" causes; they refer to explanatory factors on the 
individual and group level. The second causes he calls "distal" causes; these are explanatory 
factors at the national level and mostly o f an institutional nature. He argues that in some in­
stances micro-conditions will be translated into macro-variables by aggregation and in those 
cases international differences are the result of pure composition effects. Most o f the time, this
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sort of macro-micro link is insufficient, because institutional differences also account tor inter­
national differences. In those mixed cases, more historical and contextual interpretations of 
national configurations o f institutions have to be added. In the following section two theoreti­
cal models linking the micro and macro level are constructed as a base for cross-national com­
parison (tertium comparationis).
5.1 Macro-level Model
For Western societies after the II. World War, the following family formation behaviour for 
young people is assumed to represent a good ideal type to compare with empirical data. Since 
gender differences are basic for the home leaving process, two different ideal types need to be
considered.10 1
A young man will leave the parental household and create a new one or go into another already 
existent one under three main conditions:
1. He has a sufficiently high and stable income to support himself and, if he wants to create a 
male breadwinner family also to maintain his spouse and eventually children, which means 
to finance living in an independent household and to cover his (their) needs.11 The income 
can be a pure market income, a public allowance, and/or an allowance given by other family 
members or a mix of different income sources.
2. Another basic condition for leaving is to have found a dwelling to go to. Thus income and 
housing are necessary conditions to leave, although not sufficient ones.
3. Additional conditions are the wish to marry or cohabit, the desire for independence or the 
beginning o f an activity or study which makes geographical mobility necessary.
Transition into adulthood will follow the order of, first, finishing education, second, becoming 
financially independent, and, third, finding a dwelling to live alone, with a partner or with 
peers.
10 These ideal-types do not account for all the possibilities but only the empirically more relevant or theoretically more
clear-cut situations. The exceptions and more mixed forms of the home leaving process will be confronted with the 
ideal-types at the empirical analysis stage.
11 The concept of needs is to some extent subjective and socially constructed and thus expectations have to be assumed.
The expectations are supposed to be related to the educational level attained and to the standard of living of the parents.
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The first two sets o f conditions refer to means and the third set to preferences The relation - 
between means and preferences can be formulated in the following way: "Whilst increasing 
affluence provides the young person with the opportunity to leave his or her parental home, the 
decision whether and when to use this opportunity depends on values and preferences" 
(Mayer/Schwarz 1989). Hence, every analysis should draw its attention first to the opportunity 
structures and in a second step to dominating preferences.
On the macrosociological level this means that there are three conditions which facilitate young 
people forming independent households and which might explain a low rate of two-generation 
households: f
1 The labour market for young men should ideally offer stable jobs with earnings at least at a 
minimum subsistence level, while the state should help young men who are not on the la­
bour market or whose earnings are too low to allow economic independence. Parents ► 
should support young men's household formation by more or less regular gifts to facilitate 
the first expensive investments. Each of the three social institutions can serve as a functional 
equivalent o f the others, but the labour market remains the basis on which the state and the 
family intervene.
2. The housing market has to offer dwellings which can be paid for by young men, regardless 
if they are owned or rented.
3. Dominant values should not connect household formation only with marriage, but include 
alternative reasons for creating a new household, such as beginning a consensual union, de­
sire for independence, and so on.
f\
A young woman can follow the same logic as a man This could be called an independent 
household formation and in this case the same conditions as above are relevant. Instead, a 
woman can also follow a second logic, which is to marry or cohabit with a man fulfilling the 
conditions described above. Thus, if a women creates a household with an financially inde­
pendent man, without herself being economically independent o f him, one can speak of de­
pendent household formation. In this case the following conditions have ideally to be ful­
filled:
1. The women has bad prospects on the labour market and low hopes o f being able to enter 
employment which permits her to be economically independent. She has to find a man will­
ing to create a new family with her and with an income which permits the satisfaction of the 
needs of two people.
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2. The income of the male partner has to be high enough as to allow for a dwelling tor tw o 
persons to be rented or bought.
3. The female partner has to be willing to enter an asymmetric relationship (in terms o f eco­
nomic dependence).
On the macro level, the same for men is true for women if an independent household formation 
is aimed at. In contrast, dependent household form ation will occur more probably under the 
following conditions:
1. The female labour market is characterised by high unemployment rates and unstable em­
ployment conditions.
2. The educational structure o f women is dominated by low levels of formal education.
3. Dominant values connect female household formation with marriage; this means that most 
women prefer marriage to a consensual union and do not want to live alone or with peers.
The more the dependent household formation dominates, the stronger the connection between 
leaving home and getting married will be, at least for women. At the same time the socio­
economic situation o f young men will be very important, so that difficult labour and housing 
market conditions will strongly influence the timing and possibilities of leaving home in order 
to create a new family. This might also explain the strong connection between household for­
mation and marriage, since women with few employment chances will search for an alternative 
in marriage. In theory they could also search for an alternative in a consensual union, but only 
if social pressure against it is not too strong because consensual unions have already reached 
the critical number to be seen as a normal and acceptable social fact. However, marriage is 
more convenient for couples where the women depends economically on the men, since it 
protects the weaker part to some extent. Assuming similar educational structures, more two- 
generation households will be found if dependent household formation is widespread because 
for young women legitimate reasons for creating a one-generation household are restricted to 
marriage and they leave only for this reason.
These ideal types serve as heuristic instruments to make explicit the social mechanisms which 
are assumed, especially those at the micro level. It is obvious that social reality is more com­
plex, but these ideal types permit us to explore the relations between different institutions 
specifying precisely the micro and the macro level. In addition, the micro-level mechanisms will
64
T
be looked at in more detail below. The macrosociological model, as illustrated in Figure 
follows from the individual-level idealtypes and from the given macrosociological perspective
Figure 5: Macro Model
Explaining variables
Dependent variable (1991/1992)
National Rates o f Young People Staying At Home
Three macro level hypotheses will be tested to explain national (regional) differences in two- 
generation households. Their micro level assumptions have to  be analysed before testing the 
hypotheses on the macro level itself. The hypotheses are presented in monocausal forms but 
these will later be connected up.
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1. Dependence-diversification hypothesis
In cases with a strong division of labour between the Welfare State and the family in the fulfil­
ment o f family tasks and a high degree o f diversification of the economic dependence of chil­
dren, low rates o f two-generation households and a high diversity of young people’s living ar­
rangements will be found with a high frequency o f one-generation dependent households. By 
diversification o f economic dependence the source o f income is intended : market income, fam­
ily income, public benefit (cf.3.4). The individual-level test has to be restricted to France, since 
the French survey is the only one to contain information on public benefits. This is done in sec­
tion 8.3.
2. Precariousness hypothesis
A high occurrence o f precarious employment trajectories and low earnings result in high male 
staying home rates and in high rates of dependent female household formation. Taken together, 
both phenomena will make two-generation households more probable and one-generation 
households less diversified (less consensual unions and single households) (cf 3.3). Relation­
ships at the micro-level can be studied through national surveys with the exception, in the 
Spanish case, of the earning variable, for which data has to be estimated using other sources.
3. Low affordability-high property hypothesis
On housing markets with high prices, low vacancy rates and a low supply o f rented housing 
two-generation households will be more frequent and the diversity of one-generation house­
holds will be low (cf 3.5). These variables are context variables at the level o f cities or regions, 
which can partly be constructed using national data sets and partly have to be taken from pub­
lished sources.
These hypotheses can only be tested by controlling for intervening variables. The list o f possi­
bly intervening variables is long, but an attempt has been made to choose the most significant 
and directly related ones.
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1. Young People's Consumption Preferences Hypothesis
If young people live in a context of low average income levels, but they spend similar absolute 
amounts for transport, communication and leisure as young people in contexts with higher 
average income levels, then in the first context the prevalence o f two-generation households 
will be high. It is assumed that living in the parental home is a strategy to prevent a tow con­
sumption capacity.
2. Urbanisation
The influence o f the context o f one's residence in terms of it being rural or urban, gauged 
through the measuring of the size o f the municipality where one lives, can work in two wavs 
First, it can be supposed that in regions with a high degree o f small and middle-sized towns, 
rates of two-generation households will be low, because o f more favourable housing markets 
Second, areas with a high presence o f rural municipalities will show a high occurrence of two- 
generation households due to more traditional social norms.
3. Education structure
High university enrolment rates in contexts of restricted social rights will relate to high rates of 
two-generation households, while in contexts of more extended social rights the rate o f two- 
generation households will be lower, because one-generation-dependent households will be 
more common. High rates o f low education will result in low levels of two-generation house­
holds, all other things being equal.
4. Mobility
Areas of immigration o f young people for reasons o f study or work will present lower rates of 
two-generation households and more one-generation households, especially in the form of peer 
and single-person households.
5. Family norms
Areas where consensual unions are more wide-spread will present lower rates o f two- 
generation households, since informal living arrangements favour young people's early nest­
leaving. In addition, territorial units where neolocal and early marriage was important in the 
past will show lower rates of two-generation households, while areas where in the past stem- 
families and late and patrilocal marriage predominated will display higher rates o f  two-
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generation households. These historical patterns are closely related to the agricultural produc­
tion mode in the respective region and are relevant here only in those areas where agriculture is 
still important.
Some other intervening variables have not been included in this list, because it is assumed that 
their effect is mainly transmitted through the controlling variables listed above. This is the case 
o f age structure as a measure o f the demographic pressure of young people, which is, however, 
likely to be already reflected in unemployment rates and in dwelling vacancies.
The theoretical model consists in three explaining variables and five controlling variables, 
which have been presented with the hypothetical assumption o f statistical independence from 
each other. Instead, in the empirical test o f the model, the interaction among all the eight inde­
pendent variables has to be taken into account. This has to be done at least for those variables 
which presumably correlate in such a way that a particular independent variable modifies the 
effect o f another, outweighing it instead o f reinforcing it. This will surely be the case for the 
variables of education structure and labour market uncertainty. In the following part the right 
methodology to link micro and macro level and to account for interaction effects will be dis­
cussed.
5.2 Individual Choice M odel
In this section an individual choice model for describing the leaving-home process of young 
people in two countries will be developed. In the previous sections some individual action 
ideas were already presented. It is the aim o f this section to formalise them and to make the 
selection mechanism of young people facing the choice to stay versus to leave the parental 
home explicit. People's decisions to leave the parental home will depend on unconscious norms 
and values deriving from reference groups, about which they may not reflect at all. In addition, 
they will also depend on a personal evaluation of perceived alternatives. I assume that young 
people perceive a choice at given life course moments and these can be identified in general as 
events o f status transitions.
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5.2.1 S tatus T ransitions and  Leaving Home
I will distinguish three important decision-taking moments or status transitions:
1. on becoming financially independent from parents;
2. on moving from secondary school to vocational training or university.
3. on converting unstable relationships into relatively stable partnerships, through celebration 
of a marriage and/or birth of a child.
At these moments individuals might - or might not- consider the possibility and feasibility of 
leaving the parental home. The extent to which a choice is perceived and analysed in a rational 
manner at a given moment will depend on the norms of the reference group and on the habitus 
of the young person. For example, let us imagine a society in which the only reason young 
people leave their parents is in order to marry, and this fact appears to people to be a natural 
law and is thus not questioned. In this case individuals will think about leaving home only in 
the third status transition Thus, it can be stated that two general conditions have to be fulfilled 
for a choice mechanism to become operative:
1. The individual is not under constraint, for example because a previous decision has elimi­
nated the possibility of making a choice in the present. This might be the case o f young 
people who decide to study and who have to migrate because the nearest university is too 
far away for them to remain in the parental home.
2. A choice is perceived by the individual. In this case it means that a choice is perceived at 
the status transition moments mentioned above. It could be that because of social norms 
young people do not realise that they would have the choice to leave the parental home, for 
example when they finish secondary education.
In some European contexts, for instance in Southern Europe, marriage, i.e. the third transition, 
is strongly related to the leaving home process, while in other societies financial independence, 
university attendance and marriage together form a mixed pattern influencing home-leaving. 
For the Netherlands, Baanders (1998) found that in families where either or both parents had 
pursued higher education, their adult children expect more often the concurrence o f  home­
leaving and the educational career, and they link home-leaving less to the precondition of fi-
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nancial independence. For most West European societies it is, however, assumed that all three 
of the above-mentioned moments represent transition moments at which, at least some young 
people perceive the choice o f leaving home, and that outside these transitions few people re­
flect on leaving home. Only a minority o f young people will decide to leave home, for instance, 
when they feel that it is no longer possible for them to share the household with their parents 
independently of other transitions. In addition, there are certain universal conditions that have 
to be fulfilled in order to become independent. A young person in the process of choosing be­
tween the alternative of staying in the parental home or leaving it, will, in order to be able to 
select the alternative of leaving home, have to fulfil two economic conditions. The individual 
has to have access to an income, at least at a low subsistence level, and she or he has to find a 
dwelling.
5.2.2 Individual Choice through Comparison of Standards of Life
The new situation, which results from a transition or from the expectation o f a transition which 
the individual predicts will take place, pushes the young person to evaluate the possibility and 
desirability of leaving home. The hypothesis is that in this situation the person will reflect upon 
the quality of life she will reach if she leaves, and will compare it to the quality of life she could 
have by remaining in the parental home. Quality o f life is determined by material resources 
(constraints) and emotional well-being (preferences). It is not a given that a young person who 
earns a subsistence income, who could have access to a dwelling, and who thus has no material 
constraints to becoming independent, sets up an independent household. Leaving the parental 
home under such economically "constraint-free" conditions will depend on norms and on the 
personal definition o f  a life o f  quality. r
The quality of living in the parental home (STp3fCnts) can be seen as the result o f the income o f 
the parents minus the expenditures o f the household plus the young person's own income plus 
the non-material well-being in the parental home. Income includes market income, public al­
lowances, rent from property and family transfers. Expenditures refer to the costs for housing, 
food and leisure and to the capacity of saving of parents and child. The non-material well-being 
at home is the result o f  the emotional support parents give to their children, the extent o f  a 
possible generation conflict and the possible social stigmatisation o f cohabiting with parents at 
a certain age.
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(  1) STpjrents — ipsrents “ EXPparenti + I^n + NQUALp, renu
economic constraints preferences
Culture and social norms (SN) may affect a rational choice in a twofold way. First, they might, 
for instance, influence the relationship between one explanatory factor of economic nature and 
the standard o f life. People can prefer to buy a dwelling instead of renting it, so that expendi­
tures for housing mean the costs o f a mortgage and not the costs of a rent. Second, social 
norms might give a greater weight to some preferences rather than to others. Social norms may 
encourage early independence by rewarding young people with strong preferences for inde­
pendence, while stigmatising young people with other preferences. In this analysis the second 
view about the mechanism of norms has been taken and, thus, an additive relationship between 
individual level variables and social norms was chosen.12
(2) STparents ~  (Iparent* ~ EXPparenU Icwn + N Q U A L p arenU)  + (SN, + SN2 + SN3„) 
economic constraints and preferences in a cultural context
This equation will be developed later on in section 9.2.3, for the moment let us concentrate on 
the situation without taking the context into account.
The quality of living in an independent household is the opposite of the quality o f living in the 
parental home. It is the result o f the income of the young person and sometimes o f the income 
of a partner or spouse minus the expenditures of the household and plus the non-material well 
being, which is the personal and social evaluation o f some independence from parents and of a 
life on one’s own, with peers or with a partner. With regard to income two aspects are impor­
tant: the level o f income and the expectation that the job will be long lasting. An aspect which 
is not taken into consideration in this individual-level equation is the availability o f accommo­
dation, since it is a feature o f the context.
(3) S T  independent =  (Iown +  Ijurtncr“ EXPindepent +  N QU ALindependcnl) +  ( S N ,  +  S N 2 +  S N 3. . )
economic constraints and preferences in a cultural context
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The outcome of the evaluation of possible alternatives is believed to influence young people's 
decision to set up their own household.
If STparems <= ST independent the individual will set up an independent household
If STparems > ST independent the individual will not set up an independent household
The model posits that, if a young person thinks about the possibility o f leaving home, the deci­
sion to leave will be taken if  the quality o f  living in the independent household is as high or 
higher than the current quality o f living in the parents' home. This model is similar to that o f 
Baanders (1998) in her study for the Netherlands, except that it does not separate between the 
intention to leave and the home-leaving behaviour. In addition, the role o f  subjective consid­
erations is less theorised in my model, because I use demographic data and not opinion data. In 
my model it is assumed that the decision process o f leaving home is guided by a rational selec­
tion procedure within a given cultural context and thus shaped by norms. An individual's deci­
sion is not seen as the outcome o f an unreflected action according to tradition, passion or anxi­
ety. It is further assumed that even if some people do not act in a rational choice manner, the 
aggregation of all individual choices at the macro-level will be dominated by rational choice- 
oriented individual actions within a context. In addition, it has to be remembered that this theo­
retical approach implies rational actors who perceive a choice and think about the short-term 
future at the moment of a status transition, who are not constrained by previous decisions and 
who are capable o f sensibly evaluating the real chances of their expectations being fulfilled.
6 Selection of Cases, of Surveys and the Statistical Model
In this section methodological questions and choices are presented and discussed. First, the 
selection o f cases is described, then the choice of the surveys is discussed and finally the statis­
tical method and its application is presented.
12 The first view on norms would have required the transformatin of the equation by aggregating norms in a multiplicative 
way.
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6.1 Individuals, Regions and Nations as Cases
I have chosen a two country comparison, because this work aims to develop a comparative 
theoretical framework by analysing in detail the micro-level phenomena and their relations to 
national contexts. A large-N study of home-leaving would have necessitated a large number of 
analyses with individual data, as many as contextual units had been chosen. Clearly, this could 
not be the scope of a PhD thesis.
The cases of France and Spain were chosen because at the macro level they have different de­
pendent variables, while displaying some similarities in the independent context variables, 
which reduces to some extent the typical problem of small-N studies. It is well-known that a 
high number o f diverging independent variables which could be candidates for the explanation 
of the difference in the dependent variable makes small-N comparisons a difficult task. The 
solution to this problem can be sought through two methods. First, one should try to choose 
two cases with different values on the dependent variable, which at the same time show the 
smallest possible variation in the values of the independent variables. Second, a strategy of 
using so-called macro-variables which do not permit testing for one causal condition but which 
argue in terms o f  causal configurations can be pursued (Ragin 1987, Ragin/Hein 1993).13 The 
primary interest o f this work is to explain the long-lasting intergenerational coresidence in 
Spain from a comparative perspective, for which I follow a case-oriented and variation-finding 
comparative method (Tilly 1984). Thus, a country with early home-leaving behaviour and 
some similarities with Spain was selected. In section 2.3 international variations were pre­
sented. The candidates for comparison with Spain were the United Kingdom, West-Germany, 
the Netherlands and France. The decision for France is based on the following similarities with 
Spain:
1. similar norms about family solidarity as shown in section 3.6.1.;
2. similar age at first marriage (cf. section 8.1.2);
3. the dominance o f the Catholic denomination;
4. a vocational training system based on school-training with low significance o f dual voca­
tional training;
5. similar enrolment rates o f young people in universities (c f section 8.1.3); I
13 I have followed this strategy in a first explorative regional analysis ofliving arrangements of young people in Spain 
(Jurado Guerrero 1997)
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6. a relative high youth unemployment rate in the second half of the eighties and perception of 
youth unemployment as social problem at this time (cf. section 8.1.4);
7. a particularly high increase of short-term employment among young people (cf. section 
8.1.4);
8. agricultural production still has an important weight in the economy and social structure 
(cf section 8.1.6).
However, the variance in the independent variables is still important and difficult to control in a 
two-country comparison. For further analysis o f the importance of the contexts of labour, 
housing markets and family patterns, the cases are changed. Instead o f comparing France and 
Spain, Spanish regions are compared to each other. This does not allow the drawing o f conclu­
sions on Spanish-French differences, but it gives an idea of the role of different societal institu­
tions in shaping young people's behaviour. The analysis of the macrosociological Spanish- 
French difference will follow an interpretative and descriptive path. The individual-level 
French-Spanish analysis will highlight the respective difficulties o f different groups o f young 
people in becoming socially independent in each country. Based on these results the interpreta­
tive part will focus on how far differences in young people's social rights might explain the 
national differences in living arrangements and the different micro-sociological patterns.
The cases change throughout this work. The research question is based on countries as units of 
analysis, but it makes a recurrence to individuals as units of analysis necessary. This is achieved 
through a statistical multivariate analysis o f two large samples o f French and Spanish young 
people. This is necessary in order to compare the logic of selection of individuals in both 
countries. As already mentioned, the logic o f aggregation will be studied for France and Spain 
through the use o f regions as cases. Multi-level statistical analysis with individual characteris­
tics and context characteristics as independent variables will take into account interactions 
between individual level and context level variables (cf. section 9). I
I will use two surveys, a Spanish survey from 1991 (Encuesta Sociodemografica) and a French 
survey from 1992 (Enquête Jeunes), both conducted by their respective national statistical of­
fices. The French survey covers 9,344 young people between age 18 and 29 and the Spanish 
survey 25,555 young people between 20 and 29 years. For Spain three large and representative 
surveys for young people were available in 1995, the date when this research project begun.
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First, there was the Spanish labour force survey with a sample of 60,000 households The 
problems with this survey for this research are twofold: 1. one person of the household an­
swers for all other household members and very frequently it is the housewife/mother who 
answers. Since youth researchers have noticed that parents tend to state that their children are 
living at home while in reality they are living away, e.g. in hall o f residence, with peers, etc., 
surveys where the young person herself answers are more adequate. 2. No information on the 
first-leaving home moment and the first dwelling, on dwelling tenure, nor on consensual unions 
is provided. Second, there is the Spanish Youth Survey of 1992 with a sample of 5,000 young 
people aged 15 to 29 years. This survey has the advantage o f providing income information, 
but it also lacks information on the point o f time and the destination of the young person's 
leaving. Thus, it was decided to  choose the third possible survey, namely the Encuesta Soci- 
odemogrâfica of 1991, which has, nonetheless, one problem, namely the lack of information on 
income. Apart from this problem it presents the advantages o f having a large sample with ret­
rospective information on many different areas of life. The choice of the Spanish survey con­
strained the French choice insofar that the French survey had to be from about the same year. 
This made the choice of the Enquête Jeunes the most appropriate one, because of the year, the 
fact that the young person answered herself and because of the retrospective information. The 
European Household Panel data became available at a point o f time when this research project 
was already very advanced and thus a change o f surveys presented too high costs.
6.2 Statistical Possibilities to Test the Individual Choice Model
The test of such a theoretical model requires very rich statistical information, since, firstly, data 
on preferences and values have to be available and, secondly, detailed retrospective or panel 
data are also essential. The surveys used in this research do not include information on prefer­
ences nor do they include retrospective measures on income and expenditures. In this section 
these problems will be discussed and the decision for a cross-sectional statistical model and 
against a longitudinal model will be justified.
6.2.1 Missing: Preferences, Expectations and Time-Varying Variables
The first problem could be solved by testing only the economic part of the model, which means 
assuming that if somebody leaves home and, in the process, accepts a deterioration in her ma­
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terial quality of life, it is because she gains a high reward in her emotional well-being 
(NQUALmdepcndent)- The problem of lack o f data on the emotional side is serious, because it 
leads us to a situation whereby this hypothesis cannot be falsified, for if evidence against the 
economic side o f the model is found, it is not clear if the unexplained variance is due to the 
lack of non-material variables in the reduced "economic model" or to the incorrectness of the 
"general model”. Nevertheless, it might be worth applying the model in a reduced form. This 
application will not aim to test the validity o f the model but rather will use it as a heuristic in­
strument. If it is assumed that different groups o f persons have different preferences, then it 
can be stated for which groups the economic model has more predictive power. In this way the 
general model per se cannot be tested, but the reduced model could serve as an ideal-type to 
which different realities are compared in order to see how they differ from each other. If, for 
example, the reduced model predicts better in one country than in another, then it can be af­
firmed that in the country where the model has a greater predictive power, the socio-economic 
factors measured at individual level are more important in leaving home than in the other 
country.
The available data not only lacks information on preferences but the data set to be used for 
Spain does not provide information on income and expenditures. If the theoretical model in its 
reduced economic form is to be translated into a statistical model, income and expenditures 
have to be approximated with the available information. To find the best corollaries to test the 
theoretical action model two steps were necessary : first, the most exact indicator of the theo­
retical variable was found in each survey; separately and, second, the most adequate common 
variable was constructed at the level of survey with the poorest information. Income can be 
approximated with information on the activity and employment situation and expenditures of 
parents can be partially approximated by knowledge o f the number of children. More details on 
the operationalisation of the theoretical variables will be provided later on.
At first sight, the general theoretical model would suggest the use o f an event history model, 
because two points in time have to be observed - the moment when still living with parents and 
after having left - and these occur at different moments for different individuals. The probabil­
ity of the event o f moving out o f the parental home has to be estimated by observing young 
people over the period in which they are likely to leave the parents' home. Obviously the two 
moments can only be observed for those who have already left home, which in the Spanish
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survey were 42 per cent and in the French survey 66 per cent at the time of the interview For 
those who did not make the transition at a given moment some expectations about their quality 
of life in the near future have to  be known. Unfortunately, the interviewers did not pose ques­
tions about expectations but only about behaviour, and as a consequence one has to deduce 
young people's expectations from their behaviour.
This can be done by assuming that a young person's expectation o f her situation in the near 
future, e.g. in the year 1990, coincides more or less with the situation they finally attained in 
that year. If  this assumption is correct, then we would define for a person, who in 1990, for 
instance, lived for the first time in an independent household, her income situation in 1990 to 
be equal to her income expectations in 1989, when she was still living in the parental home. At 
this point the problem that some expectations cannot be estimated in this way emerges. The 
data to be used does not provide information about an individual's expectations with regard to 
expenditure in an independent household while she was in her parents’ home nor if the individ­
ual expected to have a partner or a spouse.
There is another important problem, which is only inherent in an event history approach. The 
Spanish data set which is available for this study does not provide exact information on the 
activity situation for every retrospective year, for it is not possible to know when someboJy 
entered unemployment and which type o f job she had in a given year. It is only possible to 
know if, for instance, somebody was economically inactive, searching for her first employment, 
in a first activity period with unemployment and short-term employment periods or in a first 
activity period with long-term employment and without unemployment periods. This is not 
very satisfying, particularly because youth is characterised by many changes in the activity 
situation. Taking into account that the activity and employment situation is taken as a proxy 
for income this is a serious problem, because types o f  activity careers would have to be taken 
as proxies for the activity situation at the crucial moment o f the transition out of the parental 
home, which in its turn is a proxy for income.
To sum up, there is the general problem o f scarce information on preferences, on retrospective 
information on income and expenditures and on expectations . In addition, the retrospective 
information of the Spanish data was not collected with sufficient detail. These problems of 
applicability of the theoretical model cannot be solved for the moment, because there are no
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surveys that could provide the necessary information. In the future the European Household 
Panel conducted by EUROSTAT might help to solve some of the problems mentioned. It is 
therefore necessary to reformulate the model and to deduct some new hypotheses, which can 
then be more easily tested with the current information.
6.2.2 Reformulating the Model by Starting From Context Differences
The problem of missing information on preferences can be tackled by assuming that national 
contexts and social groups provide dominant cultural norms and that to some extent these in­
fluence personal preferences. If this is true, then some testable hypotheses can be deduced from 
the quality-of-life hypothesis. The basic idea is that in Spain there is a dominant cultural pattern 
in home-leaving, while in France there are at least two alternative patterns. In Spain leaving 
home is strongly connected to marriage, while in France it is connected to studying and to 
forming a family.
It is assumed that young people who are at school or at university follow a different rationale 
than those who have finished their education. Students' leaving is not connected to a full-time 
and long-term job, but most o f the time to transfers from the state and/or the family and/or 
income from a part-time job. The rationale o f some o f the students might be similar to that o f 
non-students, in particular when leaving home is related to the formation o f a couple with a 
partner who has a stable income, something which occurs more often to women. However, the 
fundamental difference is that for students, stability and security is not decisive in opting for an 
independent household, since by definition their future is rather unsure. It means that when 
they compare standards of living at the parental home and outside o f it, the non-material as­
pects o f the quality o f life will weigh more. As a consequence the reduced economic model 
should have a lower predictive power for students than for non-students.
The group of non-students is less homogenous with regard to preferences, because some non­
students will follow the rationale o f leaving home only after having attained a stable income 
independently o f having a partner or not, while others will connect setting up their own house­
hold with the creation o f  a new family, and still others may prefer to leave home like students 
do, i.e. accepting income instability as the necessary cost o f social independence. Non-students
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might be a more homogenous group in Spain than in France, since leaving home and creating a 
new family are culturally more strongly connected in the first country.
The problem of missing and inadequate time-varying variables will be approached by compar­
ing differences in quality o f living among groups of persons at a given moment and not by 
comparing the situation o f one person at two points in time. In this sense it can be assumed 
that students (especially without public benefits), first-employment seekers and short-term em­
ployed have the same or a lower and more uncertain income than long-term employed. Unem­
ployed without public benefits can also be expected to have low and uncertain income. If a low 
social origin, low educational level and high housing costs are added, it can surely be assumed 
that this group o f persons will have the lowest comparative quality of living. The problem is 
that not every social group has the same expectations of quality o f living necessary to leave 
home. Thus educational level should be controlled for as a measure of expectations and of 
timing o f the school-to-work transition. By introducing social origin the original idea o f  the 
influence o f the parental resources on the decision to leave home can be adapted to a cross- 
sectional perspective.
A different rationale for students and non-students is assumed and two equations have to be 
defined. The probability of leaving home for non-students will depend on possible income 
sources, on the amount and stability o f this income;14 on expenditures (especially rent or mort­
gage); on educational level and social origin; and on a stable partner to create a family. Social 
origin is not taken as a proxy for the financial capacity of parents to help their children in be­
coming independent, because parental transfers are assumed to be of minor relevance for 
young people leaving home for non-study reasons (cf. section 3.6.1). Instead, it is assumed to 
indicate a low economic quality of living at home and, thus, less advantages for extended 
intergenerational coresidence.
(4) ProbNOSTUieaving lown ^  Ipartner + EXPindepent + EDU + CLASS + PART
141 could have used the Treiman prestige scale to estimate income in both samples in order to solve the lack of Spanish 
income data. Then employed young people could have been distinguished according to low and high earnings. Unfortu­
nately, this idea was suggested to me by Luis Garrido, Miguel Requena and Juan Jesús González at a late phase of my 
thesis, so that 1 decided to postpone the realisation of this idea to future work.
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The probability for students leaving is slightly different, because it can be assumed that parents 
play a crucial role in helping the individual financially. A student's probability of leaving will 
thus depend again on her income, potentially on her partner's income, but especially on her 
parents’ income after subtraction o f their expenses. In this equation social origin is not taken as 
a proxy for preferences about when to create one’s own household, but as a proxy for the fi­
nancial capacity of the parents. This different use o f social origin is justified by the assumption 
that students form a social group whose members have similar cultural preferences, at least if 
compared with non-students, and that for this reason social class will not indicate differences in 
preferences but instead differences in financial resources. In addition, those students whose 
parents live so far away from the university that they cannot commute, have no choice about 
the timing of leaving home. They have to leave when they begin to study.
(5) ProbSTUieaving = Iown I  partner +  Expmdepenl +  C L A S S
If young people under the same socio-economic conditions have the same probabilities of liv­
ing in a two-generation household irrespective of their country, then the macro level differ­
ences will be due only to composition effects. If, on the contrary, the national context changes 
the effects of the independent variables, then context variables can be said to have their own 
independent explanatory power. In reality, it will be a mix of both. The comparative cross- 
sectional model will help to exclude explanations due to composition effects, but it cannot an­
swer the macro-sociological question about national differences in staying home rates. It can 
only help to see which groups o f young people behave most differently in both countries.
All the above-mentioned relationships can be formulated as six micro-level hypotheses, which 
are to be tested with the logistic regression models.
1. All young people with a stable employment should show a higher likelihood to be socially 
independent than those studying and those being unemployed (market-income hypothe­
sis).
2. In a society where setting up an independent household is culturally connected to family 
formation through marriage most people will perceive the choice of leaving home only at 
the transition moment o f having formed a stable partnership and not when entering univer­
sity or entering their first stable job. At the same time they are more likely to marry when 
they can afford it, except for cases when marriage is advanced due to pregnancy. Hence,
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young people in Spain will tend to leave home under two conditions: 1. if they decide to 
marry and 2. if  they have a long-term job (men) or if they marry a partner in a long-term 
employment without having such a job themselves (women) (stability hypothesis) This 
hypothesis should have the following correlaries for people on the labour market:
a. in Spain men's long-term employment is more important for leaving home than in France, 
since it is not only essential for him but also for a potential spouse who has chosen a de­
pendent household formation strategy;
b. women in Spain are less dependent on a long-term employment compared to their French 
counterparts, since they follow more frequently a dependent household formation strategy 
and do not need to rely (completely) on a job.
3. In Spain and in France, young people on the labour market from lower social classes face a 
low economic quality o f living in their parents' home, which makes the attainment of a 
similar or higher economic quality o f living outside the parental home easier than for young 
people o f higher social classes (low-quality-of-Iife hypothesis).
4. In Spain and in France, non-students with low educational levels have a higher probability 
of living out o f the parental home, since they entered the labour market relatively early, 
may afford an earlier marriage, and they have relatively low expectations with regard to the 
economic standard of life they expect to reach when living independently (low-expect.!tion 
hypothesis).
5. In a society like the French one, where a more diversified pattern of setting up one's own 
household is found, i.e. as a student in a hall of residence, in an informal coresidence ar­
rangement and in a single-person household, all the above-mentioned transition moments 
are important. Some people will think about leaving home when they enter long-term em­
ployment independently o f marrying, many will think about leaving when entering univer­
sity and others again when forming a new family through marriage. Hence, in France to 
have a first long-term employment will predict leaving home less than in Spain, and French 
students will show a higher probability of leaving home than Spanish students (pluralisa- 
tion hypothesis).
6. If after the control o f social origin, educational level and activity, age-differences are still 
strong, then it can be argued that youth-adult cleavages are as important or even more im­
portant than class cleavages. It means that the distribution o f economic resources is 
strongly linked to age and less to social class (Age-cleavage hypothesis).
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These six hypotheses require eight different models according to national context and social 
group of reference:
Figure 6: Logistic Regression Models for France and Spain
France
Male Female Men on Women on
students students LM LM
Spain
Male Female Men on Women on
students students LM LM
Note: LM = labour market.
6.2.3 Cross-sectional Logistic Regression Model at Individual Level
The alternative to an event history approach is a traditional cross-sectional multivariate analy­
sis. In this section the problems of the application o f a cross-sectional model will be discussed, 
the choice o f a cross-sectional model as against a longitudinal model will be justified and the 
construction of the variables for the logistic regression will be described.
A cross-sectional analysis o f  transitions out o f the parental home presents the problem of ana­
lysing individuals in the survey year, and thus young people who left home in the survey year 
are analysed together with those who left home one or more years before. It means that it has 
to be assumed that their situation in 1991 is similar to the situation at the non-identified time of 
leaving home. In reality it might be that somebody left home in 1987 when she was unem­
ployed and now she lives independently and is employed. Her leaving home might be related to 
unemployment but in the model it will appear to be related to employment. To be sure, these 
are correlations and do not inform us about causality because this person could have been ex-
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peering to get a job in the near future, even if she left home when she was unemployed an i 
perhaps receiving unemployment benefit. Thus, in reality becoming independent is in fact 
caused by the expectation o f employment and not by the unemployment situation at the mo­
ment o f leaving. For this reason an event history analysis based on one year spells can some­
times be as misleading as a cross-sectional analysis with persons who are observed at a dis­
tance from one to five years after the event occurred. This is the problem related to a lack of 
information on expectations as mentioned above.
This problem o f a cross-sectional analysis has to be contrasted with the problem o f  incomplete 
retrospective information in the case o f applying an event-history approach, The most impor­
tant factor in deciding the method, however, is the research question which has to be an­
swered. The interest of this research lies in analysing the role of national configurations of the 
labour market, the housing market and, in particular, the Welfare State. There are two possible 
research designs for the study of this question: 1. a historical approach based on the question 
of how changes, for instance in social policies, in one society affect changes in the home­
leaving process o f young people; 2. a cross-national comparison of one historical moment in 
order to explain cross-national differences in home-leaving rates between two or more coun­
tries. This research has opted for the second alternative, which means that an event-history 
analysis taking account of changes in the historical context is not that useful. Contextual vari­
ables, such as the labour market, the housing market and educational structure, and social pol­
icy measures should be held constant as much as possible in order to assess the importance of 
given cross-national context differences without being disturbed by within-country changes. As 
a consequence the ideal design would be to compare two years for Spain and France. This is 
not possible, since the sample size would then be too small, but a solution would be to reduce 
the observation period to five years in each country respectively. By doing this an event history 
approach loses its strength, which consists in controlling for changes in the context. The re­
search question instead requires a parameterisation o f context in order to be able to  relate the 
results to a given historical country context.
Clearly, the choice o f a cross-sectional method rather than an event-history analysis can be 
criticised. However, the poor quality o f some of the crucial retrospective data and the necessity 
o f keeping the historical context as constant as possible have been the main reasons for select­
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ing a cross-sectional approach. At this point the construction o f the samples and the definition 
of variables for the cross-sectional model is described.
A specific feature o f the leaving home process is that it is best described as a survivor function, 
which means that nearly everybody passes the transition from the parental home to an inde­
pendent household and that this process is strongly related to age. By age 40 very few people 
have "survived" in their parents' home. The samples used include only young people from 20 to 
29 years and thus not all o f  them have already passed the transition, but will pass it in the fu­
ture. As a consequence we have a group o f right-censored individuals, that is individuals who 
will probably leave the parental home, but our samples do not allow us to know the moment 
when this happens. Hence, no general statements about home leaving patterns can be made, as 
it is only possible to interpret the patterns o f young people until age 29.
The decision process is conceived as a choice between staying at home or leaving home and is 
not thought of as a choice between staying at home or getting married, living as a single per­
son, living with peers, living with a partner, living in a residence or living otherwise. Thus, a 
binary logistic regression model has been chosen. ,
Figure 7: Possible Forms of Young People's Choices
Binary Form: Multinomial Form:
staying at home




living with kin o f other generations 
living in a hall o f residence 
living alone
It is assumed that a person will think about concrete alternatives, i.e. she will reflect on staying 
with her parents as opposed to marrying a partner and setting up a household with him or 
staying with the parents against living in a one-person household; it is not probable at all, how­
ever, that a person has eight alternatives in mind, as shown in the second tree. I could have
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taken account o f  the different destinations - partnership or other reason - by dividing the sam­
ple according to type of destination like Holdsworth and Miret (1997) have done in a compari­
son between the United Kingdom and Spain. For the reasons mentioned above, 1 preferred 10 
distinguish people according to their activity situation and to focus on the difference between 
one-generation and two-generation households (cf. 2.1) ignoring the differences within the 
former. The fact that more people in Spain than in France leave home to form a formal family 
is an important difference, but I want to analyse how far the cross-national differences can be 
explained without recurring to a cultural explanation of the type, “young Spanish people prefer 
to leave home only when they marry” . Or better, the question o f interest in this research is to 
see how far a socio-economic approach is able to explain why in Spain people marry late and 
why they form informal one-generation households less frequently, phenomena indicated by the 
high rates of staying in the parental home.
The dependent variable is the logit o f living in an independent household for the first time 
(IND91/92), which means a household occupied for more than three months. It can be a one- 
person household, a household shared with a spouse, with a partner, with non-kin and with 
other kin. Having left home in order to go to live with parents-in-law is considered as living 
independently, but staying with one’s own parents and the partner/spouse having joined this 
household is considered as staying with parents.
Since leaving home is a complex process, which for some people means living away from par­
ents in a hall o f residence without the creation of one’s own household, for others it means 
having an independent household that is paid for or owned by the parents and, thus, being, at 
least partly, financially dependent on their parents and again for others it is a progressive proc­
ess with a first leaving, a return to living in the parental home and a final leaving home. Differ­
ent meanings o f nest-leaving have obviously to be distinguished (Villeneuve-Gokalp 1997). In 
section 2.1 the concept of social independence was introduced as the phenomenon to be ex­
plained by this research, in consequence people living out of the parental home being finan­
cially dependent on their parents are nonetheless considered as living independently. Young 
people living in a hall o f residence are considered as living independently insofar they were 
recoded by the surveys. Both surveys have samples which exclude most people living in halls 
of residences. Due to the fact that these young people are frequently officially resident with 
their parents, they have sometimes been interviewed if they were at home at the moment c f  the
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interview, but in general they are underrepresented in both samples. Thanks to the retrospec­
tive information it is however possible to study some aspects related to hall of residences for 
those people who passed through such a living arrangement but are now living in a private 
household.
The last problem, concerning young people who return to the parental home, is solved by tak­
ing the current state of the young person, independently of what she did before. Thus, people 
who left home and came back are counted as living with parents, those who left and in the fu­
ture will probably come back are counted as living independently and those who left, went 
back and left again are considered as living independently. ,
Eight logistic regression models with the same five independent variables will be run in order 
to test the two theoretical models (cf. Figure 6). Not all persons of the sample will be used, but 
only those staying at home in France in 1986 and in Spain in 1985. French individuals were 
between 14 and 23 years old at this time, and they were observed until 1992 when they were 
20 to 29 years old. In Spain they were, like the French, between 14 and 23 years old, and they 
were observed until 1991, the year of the interview. Thus, individuals will be observed for a 
time period of six years, during which they all faced the same economic and political context 
of the second half o f  the eighties in France and Spain. Figure 9 shows in which years most o f 
the individuals in both samples left home.
t: •
In order to distinguish students from non-students the sample is divided into two groups: on 
the one hand, individuals who have finished primary, secondary and/or tertiary education and 
who are employed, searching for a job or economically inactive (except for study reasons) and 
on the other hand, individuals who are in vocational training or tertiary education as full or as 
part-time students. Technically it means that l first select young people who were at home in 
1985/86; second, those who during this period o f observation finished their formal education 
and entered the labour force (employed/unemployed) or started housework and thus in 
1991/92 were on the labour market; third, those who during this period were enrolled in formal 
education (including 1991/92). In addition, both groups are again divided by sex to run a 
model for men and another for women.
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The variables refer only to the situation in 1991/92, which is not necessarily the year when the 
person left home. The perspective is not longitudinal, but one of comparing young people w ho 
had the same starting point in 1985/86, i.e. they lived with their parents, and who passed 
through the same biographic cycle. A group is characterised by the event of having begun v o­
cational training or tertiary education and of continuing it until 1991/92 and the other group 
has passed the event of entering the labour force or housework at the latest by 1991/92. The 
question is therefore, how do people who have passed the same biographic transitions behav e 
in terms of home-leaving in two different national contexts?
The results of a cross-sectional model have to be interpreted in cross-sectional terms, which is 
to compare people who left in a five-year period with those who did not leave. For instance, if 
it is found that long-term employed live independently more often than short-term employed, 
then it is not possible to assert that those long-term employed young people who are in an in­
dependent living-arrangement left home when they entered this job.
For students model (5) posited above requires five independent variables:
(5) PrObSTUlcaving ~ lown I partner + Exp.ndepent + CLASS
The sample of students is formed by those people who in 1991/92 were full-time or part-time 
students, independently of the moment they began to study. It means that the sample might 
contain individuals who have been studying for 4 years and those studying only for one year. 
To approximate income I rely on information about employment parallel to studies 
(ACTIVEST)13, but this variable can only partially be used as a proxy for income for students. 
Student's activity situation allows only for two variations: full-time student and part-time stu­
dent, which means that the first are supposed to have no or less income than the latter. This 
assumption is problematic, for it ignores the possible existence o f scholarships. We know the 
income only of the people in the French surveys, and if a student receives public benefits or 
family help. For French people we will, thus, be able to test the extent to which ACTIVEST is 
a good corollary o f  market income and how public benefits can constitute an incentive to leave 
home (cf. sections 8.2.5and 8.3).
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Social origin is operationalised by the social class of the father (FACLASS) and together with 
the number of siblings (SIBL) these variables can provide an idea o f the income and the expen­
diture of the parents, and in consequence can inform us of the probability of receiving financial 
help.
Tenure of the dwelling could be taken as a rough indicator o f expenditure, but this information 
is available only for those who live independently. Again the problem o f missing information on 
expectations emerges. At this stage o f the research the problem is avoided by dropping these 
variables from the statistical analysis. These variables will have to be dealt with at context level 
and in a descriptive bivariate way.
Age (AGE) and educational level (EDUC) are added to the model, in order to control for the 
age heterogeneity of the group and in order to have the same variables as in the non-students' 
model. The educational level of students should not be significantly related to their living ar­
rangement.
(6) logit (IND91/92) -  a  + 3,(ACTIVEST) + p2(CLASSFA) - fr(SIBL) + p4(EDUC) + 
pj(AGE)
The theoretical model for non-students, compared to the theoretical model for non-students, 
includes two supplementary variables: educational level and existence o f a partner.
(4) ProbNOSTUicving = I own ^partner + E X Pindcpcnt + EDU + CLASS + PART
Unlike in the students' model, activity is a better proxy for income and the educational level o f 
the individual is introduced as a proxy for time spent in education and for expectations about 
the standard of life to be obtained. The existence o f  an employed partner can be assessed for 
those who live independently, but no information exists about partners o f people living in the 
parental home. Social origin is introduced like for students, but as a proxy for expectations and 
not as a proxy for economic resources. Formally the equation is the same as above equation 
(6). 15
15 The exact operationalisation of all variables used throughout this work is documented in the appendix.
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7 Conclusion
In this chapter the research strategy which will allow the answering of the main research oues- 
tion, namely why there are national differences in the rate o f two-generation households in 
France and Spain, was explained and discussed. Three main explanative macro-level hypothe­
ses were elaborated: the dependence-diversification hypothesis, the precariousness hypothesis 
and the low affordability-high property hypothesis. The micro-sociological foundation of the 
problem was treated with a rational choice model, which formalises the selection process 
through which individuals pass when they think about leaving home. The methodological pro­
cedure will consist in changing the units o f analysis in order to grasp the relationships at each 
different level and the interactions between different levels. Two large samples will provide the 
information for the logistic regression analysis of young people’s behaviour in France and 
Spain. The control o f individual characteristics will help to recognise where the main differ­
ences between the behaviour o f Spanish and French young people lies (chapter III). A multi­
level logistic regression analysis with regions and regional variables as context variables will 
show the relative importance of regional labour markets, housing markets and family patterns 
in Spain (chapter IV). Finally, we come back to the initial cross-national research question by a 
comparative institutional analysis of social rights for different groups of young people (chapter 
V). The procedure and hypotheses are summarised in Figure 8, whereby some parts of the re­
search strategy have not yet been presented in detail, but will be discussed below.
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Figure 8: Research S trategy  and H ypotheses
Macro-Level Contexts
Independent Variables:
' Configuration of Labour Market Housing 
Market and Social Rights
1. Precariousness-hypothesis
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DIFFERENT STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATIONS AND LEAN ING 
HOME PROCESSES IN FRANCE AND SPAIN
8 Why Do French Young People Leave Home Earlier than Spaniards?
The ideal situation for a comparative case study would be to have differences in the phenome­
non to be explained and in only one o f the independent variables, since then it could be argued 
that the difference in the dependent variable most probably is due to the one difference in the 
factors which determine the form of the dependent variable. This is very unlikely to occur in a 
cross-national study and for this reason the individual characteristics o f young people in France 
and Spain have been controlled for in the multivariate analyses performed below. Yet, it is im­
portant to show how large or small cross-national contextual differences are and this is one of 
the aims o f this part. The first sections o f this chapter describe context differences and in the 
last sections the empirical results of the cross-sectional logistic regression models will be pre­
sented. The presentation's aim is to discuss in how far the results confirm or falsify the theo­
retical hypotheses presented previously.
8.1 Timing o f Status Transitions And Context Differences in Spain And France
In this paragraph the retrospective information of the French and Spanish samples is used to 
compare patterns o f timing in the leaving-home process. In addition, the cross-sectional infor­
mation was used to construct some comparative indicators on the timing o f exit o f the educa­
tion system and entrance into employment in order to better understand timing differences in 
the process of integration into societies in both countries,. In the first section the retrospective 
information is presented and in the second section transversal indicators show current timing 
patterns.
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8.1.1 High Speed And Nonfamily Destination of Leaving Home in France
Figure 9 presents survival rates in the parental home of young people aged 20 to 29 in 1991 in 
Spain and in 1992 in France. Survival rates have been calculated for thirteen years, which 
means from 1978 until 1991 for Spain and from 1979 until 1992 for France. In these years the 
interviewees were 7 to 16 years old and accordingly nearly all lived with their parents. Then, 
little by little, young people begin to leave the parental home with important timing differences 
in both countries. In France people leave home at a much higher velocity than in Spain. It was 
found that little more than one third of the French young people had survived at home in 1992, 
whereas three quarters o f  their Spanish contemporaries were still found in the family of origin 
in 1991. In 1990, the majority of the French sample had left home, that is when the observed 
cohort was between 18 and 27 years old, while their Spanish counterparts had not nearly ar­
rived at this point in 1991, when they were 20 to 29 years old. , ,
Figure 9: Survival Rate in Parental Home in France and Spain, 1978-1992 
(people staying at home every year in % of all people aged 20 to 29 in 1991/92)'6
!
I France - a -  Spain
Source: own elaboration with Spainall (PAR78-PAR91) and with Franceall (IND79 to IND92).
Iù This figure is based on the retrospective information of Spainall and Franceall and it measures, in the French case, the 
stock of young people according to their living arrangement in each single year and in the Spanish case the "last” sepa­
ration of parents and child in each single year (cf. appendix 3, section 1.5).
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Figure 10 shows the hazard rates and confirms the previous description and, in addition, r  re­
veals that the pace o f leaving home increases strongly from 1987 to 1990 in France, while in 
Spain the slope is much flatter and does not show any period o f particular increase like in 
France.
Figure 10: Hazard Rate of Leaving Home in France and Spain 1978-1992 
(those leaving every year divided by those at risk of leaving every year)
-♦ -* France hazard rate - o -  Spain hazard rate
Source: own elaboration with Spainalt (PAR78-PAR91) and Franceall (IND79 to IND92).
Figure 11 shows the age of leaving home of all those young people who in 1991/92 had left 
home. Unlike in the previous figures, information on first leavers was used for France, which 
means that some o f those who left will have come back home later. Spanish figures, instead, 
reveal the age o f the last leaving of those who left home between 1978 and 1991. The age with 
the highest rate o f leavers is 19 years in France and 24 in Spain. These figures suggest that 
some French young people leave home after having finished their compulsory education at age 
16 and 17 and many o f them leave after having reached legal and the educational maturity. This 
might be because young people who begin to study, leave their parents' home in France, 
whereas in Spain this is less important. In Spain the peak of age 24 is near to the average age 
of first marriage, namely 26 (cf Table 12). The majority of French people had left by age 20 or 
before and three quarters of them had left by age 29 or before, while in Spain not even the 
majority had left home when they were 29 years old.
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Figure 11: Age at First Leaving, Young People Aged 20-29 in Spain 1991/ France 1992 
(first leavers in % of those living independently in 1991/92)
France % of left home 
- a -  Spain % of left home
Source: own elaboration with Spainall and Franceall and QL AGE.
Both surveys permit a comparison of the type of first dwelling young people went to when 
they left home. This last retrospective finding will help to imagine the process of leaving home 
before a cross-sectional analysis is made. Corresponding with the previous suggestion that 
many French young people may leave home not to form a new family but in order to study or 
work in another place. Figure 11 demonstrates that nearly one third of all first dwellings for 
French young people were a hall of residence, by “hall o f residence” a residence of students or 
young workers is meant. Unlike the French, only 2 per cent of the Spanish had passed through 
this experience. It has to be recalled that the Spanish survey considered halls of residence only 
if they were the official residence and if the person lived there for at least three months. An 
idea about the underestimation o f young people leaving for halls o f residence or for dwellings 
shared with flat-mates can be obtained through the calculation of the number of informal leav­
ers. The data discrepancy in the Spanish survey between the part with information on parents 
and the part on dwellings was used to estimate the number of informal leavers, i.e. young peo­
ple who officially live with their parents in their dwelling in 1991 but who said to have left the 
parental home in 1991 or before.17 After this calculation a figure o f 2.2 per cent of young peo­
ple having left informally was obtained, which is a rather small proportion. Official statistics 1
1' It was checked that young people did not leave the parental home and return later, so that this would be the reason for the 
mcongmency.
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published by education authorities show that there are large cross-national differences in the 
number of young students living in halls of residence in both countries (cf section 10.2.1)
Figure 12: First Dwellings of Leavers (in % of Independent)« France 1992/Spain 1991
! □  left informally
□  single in non-family flat
! ! □  with flat-mate/s in non-family flat
f i  with partner/spouse in non-family flat 
! ■  hall of residence
j B  without relatives in flat of family
I i □  with relatives in flat of family
France Spain
Source: own elaboration with SpaimU and France all and FIRDWELL.
The type o f first dwelling of French young people differs largely from Spanish ones too for 
other reasons. Figure 12 reveals that o f those living independently in Spain in 1991 nearly all 
had set up their first dwelling
■ with a partner/spouse in a nonfamily flat,
■ without relatives in a family-owned flat or
■ with relatives.
Thus, the family plays a crucial role in the provision of a dwelling for young people.
In France, on the contrary, most young people left home in order to live in a nonfamily ar­
rangement and without the direct provision of the flat by the family. It is the state and the mar­
ket which basically enable young people's social independence, as will also be shown further 
on. Those setting up a household with a partner or spouse number 40 per cent, that is 20 per 
cent less than in Spain and young people in one-person non family-owned flats reach 22 per 
cent of those socially independent.
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The way in which French young people leave home has consequences for the form of the proc­
ess. People who leave home in order to create a new family, and in particular those who do so 
in a formal way, are less likely to return to the parental home after they have left, while people 
who left for military service, for reasons of education or work are more likely to return home 
after a fist leaving. In fact, French young people return home relatively frequently after a first 
leaving, and the probability of returning home depends mainly on the reason for which they 
first left. According to a multivariate analysis performed by Villeneuve-Gokalp (1997), age at 
first leaving, educational certificate and parental economic help do not have an effect on re­
turning home in France. Instead, young people who left home in order to  carry out their mili­
tary service or those who left to go to a hall of residence are those who have a high probability 
of returning to the parental home. Nearly three quarters of the men who left home for their 
military service went back home afterwards and more than half o f all young people, women 
and men, who went to a hall o f residence returned home. Young people who leave home be­
fore finishing education have a higher probability o f returning home (27%) than those who left 
after having finished their education (13%).
Leaving home has different social meanings in France and Spain, since French people leave 
frequently without being financially independent. In France, frequently social and economic 
independence do not go together, while Spanish young people tend to combine social inde­
pendence with economic independence. The question becomes thus why young people in Spain 
do not leave home during periods in which they are financially dependent on parents and/or the 
state. If Spanish students with upper class origins leave home more often than those with lower 
class origins, then it could be a question o f the economic resources o f the family, but if they do 
not, then, to not leave under precarious economic conditions might be a social norm. This 
question is dealt with in section 8.2.1. In the next section cross-national similarities and differ­
ences o f young people out o f the parental home are described.
8.1.2 Degrees of Resource Sharing and Types of Living Arrangements
In section 2.1 the concept of resource sharing was introduced in order to classify young peo­
ple's living arrangements according to the economic aspect of sharing resources (dwelling and 
maintenance costs) with each other. Figure 12 that deals with first destinations o f those who 
have left home, has already shown that in Spain the majority of living arrangements of the
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leavers are where a young person shares resources with a partner or a spouse In France, shar­
ing resources with others, be it with a partner/spouse or with peers in a hall of residence, con­
stitutes, as well, the majority of living arrangements, but there is a large minority (20%) of 
young people who live in one-person households and thus do not share resources.
Why do young people in France live more frequently in non-resource sharing living arrange­
ments? Is it because they have higher earnings than in Spain, or because they receive more 
economic help from their parents or from the state while living alone, or because they accept 
lower standards o f life? A mix of all these factors produce this specific French situation as 
demonstrated in Table 11.
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Table 11: Average Income, Diversification. Activity, Age and Gender of Independent 
Youth in France According to Resource Sharing Degree, 1992
Type of Household of Independent Youth (RESOllR)
------------------------------------------------ [
Column %  of one-person household Column % of other*
Age group 20-24 44.1 29,4
25-29 55.9 70.6
Sex Men 48 40.3
Women 52 59.7______________________
Activity Full-time student 22.1 7.1
(ACTIVEST) Pan-time student 13.1 5.5
Long-term employed 47.1 51.4
Short-term employed 8 5.8
Economically inactive 0.6 10.7
Unemployed 6.8 13.8
Other 2.3 5.7
Income no income 2.3 8.8




no answer 1.9 2.7
market income 37.4 4.3
tublic benefits 5.8 3.3
Family help 1.4 54
market & state 27.3 6.2
market & family 6.9 31
state & family 16.4 19.9
............. 1market, state & family 4.8 30
ample (N) 872 3680
tote: * "other" does not include young people in halls of residence and "family help" includes help from par- 
nts and from spouse. Source: own elaboration with Franceall. More information on variables cf. appendix 3.
'able 11 shows that French young people in one-person households are more frequently aged 
5 to 29 than younger and to a degree more often women than men. It is mainly a living ar- 
mgement o f people with a long-term employment and o f young people enrolled in education, 
tterestingly, the income distribution o f young people in one-person households is not very 
ifferent from other independent young people: the former are less frequently without income
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and more frequently they earn more than 7.500 FF, i.e. 1081 PPS (1992).,h Most young people 
living alone might have a similar or a lower standard o f  life, for most of them have similar in­
come levels than their counterparts in resource-sharing households. Yet. this depends on the 
existence o f a formal partnership relationship, which does not decrease the costs of maintaining 
a one-person dwelling but might decrease other maintenance costs. The most curious finding 
refers to the diversification o f dependencies (cf. section 8.3 for definition o f variable). Com­
pared to young people who share resources, young people living alone more frequently depend 
totally on market income or on market income and state benefits. The family plays a compara­
tively minor role for these young people.
Figure 13: Types of Living A rrangem ents of Independent Youth, Spain 1991/France 92
(in %  of independent youth aged 20-29)
□ married B cohabitation
| Done person □  with peers
|  i □  other________________________
□  married B cohabitation
□  one person
□  other
□  with peers
Sources: own elaboration with Franceall and Spainail and LIVARR.
There are not only differences in resource-sharing degrees, but also in the types of resource­
sharing one-generation households. Living with peers has a similar diffusion in both countries, 
but cohabitation with a partner is much less prevalent in Spain than in France.19 It is not possi­
ble to explain the low proportion of consensual unions in the frame of this work, but some 
ideas for reflection can be offered. Young people aged 15 to 24 who were asked about their 
opinion on "living together without being married" answered in most European countries that 
this is something not to be judged by others (Eurobarometer 1993 in: EUROSTAT 1997). In
IS
19
In 1992 the exchange rate was 1 Purchasing Power Standard for 6.94 FF and for 124.13 Ptas. Thus, 1081 PPS are the 
equivalent of 134,185 Ptas.
It has to be remembered that consensual unions suffer from underreporting in most surveys and census, and. I 
a greater problem in countries where it is still a minority phenomenon (Prinz 1995). The European Hous< 
pom similar figures for Spain and France for 1994. Of those aged 25 to 29,4 per cent live in consensual 
Spain, whereas in France they number 25 per cent (EUROSTAT 1997). , -
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Spain and in France the proportions who answered in this way are very similar, as are also the 
rates of people stating that it is a good thing (around 23%) and a bad thing (2%). The propor­
tion of Spanish young people approving consensual unions is by far higher than those exercis­
ing it, while in France the rate of those living in consensual unions is higher than the proportion 
of those approving it explicitly. Some Spanish youth surveys asked people if they would like to 
live in a consensual union and around 15% would like to do so (Elzo et al. 1994, Orizo et al 
1985). Thus, the low rate o f consensual unions in Spain seems not to be a result o f a low ap­
proval, but the reasons have to be searched for elsewhere. It might be related to three socio­
economic factors:
1. the low Spanish rate o f accessible dwellings to  rent;
2. social pressure from the older generation in favour o f marriage. Since young people in 
Spain depend very frequently on the support o f their parents, they may also have taken into 
account their parents values and preferences more seriously than French young people, and
3. the convenience o f a marriage contract for women who follow the dependent household 
formation strategy.
Most likely, the low rates o f consensual unions and the strong preference for owner-occupied 
dwellings contribute to the delayed home-leaving pattern in Spain. In fact, in section 8.4 it is 
shown that young people living in a rented dwelling, a less expensive living arrangement than 
an owner-occupied dwelling, are younger and more frequently cohabiting partners than young 
people in owned dwellings. The regional analysis of section 9.2.3 shows that people in regions 
with a high rate o f consensual unions and of rented dwellings are less likely to be in an 
intergenerational coresidence setting. Since in Spain we find a very small housing sector with 
rented dwellings, it can be argued that, if the supply o f rented dwellings was more accessible to 
young people, they would leave earlier and they would cohabit more. It can be objected that 
the low supply o f rented accommodation is not the cause of low rates o f consensual unions and 
of early home-leaving but its consequence. This question depends on the strength o f social 
norms and preferences for marriage as way of leaving home independently of the tenure struc­
ture o f the housing market. Since more Spanish young people affirm they would like to cohabit 
with a partner than actually do, some objective conditions influence the low rate o f Spanish 
cohabitants and o f  early leavers. Let us put it in the following way; housing and labour market 
structure does not determine consensual union patterns and early leaving, but they influence 
both and probably prevent the creation o f a significant minority o f innovators (Prinz 1995).
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Villeneuve-Gokalp (1990) shows for France that consensual unions were a rather diffused 1;\-  
ing arrangement among working class men in the 1960s and 1970s because they could not af­
ford an early marriage. This contradicts the argument of this work, which sees in the worse 
employment situation a condition favouring marriage. Yet, French working class w omen were 
less likely to cohabit than their male counterparts. The author does not explain this contradic­
tion. It is not clear how working class men cohabited relatively frequently, while their female 
counterparts did not, given that couples tend to be homogamous with respect to social class 
Besides, the author shows that practicising Catholics and Protestants were less likely to begin a 
consensual union. The fact that religious practice hinders the starting of a consensual union is 
something which occurs in Spain too, as discussed in section 9.2.2, but religious practice is 
somewhat less related to consensual unions than is the housing market structure.
Another fact that indicates indirectly the importance o f consensual unions for early social inde­
pendence in France is the similarity o f the age at first marriage in Spain and France. Thus, early 
nest-leaving in France is not related to early marriage. Male mean age at first marriage was in 
both countries 27 in 1988. Also women marry at similar ages, Spanish women on average at 
age 24.8 and French women at age 25.2 (cf. Table 12). Yet, even if French and Spanish people 
marry at similar moments, it does not mean that the forms o f formal family formation are simi­
lar








standard deviation 1.12 0.98
Source: EUROSTAT 1992.
In Spain we find more women who depend economically on their spouse compared to France. 
In the theoretical part it was argued that France and Spain may differ in the proportion o f 
women who follow a dependent family formation path, i.e. need to be (partly) maintained by 
their husbands in order to be able to leave the parental home. A detailed test o f these French-
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Spanish differences cannot be performed, but there is cross-sectional evidence which shows 
that of those women who are living out of the parental home a higher proportion are economi­
cally inactive in Spain than in France. Figure 14 reveals that in 1991 33 per cent o f  all socially 
independent women in Spain were economically inactive, while in France the same rate num­
bers only 14 per cent. These figures cannot tell us if these women left home while being eco­
nomically inactive, if they became it just after marriage, for instance, or if they quit the labour 
market after a child was bom. Yet, if we define family formation as a process which happens 
from age 20 to 29 and comprises partnership formation and eventually child birth, then it can 
be stated that in France in this life phase there are much less economically inactive women 
among those who are living out of the parental home than in Spain. Thus, in Spain we find 
more male-breadwinner families among young people than in France, even if from 1976 to 
1991 the rate o f  young married women (25-34) with an employment has increased in Spain, 
which points to  some changes in female employment and family biographies (Garrido/Requena 
1996).
Figure 14: Socially Independent Women (20-29) by Activity, France 1992/Spain 1991
j | □  long-term employed □  short-term employed j
I I M self-employed ■  family help
1 □  part-time student H  full-time student [
O  unemployed after job □  first-job seeker j ;
; □  economically inactive_________  !
Source: own elaboration with Franceall and Spainall and ACTIVEST
Economically inactive women who do not live with their parents have to rely on their partner's 
income or on public benefits. Since in Spain there are fewer types of public benefits and the 
existing ones are less generous than in France, it is to be expected that most of these economi-
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caliy inactive women rely mainly on their husband’s income. As a consequence this means that 
their husbands have to receive a sufficiently high and stable income in order to be able to 
maintain at least two adults. Long-term employment is of great significance for Spanish family 
formation. This is confirmed by recent findings of a longitudinal analysis on the determinants of 
partnership formation in Spain which shows that long-term employment has become more 
relevant for male partnership formation in the last decades (Luxan/Miret/Trevino 1999)
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8.1.3 Early Exit From Education And Late Employment Stability' in Spain
Young people in Spain enter the labour market on average earlier than French young people 
In 1987 half of all Spanish young people had entered at age 19, while half o f all French young 
people had entered at age 20. In 1995 the age difference was 21 to 22 respectively 
(EUROSTAT 1997). Besides, employment conditions young people face on the labour market 
vary from one country to the other. The cross-sectional information of 1991 for Spain and 
1992 for France permits the analysis of some timing differences related to education and em­
ployment in both countries in these years. Unlike in the previous paragraphs, the figures pre­
sented here do not originate from the retrospective answers of the interviewees, but refer to 
the situation of the surveyed young people o f  different ages at the moment of the interviews.
Figure 15: Male integration into adulthood, Spain 1991/ France 1992 
(transveral in % of age group)
Source: own elaboration with Franceall and Spainall and with ACTTVEST, IND9I/92.
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Figure 16: Female integration into adulthood, Spain 1991/ France 1992 
(transveral in % of age group)
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20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
—• —  long-term employment, F 
— •—  full-time student, F 
— a— part-time student, F 
— *—  living independently, F 
■ * ♦  * * long-term employment, H
• - ♦  * * full-time student, E 
- * •* ■ * part-time student, E
• - x  * • jiving independently, E
Source, own elaboration with Franceall and Spainall and with ACTIVEST, IND91/92.
Figure 15 and Figure 16 display some indicators for men and women of different ages in Spain 
and France. In France more than half o f young men aged 20 follow some formal education 
programme, while only around 30 per cent of their Spanish counterparts do.20 For women the 
percentages of enrolment are higher in both countries, but the differences between the two 
countries are very similar to that of men. In general, young people in Spain leave education 
earlier than in France and only at age 25 do the two national patterns become similar, since in 
both countries only a minority of young people are enrolled in education over age 25. Young 
people who combine education with work represent in both countries less than 10 per cent of 
their age-group in all ages, but in this case there are nearly no cross-national differences. These 
differences in enrolment are also confirmed for 1995 by labour force statistics. Of the 18 year- 
olds, 66 per cent o f Spaniards and 84 per cent of French were enrolled in education, which
20 The Spanish figures on educational enrolment presented here are lower than those of Rivière ( 1996) who uses also the 
socio-demographic survey. Probably because he used the retrospective information on education, while the figures here 
come from the cross-sectional part on activity-. The figures of the Spanish Labour Force Survey give a similar number of 
young people aged 20 to 29 enroled in education than the results of my own elaboration with Spainall (cf. Table 1 in 
Appendix 1 ).
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yields a difference of 18 per cent between the two rates. Instead, enrolment rates o f those aged 
24 are very similar in both countries, namely around 15 per cent (EUROSTAT 1997).“1
The interesting fact is that Spanish people leave education earlier than in France, but that they 
do not acquire a long-term employment earlier than in France, as it could be expected due to 
their earlier entrance into their labour force and their potentially longer work-experience. Sev­
enty per cent o f men aged 29 in 1991/92 had a long-term job in France, while in Spain they 
reached not even 40 per cent, i.e. 30 per cent o f difference between both countries. This is 
exactly the same percentage difference between French socially independent and Spanish so­
cially independent men. The same differences exist for female long-term employment in France 
and Spain, but the difference between the rates o f social independence are somewhat smaller 
(23%). By comparing young people aged 29 in 1991/92 we have chosen a Spanish cohort who 
faced a relatively friendly employment context when they entered employment at the end o f the 
80s, as was the case in France too. Yet, unlike in France, these Spanish young people were 
offered more short-term jobs and they had to face a very difficult housing situation, with a 
small supply of rented accommodation and very high rents and prices for the purchase o f ac­
commodation (cf. section 8.1.7).
To sum up, in Spain young people do not stay longer in education than in France, but this does 
not mean that they enter long-term employment earlier. It means that young people in Spain 
pass more time searching for employment and changing jobs than in France. To leave home in 
such circumstances would mean to leave home with uncertainty in order to  search for a job 
somewhere else or to share a dwelling with peers or with a partner, and less in order to form a 
new family. It is not a context where young people can afford to get a mortgage under their 
own responsibility, but where they need some support from the family or the state and an eas­
ier access to rented accommodation. The next section completes the cross-national contexts 
description with additional cross-sectional information. 21
21 OECD statistics show that young men's (aged 20-24) labour force participation rates have decreased from 1979 to 1994, 
but that they were always higher in Spain than in France. In addition, the cross-national difference has increased in the 
last decade (OECD 1996).
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8.1.4 M ain L a b o u r M arket Features in 1985 to 1992 in Spain and France
The aim of this section is to give an overview of the main characteristics of the labour market 
situation in the period from 1985 to 1992 in France and Spain, This allows one to get an im­
pression about the economic cycle, during which young people were likely to leave home and 
about the possibilities o f young people to access a stable employment situation.
In the first half o f 1980s the labour market situation in Spain was very difficult for young peo­
ple. much more than it was for French young people, but in the second half o f the 1980s the 
unemployment problem diminished (Figure 17). Yet, Spanish-French differences in youth un­
employment persisted. These differences are partly due to a higher demographic pressure of 
young people in Spain, but also due to variations in the employment creation capacity o f both 
economies. In 1990 the demographic pressure as measured by the rate of young people aged 
15 to 24 in relation to the population aged 25 to 54 was around 37 per cent in France, while in 
Spain it reached 43 per cent (OECD 1996).
Figure 17: Unemployment of Young People (15-24), in France/ Spain 1985-1992
(in thousand)
— France Spain
N o te : U n e m p lo y e d  a g e d  15 to  24  in  F ra n c e  a n d  16 to  2 4  in  S p a in . 
S o u rc es : B E L  1994, IN S E E  1992.
In both countries the number of unemployed people in the youngest age group fell in the pe­
riod of this study, which means that in both countries the labour market situation was rather 
favourable to leaving home. In Spain this employment boom was related both to economic and 
institutional factors, since many young people found their first employment in regulated short-
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term jobs (cf. section 10.3). The employment boom should have been accompanied by a de­
crease of young people’s staying home rates, but in both countries this was not the case (cf. 
section 2.2). Spanish employment rates o f young people increased strongly from 1986 to 1991. 
but young people's staying home rates increased, too. This paradox disappears if one looks at 
the employment rates o f young men (25 to 29) who had had their job for three or more years, 
because the rates fall in a very similar way compared to the rates of young male family heads 
(Garrido/Requena 1996). Thus, there was expansion in employment in France and Spain, but 
most new jobs where fixed-term ones, especially in Spain. EUROSTAT labour force statistics 
show the impressive increase o f fixed-term employment in the last decade in two out of 15 
European countries, namely Spain and France. In 1987, 29 per cent o f Spanish employees aged 
15 to 29 had a temporary work contract, while in France only 18 per cent were in this situa­
tion. Eight years later the Spanish rate had more than doubled (64%), while the French rate 
increased by less than double and stood at 29 per cent in 1995 (Freysson 1996). Thus, waiting 
queues to obtain a long-term employment are longer in Spain than in France and these also 
have consequences on earning levels, which are lower in Spain than in France as shown in sec­
tion 10.3.4.
Despite employment growth in both countries, from a comparative perspective unemployment 
in Spain was much higher than in France. This means that young people in Spain faced a very 
crowded labour market, which surely influenced their perceptions o f employment possibilities 
and clearly also their actual employment chances. Not only were the expectations of finding an 
employment much worse in Spain, but in particular the expectations o f finding a long-term 
employment. This is illustrated for 1991/92 in Figure 18, where one can see that more French 
young people than Spanish were in long-term employment. This is especially true for men, 
since more than 40 per cent o f French men had a long-term contract, whereas only 20 per cent 
of their Spanish counterparts were in the same situation. The higher employment instability of 
the Spanish youth labour market is further indicated by the lower Spanish rate of first- 
employment seekers and the higher rate o f unemployed who previously had had a job com­
pared to their French counterparts.
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Figure 18: Activity Structure of Youth (20-29) by Gender, Spain 1991/France 1992
□  long-term employed 
■  part-time student
□  economically inactive 
O family help
□  unemployed after job
S  short-term employed 
■ full-time student
□  self-employed
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S o u rc e : o w n  e la b o ra tio n  w i th  FranceaU y  Spainoli a n d  w ith  A C T IV E S T
Another two important Spanish-French variations are the higher female unemployment and 
economically inactivity rates in Spain compared to France, Spanish women were twice as likely 
to be unemployed and economically inactive than French women.
The problem with regard to the Spanish labour market is not just o f finding a first employment, 
but in particular, keeping a job. The high levels of unemployed aged 30 to 34 who had a job 
before, show the difficulty to stay in employment during a life-phase were family formation 
usually takes place (Garrido/Requena 1996). The same authors interpret the development of 
the Spanish labour market towards a market with a very high rate o f short-term jobs as the 
solution of an important intergenerational inequality problem. Young Spanish people are much 
more qualified than their parents who passed their infancy and youth in the post-war dictator­
ship and acquired relatively low levels o f  education. A possibility to compensate for this disad­
vantage o f the older population was to maintain the legal protection of the employment stabil­
ity of older people to prevent a substitution of older people by more flexible and better quali­
fied young people. This solution might have been accepted by the younger generation thanks to 
the family support they receive.
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A recent study supports the idea o f short-term contracts as measures favouring the integration 
of young people into employment, but it also shows that the diffusion o f short-term contracts 
produces high job rotation, specific risks o f becoming unemployed independently o f social 
class and it has effects on the level of earnings. García Polavieja (1998) reports that in the pe­
riod from 1987 to 1995 few short-term workers became long-term workers, and when this did 
happen, it occurred mainly in highly qualified occupations. Thus, in general, short-term em­
ployment means increasing job-rotation as shown by data from the Spanish labour force sur­
vey. In 1987, 21.4 per cent o f the short-term workers had been employed in a different job one 
year before. This rate constantly increased until 1995, when it reached 50.9 per cent. These 
trends lead to high rates o f unemployment, since many temporary workers pass through phases 
of unemployment until they enter a new job. Interestingly, the fact of having a short-term em­
ployment is the most determinant factor o f the probability of being unemployed, even if one 
controls for age, sex, occupational category, activity sector, place of residence and social 
class.22
In Spain, apart from the wide diffusion o f unemployment and short-term employment there is 
an additional problem, which is the high incidence o f irregular jobs. To give an idea o f this 
phenomenon two figures should suffice. The survey on life and work conditions of 1985 
(ECVT) estimated the number o f irregularly employed people, who were defined as those who 
had a job without social security, with incorrect social security or who were receiving unem­
ployment benefit although they had a job. In 1985 they estimated that 27 per cent of the popu­
lation in paid work was irregular, and 73 per cent o f  those aged 16 to 19 and 45 per cent o f 
people aged 20 to 24 (CIS 1986, Muro et al. 1988). In the Catalan youth survey of 1991, peo­
ple were asked if their job was without social security, a sporadic job or an employment with­
out a contract. These jobs were classified as irregular. Around 18 per cent o f those aged 22 to 
29 years who were working or had worked, said that their job was irregular (Martinez/Bemey 
1991).
:: Garcia Polavieja used two surveys, one for 1991 and one for 1997, and he performed a logistic regression analysis.
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8.1.5 Low er E d ucational Levels in Spain  C om pared  to F rance
Figure 18 shows that the number of students who work and study is very similar in both coun­
tries, while the proportions of young people who only study is different. French (21%) than 
Spanish (11%) young people are enrolled in formal education in the group of those aged 20 to 
29. This is due to differences in the age group from 20 to 24, where many more French are in 
education than Spaniards, while in the older age group (25-29) French and Spaniards dispiay 
the same enrolment rates (cf. Figure 15 and Figure 16) These different educational participa­
tion patterns lead to different levels of completed education in both countries.
Figure 19: Completed Educational Level (20*24 and 25-29), Spain 1991/France 1992
□  tertian- certificate 
B maturity certificatei B secondary vocat. certificate
□  basic vocational certificate ! :
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Source: own elaboration with Franceall y Spainoli and with EDUC.
As can be seen from Figure 19 many more Spanish than French young people have only a pri­
mary certificate or a lower educational level. In the age group 25 to 29 they number 53 per 
cent in Spain and 20 per cent in France. These large cross-national differences are not due to 
the fact that many more French people complete secondary and tertiary education, but is re­
lated to the very small proportion of Spanish young people with a basic vocational qualifica
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tion. Only 11 per cent of those aged 25 to 29 have such a qualification, whereas their French 
contemporaries represent 40 per cent of their age group ~ EUROSTAT figures on enrolment 
rates of young people in vocational training show that in 1993/94 41 per cent of Spanish stu­
dents enrolled in secondary education were undergoing vocational training, while 53 per cent 
of their French contemporaries were (EUROSTAT 1997). These figures correspond to the 
higher Spanish rate o f people with a non-vocational secondary certificate among those aged 2 
to 29 compared to the French rate in 1991/92, as shown in Figure 19. In addition, all Spanish 
young people aged 15 to 29 enrolled in basic vocational training courses are mainly in school 
(more than 75% o f hours), while 22 per cent of their French counterparts combine school 
training with training on the job (EUROSTAT 1997).
At the other end o f the educational ladder, a higher proportion o f  people with a completed 
tertiary certificate can be found in France than in Spain. This is not due to timing differences, 
since cross-national differences are found for those aged 20 to 24 and those aged 25 to 29. If 
one looks at Spanish young people from 30 to 34, a very similar proportion of people with a 
tertiary certificate is found (Riviere in Garrido/Requena 1996).23 4
For the explanation of the cross-national differences in leaving home in France and in Spain, it 
is very important to  have a closer look at students in tertiary education. In 1990/91 in France 
there were 74 universities, where 1,698,700 students were studying, while in Spain in 1991 
there were 36 public universities, 5 private universities and around 1,137,228 students were 
enrolled (Consejo de Universidades 1992, INSEE 1993). Unlike France, Spain does not have 
elite universities. This is probably one reason for the less centralised character of the Spanish 
university panorama. In France, 33 per cent of all students were studying in the Ile-de-France 
region, in other words in the area of Paris, while in Spain 20 per cent o f all students were 
studying in the region o f Madrid and 14 per cent in Catalonia (Schaferbarthold 1992, Consejo 
de Universidades 1993).
23 The results for Spain are very similar to the results Jaime Riviere obtained in his analysis of the Sociodemographic Sur­
vey (Garrido/Requena 1996).
24 Yet, EUROSTAT labour force figures of those aged 30 to 34 in 1995 show a higher percentage of Spanish people with a
tertiary' certificate, namely 22 per cent compared to the 15 per cent obtained here for 25 to 29 year old people 
(EUROSTAT 1997),
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In France in 1990, 8 per cent23 of the new entrances into universities were young people com­
ing from another administrative region (académie). The migration balance o f students leaving 
and students coming to a region varies significantly from one region to another The academics 
of Montpellier, Lyon, Strasbourg, Aix-Marseille, Toulouse, Bordeaux and Ile de France show 
a positive balance, these universities traditionally attract many students. In 1990 less migrations 
of students than ten years before could be observed (MEN 1993).
French tertiary education includes not only universities, but also Higher Technical Colleges 
(STS), University Institutes o f Technology (IUT), and Preparatory Classes for the Grandes 
Ecoles (CPGE). The length of study in these institutes lasts from two to three years and ends 
with a Technological University Diploma (DUT). At university, students obtain a first degree 
after two years (DEUG), if they continue they obtain a second degree (Licence) after another 
year, and if they add a supplementary year, they can reach a third degree (DEA or DSS). After 
these diplomas, students can continue with doctoral studies. This means that, in general,
French young people obtain their maturity certificate at age 18, their DEUG or DUT at age 
20/21, the Licence at age 21, the maîtrise at age 22 and the DEA or DESS at age 23. Engi­
neering Diplomas should be obtained at age 23, too (Jallade et. al 1993).
In Spain, tertiary education can be divided into two types: courses o f one cycle lasting three 
years and courses o f three cycles, whereby the first lasts three years, the second two to three 
years and the third as long as it takes to complete the doctoral thesis. The first type o f tertiary 
courses are offered by the University faculties {facultades universitarias) and the Higher 
Technical Schools (Escuelas Técnicas Superiores) In the university schools (Escuelas Univer­
sitarias) short cycle courses can be followed. In another type o f institution {Colegios Univer­
sitarios) students can enrol for the fist cycle and then they have to change to another tertiary 
institution in order to obtain a degree. Last, there is a university where students can study 
without having to attend, i.e. from distance {UniversidadNacional de Educación a Distancia). 
In the last few years, special postgraduate courses are becoming very important in Spain.
These courses aim to provide students with a master degree. They are offered by universities, 
as well a by private institutions. After short-cycle studies students obtain a degree o f  Diplo- 25
25 The rate is calculated by dividing the number of new entrances into a university by the number of young people who have 
obtained in the same academic year their maturity certificate (MEN 1994).
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mudo, Arquiìecto Tecnico or Ingeniero Tècnico, while long-term studies finish with a certifi­
cate of Licenciado, Arquitecto or Ingeniero (MEC 1988).
In France students in tertiary education can decide almost year by year if they want to carry’ on 
tertiary education or if they want to try their luck on the labour market with a university cer­
tificate o f a lower level than the DEA or DESS 26 In Spain people have to study at least until 
age 21 that is until they can obtain the diplomatura or an equivalent and if they decide to con­
tinue they have do so until age 23, when they obtain the licenciatura or an equivalent.
8.1.6 Social Class Structures
French and Spanish social class structures are analysed for the group of parents of young peo­
ple aged 20 to 29 in 1991/92. Thus, Figure 20 does not show the current social structure as a 
whole, but only the structure o f a specific generation o f people, namely adults who at the end 
of the 1980s had adult children. The French social class structure shows more people in higher 
levels, since the French service class is nearly twice as large as the Spanish one and the group 
of French skilled workers is about one third larger than the group o f Spanish skilled workers. 
Correspondingly, we find many more non-skilled and agricultural workers in Spain than in 
France. Interestingly, the rate of young people from a farming background is very similar in 
both societies. This social class structure is also reflected in the lower average net earnings of 
Spanish people compared to French. According to data of the European Household Panel of 
1994 average net earnings were 144,065 PTAs per month in Spain and 9,790 FF in France, 
which converted to the Power Purchasing Standard results into 1,110 and 1,402 monthly PPS 
respectively (Barailler 1997).
20 But, in practice the DEUG certificate only has academic significance (Jallade et al. 1993).
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Figure 20: Social O rigin of Youth (20-29), Spain 1991/France 1992
D  service class □  routine non-manual workers
H petty bourgeoisie ■  farmers
□  skilled workers ■  non-skilled workers
□  agricultural workers E3 economically inactive
Spain France
Source: own elaboration with Franceall and Spainall and with FACLASS.
For 1994/95 there are some comparative figures on cross-national differences in young peo­
ple’s family background. Very similar proportions of those young people living with their par­
ents and aged 15 to 29 did live in a household where at least one parent was unemployed: 14 
per cent in Spain and 12 per cent in France. Yet, 42 per cent o f socially dependent Spanish 
young people said that the household experienced major difficulties in making ends meet, while 
in France only 23 per cent of those living in the parental home stated the same thing 
(EUROSTAT 1997). There are also some differences in the number of siblings young people 
have in both countries. In France young people have less frequently than in Spain a high num­
ber of siblings. In particular, in Spain 5 per cent of young people aged 20 to 29 have no sibling, 
while their French counterparts without any sibling number 9 per cent (Figure 21). Thus, 
young people in Spain have to share their parents' welfare more often with some sibling than it 
occurs in France.
Figure 21: N um ber of Siblings of Y outh  (20-29), Spain  1991/France 1992
□  no sibling □  one sibling







Source: own elaboration with Franceall and Spainall and SIBLI.
Thus compared to France, young people in Spain have a family background which has more 
frequently lower economic and social resources. Since, young people need their parental home 
in the phase o f becoming adults, it is evident that in Spain they have less chances of being sup­
ported by their parents in the way French young people do. Very probably, Spanish young 
people have to support their parents more frequently than their French neighbours, but no 
comparative figures on this are available.
8.1.7 Housing Market Structures: Differences and Similarities
Housing markets in Spain and France are very different, for they display opposite tenure 
structures and because they faced country-specific problems in the second half of the 1980s. 
Spain has a very high proportion o f people living in owner-occupied accommodation, and it is 
the European Union country with the highest proportion o f empty dwellings and of secondary 
residences. Also, Spain has a very high rate o f new dwellings, namely dwellings constructed 
after 1945, since in the last decades many houses had to be constructed due to large internal 
migration processes and high fertility rates in the 1960/70s.
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At the beginning o f the 1990s, Spain had one of the lowest rates of rented accommodation in 
Europe: in 1991, 15 per cent o f main residences were rented as against 35 per cent in the 
European Community and 39 per cent in France (Cortés Alcalá 1995, EUROSTAT 1997) 
Another difference which has to be taken into account is the low proportion of state-owned 
rented accommodation in Spain in comparison to northern European countries. Only 7.6 per 
cent of all rented dwellings consisted o f  state-subsidised public housing, while this percentage 
was nearly five times higher in France in 1988 (Leal 1992).
In addition to the specific Spanish housing tenure structure, the Spanish housing market is also 
characterised by a difficult affordability of property. First, interest rates for mongages in Spain 
exceeded the Union average in 1989, 1990 and 1991: they oscillated around 15 per cent in 
Spain and 10.5 per cent in France (Banco Hipotecario Argentaría 1992). From 1985 to 1991 
selling prices for apartments rose in Spain, and then from 1987 to 1991 the increase o f prices 
exceeded by far the rise of wages. In 1985 the financial effort related to the family income (one 
income) necessary to buy a dwelling was 47 per cent before taxes and 34 per cent after taxa­
tion; then it increased constantly until 1991 when the effort after taxation reached 57 per cent 
of the family income. By 1991, it was estimated that the cost o f a dwelling in one o f the large 
towns had risen fivefold in the previous seven years (Rodriguez López 1994, Valenzuela Rubio 
1994). Yet, price increases were not homogenous, since they affected in particular large towns 
such as Madrid and Barcelona. Data from the respective national household budget surveys 
permit a comparison of the average expenditures o f households on housing. In 1985 an aver­
age French household directed 17.5 per cent o f its expenditures towards housing, while Span­
ish households' part on housing expenditure stood at 19.5 per cent. In 1989 the respective rates 
were 20.5 in France and 22.5 per cent in Spain (Geindre 1993, INE 1993, EUROSTAT 
1990).27
The enormous Spanish price increases were a consequence o f increasing demand due to the 
improvement of the employment situation, and the high number o f young people home-leaving 
age, but most importantly, it originated in the attractiveness o f the Spanish housing sector, to
27 The figures for 1989 are taken from their respective national surveys. Housing expenditure in France includes rent, pay* 
ment of mortgage, maintenance, energy, heating, taxes and insurance. In Spain they include rent, mortgage, heating and 
energy. If in Spain one includes maintenance, furniture and domestic good the proportion of all these expenditures in­
crease to 28 per cent. The figures for 1985 come from a EUROSTAT publication using standardized results of national 
household budget surveys. They include gross rents, rents of tenants, imputed rents of owner-occupiers, expenditure on 
repairs and maintenance of housing and water charges.
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national and foreign speculative investment, since Spain’s entering of the European Union in 
1986. Investing in housing was considered an ideal way to launder money from informal ac­
tivities (Leal 1992, Gomez 1989). House construction was directed mainly to high-income 
groups, to people demanding secondary residences and it was concentrated in touristic areas. 
From the total increase o f dwellings constructed between 1981 and 1992, only 56 were main 
residences, while the remaining ones became secondary or unoccupied residences (Leal 1992). 
This period, from 1986 to 1991 was also characterised by a fall o f  state-subsidised housing 
construction and a clear dominance o f non-subsidised construction. This means that in the sec­
ond half o f the 1980s rented accommodation as well as property were not accessible to a large 
part o f the population (Valenzuela Rubio 1994).
In France, instead, mortgage interest rates diminished in real terms from 1981 to 1986 and 
were then stable until 1991 (Geindre 1993). State expenditure for the subsidised rented sector 
decreased from 1985 to 1990 and then increased somewhat until 1992, while expenditure for 
subsidised home-ownership decreased during this period. As a consequence, the social-rental 
housing (HLM) part of the housing stock increased from 16.4 per cent in 1984 to 17 1 per cent 
in 1993 (Blanc/Bertrand 1996). Added to this, the proportion of personal housing allowances 
in the total public housing budget constantly increased between 1985 and 1992 (Geindre 
1993).
In Spain, the cost o f  renting had risen at almost the same rate as the cost o f buying. This was 
partly because o f a 'spill-over* effect, but it was also a result o f the implementation o f a new 
rent act, which made rents o f  newly rented accommodation increase well above the rate of 
inflation. In 1992 the average national monthly rent for a dwelling was estimated to have 
reached 67,000 Ptas for an average flat o f 88 m2, which represented nearly half of the average 
national wage. By this time renting was as expensive as paying a monthly mortgage (Valen­
zuela Rubio 1994/Cortés Alcalá 1995). In France the average national monthly rent o f a 
dwelling was 1,793 FF and 27.5 FF per square metre in October 1992 
(Blazévic/Detour/Martinez 1997). If we take as reference an 88 m2 dwelling the average 
French rent would be 2,420 FF. The Purchasing Power Standard permits a comparison of both 
average rents: 349 PPS for a French dwelling and 540 PPS for a Spanish dwelling. Thus, on 
average to rent a dwelling was more expensive in Spain than in France.
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Figure 22 shows the tenure structure o f the dwellings of those young people who in 199 ] 0: 
were living on their own. There are very large differences between both countries, for in 
France nearly three quarters o f socially independent young people were renting their dw elling, 
while in Spain only one quarter were doing so. Most Spanish young people living out o f the 
parental home have bought their dwelling (67%). In addition. Spaniards receive help somewhat 
more frequently in the form of a dwelling that has been given to them, i.e. a dw elling not 
rented or owned but given by the family or the employer for cost-free use.
Figure 22: Dwelling Tenure of Independent Youth (20-29), Spain 1991/France 1992
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Source: own elaboration with Franceatl y Spainail and DWELL.
The figures of Figure 22 can be compared to other official statistics. A survey of the Spanish 
Housing Ministry in 1991 shows that, in fact, young people live more frequently than older 
people in rented accommodation and that rented accommodation is more significant in large 
towns than in rural communities, with the exception o f towns between 500,000 and 1,000,000 
inhabitants, were property dwellings are more diffused than in larger towns (Valenzuela Ruoio 
1994). French literature shows also that young people are more likely to rent than to own a 
dwelling. Curci and Taffin (1991), for instance, report that at the end of the 1980s in France, 
tenants of rented housing were most frequently aged 30 or less, while most owners were aged 
50 to 64 years. Besides, the first wave o f  the European Household panel o f 1994 shows nearly
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the same distribution of rented dwellings among all young people's households as that obtained 
from my own elaboration (EUROSTAT 1997).
8.2 Results o f  the Logistic Regression Models
The results of this section refer to model (6) presented previously in section 0. with two differ­
ences. For reasons o f sampling and to avoid weighting of the samples used for the logistic re­
gression {France86 and Spam85) two context variables were introduced. The model used for 
all logistic regressions o f this section is as follows:
(7) logit (IND91/92) = a  + ft^ACTIVEST) + p2(FACLASS) - P?(S1BL) + p4(EDUC) + 
ps(AGE) + p6 (RURURBAN) + p7 (REGION)
This equation was applied separately by country, gender and activity situation. At this point it 
is useful to recapitulate, in a summarised form, what the variables are thought to be measuring 
and which hypotheses are to be tested.
Table 13: Micro-level Variables and Hypotheses
EDLC FACLASS SIBL ACE
1. expectations of 
standard of life 
(non-students)
2. timing school to 
work transition 
(non-students)
1. expectations of 
standard of life 
(non-students)
2. resources of 
parents (students)
1. standard of life 
at home (non- 
students)
2. resources of 
parents (stu­
dents)
I . age differences
Related
hypotheses















The detailed results o f  the models are all in the appendix and the most important findings are 
presented here in a more illustrative way. First, the predictive capacities o f  the models are 
compared to each other. Second, the probabilities o f the reference categories o f the models are 
shown to allow for an appreciation of the cross-national differences that persist after control­
ling for many socio-economic variables. In a third step, the results are interpreted for each sin­
gle group.
1 2 0
The predictive capacity of the models is indicated by the -2  Log Likelihood, which is a mea>- 
ure of how the prediction of the dependent variable becomes more accurate once one intro­
duces the independent variables. Since this measure is sensitive to the sample size, it was de­
cided to compare different models through the comparison of the proportions by which the 
inclusion o f all independent variables increase the -2LL with respect to the -2LL w ithout in­
dependent variables. Contrary to what was assumed, the models for students have a higher 
predictive power than those for non-students. It means that the reduced model, i.e. the socio­
economic model explains nest-leaving probabilities better for students2$ This could mean two 
things: first, non-material aspects of leaving home are more important for young people on the 
labour market than for students or second, activity situation as a proxy of income level and 
income stability is more appropriate to differentiate among students and less among non­
students. Within the group o f students, the best fit is found for French men, followed by Span­
ish men, Spanish women and French women. The best prediction for non-students is obtained 
for Spanish men, followed by French men, Spanish women and French women. This reveals 
that the male models always show a better fit than the female models, which suggests that in 
the female cases non-measured variables such as the availability o f economic help from a male 
partner or/and non-material aspects of the quality of life have a high relevance for their nest­
leaving probabilities. The socio-economic models predict somewhat better for Spaniards than 
for French with the exception o f Spanish male students. This does not necessarily suggest that 
non-material aspects o f the quality of life are more important in France than in Spain, but it 
might mean, for instance, that in the former model, the activity situation is not as good a proxy 
for income as in the latter model. It will be shown later that there is some important income 
heterogeneity within French long-term employed young people, while Spanish research sug­
gests that long-term employed people in Spain always earn more than short-term employed. 28
28 This presentation refers to the figures of the detailed result tables of the appendix.
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The models allow the estimation of the probabilities o f living independently in 1991/92 ac­
cording to given individual characteristics. The estimated probability o f living out o f the pa­
rental home of a person with the characteristics o f the reference category of each independent 
variable can be computed through the transformation of the coefficient o f the intercept into the 
estimated probability.29 According to the model o f young people enrolled in education, a 
French women who combines studies and work, is between 25 and 29 years old, has already 
obtained a tertiary certificate, her father belongs to the service class, she has no siblings and 
lives in a large town in the Ile-de France region has a probability of living independently of 79 
per cent, while her Spanish counterpart in a large town in the region o f Madrid reaches a prob­
ability o f 33 per cent. Of the French sample o f women enrolled in formal education 42 per cent 
are living independently, which clearly shows that this reference category is more likely to be 
found among the independent than the average female student.30 The average Spanish student 
has a rate of independence o f 12 per cent. This means that the fact of belonging to the refer­
ence category increases the chances of young Spanish women to be socially independent by 64 
per cent, while in France by 53 per cent only. These figures show three important things.
■ First, the difference between the Spanish and French average female independence rates 
cannot be explained as a mere composition effect o f the variables included in model 7. 
There are other individual or context variables which are not included in the model and 
which make French and Spanish students who display the same socio-economic conditions 
behave differently.
■ Second, the fact o f belonging to the "privileged" group increases the chances of a Spanish 
female student living independently more than that of her French counterpart.
8.2.1 High Indiv idual Resources Do N ot Always E ncourage to Live Independently
A reference category is characterised by the fact that it has the value 0, which means that the logit(IND91/92) = a + Pi(0) 
+ P:(0)+ P3(0) + .. + p<0). Thus, the transformation of the logit into a probability for a person with the characteristics 
of the 7 ommited categoires is: Prob(IND9I/92)=(eay(l+e11) (Menard 1995).
Independence ra tes an d  th e  d iffe rence betw een these a n d  the  p ro b ab ility  o f  the reference category' are  taken from  the 
tables in appendix  2.
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Third, people with the characteristics of the reference category are supposed to have a high 
standard of life in the parental home, since they belong to the service class, hav e no siblings 
and live in a context with many resources. Their standard o f life outside the parental home 
is relatively high in terms of human capital, since they already have a tertiary' qualfication 
and in terms o f  economic capital, since they have a job. Yet, only in France the relatively 
high standard o f life that such people reach, when they live independently, makes most of 
them leave home, while in Spain the majority of these people stay at home. In Spain, 
"privileged" young people estimate the relative high standard of life they could reach away 
from home as too low to make nest-leaving attractive, because non-measured features such 
as income levels, housing market, social benefits and family formation norms make the 
standard of life o f living independently lower than in France. Unfortunately, the logistic re­
gression models do not permit the disentangling the exact significance o f each o f these un­
measured features. The institutional analysis and the cross-regional analysis explore these 
aspects further on.
Figure 23: Estim ated Probabilities To Be Socially Independent and Indepence Rates 
(Youth Enrolled in Education, Spain 1991/France 1992)
□ reference category □  % of independent
France Spain France Spain
Male students Female students
Source: own elaboration with figures from appendix 2. tables 1 and 2.
"Privileged" male students in France have a very high likelihood of living independently (84° o). 
whereas their Spanish counterparts have a small probability (31%). As in the female case, the 
reference categories in both countries have higher probabilities of living out of the parental 
home than the average student (35% and 11% respectively in each country). Again like 
women, the Spanish reference category increases its chance o f living independently by 63% 
compared to the average student, while his French counterpart only by 58%. This means that, 
though the models control for different socio-economic variables, national differences persist. 
Male students in France might follow a different rational choice logic than Spanish male stu­
dents or the model has to be changed by including better variables in order to discover the 
same logic.
These figures show that differences between the average probability o f living on one's own and 
the estimated probability o f the reference group are larger in Spain than in France, which sug­
gests that the influence o f social inequalities with respect to parents' and one’s own resources 
on the chances o f being a socially independent student are greater in Spain than in France.
The analysis of women on the labour market gives very interesting results, since we find here 
the greatest differences between French and Spanish living arrangement patterns (Figure 24). 
Of the French sample 67 per cent of women live independently, while o f the Spanish sample 45 
per cent. This shows that French and Spanish women not enrolled in education are found more 
frequently out of the parental home than their respective counterparts who are still enrolled in 
formal education. The delay hypothesis (cf. section3.2) which affirms that longer enrolment in 
education delays leaving home is supported by these individual-level findings. The French ref­
erence category, a women with a long-term employment, aged between 25 and 29, with a ter­
tiary qualification, from service class origin, without siblings, in a large town in the Ile-de 
France has an estimated probability o f 82 per cent to be living independently. It means a higher 
probability than the average women of the sample. Interestingly, the Spanish reference cate­
gory, a women with the same characteristics living in a large town in the region of Madrid, has 
a lower likelihood o f living outside the parental home (28%) than the average women o f  the 
sample (45%).
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Figure 24: Estimated Probabilities To Be Socially Independent and Indepence Rates 
(Youth On the Labour Market, Spain 1991/France 1992)
! □  reference category □ %  of independent
Men on the Women on the
labour market labour market
Source: own elaboration with figures of four models, cf. appendix 2. tables 1 and 2.
These figures dealing with people on the labour market show again, as in the case of students, 
that French and Spanish women with the same socio-economic characteristics follow a differ­
ent strategy. Unlike in the students' case Spanish "privileged” women do not show a higher 
probability of living independently than the average women o f the sample. Thus high resources 
do not encourage to early social independence or, in other words, low resources animate to 
early leaving home. This confirms the prediction for women that was deduced from the stabil­
ity hypothesis in section 6.2.2, which stated that Spanish women are less dependent on a long­
term employment than French women, since they choose more frequently a dependent family- 
formation. Yet, from a comparative macro-sociological perspective this specific Spanish pat­
tern does not support early leaving home in Spain, since only 45 per cent o f the women in the 
Spanish sample are living independently compared to 67 per cent o f the French.
Patterns for men are similar to those of women with one difference. “Privileged” Spanish men 
have a slightly higher estimated probability o f living out of the parental home than the average 
rate o f the sample. However, compared to French men the difference between the reference 
category and the average is much smaller. French men with high resources have a 36 per cent 
higher chance of living independently than the average, while Spanish men with high resources 
increase their chance only by 11 per cent. This contrasts with the figures of young people en­
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rolled in education. It means that in both countries high resources are much more important in 
facilitating leaving home for male students than for men on the labour market.
It is very striking that young Spanish men with a long-term employment, aged 25 to 29. with a 
tertiary qualification, of service class origin, without siblings, living in large town in the region 
o f Madrid display an estimated probability of social independence o f only 36 per cent. It means 
that the great majority o f these young men are still living with their parents, despite their high 
level o f personel resources. Instead, 78 per cent o f  their French counterparts are living on their 
own. This shows clearly that long-lasting cohabitation in Spain is not a problem mainly con­
fined to young people without a long-term employment, but must relate to  housing accessibil­
ity and/or specific family-formation norms such as the link between leaving home and becom­
ing married, and leaving home and buying a dwelling. In the next section the analysis of the 
role of the activity situation for living arrangements will shed more light on these French- 
Spanish differences.
8.2.2 Unemployment, Full-time Education and  Short-term  Jobs Delay Leaving Home 
Everywhere
In the following sections results o f the regression models are presented in figures showing the 
net unstandardised logistic regression coefficients. Each independent variable of the model, 
which estimates the logit o f living out of the parental home, has one omitted or reference cate­
gory. The influence o f the independent variable "activity” on living independently is measured 
by comparing the relationship o f different categories o f "activity", for instance "short-term em­
ployed", "unemployed", "family help", with the dependent variable relative to the omitted cate­
gory "long-term employed". Figure 25 shows that French men who are short-term employed 
reduce their logit (or likelihood) o f living independently by a net coefficient o f "-1" compared 
to long-term employed French men, or in other words, they have a lower probability o f  living 
independently. The figures show the net effects, which means that the influence o f activity is 
estimated net o f the influence o f the other independent variables: education, social origin, etc. 
A short-term employed French man has a lower chance o f living independently compared to a 
long-term employed French man independently of the fact of having a low or a high educa­
tional level, independently o f coming from a service class or a working class origin, and so on. 
In the figures the omitted or reference category o f an independent variable is represented by
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the horizontal axis and the coefficients o f the other categories are shown by the bars Thus, 
figures show only relative differences within each country and within each gender group De­
tailed results can be found in appendix 2.
The market-income hypothesis states that to receive a stable market income is the most im­
portant condition to allow for nest-leaving. Thus, it has to be expected that people without a 
job have the lowest likelihood o f being socially independent, those with a short-term job have 
higher chances and those with long-term employment have the highest probabilities. Figure 25 
demonstrates that this applies to Spanish men, but not really to French men. Spanish men with 
some income are more probably living out of the parental home than full-time students, first- 
job seeker, the unemployed and the economically inactive. By contrast, French male family 
helps have the lowest probability of living independently compared to long-term employed 
men, next come first job-seekers and these are followed by full-time students, short-term em­
ployees and last by unemployed people who previously had a job. Thus, the hypothesis has to 
be falsified for French men. The fact that short-term employed French men are less likely to be 
socially independent than the unemployed has to be seen in relation to the low earnings of 
young people in fixed-term employment measures. The market-income hypothesis is also not 
not valid for women, since women who are economically inactive have more probability to be 
living independently than women with a long-term job. However, these female patterns are in 
line with the theoretical assumptions, since for women it was stated that the role of the re­
sources of the partner can be as or even more important than the resources o f the women her­
self. Yet, for technical reasons it was not possible to include the information about the pres­
ence or absence o f  a partner.3'
Young women in full-time education show the lowest likelihood o f living out o f the parental 
home compared to the long-term employed, while young male full-time students also have a 
low likelihood o f living independently, but they do not belong to the group with the lowest 
chances. In Spain, male first-job seekers have an even lower probability o f living out o f the 
parental home than students if  both are compared to long-term employed men. French full-time 
students are more likely to live independently than first-job seeker and family helps. In both 
countries part-time students are more likely to live out o f the parental home than full-time stu- 31
31 This is due to the fact that having a spouse/partner means two things at once: the fact of being socially independent and 
the fact of having potentially acces to the partner’s resources.
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dents with the exception o f  French men. for whom the estimated coefficient is statistically not 
significant. Short-term employed people have everywhere a relatively low likelihood to be liv­
ing out of the parental home, but their likelihood to do so is always higher than that o f first- 
employment seeker with the exception o f French women, i ■
Figure 25: Net Effects o f Activity Situation On the Likelihood o f Social Independence 
(All Young People, France 1992/Spain 1991)
I
i
i “ ' ---
ill short-term employed □ part-time student □full-time student 
! I □  economically inactive □  self-employed ■  family help
■  unemployed after job E3 first-job seeker
S o u rc e : lo g is tic  r e g re s s io n  w ith  France86 a n d  Spain85. 
N o tes : s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  < = 0 .0 5 .  N o  ta b le  in  a p p e n d ix .
The pluralisation hypothesis predicts that French students will show a higher probability of 
leaving home than Spanish students, which corresponds with the results o f the logistic regres­
sions. In the female case part-time students in both countries have the same likelihood of living 
independently, but French full-time students have a significantly higher chance to be socially 
independent than their Spanish counterparts.32
32 In some cases it was necessary to check if the cross-national differences between the coefficients are significant. This has 
been done by merging the Spanish and French samples into one, by introducing a new variable indicating the person's 
country and by introducing interaction terms. In the case here an interaction between activty and country was included 
in the merged sample, in addition to the list of variables of the county model and to the country dummy. If the coeffi­
cients of the interaction term are significant, it means that the cross-national differences between the coefficients, as 
■ shown by the illustrative figures are statistically significant. The detailed results are not further presented.
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In the next two sections students and non-students’ living arrangement patterns will be ana­
lysed separately and cross-national differences will be interpreted.
8.2.3 Social Class Affects Students* Living Arrangements in France
If students are analysed separately, the activity effects confirm the previous findings "  In both 
countries, students who combine a job with education are more likely to be living independ­
ently and the strength o f the effect is equally strong for French than for Spanish people, al­
though in both countries it is somewhat stronger for men than for women.3 4 Again, the larer 
finding might be related to the possibility o f female students to depend on the resources o f their 
spouse/partner. As shown above in Figure 18 nearly as many French as Spanish men and 
women combine work with studies, so that in this case o f similar individual strategies in both 
countries, composition effects cannot help to explain the overall differences in the 
intergenerational coresidence patterns between French and Spanish students. It means also that 
there are no contextual effects influencing part-time students in both countries.
Female students in France are more likely to live out o f the parental home if they are between 
25 and 29 years old, and if they have a relatively high educational level. This means that nest­
leaving is more diffused among university students than among students of secondary voca­
tional training for example. Interestingly, students from a petty bourgeoisie and a farming 
background show higher probabilities o f living independently than those of service class origin. 
Instead, those of working class origin have low probabilities o f living out of the parental home 
(Figure 26). The petty bourgeoisie and famer effects might be due to fact that young women 
from these family backgrounds are more frequently forced to emigrate for study reasons. Yet, 
even if this is the case it means that these young people are able to afford living away for study 
reasons, because o f the relatively high resources of these families, and/or because o f the fact 
that students from these origins are more likely to receive scholarships than those o f working 
class origin. This might be due to the phenomenon that the income o f the parents o f the former 
is more difficult to estimate correctly by the state bureaucracy than that of dependent workers.
33 The interpretation of this section is mainly based on the tables 1 and 2 in appendix 2, since it was not worth illustrating
all results with figures.
34 It has to be noticed that part-time students are those people who in both questionnaires first answered that they were
employed and then said that they combined their jobs with studies. Thus, these are people who perceive themselves first
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Findings presented later on (cf. 8.2.5) show that all these social origin effects persist when one  
includes income information in the model, which means that it cannot (only) be a question o f  a 
higher likelihood of receiving public grants and family help, but that other characteristics origi­
nating from these specific class positions are relevant.
Figure 26: Net Effects of Social Origin on the Likelihood of Social Independence
(Students, France 1992/Spain 1991)
i §  routine non-manuai work. □  petty bourgeoisie 
I □  farmers □  skilled workers
| B non-skilled workers______M agricultural workers
Source: own elaboration with figures of four models, cf. appendix 2. table 1 and 2.
French men behave similarly to French women with three differences. The age effect is non­
existent, while instead all educational levels exert a statistically significant effect. This means 
the lower the educational level the less one is likely to be living out of the parental home. With 
respect to social origin effects, the effect o f coming from a fanning background is, in contrast 
to women, statistically insignificant, probably because men remain more often bound to the 
farm than women. This is supported by the fact that small municipalities show more negative 
effects on males living independently than in the case o f women. Male students in rural areas 
under 20,000 inhabitants are less likely to be living independently. Like female students, male 
students from a petty bourgeoisie background are more likely to live independently than their 
colleagues form the service class, the routine non-manual class and the working class. Only 
men o f agricultural working class origin also have a high probability o f living independently,
of all as employed and then as students. They might display other characteristics than people who consider themselves
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even higher than those from the petty bourgeoisie. As in the female case these social class ef­
fects remain very similar once income is included in the logistic regression models Thus, social 
origin differences might be related to a different accessibility to public benefits for students 
according to social class, since students receive grants either because their parents' income is 
very low (agricultural workers) or because it officially appears to be low (petty bourgeoisie), 
but this interpretation is not sufficient. The argument that these families have more resources 
than other families is not valid either, since they are more likely to have independent child, en 
than the service class, which is supposed to have higher resources. The most convincing inter­
pretation is that these young people's families live more frequently in rural areas than service 
class families and that they have to leave home in order to study. However, this does not ex­
clude that they receive also more frequently public benefits and family help.
French male students' chances o f living out of the parental home are strongly influenced by 
their social origin and not at all by age, in contrast to what happens in Spain. French female 
students display also a smaller age-effect and relatively large social origin effects. It might be 
argued that French young people who are enrolled in education are not considered as children 
who have to be maintained by their parents, which would make more age-differences and less 
social class differences appear. In Spain, by contrast, large age-differences and the absence of 
social class effects, reflect more generalised social norms about students' social dependence. It 
can be stated that the French male students' patterns falsify the age-cleavage hypothesis, while 
the Spanish patterns confirm it, as is shown next.
Spanish female students show few differences in their chances o f living independently. Apart 
from the effect o f a part-time job, only two other effects were found:
1. older women are more likely to be out of the parental home than younger ones;
2. those with an already completed tertiary education are more likely than those with a ma­
turity certificate.
Like their female counterparts, Spanish male students show little differences among them­
selves. Only older students, those from an agricultural workers' background and those with 
many siblings are more likely to be living independently than younger students of service class 
origin and with no siblings. Either their standard of life is very low in the parental home and
first of all as students and only sporadically combine this main activity with some jobs.
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thus pushes them out of the nest or they have more chances of receiving a sufficiently high 
scholarship to live out of the parental home. Yet. it is strange that these effects were not found 
for their female counterparts.
Nest-leaving of Spanish female students seems to be strongly socially regulated, since it is the 
attainment of a given age and the end o f tertiary education which seems to guide these 
women's strategies. Male students are affected by a similar age effect, but also by the fact of 
being of a family background with a low standard o f  life. Unlike the patterns of their French 
counterparts, Spanish students’ patterns confirm the age-cleavage hypothesis.
8.2.4 Economically Active Youth and Social Independence in Spain and France
If one takes the sample o f young people out of formal education, it appears that first-job seek­
ers always have less probabilities of living independently than people with a long-term em­
ployment, as revealed by Figure 27. This type o f unemployment affects the most Spanish men's 
likelihood to be socially independent and the least Spanish women’s likelihood. First employ­
ment seeking affects more Spanish than French men.35 Only in France young people searching 
for a first unemployment at the end of the 1980s had access to a means-tested unemployment 
benefit, while Spanish people were entitled to attend vocational training courses specially set 
up for the unemployed, but had no entitlement to unemployment benefits. In addition, French 
young people in need could apply for housing allowances, whereas these did not exist in Spain 
(cf. section 10). It has also to be remembered that many French young people leave home dur­
ing their enrolment in education. Afterwards some o f  them return home but others remain so­
cially independent and try to  overcome brief periods without market income without returning 
home. These differences in social rights might explain that first unemployment in France affects 
the male likelihood o f social independence less than in Spain. This argument is not valid for 
women, since in Spain the estimated coefficient o f  first-job seeker is not significantly different 
from the French one. Yet, again this might be in relation to the fact that in Spain more women 
rely on their partners' resources than in France.
3' Differences are statistically significant.
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Young men who had a job and lost it are also less likely to live independently than their coun­
terparts with a long-term job. At first sight, in Spain this type o f unemployment seem to affect 
more the likelihood o f social independence than in France, but the difference is not statistically 
significant. This contradicts the idea that social rights differences o f unemployed people might 
partly explain country variations, since French unemployment insurance coverage is more ex­
tensive and more generous in terms o f time than the Spanish unemployment difference (cf 
section 10.4.2).
In both countries to be a fixed-term male employee decreases the likelihood o f living independ­
ently compared to long-term employed men in a similar way.36 Since Spanish employment pol­
icy is more strongly directed towards flexibilisation at the margin than in France, these policy 
differences might be related to the average cross-national variation. In other words, individual 
strategies o f fixed-term employed men are similar in both countries, but Spanish employment 
policy favours more than the French short-term contracts for youth and there are more fived- 
term employed young men. These context differences partly explain the higher rate o f two- 
generation households in Spain.
Coming back to the stability hypothesis presented previously, it can be stated that for Spanish 
men, employment is more important for social independence than for French men, since first 
unemployment affects Spaniards’ social independence more than it affects French. These find­
ings contradict the hypothesis as it was formulated in section 6.2.2, because fixed-term jobs 
and unemployment after a job have similar effects in both countries, but it confirms the great 
problem o f first-unemployment in Spain.
36 The difference between the Spanish and French coefficients as revealed in Figure 26 is not statistically significant.
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Figure 27: Net Effects of Activity Situation on the Likelihood of Social Independence
(Non-Students, France 1992/Spain 1991)
B short-term employed □  economically inactive □  self-employed 
! □  family help □ unemployed after job B first-job seeker
Source: own elaboration with figures of four models, cf. appendix 2. tables 3 and 4.
In France and Spain, women who are economically inactive are more likely to be living out o f 
the parental home than women with long-term employment. This is not surprising, for self­
definition as economically inactive is something that seldom occurs if women live in the pa­
rental home. Therefore nearly all economically inactive women are per definition living inde­
pendently from their parents.
Interestingly, Spanish women who lost their job are more likely to be found living independ­
ently than women with a long-term employment. These are surely women who had a job when 
leaving home and which having lost it maintain themselves thanks to unemployment benefit 
and/or their partner's income. Yet, why do we not find this pattern in France? Very likely this is 
connected to the fact that long-term employees, the reference category, behave differently in 
both countries. Above, it was shown that Spanish "privileged” women, i.e. those with long­
term employment and other high resources, are less likely to be living independently than the 
less "privileged". The reason for this is that young women in Spain follow, more frequently 
than their French contemporaries, a dependent household formation strategy as shown in sec­
tion 8.1.2. Spanish women show less pronounced net effects o f their own resources on their 
chance o f being out o f the parental home than do their French contemporaries. This supports 
the stability hypothesis for Spain.
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With respect to education the theoretical model for young people on the labour market a>- 
sumed that educational level is an indicator of expectations of living standard, and o f the time 
young people are already on the labour market. This is probably the reason why Spanish and 
French differences in the effect o f educational level are so pronounced, as summarised by 
Figure 28.
Figure 28: Net Effects of Education on the Likelihood of Social Independence 
(Non-Students, France 1992/Spain 1991)
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I □ secondary vocat. certificate □ maturity certificatei
| @ missing
Source: own elaboration with figures of four models, cf. appendix 2. tables 3 and 4.
Spanish women with low educational levels are more likely to be living independently than 
women with a tertiary qualification. This is related to the fact that women with low education 
credentials are found more frequently among those living in a male-breadwinner family. A lo­
gistic regression with the sample of Spanish women who live out o f the parental home, which 
estimated the likelihood of being an economically inactive women against all other activity 
situations, shows that education has a strong net effect. Women with educational levels beiow 
a tertiary qualification are all more likely to be in a male-breadwinner family, and this is the 
most likely for women whose highest qualification is the completion of compulsory educa­
tion.37 This explains why in the group o f young women aged 20 to 29 those with the highest




likelihood of living out o f the parental home are women with the lowest educational level. In­
stead, young women with a tertiary certificate are less likely to  be living independently during 
this life cycle phase, because they seldom follow a dependent household formation strategy.
This corresponds with the predictions o f  the stab ility  hypothesis, which foresaw' that m arriage 
with an employed husband is a very diffused strategy for female home-leaving in Spain. Apart 
from these relationships there are also good arguments for confirming the low-expectation 
hypothesis, which affirms that young people with relatively low educational levels entered the 
labour market early and have relatively low expectations with regard to the economic standard 
of life out of the parental home.
In France, we find exactly the opposite pattern. Women with low educational level have more 
difficulty in living out o f the parental home than those with a tertiary qualification. This is 
partly due to the fact that many women with a tertiary qualification had already left home for 
the time they were enrolled in education. This specific French pattern is so strong that it out­
weighs the effect that French women with a low educational level tend to be more frequently in 
male-breadwinner families, like in Spain. The same logistic regression as for Spanish women 
was run, where the likelihood of socially independent women to be economically inactive was 
estimated. Unlike in the Spanish case, not all educational levels below the tertiary qualification 
increase the chances of being in a male-breadwinner family, but the lowest educational level 
does. On the one hand, these findings confirm the p luralisation hypothesis, since they show 
that many French women leave home in order to enter a male-breadwinner family but that 
many also leave home for study, while in Spain few women leave home for study and many 
more in order to live in a male-breadwinner family. On the other hand, the low-expectation 
hypothesis has to be rejected for French women.
Spanish men with low educational levels are also more likely to be living independently as 
compared to men with a tertiary certificate. Unlike women, this is not necessarily in relation to 
the male-breadwinner model, but is a timing effect. Men who were already out of education for 
some time had more employment experiences, had an income and could save some money. 
Garrido and Requena (1996) included years o f employment experience in a logistic regression 
estimating the likelihood o f  living out o f  the parental home. This variable has a quasi-linear 
positive effect on the probability o f social independence, which is, the larger one's employment 
experience the higher the probability o f being socially independent. This effect is net of the
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current activity situation, which means that accumulation of resources in the labour market has 
an effect independent o f the current labour market situation. Thus, both the labour market ca­
reer and the labour market situation are important net o f all other effects, such as age and so­
cial origin. This is also a result o f the fact that those who enter the labour market late have lost 
some years of income, but have a better chance to find a job. Young people with low educa­
tional levels enter their first employment earlier than those with higher educational levels, but 
at the same time, if one controls for age at leaving school, it appears that Spanish young people 
with higher educational qualifications are less likely to be unemployed (Garrido/Requena 
1996). Thus people with low educational levels have many difficulties on the labour market but 
they have had nonetheless more time to accumulate savings than those with a higher educa­
tional level, in particular if we only observe young people aged 20 to 29. In addition, if we 
interpret educational levels as proxies for expectations then it can be argued that people with 
lower educational levels also have lower expectations with regard to the economic standard of 
life they wish to attain out of the parental home. Thus my own results and other research find­
ings confirm the low-expectation hypothesis for Spanish men on the labour market.
French men, instead, do not show different patterns by educational level. It is as if the current 
labour market situation was able to indicate all differences, those related to the labour market 
career and those referred to the current situation. Probably, early entrance into the French la­
bour market means much more that it brings persisting disadvantages for the future labour 
market position, which outweighs the advantages related to early entrance. In addition, French 
men display many social class effects, which seem to be so important that they directly affect 
these people's chances without being mediated by educational level differences.
Figure 29 illustrates that for French men social origin plays an important role for their chances 
o f social independence, net of many other effects. These results are in line with what was found 
for students. This contradicts common sense expectations about the redistributory effects of 
well-established Welfare States and their consequent mitigation o f social class differences. Yet 
as is shown below, in spite of the fact that public benefits increases all young French men’s 
chances of social independence, social class effects persist (cf. 8.3). Thus, public benefits have 
effects on young people's life chances, but they are not so strong as to eliminate social class 
effects. As in the students' case, a petty bourgeoisie background favours social independence, 
probably because many of those people left home when they were students. Again, as for stu­
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dents a working class origin diminishes the chances of social independence, including those 
from an agricultural worker background. The latter had a positive effect on students' likelihood 
of living out of the parental home. Thus, for French men on the labour market the low -qualitv- 
of-life hypothesis and the low-expectation hypothesis have to the falsified. Young people 
from lower class origin do not tend to be more frequently socially independent.
The low-quality-of-life hypothesis does not work either for Spanish men. Spanish men from 
farmers’ and non-skilled workers' backgrounds are less likely to be living independently than 
their counterparts from the service class. The positive effect o f an agricultural worker origin, 
which was found for students, does not appear more for non-students, it is instead negative, 
but not statistically significant.
Figure 29: Net Coefficients of Social O rigin  on the Likelihood of Social Independence
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Source: own elaboration with figures of four models, cf. appendix 2, tables 3 and 4.
Women in both countries display few social origin influences. Again, a petty bourgeoisie origin 
is a positive factor for French women, while a skilled workers' origin increases the probability 
of living out o f the parental home. For women too, it is not possible to confirm the low- 
quality-of-Iiving hypothesis.
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A curious finding is revealed by Figure 30: parental resources seem to be important in Spain, 
not as indicated by social origin but by number of siblings. Instead, in France the number of 
siblings has no effect on living arrangement. The costs parents face due to a larger or smaller 
number of children influences living arrangements in Spain. A linear relationship between the 
number of siblings and the likelihood of leaving home exists: the more siblings a young person 
has, the higher the tendency to live independently. It is as if the advantages of living in the pa­
rental home diminish when the parental resources have to be shared among many children and 
this applies to all social classes. The lack of this effect in France might be due to the relatively 
generous French family policy, which is able to equalise to some extent child costs among 
families with different numbers o f children. These results suggest once more a falsification of 
the low-quality-of life hypothesis for French men and women, while they partially confirm it 
for Spaniards o f both gender.
Figure 30: Net Coefficients o f Siblings on the Likelihood of Social Independence
(Non-Students, Spain 1991)
tone sibling D two siblings Qthree and more siblings ^missing
Source: own elaboration with figures of four models, cf. appendix 2, tables 3 and 4.
Age plays a much greater role in Spain than in France, since young people aged 20 to 24 years 
are much more likely to stay at home than their 25 to 29 year-old counterparts. In France, dif­
ferences are significantly smaller, which indicates that moving into adulthood can be achie/cd 
early in a comparative perspective. However, contrary to what happens to French students, 
age-differences persist in the case o f  French youth on the labour market. Thus for youth out o f
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the education system, we find in both countries that the age-cleavage hypothesis is confirmed 
The comparatively longer dependence of young Spanish people, students and non-students, on 
their parents is strongly institutionalised in Spanish society and is also reflected in Spanish so ­
cial security and taxation law (cf section 10.1).
Figure 31: Net Coefficients of Age on the Likelihood o f Social Independence 
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Source: own elaboration with figures of four models, cf. appendix 2. tables 3 and 4.
Before general conclusions are drawn, it will be shown how much better it would be to include 
information on income into the logistic regressions. The French survey allows for the amelio­
ration of the empirical test o f the theoretical model, since income data are available.
8.2,5 Is Activity a Good Proxy for Income Level and Stability? The French Case
In section 6.2.3 the theoretical model included income level and income stability as explaining 
variables instead o f  activity situation. It was necessary to take activity as a proxy for both level 
and stability o f income, since the Spanish survey does not include information on income. On 
the other hand the French survey pro\ ides this information, and for France a model was com­
puted, in which income was combined with activity. In this way we can see if the model with 
income level and stability explains more than the model using activity as proxy for both, as has 
been assumed in the cross-national empirical models. It was decided that an amount slightly 
over the minimum wage as cutting point for the construction of a new variable should be taken
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(ACTIVINC). which takes the place o f the comparative variable ACTIVEST Instead o f a 
distinction between long-term and fixed-term employment, unemployment, etc. ACTIN'INC 
distinguishes between long-term employment with a monthly income at or below 5,000 FF. 
long-term employment over 5,000 FF, short-term employment at or below 5,000 FF. short­
term employment over 5,000 FF, etc.
All four French models with the variable income (ACTIVINC) instead o f activity show lower -  
2 Log-Likelihood values, which indicates that they predict living independently better than the 
former French models.38 Compared to long-term employed people with an income over 5,000 
FF, an income at or below 5,000 FF has, in general, a negative effect on the probability of 
leaving home independently o f  the stability o f the employment.39 Also, male students who have 
an income at or below 5,000 FF are less likely to be living independently than students with a 
part-time job paid over 5,000 FF. First-job seeking and unemployment is negatively related to 
social independence, if the male or female unemployed people receive at or below 5,000 FF 
income, but if they have access to a higher income then their chance of living independently 
does not differ from those having a long-term employment paid over 5,000 FF. Women who 
are economically inactive are not more likely to be living independently than a long-term em­
ployed women with a high income. Thus, income level is a significant dimension for explaining 
young people's living arrangements in France. It especially helps to distinguish different groups 
of long-term employees, which in the model without income are treated as a homogeneous 
group. This problem does not exist for the group o f  short-term employees, since compared to a 
long-term job paid over 5,000 FF a short-term employment always decreases men's and 
women's likelihood of living out of the parental home, even if  it is paid over 5,000 FF. This 
means that income stability is very important.
The strongest negative net effects are found for young people with a short-term job or search­
ing for a first job and having an income at or below 5,000 FF. Full-time students with no or a 
low income also have the lowest probability of social independence compared to part-time 
students with an income over 5,000 FF. Yet, in the case o f students the net effect o f  some edu­
cational levels and o f some social origin categories exert similar strong effects. As in section 
8.2.2, these findings cannot confirm the market-income hypothesis for French young people
38 Detailed results can be found in appendix 2, table 5 to 8.
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an the labour market, since to have a low paid short-term employment supports social inde­
pendence less than to be unemployed, in particular if receiving more than 5,000 FF. For stu­
dents too, market income is not the most determinant feature with respect to strength o f the 
influence o f other variables, as for instance to have a low educational level or to be o f  a petty 
bourgeoisie origin.
Flow far do these new models with ACTIVTNC change the effects o f all other variables? Com ­
pared to the female model without information on income, social origin and education effects 
disappear completely in the model o f  female non-students with income, which means that in­
come (from market and/or spouse), income stability and age are the only significant variables at 
the individual level. The inclusion o f income in the male non-students model hardly alters the 
effects o f the other variables, with two exceptions. A negative effect of being from a farming 
background appears and the effect o f  having a non-skilled father becomes statistically insignifi­
cant. Thus, for men, access to a long-term employment, an income over 5,000 FF and to be o f  
service class or petty bourgeoisie origin are the best conditions for social independence.
Female students show very similar effects in the model with and without income, while male 
students show less social origin effects once information o f income is included in the model.
The positive agricultural workers' origin and the negative skilled workers' origin disappears.
All in all there remain various social origin effects for both gender o f students, in particular the 
positive petty bourgeoisie effects persist.
Thus, it can be stated that activity is a quite good proxy for income level and income stability, 
at least in the French case. Nonetheless, data on income provide a greater predictive power and 
help to discover heterogeneity within the group o f long-term employees,
8.2.6 Conclusion: Labour M arket Difficulties Affect M ore Spaniards Than French
The socio-economic model has proven some explanative power, for it explains 12 to 29% o f  
the observed variation. It performs as well for Spain and France, but it always explains men’s 
behaviour better than women’s behaviour. Contrary to the theoretical assumption, it explains
39 There are some exceptions, namely economically inactive men, self-employed women, and female and male family helps.
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students’s chances of social independence better than non-students’ behaviour This does not 
change when income information of the young person is introduced into the model, as vva.. 
done for France. This variation between students and non-students might mean two things 
First, if one assumes that the relevant socio-economic variables are all included in the model, 
then it might mean that preferences play a larger role in non-students* decision to leave home 
than in students’. Second, it might mean that the theoretical model of non-students has not 
been operationalised adequately. Non-students’ leaving home process less frequently follows 
an individual strategy than students’ leaving home process, since non-students more often fol­
low a “couple” strategy. This fact is taken into account in the theoretical model but, due to 
technical problems, not in its empirical application. This means that for the study o f young 
people out of education, data which permit a better operationalisation of the theoretical model 
are needed. Ideally we would need as much information on the partner o f the individual, i:> 
stable and non-stable partnerships, as on the individual herself. For future development it 
would also be better to include not only income stability and income level in the theoretical 
equation but also time spent in employment. This fact seems especially important in Spain be­
cause saving for a dwelling while staying in the parental home is a widely diffused strategy.
The comparative logistic regression models lead to three general conclusions and some more
specific results.
1. It was shown that people with many personal resources and from a privileged social class 
background do not behave similarly in both countries, which means that composition ef­
fects cannot help to explain away cross-national differences. The likelihood o f Spanish 
"privileged" people to be socially independent is always low compared to their French 
counterparts. This points to the limits of the socio-economic model as operationalised in 
this analysis.
2. The findings support the pluralisation hypothesis for France and falsifies it for Spain, i.e. 
young people in France show a more diversified pattern o f  setting up an independent 
household and social independence is less related to men's position on the labour market.
3. To have a stable market income is an important characteristic for increasing Spanish young 
men's chances o f living independently, but the market-income hypothesis is falsified for 
young French men and for women in both countries.
but the first three categories were not siginificant in either the comparative model.
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French male students* probability of leaving home is the highest for those having a job. having 
higher educational levels and for those of an agricultural workers’, petty bourgeoisie and serv ­
ice class origin. French female students show similar patterns, yet in contrast to men. to be 
between 25 and 29 years old increase their probability of being out o f the parental home net o f 
all other effects. French students' chances o f social independence depend much on their own 
resources and on the resources of their parents. It might also be closely related to the need of 
migration to university towns. Spanish students seldom leave the parental home and leaving is 
only favoured by personal resources and by having reached at least age 25. The redistribution 
of public and private resources towards students depends a lot on age in Spain and not much 
on social class, while the contrary is true for French students. This means that in France we 
find a stronger social class cleavage, while in Spain the age cleavage is more pronounced. The 
fact that Spanish students' nest-leaving does not depend on their parents' resources suggest that 
there are social norms connecting enrolment in education with social dependence.
Spanish men not enrolled in education are the most likely to live independently if they have a 
stable market income, are at least age 25, have many siblings, a low educational level and come 
from a farmer or non-skilled worker background. Complementary to this male pattern, a 
Spanish female non-student is the most likely to  live out o f the parental home if she is eco­
nomically inactive or unemployed, aged 25 or more, has a low educational level, has many sib­
lings and her father was economically inactive when she was 16. Thus, for Spaniards out o f  the 
formal education system the stability hypothesis, the low-quality-of-life hypothesis40, the 
low-expectation hypothesis and the age-cleavage hypotheses could be confirmed.
Patterns of their French counterparts falsify the low-quality-of-life and the low-expectation 
hypotheses. The highest male probability to live independently corresponds to men with a 
long-term employment, aged over 24 and from a petty bourgeoisie or service class back­
ground. French women are the most likely to  be living out o f the parental home if they are 
economically inactive or have a long-term employment, are aged 25 to 29, have a tertiary 
qualification and come from the petty bourgeoisie or from the service class.
40 only if one takes SIBL as indicator of parents' resources.
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Cross-national French-Spanish differences in the rate of young people living out o f  the parental 
home can be related to four differences:
1. French university students leave home much more frequently than Spanish students and 
some facts indicate that this is related to a higher geographical mobility in France and ô a 
lower accessibility of Spanish university students to economic resources.
2. Spanish men out of education find many more barriers for leaving home than their French 
counterparts, because o f the various difficulties they encounter to find an employment and 
in particular a long-term job on the Spanish labour market and their higher dependence on 
a market income.
3. French women depend less on a spouse's income in order to live independently and this is 
surely related to their higher chances of finding a long-term employment earlier than Span­
ish women.
4 Spanish people leave home mostly to form a new family and only after having stabilised at 
least one income, whereas French young people leave home also for studying and cohabi­
tation and they depend less on a stable market income.
It is not possible to show that Spanish young people having access to public benefits are more 
likely to live independently than those who only depend on the market or on the family. Partly 
because the survey provides no information on transfer income, but partly also because a 
whole range o f public benefits do not exist for Spanish young people or are of a very limited 
significance, such as housing allowances, access to social housing, access to publicly subsidised 
halls o f residence and means-tested unemployment benefits. Instead, it is possible to test the 
importance o f income diversification for young people's living arrangements in France.
8.3 Public Benefits And Market Income Help Leaving Home in France
In this section the dependence-diversification hypothesis will be formulated and tested at the 
individual level. To confirm the dependence-diversification hypothesis at the individual level 
one would expect that people who have two income sources are more likely to leave home 
than those who have only one income source and that those who have three income sources 
are even more likely to live independently than those with one source. Within these differences 
market income will be superior to public income and the latter superior to family transfers, so 
that it is, for instance, more useful to receive market and public income than family transfers
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and public benefits. Thus, the best condition to leave home would be to combine market in­
come, with public benefits and family help, the next best combination market income and pub­
lic benefits, then market income and family help, followed by public benefits and family help 
and at last to rely only on market income. To have only family support or only public benefits 
should be worse for predicting social independence than to rely only on market income.
Many young French people go to a hall of residence when they first leave home. Without the 
offer of halls o f residence they probably would not have left the parental home, or if they had 
then they would have needed parental financial help through money transfer or supply o f ac­
commodation. In section 10.2.3 the importance o f grants and public housing benefits for 
French students is discussed. Are these public benefits relevant for French students leaving 
home or are market income and family help more important? ~ ;
Testing of the dependence-diversification hypothesis for non-students is more complicated 
than for students, because o f the wide range o f  public benefits they can be entitled to - unem­
ployment benefit, regulated employment measure or housing benefit - and because the effect o f 
some of these measures on leaving home is not easy to establish, for instance, the effect o f em­
ployment measures. In section 10.3 the impact o f employment measures on young people’s 
financial autonomy and in consequence on their choice to leave home is discussed. Employ­
ment measures rarely guarantee financial autonomy but they seem to increase the pace o f 
young people’s attainment of a stable job, i.e. they open the door to financial autonomy after 
the measure. Besides this substantive difficulty, the retrospective part o f the French survey 
does not provide detailed information about the types of employment measures somebody had 
benefited from, but mixes short-term unregulated jobs with short-term regulated jobs.41 The 
influence of unemployment and housing benefits for the unemployed can be studied more easily 
and as shown in sections 10.4 and 10.5.4 both types of benefit, together, amount frequently to 
a subsistence level income, in particular for the unemployed who had previously had a job. In 
addition the comparative logistic regressions have shown important cross-national differences 
in unemployed people's probability o f living independently. Thus, the test for non-students will
Jl Furthermore, there is regional variation in the number of people enroled in some employment measures, but there is very 
little regional variation in the likelihood of social independence in the logistic regression for French young non-student 
men. In the female model some more variation is found, but only four regions out of 22 show a significant effect on 
young female non-students* likelihood to leave home (cf section 9.1.1).
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concentrate on the effects o f  receiving versus non-receiving public unemployment or housing 
benefit and will ignore the role of regulated employment.
The French survey permits a test o f the dependency-diversification hypothesis at the individual 
level. The theoretical individual-level model presented above has to be changed to permit the 
test. The model above was:
(3) S Tin dependent =  (low) +  Ipertner- HXPindepent +  NQU ALindcpendcrt ) +  ( S N i  +  S N :  +  S N ? . . )  
economic factors/constraints preferences in a cultural context
The new model is summarised by:
( 8 )  S T  independent (Imaikct Lllowancei^- 1 partner Ipir “ EXPjndcpent +  B E N kind+  N Q U A L indepc ndcnl)
(SNi..)
economic factors/constraints preferences in a cult, con-
text
where income is split into income from work on the market (Inurtct) and into income coming 
from social security or the state, such as housing allowances, unemployment allowances, grants 
and minimum income transfers (I,nowance»)- Public benefits in kind (BEN^d), such as halls of 
residence or social housing, have to be subtracted from the expenditures o f living independ­
ently. Benefits coming from parents have been added as well (lpar).
Translated in the logistic regression language the equation becomes:
(9) Probicivìng ~ Inurkct ^allowances ^partner lp ,r + BENkind + EDU + CLASS + PART
Information on expenditure o f living independently and on the existence o f a partner have to be 
omitted in the regression model, since this variable exists only for those who have left. We do 
not know either the expectations about expenditure in an independent dwelling o f those living 
with the parents or the existence o f  a partner. As in previous models, information on education 
and social origin have been introduced into the statistical model (cf. 0)
Allowances in the case o f non-students can be unemployment allowance, "indemnité de licen­
ciement", minimum income (RMl), family and/or housing allowance. The benefits in kind are 
"to have left home in order to go to live in a hall o f residence for young workers" at the time of
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the first leaving or "to live in a social dwelling" in 1992. There is also information on income 
coming from a partner and from father and/or mother. Instead o f activity situation the exis­
tence or non existence o f market income will be taken. Grants, minimum income, fam- 
ily/housing allowances, and market income are relevant in the case o f students, as well as the 
partner's and parents' contributions. As for benefits in kind, it is possible to know if the young 
person left home in order to live in a hall o f residence for students or if the individual lives in a 
social dwelling.
The survey does not provide information on the amount o f  each income type, but only on the 
total amount o f income. Since, in this section the interest lies in the diversification o f income 
and not in the amount o f each benefit, this is not a problem. The information refers to the in­
come of the month previous to the interview. Information on the use o f halls o f residence re­
fers to the moment o f the first home-leaving in order to avoid the problem of under­
representation of people in halls of residence and to avoid an over-determination of living ar­
rangement by the fact that all young people in a hall o f residence are by definition out o f the 
parental home. The variable was created taking 7 possible situations into account (DIVERS):
1. only market income in 1992 and never lived in state-subsidised dwelling;
2. no market income or family help, but only public benefits or lives in a social dwelling in 
1992 or lived in a hall o f residence when left home the first time;
3. only family transfers or living in a dwelling paid by the parents in 1992 and never lived in a 
hall of residence;
4. market income and public allowances, or market income and lives in a social dwelling in 
1992 or had left for a hall of residence in the past;
5. market and family transfers of any type (also payment o f dwelling), the latter including 
support from parents and partner in 1992,
6. family help in1992, and public transfers in 1992 or hall o f residence when left home,
7. market income, public allowances or benefits in kind and family transfers in 1992 or when 
left home.
Figure 32 reveals the diversification o f  income sources o f young people. Most students receive 
some income from the family and from the state and the next most common situation is to re­
ceive income from the market and the family. All other combinations oscillate somewhere un­
der 9 per cent. There are very small differences between the two gender. Young people on the
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labour market show a more diversified distribution of income sources. The most common in­
come combination is to receive income from the market and the family, followed by the combi­
nation of market, state and family, and by the combination o f market and family and market 
alone. In this case we find significant gender differences, since women more frequently than 
men receive only family help or state and family transfers and they are less likely to combine 
market and family income or to receive only market income.
Figure 32: Diversification of Income Sources, Youth (20-29), France 1992
□  family help □  public benefits
' H market income ■  market & state
] □  market &. family ■  family & state
Î ; □  market, state & family
Women Men Women Men
Students Students Non-students Non-students I
Source: own elaboration with Franceall and with DIVERS.
In section 10.3 it will be shown that financial independence through market income is reached 
on average between the ages 25 and 29 years in France. An analysis o f the Enquête Jeunes 
]992 in order to comprehend the process of financial independence shows very clearly the im­
portant role o f transfer payments in comparison to market income and to family help in the 
process of becoming financially independent (Caussat 1995). At age 18 only 7 per cent of 
young people receives a market income, while 10 per cent receive a grant and insignificantly 
few receive payments from their parents. At age 23 around 15 per cent o f young people re­
ceive financial help from their parents and the same percentage receives a family or housing 
allowance, half o f these young people obtain a market income, nearly 4 per cent receive finan­
cial help from other relatives and 7 per cent receive an unemployment allowance. Then, at age 
29 around 65 per cent obtain an income from their occupation, almost nobody receives help
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from their parents and only 3 per cent are helped by other relatives. Instead. 30 per cent obtain 
family or housing allowances, 8 per cent receive an unemployment allowance, and 2 per cent 
receive a RMI allowance. Market and transfer payments play a dominant role in order to allow 
many young adults to be financially autonomous. According to an income survey o f  1990 six 
out of ten households, where the household head is aged less than 30 receive more than half o f  
their income from the state (Caussat 1995).
The presentation o f the results o f these new models will focus on the role o f the diversification 
variable (DIVERS), since the effects o f the other variables are mainly the same as in the mod­
els with the variable activity presented previously, as can be seen from the result tables 5 to 8 
in appendix 2. The reference category for all models is to  receive mainly market income.
Women out of education display behavioural patterns nearest to the theoretical assumptions, 
but they are not totally concordant with the dependence-diversification hypothesis. All situa­
tions of income combinations that are not "receives mainly market income" increase young 
women's likelihood to live independently. The highest probabilities are shown by women re­
ceiving family help, followed by those with market income, public benefits and family help, 
next come those with public benefits, those with public benefits and market income, and finally 
those with public benefits and family help and those with market income and family help. This 
model shows once more the importance o f resources coming from the spouse/partner or the 
parents for women's social independence. In addition, it shows that a high diversification of 
income sources increases the likelihood o f living out o f the parental home more than any other 
combination. Market income as sole income source does not favour women's social independ­
ence, instead public benefits as exclusive income source do favour it. This confirms the de­
pendence-diversification hypothesis partially in its dimension o f  diversification but not in the 
assumption that market income would be the most important income source. If a variable 
measuring the existence o f a spouse/partner is introduced into the logistic regression model in 
order to control for the fact that many women follow a dependent household formation, differ­
ent results are obtained.42 In this case the combination o f  market and state income is the only 
value exerting a positive effect, while combinations o f market and family, state and family, and
42 The inclusion of a variable measuring the existence of a partnership overdetermines the model, because of the strong 
correlation between social independence and partnership formation. Yet, if one is not interested in the overall fit but 
only in the interaction between partnership and income diversification, then it reveals the effects of the variable 
DIVERS change when partnership is controlled for. The detailed results are not presented.
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market, family and state become negatively linked to the likelihood of social independence 
This shows that the only combination that favours all women's living out of the parental home 
independently o f their household formation strategy is the combination o f market and public 
transfers.
In the case o f male non-students three combinations of income out of seven have a significant 
effect on the probability of living independently. The best situation is to receive transfers from 
the market and from the state, followed by the combination of market income, public benefits 
and family support. The worst case is to rely only on the family and the state. To receive exclu­
sively public benefits, exclusively family help or to combine market income and family help do 
not statistically differ from living mainly from market income. The first two situations are 
rarely found among French men. Interestingly, the combination of public benefits and family 
help decreases the chances o f social independence. Thus, men need a market income.in order 
to have a high probability o f living independently and if, in addition, they receive public bene­
fits than they increase their chance o f social independence considerably. Nearly all deductions 
from the dependence-diversification hypothesis are confirmed in the case of men on the la­
bour market.
Female students show very simple patterns, since only one combination o f income increases 
their probability o f living independently compared to the situation of receiving mainly market 
income. As in the case of men the best situation is to receive market and public transfers, while 
the worst is to rely on the family and the state only. To perform some activity on the market 
and to have access to state benefits or to depend mainly on market income were basic condi­
tions to be fulfilled by female students who wanted to leave home between 1986 and 1992. 
Diversification o f income alone is not sufficient, it is only positive if it happens to people with 
some market income.
Male students' likelihood to be living independently is favoured by market income, but the 
combination o f market income with other transfers does not increase their chance of living out 
o f the parental home. In line with the prediction are the findings which show that to receive 
only public benefits or family help decreases men's chances o f social independence compared to 
those who mainly depend on market income. As in the two previous cases, to combine state 
and family transfers is negatively related to living independently. These findings do not mean
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that to receive some additional help from the state while working does not help leaving home, 
it only means that compared to having a market income it does not increase the chances of 
living independently. It is as helpful for social independence to combine market and public 
transfers than to live mainly from market income. Thus, the dependence-diversification hy­
pothesis can only be confirmed in its negative predictions and the market income dimension, 
but not in its predictions about positive a link between general income diversification and social 
independence.
To conclude the test o f the dependence-diversification hypothesis, it can be stated that the pre­
dictions of a negative link between receiving only public benefits or only family help and the 
likelihood of social independence is only confirmed for men on the labour market. The deduc­
tions about the positive influence o f combining market income with public benefits or market 
income with family benefits or all three things together are confirmed for women on the labour 
market and partly for men on the labour market and women enrolled in education. The finding 
that a combination o f family and public transfers decreases the chances of living independently 
in all cases except women on the labour market contradicts the previsions. The idea that the 
best condition for social independence is to combine market, state and family transfers is only 
confirmed for young people on the labour market.
Public benefits in combination with market income increase the chances of social independence 
o f all young people except male students. In the latter case this combination appears to be as 
favourable as the complete reliance on market income. Thus, the crucial role o f public policies 
for living independently in France has been confirmed for all young people except male stu­
dents. A corrected version of the dependence-diversification hypothesis at the individual level 
would be: The combination of market income and public benefits facilitates social independ­
ence more or at least as much as relying mainly on a market income. Instead, family help alone 
or in combination with market income never increases the young person's chance o f social in­
dependence. This last finding is very important, since it shows that only the relatively strong 
division o f labour between the French state and the parents with respect to the tasks o f helping 
young people on their way to adulthood increase all young people's chances o f  social inde­
pendence.
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8.4 Test o f  H igh  Property-Delayed Leaving Hypothesis
The price level o f rents and mortgages is a major element in explaining different degrees of 
housing affordability for varying social groups and geographical areas This idea, which forms 
the first part o f the low affordability-high property hypothesis will be tested with a multi-level 
model including regional contexts in section 9 2.3 In this section only the second pan of »he 
hypothesis, the high property-delayed leaving hypothesis and its individual lc\el implica­
tions will be analysed, since it is more closely related to housing policy The micro-level h\- 
pothesis states that young people who acquire a dwelling are more likely to have accumulated 
savings and to have a family formation project than those who rent a dwelling The latter tend 
to have less defined personal projects, they only need to pay a monthly rent, and thus they are 
less tied by long-term decisions. Consequently, young single or cohabiting people will be more 
likely to rent a dwelling than married people, and the youngest young people w ill be found less 
frequently in owned dwellings.
These relationships are tested with a logistic regression which predicts the likelihood of a 
young person living independently in 1992 to have an owned dwelling in contrast to a rented 
or given accommodation. The samples are formed by all young people who in 1985/86 were 
living in the parental home and in 1991/92 were socially independent The same logistic regres­
sion model was performed for France and Spain, where the logit of living in a rented dwelling 
in 1991/92 against living in a own-property dwelling was estimated Like in the previous mod­
els it is assumed that the young person's own resources, those of the parents, age, and regional 
and rural-urban context influences the individual's choice of the type of dwelling In addition, it 
is assumed that the type of living arrangement of those living independently is related to the 
choice o f housing tenure.
(10) logit (DWELL91/92) = a  + P,(ACTIVEST) + P;(FACLASS) - p,(SIBL) + p,(EDUC) + 
Pj(AGE) + p6 (LIVARR) + p7(RURURBAN) + Ps(REGlON)
The results are in line with the high property-delayed leaving hypothesis, because it was 
found that cohabiting couples and individuals in one-person households are more likely to rent 
than to own a dwelling and younger people live more frequently in rented dwellings than their
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older counterparts.4'' The age-effect is very similar in both countries, but the effect o f cohabit­
ing is somewhat larger in Spain than in France. In France individuals in one-person households 
are the most likely to rent a dwelling compared to married people, more than cohabiting and 
flat-sharing people. By contrast, in Spain there is a decreasing linear relationship between living 
arrangement and type o f dwelling. The highest probability o f renting is found for cohabiting 
young people, next come those in one-person households and last those sharing a flat with 
peers. In any case, renting a dwelling is more strongly related to leaving home for destinations 
o f informal family formation and for nonfamily formation living arrangements in both countries. 
This confirms the idea that renting a dwelling is less cost-intensive and more adequate for un­
certain and transitory life-cycle moments such as youth. The fact that in Spain short-term em­
ployees tend also to rent more frequently than those with a long-term job, gives further support 
to this idea. In France most young people who live independently live in a rented dwelling, that 
is in a more youth-adequate dwelling, whereas young people in Spain live more often in a . 
owned dwelling, which is more adequate for the status o f adulthood.
Some country-specific effects were found. In Spain there are many social class effects, since 
most social classes are less likely to rent a dwelling than those young people coming from the 
service class. Young people from the classes o f the petty bourgeoisie, o f  farmers, o f skilled 
workers and o f non-skilled workers rent a dwelling less frequently than those of the service 
class. There are also great regional differences, which will be presented later on. In France dif­
ferences according to the size o f the municipality where the young people lived in 1992 
emerge. Compared to living in a town over 100,000 inhabitants, those living in municipalities 
from 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants are more likely to rent, while those living in municipalities 
smaller than 5,000 inhabitants are less likely to rent a dwelling.
To conclude, the high rate o f young people living in a rented dwelling in France favours early 
nest-leaving in this country. Since housing policy regulates to a more or less extensive degree 
prices, vacancy rates and tenure structure of housing markets, an analysis of mechanisms 
through which this regulation is attained will help to understand the cross-national differences 
in young people's living arrangements. This is the aim of section 10.5. 43
43 Detailed results are shown in table 9 in appendix 2.
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CHAPTER IV:
CHANGING PERSPECTIVE IN ORDER TO TEST THE ROLE OF 
HOUSING MARKETS AND SOCIAL NORMS
9 Bringing the Context In: Culture and Other Context Effects
At this stage it is important to have a closer look at possible contextual effects on leaving 
home. Ideally, these context effects would have also been studied through a cross-national 
comparison with many countries. This would have allowed for a test of the role o f social poli­
cies in explaining the differences between Spain and France. This cannot be the scope of this 
work and, therefore, the role of social policies, of housing markets and social norms that oper­
ate at national level can only be considered in a descriptive way. Perform a regional analysis 
was chosen for two reasons. First, because in Spain we find many regional variations in leaving 
home patterns (Jurado Guerrero 1997). Second, given the small-n problem of a two-country 
study a regional comparison was chosen to study the role o f  context effects such as social 
norms and housing conditions on social independence, since they cannot be studied at ind’vid- 
ual level with the given data.
Not only the regional context is taken into account but also the rural-urban context differences. 
A variable that measures the size of the place of residence in 1991/92 of each individual con­
trols for the latter context differences. This variable will help to control for differences in living 
arrangement patterns in rural and urban contexts The effect o f the size o f the place o f resi­
dence o f the young person can go in two divergent directions (cf. section 5). First, it can be 
imagined that in regions with a high degree of middle-sized towns, rates o f two-generation 
households will be low, because of more favourable housing markets. Second, areas with a 
high presence o f  rural municipalities will show a high occurrence of two-generation households 
due to more traditional social norms.
Regional differences in staying home rates can be due to composition effects, for instance, if in 
a region a social class whose children tend to leave home early is over-represented. Composi­
tion effects concerning social class o f  origin, activity situation, educational participation and
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age distribution will be analysed in the regional models, since the logistic regression with re­
gions also includes these other variables measured at individual level. If  after the control of 
social origin, activity situation, educational level and the other individual-level variables, re­
gional differences in leaving home persist, it can mean two things. First, that regional effects 
are due to composition effects of individual characteristics not included in the model; for ex­
ample, income. Second, it might mean that there are context effects on the probability of leav­
ing home which are not due to composition effects o f individual-level factors. These context 
effects have to be interpreted as specific dominant social norms, which prescribe socially non­
deviant behaviour, or as a particular frame o f  socio-economic constraints which influence the 
individual’s preferences, or in other words, the actor's view about which aims are worth fol- 
liwng since they are likely to be attained. An example of the first case would be regional norms 
on patrilocal or neolocal family formation. The second case would be regions with very diffi­
cult youth labour markets, where young people are aware o f the limited possibilities they have 
to find a long-term job and thus adapt their expectations to the circumstances.
In the regional quantitative models those context effects which show important regional varia­
tion will be analysed: housing markets, labour markets and family norm. In some cases it would 
be better to take local instead of regional contexts as the units of analysis, but this would re­
quire very detailed and mostly not available data. It is possible to find provincial census data on 
most labour market indicators and on some family patterns, but provincial data on prices of 
dwellings are not reliable, since existing survey data is not representative at provincial level (cf. 
9.2). Thus, it was decided to take regions as units o f analysis, but we have to be aware o f the 
fact that within a region, within a province and even within a town, if it is a large one, context 
differences may exist. In addition, to asses the extent o f within region differences in the likeli­
hood of living independently provincial differences are described.
The first models interpreted here are the same as those whose individual level results were pre­
sented in section 8.2 :
(7) logit (IND91/92) = a  + p,(ACTIVEST) + p2(FACLASS) - p3(SIBL) + p4(EDUC) + 
Ps(AGE) + p6 (RURURB AN) + p 7 (REGION)
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Stepwise introduction of the context variables allows the observation of their effects with and 
without control of individual level variables, and thus permits the observation of composition 
effects. The next sections are organised as follows. First, bivariate relations between living 
arrangement and region o f residence are presented in the form of cross-tabulations in order to 
present regional maps o f living arrangements. Second, the results of the logistic regression 
analyses with respect to the effect o f living in a given region for the probability o f living inde­
pendently are presented. Third, the Spanish regional differences are analysed more deeply ir. 
order to compare the role o f housing, labour markets and family norms. New multi-level mod­
els are used for this scope.
9,1 Regional Variations in Leaving Home in Spain and France
First, some remarks on data problems have to be made. In the Spanish sample information on 
the region of residence is introduced as an external variable, it means it is not information pro- 
• vided by the individual, but it refers to the person’s official registration in the census o f 1991. If 
in the time between the census survey and the sociodemographic survey somebody changed 
their residence due to a regional migration, this individual appears to be living in the old place. 
In addition, young people registered as living with their parents, despite their real residence out 
of the parental home, appear to live in the region of the parents. In the French sample regional 
information is provided in two ways: first, it is part o f the labour force survey and then it is 
also provided by the retrospective part of the Enquête Jeune. For comparative reasons it was 
decided to use the information from the labour force survey and thus for the moment o f the 
interview.
The Spanish data problems affect more students than non-students, since the former live more 
frequently in halls o f residence or in non-registered informal living arrangements. The regional 
context has a very limited net effect on living out o f the parental home in the models o f Spanish 
students, probably also due to these technical problems. These problems and the non signifi­
cance of region for student's likelihood to live independently prompted to the decision not to 
pursue a very detailed regional analysis o f students' living arrangements by regions, but instead 
to merely present the regional differences as they appear using our limited survey data.
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In this section the first step o f the analysis is carried out, while the results of the multivariate 
analyses are discussed separately for France and Spain in the subsequent parts. Regional stay­
ing home rates for young people in Spain and France are presented in subsamples according to 
gender and activity situation.44 The standard
deviation is the measure chosen to compare the importance o f regional differences in both 
countries.
French male students show regional rates of living in their parents' home (staying home rates) 
which range from 22 to 86 per cent and which display a standard deviation of 18. If one takes 
5 per cent over and under the average o f 58.4 per cent as cutting points, ten regions appear 
under this cutting point and six above o f it. Champagne-Ardennes, Haute-Normandie, Bour­
gogne, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Bretagne, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées, Limousin and 
Languedoc-Roussillon have low rates o f young people living at home, while Ile-de France, 
Basse-Normandie, Picardie, Lorraine, Poitou-Charente and Provence-Côte d'Azur display 
relatively high staying home rates o f students. Later it is shown that most of these regional 
effects are the same if one performs a multivariate logistic regression with the individual data 
o f the France86 sample.
*
44 The samples used in this descriptive part are the entire samples Francealt and SpainalL The Spanish sample was 
weighted (cf. appendix 1)
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Figure 33: Fem ale and M ale S tuden ts ' S taying Hom e R ates in F rance by Region. 1992
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Female students show similar regional patterns with some differences. Contrary to the male 
case, Haute-Normandie and Languedoc-Roussillon do not show low staying home rates, while 
Auvergne does. The remaining male low-staying regions show also low female rates. Female 
students have, like their male counterparts high rates of people in the parental home in Ile-de 
France, Picardie, Poitou-Charente and Provence-Côte d’Azur and unlike men they show high 
rates in Pays-de la Loire and Rhône-Alpes, as well. The standard deviation of 14 is smaller 
than in the male case and the average staying home rate is 51.4 per cent, that is, lower than the 
male rate. In the multivariate analysis similar regional effects can be observed.
Regional differences in staying home rates for Spanish people enrolled in education are very 
low, 4 standard deviation for men and women and average rates of 90.9 and 89.5 per cent re­
spectively. In the case o f men only those living in the Basque country show a relatively high, as 
compared to the average, staying home rate and those in Aragon a relatively low rate. The 
latter occurs also in the case of women. The same results are obtained in the multivariate 
analyses for men and women enrolled in education.
For people on the labour market, regional differences in staying and independence rates are 
similar in Spain and France in terms o f standard deviation. In Spain women and men show a
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standard deviation of 5.8 and 5 respectively and in France for women and men it is 6.1 and 6.2 
respectively. The average female staying home rate in Spain is 56.2 per cent and 21.4 for their 
French counterparts. For men the Spanish rate amounts to 71.8 and the French independence 
rate 37.8 per cent. The Spanish region with the lowest staying home rate. Baleares, displays a 
rate, which is still higher than the highest regional rates in France, Nord-Pas de Calais and 
Lorraine, since the former female and male rates are 45 and 64 per cent and the latter are 36 
and 49 per cent. This means 9 and 15 per cent o f  cross-national distance for men and women 
respectively.
The Spanish regional picture of staying home rates also shows differences by gender (Figure 
34). Men and women in Cantabria, the Basque Country and Navarre have high rates compared 
to the average, while those living in Baleares and Catalonia have relatively low rates. Yet, men 
also show relatively low rates in Andalusia and Valencia, and high rates in Asturias and Cas- 
tile-Leon. In the multivariate models men and women show more regional effects than in this 
bivariate description.
Figure 34: Female and Male Non-Students' Staying Home Rates in Spain, 1991
■  6 6  to  70 ,2  (1 )  
! ■  61 .8  to  6 6  (2 )
j ■  57.6 to  6  L 8  (2 ) 
! H  53.4 to  5 7 .6  (9 )  
□  49 .2  to  5 3 ,4  (2 )
! □  4 5  to  4 9 .2  (1 )
_
J Cananas
j ■  7 9 .5  to  8 2 .6  (4 )
■  7 6 .4  to  7 9 .5  (1 )
■  7 3 ,3  to  7 6 ,4  (2 )  
B  7 0 ,2  to  7 3 ,3  (5 )
□  6 7 .1  to  7 0 ,2  (4 )
□  6 4  to  6 7 ,1  (1 )
•tr0 J
S o u rc e : o w n  e la b o ra t io n  w i th  Spainall a n d  IN D 9 1 .
The French picture is more complicated, since more regions differ from the average and more 
gender differences exist, as shown in Figure 35. Men and women in Bourgogne and Bretagne
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display relatively low staying home rates, while nearly all high rates differ by gender. Men in 
Centre, Pavs de la Loire and Limousin have relatively low staying home rates and high ones in 
Lorraine, Champagne-Ardennes, Picardie, Nord-Pas de Calais, Aquitaine and Franche-Comte 
Women in Haute-Normandie, Basse-Normandie, Bretagne, Pays de la Loire. Bourgogne. Al­
sace and Franche-Comté have low rates, while they show high rates in Lorraine, Aquitaine and 
Languedoc-Rousillon. It will be shown later that nearly all male regional differences disappear 
in the logistic regression analysis and differences for women diminish, which means that many 
regional differences are not statistically significant.
Figure 35: Female and Male Non-Students' Staying Home Rates in France, 1992
Source: own elaboration with Franceall and IND92.
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independence, which permits a clear analysis o f those regions which facilitate living out of the 
parental home. In addition it clearly highlights the importance of French centralisation in the 
university system (cf. section 8.1.5).
The multivariate analysis for students with region, size of municipality and all individual char­
acteristics included in the model shows that young male students in 10  out of 21 regions have a 
higher likelihood to live independently than students in the region o f  Paris.45 For female stu­
dents one can observe 9 regions with a higher likelihood than those in Ile-de France. These 
effects are similar for men and women in five regions, namely Bourgogne, Languedoc- 
Roussillon, Alsace, Bretagne, Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées, while the remaining regional ef­
fects differ for men and women. A possible explanation for these regional effects could lie in 
students' migration out o f the region o f origin in order to enrol in a university outside the par­
ents' region. Figures from the French Ministry o f Education seems to support this idea, as 
shown in Table 14.
The detailed results are not presented in the appendix, only the regional coefficients are shown in Table 14 in the text. 
The regional coefficients are always net effects after control of all variables as presented in equation (7).
162





















Nord-Pas de Calais 2,3










































Pays de la Loire 
Ue-de-France
~£%Û226*-*














Nord-Pas de Calais 
Basse-N onnandic 














Notes: Bacheliers = people who obtained maturity certificate. Sources: Ministère de l'Education Nationale 1994 and own 
elaboration with France86.
The export rate is computed with the number of bacheliers o f a given region who enrolled in a 
university o f a different region divided by the total number o f bacheliers o f the region of ori­
gin.46 It can be seen that most regions with high rates o f export also show significant regional 
coefficients, be it in the male or in the female model. The exception o f Picardie could be ex­
plained by the fact that this region is a neighbour region o f Ile-de France and young people can 
probably live in the parental home despite of the fact that they go to a university in Paris. Fe­
male and male students in Alsace and Bretagne are more likely to live independently than in 
Paris, though they had low export rates of bacheliers in 1990. This cannot be due to rurality 
since the model controls for size o f municipality and because people in small municipalities are 
less likely to live independently. As shown below, Bretagne and Alsace have a pushing-out-of- 
home effect also for young people on the labour market, in particular for women. There is 
some cultural or non-controlled socio-economic context factor in these regions which make 
young people, students and non-students, leave home at an early stage. The detailed explana­
tion o f students* patterns would require further analysis, which cannot be provided here.
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The models for young people on the labour market have been run stepwise to allow for an 
analysis o f composition effects. In fact composition effects and also contextual effects were 
found. The detailed results are shown in Table 10  in appendix 2.
1 . In the first model for men the size o f  residence was the only independent variable and it 
emerges that young men out o f education who live in rural areas compared to towns over 
100,000 inhabitants are less likely to  be living independently (model 1 )
2. By contrast, the region o f residence —as sole independent variable- shows one negative 
regional effect on the likelihood to live out o f  the parental home for Nord-Pas de Calais 
(model 2 ).
3. If  these two context variables are included in a complete model (4) with individual-level 
variables, it can be observed that regional effects change. The regions Pays de la Loire, and 
Bretagne become positively linked to living independently compared to the region Ile-de- 
France and the effect o f  Nord-Pas de Calais disappears. How can this change o f regional 
effects be explained?
The effect o f Nord-Pas de Calais is due to a composition effect o f activity situation and size of 
municipality as shown in model 3. It is probably due to the difficult labour market situation in 
this region and its relatively high urbanisation.47 It can be observed that in model 3 three new 
positive effects appear, namely those o f Auvergne, Bretagne and Pays de la Loire. The last two 
correspond to the findings o f model 4, the complete model. The appearance of their effects has 
to be explained in terms o f  counteracting effects.48 The simultaneous control of size of munici­
pality and activity situation makes them become significant, because just these individual-level 
effects were cancelling each other out in model 2. The disappearance o f the effect of Auvergne 
in the full model is due to  a composition effect caused by a combination of the effects o f activ­
ity, size o f municipality, region and age, most probably caused by the over-representation o f 
young people o f  age 25 to 29 in Auvergne.49 To sum up, only two positive net regional effects 
can be observed for French men on the labour market, while there is also a strong negative 
effect o f rural areas on the probability o f  living out o f the parental home.
40 Bacheliers are people who have obtained the highest available secondary education certificate.
4 ' It is not a simple composition effect nor of activity nor of size of municipality, but of the combination of both. Results of 
these first two models are not presented.
^  In a model only with activity and region these two effects dot not appear. The results are not presented.
49 The results of this model are not presented.
164
The situation for women on the labour market is similar. The detailed results are shown in table 
11 in appendix 2 .
1. Unlike men, women are not affected by the size of the municipality, in which they live 
(model 1).
2. Women living in Lorraine, Aquitaine and Languedoc-Roussilon are less likely to live out o f 
the parental home than those in Ile-de-France if one looks only at the bivariate relationship 
(model 2 ).
3. These bivariate results change importantly once one introduces region and size of munici­
pality into a model with individual level characteristics in order to control for composition 
effects (model 4), All negative effects disappear and we find, instead, four positive effects: 
Haute-Normandie, Alsace, Pays de la Loire and Bretagne. Besides, a negative effect of the 
place of residence for young women in municipalities under 5,000 inhabitants emerges, too.
The explanation o f this change is similar to the male case. The disappearance o f the effects of 
Aquitaine and Languedoc-Roussilon are due to the combined composition effects o f activity 
and size of municipality. Both effects also make the positive effect of Bretagne appear (cf 
model 3). Then in a model where one adds the variable education to model 3, the effect of 
Lorraine becomes nearly statistically non significant and the effect of Pays de la Loire ap­
pears.50 Nonetheless, it is only the complete combination o f the variables of model 4 which 
explains the final four positive regional effects of Haute-Normandie, Bretagne, Pays de la Loire 
and Alsace. Women enrolled in education and living in Bretagne and Alsace are also more 
likely to live independently, as mentioned previously. Interestingly, the same logistic regression 
model for women out of education with the variable income diversification instead of activity 
makes all regional variables disappear (cf. Table 6 in appendix 2) It might be argued that in the 
case o f women the regional effects are, indeed, composition effects due to differences in in­
come diversification of women in different regions. Thus, as in the male case, the female model 
display small regional effects, which in addition are due to composition effects. For both gen­
der the most important context effect is that of size of municipality.
All in all, it can be stated that regional effects are rather insignificant if  one wants to explain 
living patterns o f young people on the labour market in France, while they are more important 
for students. It was argued that the effects o f region on students are to a great extent due to
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their emigration to universities outside their region o f origin, many students leave for Paris to 
enrol there in a university. The relatively small regional effects, compared to Spain, of young 
French people on the labour market will not be further explored in the frame of this work In­
stead, it seems interesting to discuss the general negative effect of rurality, which was found 
for all four groups of young people.
All French young people in very small municipalities are less likely to  live independently than 
those in towns over 100,000 inhabitants. These results suggest that young people in rural areas 
follow other social norms than those in larger municipalities, since many socio-economic dif­
ferences were controlled for. In addition, differences in housing markets seem to be relevant, 
as shown below.
In a very encompassing study o f rural youth in France, conducted at the end of the 1980s • 
(Galland/Lambert 1993), it was found that independently o f  social class young people in rural 
areas were more likely to have at most a secondary school certificate and less likely to have a 
tertiary educational certificate. In the same study they found that these young people had more 
difficulties in entering employment and hence had higher unemployment rates than urban young 
people, in particular young women were affected by high unemployment rates. Nevertheless, at 
the age of 25 most young people had attained their professional integration. Young people in 
rural areas and in this educational and employment context live in the parental home more fre­
quently than their urban counterparts, but this is mainly due to the behaviour o f the young men, 
since half of them still live with their parents at the age of 25 while only one third of their urban 
counterparts do so. In contrast to this, young women at age 25 mostly live with their husband 
(65%), whereas in urban areas not even half o f all women live with their husband (44%). These 
differences in living arrangements are not simply a composition effect o f social class, since the 
authors found similar rural-urban differences for all social classes. Galland proposes three pos­
sible explanations for the specific rural way o f  life. First, he points to  the role o f more tradi­
tional cultural norms which might influence all social classes. Second, the specific rural housing 
market with its low offer of small dwellings and the predominance o f  large parental houses, 
which makes intergenerational coresidence more easy. Third, it might be that young people 
who like to live independently emigrate to larger towns. With respect to the first hypothesis, a 
comparison of the preferences of young rural people with those o f  young lycéens (students of
w Detailed results are not shown.
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upper secondary school) of a small town in Seme-Maritime shows that young rural people 
prefer more frequently marriage to cohabitation, especially to a model o f cohabitation as way 
of life and not only as trial-period before marrying.
The model used in section 8.4, where the likelihood of renting a dwelling was estimated for 
those French young people living independently in 1992, provides also some interesting infor­
mation. Young people in rural areas are less likely to rent a dwelling compared to those living 
in large towns, net of the effects o f the type of living arrangement they have (cf. Table 9 in 
appendix 2). This supports Galland’s and Lambert's idea about the existence of specific rural 
housing markets. It means also that the higher housing costs in large towns do not prevent 
young people living more frequently out of the parental home compared to their counterparts 
in rural areas.
9.1.2 Regional And Provincial Differences in Spain
In the Spanish case I proceed as with the French data, but different results emerge. The re­
gional reference category is Madrid, which in every subgroup display average independence 
rates. As in France the reference category for size of municipality are towns of over 100,000 
inhabitants.
First o f all, Spanish students show little regional and rural-urban variation in their likelihood to 
live independently. Only male students from the Basque Country show a lower probability of 
living independently than those in Madrid. Female patterns are not influenced by any of the two 
context variables.51 It has to be remembered that according to our census-based surveys very 
few students o f the sample live independently in Spain, namely 11 per cent of men and 12 per 
cent o f women, while in France the respective rates are 35 per cent and 42 per cent.
Unlike for students, leaving home patterns o f young men on the labour market display many 
regional variations (cf. Table 12 in appendix 2).
1. If one looks first at the bivariate relationships of the context variables, it emerges that the 
size o f the municipality has no influence on leaving home (model 1),
51 Detailed results are not reported.
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! 2. while 8 regions out o f 16 have an impact (model 2). Young men from Galicia. Cantabria.
Asturias, the Basque Country, Navarre and Castile-And-Leon tend to live with their par­
ents more frequently compared to those in Madrid, while the contrary is the case for those 
in Catalonia and Andalusia.
3. In the full model with context and individual level variables the regional effects persist or 
even increase their coefficients (model 4). The negative effect o f  Galicia disappears due to 
various composition effects in model 4 .32 The interpretation of these regional effects is the 
objective o f the next section.
The homogeneity o f regional living arrangements was tested by looking at provincial differ­
ences. Model 4, as before, was run with provinces instead o f  regions.33 All provinces with a 
positive effect are part o f regions which also have a significant positive effect on men's inde­
pendence, but not all provinces from a significant region are themselves significant. In the 
Basque Country, the provinces of Guipúzcoa and Biscay show significant negative effects, in 
Galicia it is the province o f Pontevedra and in Castile-And-Leon the provinces o f  Segovia and 
Valladolid show also signifant negative effects. The uni-provincial regions of Asturias, Canta­
bria and Navarre also show significant effects. The provincial analysis shows, with respect to 
the regions with a positive effect, that the significant positive effect in Catalonia is due to the 
significant effect o f Barcelona, while in Andalusia all provinces except Seville and Huelva show 
significant effects. In addition, within the region o f Valencia the province of Valencia shows a 
positive effect, but it is not strong enough to push the whole region o f Valencia into a signifi­
cant effect. Thus, there is some interregional heterogeneity but it is not as large as to combine 
provinces with significant positive and significant negative effects into one region. In addition, 
in all significant regions all provinces have the same sign, some being significant and others not 
(exceptions are Huelva in Andalusia and Lérida in Catalonia). Thus, it can be concluded that 
regions are relatively uniform geographical units with respect to young men’s living arrange­
ments, i.e. with respect to the dependent variable.
The models for women out of education show the following results (Table 13 in apendix 2):
1. As in the male case no rural-urban effects appear (model 1).
'1I
5* The most plausible bivariate and trivariate combiniations of variables such as activity, social class, education, etc. were 
analysed to see if they explain the dissapearence of the Galician effect, but they did not. Thus it is a complex composi­
tion effect of many variables together.
” Detailed results are not reported.
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2 . Positive relationships are more significant compared with men: seven regions are signifi­
cant in shaping leaving patterns. Women who live in Galicia, the Basque Country and Cas­
tile-And-Leon are less likely to live in an independent dwelling, while women in Catalonia. 
Baleares, Castile-La Mancha and Pais Valenciano are more frequently independent (model 
2).
3 . In the full model some changes occur, since the group o f  regions with a negative effect is 
joined by Canarias, while the group of positive effects loses Castile-La Mancha, for it is not 
more positively linked to living independently. Very interestingly, women from villages of 
under 5,000 inhabitants are now more likely to live independently than women in towns of 
over 100,000 inhabitants (model 3).
A provincial analysis shows that, like in the case o f men, not all provinces of the regions which 
display a significant effect are themselves significant. In the region of Galicia only the province 
of Orense is significant, in the Basque Country the provinces o f Guipuzcoa and Biscay, in the 
region of Castile-And-Leon only the provinces of Avila and Segovia, and in the Canary Islands 
only the province of Las Palmas. Similar is the situation for young women in regions that affect 
leaving home positively. In Catalonia the provinces of Barcelona and Tarragona show a signifi­
cant effect and in the Pais Valenciano only Valencia does. In addition, the uni-provincial region 
of Baleares shows a positive effect. The important fact is that within a region significant pro­
vincial effects go in the same direction as the regional effect and no province shows an effect 
that goes against the regional trend, if the latter is statistically significant.
To sum up, men and women from the Basque Country and Castile-And-Leon are less likely to 
live independently than their counterparts in Madrid, while men and women in Catalonia are 
more frequently living out o f the parental home. There are regional effects which vary by gen­
der, so men in Asturias, Cantabria and Navarre are less likely to live independently than men in 
Madrid, while this is not the case for women. In addition, men in Andalusia have a higher 
probability o f living out o f the parental home, whereas this is not true for women. Men show 
more negative than positive regional effects compared to women. As a consequence women in 
Baleares and in the Pais Valenciano display a significant positive probability of living independ­
ently, while men from these contexts do not. These gender differences could be related to the 
fact that in Madrid, the reference category, the most “privileged” men have a higher estimated 
probability to live independently than their female counterpart. So, there are few other men
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who have a significantly higher probability of independence as is the case in Catalonia and An­
dalusia. Since the female reference category has a relatively low probability o f independence 
compared to her male counterpart, more positive regional effects appear for women, whereas 
they show few negative regional effects.
9,2 What do regional differences stay for?
It should be possible to explain a part o f  the Spanish regional differences in living arrangements 
o f  non-students with the regional particularities o f  housing markets and social norms. If one 
goes back to the original hypotheses o f  this work (cf. 5), their validity for explaining regional 
differences should be posed. Not all these hypotheses are useful to apply to a regional analysis. 
A regional analysis with different regional context variables has to be used cautiously also due 
to the rapidly emerging problem o f collinearity, if  one introduces many context variables. The 
choice of the most relevant variables is to be discussed next.
9.2.1 Explaining Variables
The dependence-diversification hypothesis (cf. 5) is not very useful for a regional analysis, 
since the greatest variations are cross-nationally. It could be studied through the inclusion o f 
regional data on grants, on halls of residence for students and young workers, and with figures 
on public benefits for young people. Since for France we are informed if individuals receive a 
grant, a housing allowance or if they live in a publicly subsidised dwelling, a specific individual- 
level model for France was performed, in which the dependence-diversification was tested and 
partly confirmed (cf. section 8.3).
For Spain such an individual-level test is not possible due to  lack o f data. Besides, the Spanish 
sample excludes all those living in halls of residence and thus is inappropriate for the study of 
regional differences in grants for students and in halls of residence. The collection of regional 
data on other public benefits is a rather hard task54 and without a comprehensive collection o f 
all possible public measures the test is useless. Thus, the regional model will not include a test
The INEM (Institute for Employment), for instance, publishes data on beneficiaries of unemployment benefit by regions, 
but without differentiation by age (AEL 1991).
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of the dependence-diversification hypothesis, due the problems of lack o f data in the surves 
itself and in official statistical publications.
The testable precariousness hypothesis affirms that a high occurrence o f short-term employ­
ment and of unemployment among men results in a high probability of these staying at home 
The female likelihood of living at home in areas with high fixed-term employment and unem­
ployment will also be high due to their difficulties in becoming financially independent from 
parents and partner, and due to the relatively low number o f financially autonomous male part­
ners.55
This hypothesis has been tested at individual level and it was shown that short-term employed 
young people are always less likely to live independently than long-term employed. This rela­
tionship is strongest for French women and men, less strong for Spanish men and the leas; 
strong for Spanish women. With respect to unemployment, it emerged that from all activity 
categories, first-employment seekers have the greatest disadvantages compared to long-term 
employed young people. This negative relationship is the strongest for Spanish men, followed 
by French men, French women and Spanish women. Unemployed people who already had a 
job before are also less likely to have left the parental home, but the effect is less strong and, 
interestingly, Spanish women who are unemployed after having had a job are more likely to 
have left home.
Although these relationships have already been tested and confirmed at individual level, it is 
important to know if contexts with very precarious labour markets reinforce individuals’ l:keli- 
hood to stay at home or on the contrary changes their behavioural patterns through a decrease 
in their expectations. Also, it is important to compare the effects of labour markets with those 
of housing markets. The context question that emerges at this point is: do young people who 
live in contexts that are strongly marked by short-term employment and unemployment stay 
longer with their parents than those in more favoured areas, independently of their individual 
activity situation? That is, is there a specific labour market context effect, which goes beyond a 
mere composition effect? It is assumed that the situation o f the labour market is highlighted
55 The latter affirmation depends on the age-difference of spouses. If men now find more difficulties in becoming financially 
autonomous and if the age difference between genders does not increase, it means that women will marry later
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well by taking only male rates of first employment seekers in 1991 (UNEMP) and in this way it 
indicates also constraints for married couples with only one-earner.
The low affordability-high property hypothesis is a hypothesis which can only be tested on 
a context level, even if an approximation on the individual level was tried in section 8.4. On 
housing markets with high prices, low vacancy rates and a low offer o f rented housing, two- 
generation households will be more frequent and the diversity o f one-generation households 
will be low (cfi 5). The original hypothesis can be reduced to a more manageable hypothesis 
for the empirical test. It can be assumed that the rate o f rented dwellings in 1991 (TENRENT) 
is in close relation with the level o f rents and thus for the multivariate analysis, the former indi­
cator was chosen, as it is more easy to access reliable regional data in its regard. Buying a 
dwelling is related to leaving home, in particular, through the fact that it is a more long-term 
decision than that of renting a dwelling. This element together with the fact that normally peo­
ple have to have some savings or obtain some money from the parents to be able to take a 
mortgage, leads one to presume that to buy a dwelling is more related to delayed leaving than 
to early leaving. In section 8.4 it is shown for France and Spain that, in fact, younger people 
are more likely to live in a rented dwelling than their older counterparts, and cohabiting cou­
ples are more likely to than married couples. Since in Spain buying a dwelling is so wide­
spread among young people too, the regional model also tests the role of regional price differ­
entials for acquisition o f dwellings (ACCES).
The problem with data about the housing market is that the theoretically ideal unit of analysis 
would be the local community, since within a region, prices o f dwellings will be quit different 
depending on the size o f  the town and the spatial organisation of production. A small rural 
town near to an important industrial town might display high dwelling prices, since many peo­
ple working in the industrial town live in the smaller rural municipality. Given the limited re­
sources o f this research we have to do with the regional average.
The estimation o f the affordability o f owned dwellings poses some methodological problems. 
For example, many estimations are based on expected prices, which can differ from real prices 
at the trade moment (Cortés Alcalá 1995). The most detailed information is provided by the 
Banco Hipotecario Español (Spanish Mortgage Bank), which processes the information o f the 
dwellings for which they offered a mortgage. In general, their survey comprises 40,000 dwell-
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ings every year and it is more accurate for national figures than for regional or prov mcial om> 
and more for periods longer than a trimester. For the years of 198b to 1987. 80 per cent of iln- 
sample were publicly subsidised dwellings and in 1988/89. 60 per cent were duellings on »he 
free market. The regional price structure for used dwellings, which were financed bv the BHL 
has not changed throughout the period 1986 to 1993. The regions where, traditionally acqui­
sition o f housing is less expensive are Estremadura. Andalusia and Castilla La-Mancha (San­
chez Villar 1993). Based on these prices and on the annual disposable family income. Gome* 
Churruca and Levenfeld (1993) calculated the accessibility of dw ellings by regions in 1997. 
first without tax deductions and then after taxes The latter estimation is used for the regional 
regression model (ACCES).
Contrary to the original idea to control for different theoretically significant intervening vari­
ables in the logistic regression models, it was decided to construct a simple model Indicators 
for regional labour markets and housing markets will be part of the model, and from the inter­
vening variables only family norms will be included in the model due to their theoretical im­
portance. This procedure is necessary because of the technical problems which appear vs hen 
one introduces independent variables which are themselves correlated To have, however, an 
idea about the role o f some of the intervening variables, their regional variation w ill be de­
scribed briefly in the next section.
9.2.2 Control Variables: Wealth, Consumption Standards, Mobility and Family Norms
There are five independent control variables of the theoretical model in section 5 urbanisation, 
education structure, geographical mobility, family norms and wealth Effects of urbanisation 
and education have been controlled for at the individual level
Differences in wealth could not be analysed at the individual level for Spain, but only for 
France, since we lack information in the former case. Instead, wealth as indicated by regional 
GDP per head or regional average household expenditure is a measure available for Spain The 
indicator chosen is average household expenditures, for it avoids problems of sub-estimation of 
income statistics and it permits at the same time taking a closer look at the use of expenditure 
for different aims. The idea is that not only the level of wealth is important but also, if people 
with lower income levels have similar or different consumption standards
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It is difficult to find regional data on young people's expenditure, since statistics o f household 
surveys only analyse the expenditure o f young people living independently but not of those 
living with parents. However, to give an idea o f  regional differences some figures from the 
Household Expenditure Survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares) o f 1991 and ofGPD 
per head are presented.
Figure 36: A verage Household Expenditure Per Consum ption Unit 
(Household Head Aged 0-29) and G D P Per C ap ita  (National averages= 100), Spain 1991
i 1 — average expenditure —a— GDP per capita i
Source: own elaboration with INE 1995 and Martin Rodriguez 1996.
The average monthly expenditure per consumption unit o f those households where the head is 
younger than 30 amounted to 87,998 Ptas in 1991 (750 PPS). Annually, the national average is 
1,055,974 Ptas, whereas the lowest average was shown by people living in Estremadura 
(701,267 Ptas) and the highest in Catalonia (1,545,931 Ptas). Figure 36 provides details o f the 
regional distribution o f the average expenditure o f  households with young family heads and of 
the GDP per capita. First, it can be observed that, in general, the households headed by a 
young person which spent over the national average ( 100) are found in those regions where 
also the GDP per capita is higher than the national GDP per head and vice versa. It means that 
the general wealth of regions is also reflected in the consumption capacity of young people
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living independently. Young people who left home do not seem to have risked a decrease in 
their consumption capacity compared to the regional standard. This is in line with the theoreti­
cal idea that young people leave home if they are able to attain a standard o f life similar to that 
of their parents or to that o f their regional context.
Interestingly, regions with low average expenditure levels and GDP per capita, for instance 
Andalusia, are found among the regions with low staying home rates, in particular with respect 
to men, and at the same time regions with high levels are also found among the early leavers 
(Catalonia, Baleares). The same unsystematic grouping is found among regions belonging to 
the group o f late leavers: there are "poor" regions such as Galicia and Castile-And-Leon and 
there are ''rich" ones, such as the Basque Country and Navarre. Is the relation between wealth 
and leaving home mediated through differences in consumption preferences?
The theoretical model in section 5.1 includes a hypothesis about young people's consumption 
preferences. It states that if young people live in a context o f low average income levels, but 
they spend similar amounts for transport, communication and leisure as young people in con­
texts with higher average income levels, then in the first context the prevalence o f two- 
generation households will be high. On the other hand, early leaving home could be a result o f 
lower consumption levels in some important areas such as housing and leisure. It is assumed 
that living in the parental home is a strategy to prevent a low consumption capacity. Thus, 
people in regions with low income and expenditure levels, who nonetheless leave home early, 
might spend less on leisure, because they have lower consumption standards. Instead, regions 
with high income levels and high staying home rates, should display rather high amounts of 
expenditure for leisure, since there are high consumption standards and thus young people will 
only have left home after they were sure to be able to reach the regional standard.
Expenditure for leisure is indicated as a percentage of the total national average annual expen­
diture per consumption unit in 1991. The average national proportion spent on leisure goods 
was 6.4 per cent o f total expenditure, which in Figure 37 has been transformed to 100. The 
smallest proportion with respect to  total regional expenditure was 4.6 per cent and the highest 
rate 9.4 per cent. Young people who live independently in Andalusia, a "poor" region, spend 
less for leisure than the national average, and young people who live in the Basque Country 
and Navarre, "rich" regions, spend more than the average on leisure. Yet, the correlation be-
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tween regional staying home rates and average consumption on leisure of those living inde­
pendently seems weak. Independent youth in Madrid, Baleares and the Basque country show 
similar levels of expenditure on leisure, whereas their regional staying home rates are very dif­
ferent. Catalans spent most o f all young people in Spain in total, most for leisure and in addi­
tion they leave home the earliest. A possible reason for this is that they spend relatively little 
for accommodation. This point was discussed before and will be analysed in more detail below. 
however, figures related only to socially independent youth are presented here in Figure 3 7 .
Figure 37: P art of Expenditure on Leisure/Housing of Average Household Expenditure 
Per Consumption Unit (Household Head Aged 0-29, National av erag es-100), Spain 1991
Source: own elaboration with INE 1995.
In 1991, young people who were living independently spent on average 16,492 Ptas per month 
on accommodation, heating and electricity, which represents 18.7 per cent of their total expen­
diture. The annual average rates per consumption unit in relation to the respective regional 
total ranged from 25.9 in Cantabria to 15 per cent in Murcia. If the regional expenditure is 
compared to the national average, then it appears that independent young people in Madrid 
spent most for housing. The correlation of expenditure for accommodation with regional stay­
ing home rates is not clear, since young people in Catalonia and in Baleares pay a rather high 
proportion for housing despite the fact that they leave earlier, and youth in Castile-And-Leon
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and Cantabria spend relatively little on housing while they stay in the parental home for a long 
time. Yet, it has to be taken into account that the part of expenditure on housing considers 
only those young people who have already left home, which means that it does not consider 
the general price levels of housing. These figures here partly reflect other regional factors fa­
vouring or hindering social independence.
Another variable it was proposed to control for in the theoretical model was geogr a p h ic a l mo­
bility. The argument there was, that areas with immigration of young people for reasons of 
study or work will present lower rates of two-generation households and more one-generation 
households, especially in the form of peer and single-person-households. To test this idea a 
variable at individual level can be introduced in order to measure the importance o f  having 
changed town, province or region for the likelihood of living independently. Yet, there are 
some problems. First, there is the already mentioned problem of under-registration o f  informal 
living arrangements in the sociodemographic survey, but which most probably affects the de­
pendent and independent variable in the same way. Second, there is the problem that all those 
who migrated from one municipality, province or region to another have left the parental home 
by definition. Technically this means that it does not make any sense to include geographical 
mobility into any of the multivariate models, since the variable migration is part o f  the depend­
ent variable. Only those who live independently have the possibility to take a positive value on 
the variable migration. Of young people aged 20 to 29 in 1991 6.4 per cent migrated when 
they left home and there are some small regional variations. In 1991, eight per cent o f those 
living in Madrid, in La Rioja and in Baleares had migrated when they left home, while in the 
Basque Country they were only 4 per cent, in Andalusia 5 per cent and in Murcia 5.6 per cent. 
Thus, the relationship to the regional differences in staying home rates seems to be rather 
weak.
Family norms and family culture is supposed to play an important role in leaving home. In this 
research the perspective chosen explicitly ignores these factors most o f the time. It is not be­
cause they are thought to be irrelevant, but because the aim is to explore how far one can go 
with a socio-economic explanation. Clearly, economy and culture are not independent from 
each other as has already been mentioned. Economic and social behaviour is embedded in cul­
tural frames and thus it is difficult to assert if a given variable indicates a cultural or an eco­
nomic phenomenon. So, the decision of women to search for paid work is simultaneously
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linked to cultural contexts and to economic and production characteristics of those contexts 
The hypothesis o f the theoretical part states that areas where consensual unions are more wide­
spread will present lower rates o f two-generation households, since informal living arrange­
ments favour young people's early nest-leaving. In addition, territorial units where neolocal and 
early marriage was important in the past will show lower rates of two-generation households, 
while areas, where in the past, stem-families and late and patrilocal marriage predominated, 
will display high rates o f  two-generation households. These historical pattern only have rele­
vance in the present if the production mode o f  agriculture in the respective region remains im­
portant.
From the 19th century until 1960/70 great regional differences in marriage patterns existed in 
Spain and they were relatively stable over time until well into the 20th century. In the northern 
coastal areas and the Canary Islands, male and female marriage was restricted as in north­
western Europe, while in the centre, in the eastern coastal regions and in the south it was in­
tense. Reher has shown in a historical provincial analysis that the provinces of high nuptiality 
were "areas o f high mortality, partible inheritance practices, balanced marriage markets, mod­
erate out-migration by both sexes, low population density, and professions which facilitated 
marriage" (Reher 1991). I f  one looks at the types o f families, nuclear versus pluri-nuclear, the 
Spanish census o f 1970 shows very large regional differences in the rural areas. The pluri­
nuclear family dominates in the rural areas o f Galicia, the Basque Country, Asturias and Cata­
lonia, which are areas o f small-sized and family-based agricultural production. Large nuclear 
families are more common in rural areas with large estates and high rates of agricultural day- 
workers, such as Andalusia, Canary Islands and Estremadura (Pablo Masa 1976). Age at mar­
riage among agricultural dayworkers and large estate owners was traditionally lower than 
among other social classes in western Andalusia (Contreras 1991). Spanish long-lasting re­
gional differences in marriage patterns, inheritance practices and diffusion of stem-families 
have been and are still the subject of controversy as to if there existed two or more regional 
family models (Reher 1997). The interesting fact for this research is the persistence o f different 
family models until current times.
Early family formation patterns in large estate areas are still found in the present-day Spain. 
Following two qualitative analyses, the process o f  family formation o f  young people from agri­
cultural dayworker origin would seem to differ from that o f young people with other social
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origins, especially from that of young people coming from farming families These two strdies. 
refer to the town o f Lebrija, in the province of Seville, at the beginning o f the 1990s and to 
eight towns in western Andalusia in 1989/90 (Talego Vazquez 1995. Gavira Alvarez 199.’ > 
According to Talego, young agricultural dayworkers form, for the most part, neolocal families, 
i.e. outside the parental home, and, in addition, earlier than other social groups. The average 
marital age o f the men is 24.9 years and of the women 21.8 years, while in the small and mid­
dle agricultural owners group o f the same town men marry at 28.7 and the women at 25.6 
years, figures which are similar to the Spanish averages. The family formation process o f agri­
cultural dayworker families follows the inverse logic of most other Spanish families. The pre­
vailing logic is not to wait in the parental home until the conditions for a particular living stan­
dard for the new couple are met, since it is only by becoming independent under precarious 
conditions that the new family can begin to improve its conditions. Talego explains that this 
phenomenon is related to the work organisation of the dayworkers' families and to the agrarian 
labour market.
Jr
The specific gender and age division o f labour within the family, characteristic o f  the so-called 
modem nuclear family, does not apply to these families. All adult members are considered from 
their 16th birthday onwards or even earlier as labour power and participate in different jobs 
outside the house. The precarious employment and income situation o f the household head, 
normally the father, and the particular labour market are the reasons for this massive use of the 
labour power o f all the family members. The consequence o f this is that most children go to 
school only for a few years and have high drop-out rates (Gavira Alvarez 1993). The children 
begin to contribute to the family income early and, clearly, the income and services offered by 
the children is in the interest of the parents and other family members. To become independent 
means that one no longer needs to contribute to the income o f the family o f origin, and, in ad­
dition, men seem to find a job more easily if they are family heads.
This early home-leaving; despite the very precarious economic conditions o f young couples, is 
possible because of the very specific housing market. In Lebrija, for example, a large amount 
of rented accommodation ("casas de vecinos") exists, and in particular, it is possible for day- 
workers with a low income to rent only a room at a very low price instead of a whole apart­
ment (Talego Vázquez 1995). If this early neolocality o f Andalusian day-workers in western 
Andalusia is also to be found in other parts of Andalusia, it makes it understandable why the
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Andalusian staying home rate is average and not high, in spite o f the difficult labour market 
situation. Thus, the rate o f agricultural dayworkers in relation to all paid workers in 1991 
(DAYWORK) will be taken as an indicator o f  different family models and of the regional im­
portance o f  agriculture.
In addition, in the south-western coastal regions less people are practicising Catholics and 
these regions had important traditions of anarchism and liberalism, whereas northern regions 
are more strongly determined by Catholicism. Since it was shown that in Spain young people in 
consensual unions are more likely to be non-practicising Catholics or Non-Catholics (Valero 
1992), it is not surprising to see that the regional index o f  the number o f young people who 
have not declared themselves to be practicising Catholics relates positively to the regional in­
dex o f consensual unions in relation to all partnerships (Figure 38 and Table 15). The rate o f 
consensual unions in 1991 was chosen for the multi-level logistic regression because it reflects 
religious differences relatively well and because it is also an important cross-national difference 
between France and Spain (COHABIT). Thus, consensual unions are taken as an indicator o f  
social norms, even if this phenomenon is also linked to socio-economic variables as shown by 
the correlation with the rate of rented dwellings (cf. Figure 38) and as theorised by some ana­
lysts.
180
Figure 38: Non-Practicising Catholics (aged 15-29), Consensual Unions (all age*)-allt* 
Rented Dwellings (all ages) (National Averagcs=100), Spain 1991/92
-♦ - In d e x  of Non Practicising Catholics
—o -  Index of Cohabitation
—a— Index o f Rented Dwellings_______
Sources: own elaboration with INE 1994.1995 and Navarro Lopez/Mateo Rivas 1992.
From a modernisation perspective, some authors have seen the increase in consensual unions 
more as the result of general socio-economic changes than as the result o f religious differences. 
Chafetz (1992 in: Prinz 1995) describes family change in general as a process with five phases. 
In the first phase, the social structure of a country changes due to technological change and 
economic growth. In a second phase, women's labour force participation and their enrolment in 
education increases. In a third phase, female employment rises among all women, including 
married women and mothers. In a fourth phase, family changes, such as delays in marrying, 
fertility decline and increase in divorce and cohabitation, can be observed, while the women's 
movement emerges and grows. In the last phase, public opinion regarding gender and family 
patterns change and contributes to the acceleration of family change. This perspective has 
some problems if one wants to apply it to Southern Europe, since the fourth phase in Spain and 
Italy had specific features. A delay in marriage and a fertility decline can be observed, but the 
increase in divorce and cohabitation is very slow, as is the emerging of a women's movement. 
The latter is in decline instead o f on the increase (Jurado/Naldini 1996, Morales 1999). How­
ever, a regional analysis testing for a correlation between more "modernised" regions with 
more cohabitation and earlier home-leaving. The question o f  causality remains nonetheless
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open, since there are arguments in favour o f linking cohabitation to religious differences and in 
favour of relating it to socio-economic changes.
9.2.3 Theoretical Model for Spanish Regional Analysis And Results
Finally, it was decided to  use two indicators for different regional family cultures, two indica­
tors for the housing market and one indicator for the labour market.56 The regional labour 
market will be described by the rate o f  young men who are searching for their first employment 
in relation to all young people of the age-group (UNEMP). It was decided to not include an 
indicator of short-term employment, because it strongly correlates with the family culture indi­
cator DAYWORK. The housing market will be described with two indicators, one is the rate 
o f rented dwellings (TENRENT) and the other is the price o f acquisition of a used dwelling 
financed by the Spanish mortgage bank in relation to disposable income (ACCES). The rate o f 
consensual unions is chosen as an indicator o f tradition in terms o f degree of secularisation and 
of prevalence o f marriage as main household formation practice (COHABIT). The rate o f agri­
cultural dayworkers o f all paid workers is taken as a twofold indicator, namely to represent the 
weight o f agricultural dayworkers as an indicator of early, nuclear and neolocal family forma­
tion patterns and of the weight of agriculture (DAYWORK). The regional rates are treated as 
quantitative variables.
The model for Spanish young people on the labour market is as follows:
(11) logit (IND91/92) = a  + p,(ACTIVEST) + p2(CLASSFA) - p3(SIBL) + p4(EDUC) +
Pj(AGE) + p6(RURURBAN) + p7(UNEMP) + pg(TENRENT) + 
p9(ACCES) + Pio(DAYWORK) +P„(COHABIT)
The inclusion o f  all variables into one model is problematic due to problems of collinearity. If 
one includes all regional indicators into one model the predictive power of the model increases, 
but this a statistical artifice, since one is including indicators measuring similar things. Thus, it 
was decided to run two different models containing each time only one indicator for the hous-
56 For more details on the variables see appendix 3.
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ing market, labour market and family norms. Those combinations of indicators were chosen 
which show less correlation.
Note: (Coefficient / (Cases) /  2-tailedSignificance). cf. appendix 3.
There is a strong negative correlation between daywork and access, which means that in re­
gions with high percentages of agricultural dayworkers dwellings are less expensive. A simi­
larly strong correlation but o f positive sign exists between cohabit and tenrenty which is in line 
with the expectation that more people are in consensual unions in regions where higher rates of 
rented dwellings are found. This confirms at regional level the relation between being in a con­
sensual union and the higher likelihood of living in a rented dwelling. As expected, there is also 
a strong negative relationship between the rate o f practicising young Catholics and cohabita­
tion. To prevent strong correlations within one model the following two models were com­
puted:
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(12) logit (IND91/92) = a  + PKACTIVEST) + p:(CLASSFA) - P?(SIBL) + p4(EDUC) *
p5(AGE) + p6(RURURBAN) + p7(UNEMP) + P i ( T E N R E N T )  -  
p9(DAYWORK)
(13) logit (IND91/92) = a  + Pi(ACTIVEST) + p2(CLASSFA) - p,(SIBL) + p4(EDUC) +
ps(AGE) + p6(RURURBAN) + p7(UNEMP) + p8(ACCES) + 
+p9(COHABIT)
First each context variable was included separately into the complete model and then two mul­
tivariate models were computed. Next, the results of the separate inclusion of regional vari­
ables is presented.57 58
The regional price of dwellings in relation to disposable income is significantly and negatively 
linked to the probability o f young active men to live independently (-0,0132**), while the rate 
o f rented dwellings has a positive effect (0,0228**). The rate of male agricultural dayworkers 
as a percentage o f all men employed in agriculture shows a positive effect on the likelihood o f 
living out of the parental home (0,0280**). The number o f consensual unions in relation to all 
unions shows a stronger positive effect than the previous variables (0,1106**). Last, the rate 
o f  young people searching for their first employment influences living independently in a posi­
tive way as well (0,0266*). All regional variables are significantly related to the dependent 
variable, each o f them separately.
The results o f  both multivariate models (model 12 and 13) are very similar5g In both models all 
three variables are significant, but the relative importance o f  each o f  them changes. In the first 
model the indicator o f  the labour market has the strongest effect, followed by the indicator of 
family patterns, and the indicator o f housing market. Whilst, in the second model the most im­
portant variable is cohabit, followed at some distance by unempm and access. The predictive 
power of the first model is somewhat higher than that of the second one (-2LL. 9321,824 and
57 The detailed results of the models with only one independent regional variable are not reported.
58 Detailed results for model 13 are not reported, but for model 12 they are shown in Table 14 in appendix 2.
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-ILL: 9366.667 respectively) and therefore model 12 is taken in order to develop an explana­
tion.59
For women the procedure has been followed in the same way, that is to firstly introduce every 
context variable separately. If  the effort o f acquiring a dwelling (access) is introduced as 
unique context variable, it can be observed that this variable has no significant effect, com ran* 
to what the male model has shown. The rate of rented dwellings, instead, has a significant 
positive effect on women's likelihood to live independently (0.0296**). With respect to the 
cultural variables, the two respective models show first a non-significant effect o f daywork and 
a significant positive effect o f cohabit (0.1695**). The male rate o f first-employment seeker 
exerts a negative influence on women’s probability of living out of the parental home 
(-0.0907**). The multivariate models 12 and 13 have more predictive power than the previous 
uni-variate context models.60 The model with unemp, tenrent and daywork shows a -2  log- 
likelihood of 10505.475, while the model with unemp, access and cohabit provides a some­
what higher -2LL (10511.423). In both cases all three coefficients show statistically significant 
effects In the first case the strongest effect comes from unemp (-0.1057**), followed equally 
by tenrent and daywork (0.018**). In the second model, to be in a region with a high rate of 
consensual unions increases the likelihood of social independence more (0.1315**) than to be 
in a region with a low first-employment seeker rate (-0.0891 **). To be in a region with high 
dwelling acquisition prices has the smallest effect on the chances o f living independently 
(-0.0130**). Again, as in the case o f men the more predictive model, that is model 12, is se­
lected for further interpretation.
In the male and female models the respective significance o f  the cultural variables changes de­
pending on the form of the triad o f independent variables. However the housing market indi­
cators are always the less determining variables, while the labour market and the family prttem 
variables battle it out for the first place. The models with less predictive power, which include 
the rate o f consensual unions, the rate o f effort to acquire a dwelling and the male rate of first- 
employment seeker, show a larger influence of family norms than of socio-economic variables.
M To prevent the doubt that the rate of practicising Catholics (CATHOLIC) could have been a better indicator of cultural 
variations and that it would have been more predictive, two other male models were computed. A first one with only 
CATHOLIC shows a significant net coefficient of-0.0157 and another with CATHOLIC, ACCES and UNEMP shows 
three significant effects, whereby UNEMP displays the strongest net effect, followed by smaller effect of ACCES and an 
even smaller effect of CATHOLIC. The -2LL of 9361,028 shows that the model is less predictive than model 12. The 
detailed results are not presented.
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Again, women are more strongly influenced by the labour market indicator than men. These 
results make evident how important the choice o f indicators on social norms and culture are 
and to which extent there is always some arbitrariness. This is in relation to the fact that culture 
is only relatively autonomous from socio-economic variables, and that thus cultural indicators 
always carry a socio-economic part within them.
Compared to the models with the regional dummies (model 4), the models which give a mean­
ing to regional differences through the combination of two economic and one cultural variable 
(model 12) reach a very high predictive power.* 61 The fit o f the more interpretative models is as 
good as the model with the 16 dummy variables. For men, the differences between the -2  Log 
Likelihood o f the model with region dummies (model 4) and the -2LL of the best predicting 
model with regional rates (model 12) numbers 15. The number o f  degrees of freedom differ­
ence is 13, because model 4 has 16 regions and model 12 has 3 regional variables. A %2 te s t . 
with 13 degrees o f freedom and a probability o f error of 0.01 shows that the -2  LL difference 
of 15 is not statistically significant. This means that model 12 predicts as well as model 4 and 
thus is able to explain away the regional differences thanks to variables indicating regional dif­
ferences in labour markets, housing markets and family norms. For women the -2  Log Likeli­
hood difference is higher (26), but a %2 test with 13 degrees of freedom shows that the -  2 LL 
difference o f 26 is not significantly different with an error probability ofO.Ol. However, our 
model explains men's behaviour better than women's, since model 12 for men explains 17 per 
cent of variance, while model 12 for women explains only 14 per cent of variance. This is what 
happens with all the models used in this thesis, since they are employment-oriented and take 
only individual strategies into account.
Table 16 shows that, for men, the two regions that are significantly positive are also among the 
first three regions according to the context indicator62 (Andalusia and Catalonia), while o f the 
five regions that have significantly negative coefficients four of them are among the last five 
regions as measured with the context indicator. For women the correlation is weaker.
90 Detailed results of model 12 are shown in table 15 in appendix 2.
61 For detailed results see appendix 2, tables 14 and 15.
63 The context indicator takes for each region one value, which is the sum of the three context variables, TENRENT,
DAYWORK and UNEMP of model 12.
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To sum up. men and women on the labour market face different probabilities of living inde­
pendently according to the region, in which they live, and independently o f their individual 
chances. If they live in regions with low rates of male first-employment seeker, a high offer of 
rented dwellings and high proportions o f men working as agricultural davworkers. they have a 
better chance to live out o f the parental home, than those in regions with high unemployment 
rates, a low offer o f rented dwellings and few men working in agriculture as davworkers. Let 
us now describe the concrete situation of each region which was found to have a significant 
effect on the probability o f living independently in comparison to Madrid.
Table 16: Indicator of Context Favouring Independence and Regional Differences
Indicator (tenrent-»-daywork-unemp) Coefficients of Men Coefficients of Women
Andalusia 28.7 Andalusia ÍQ.4M3** ' Catatonía 0,441**
Baleares 24.9 Catalonia Baleares jO,4398** : 
Ì0J2702;* r .Catalonia 23.8 Baleares 0.2587 País Valenciano
Estremadura 23.0 País Valenciano 0.1927 La Rioja 0.1709
Canarias 18.1 Murcia 0.1921 Aragón 0.1038
Murcia 15.5 Estremadura 0.1812 Castile-La Mancha 0.0613
Madrid 15.5 Caslile-La Mancha 0.0506 Murcia 0.0256
País Valenciano 15.3 La Rioja 0.0388 Estremadura 0.0032
Castile-La Mancha 15.2 Madrid 0 Madrid 0
Aragón 14.7 Canarias -0.0405 Anda 1 asía -0.0319
Asturias 13.5 Aragón -0.0621 Asturias -0.1077
Galicia 13.3 Galicia -0.2395 Cantabria -0.3277
La Rioja 12.8 Castile-And-Leon W 657*r' Navarre -0.294
Castile-And-Leon 11.9 .Asturias .-0.3892V : Galicia ,-0J2914* . r
N'avarre 10.1 Cantabria ■0.4088* _ Cananas ■0J05T*
Cantabria 8.0 Basque Country U .3 1 3 * * ^ -r - ■ ■ • ■ V v .
Casti!e-And-tveon r<U406**¿
Basque Country 2.8 Navarre MW454**:.' Basque Country U .5 4 2 3 * * ^
Ì .  .
Source: own elaboration with census and logistic regression results of table 14 and 15, appendix 2.
The positive regional effects of Andalusia and Catalonia on young men's probability o f living 
independently is due to their combination of specific labour and housing market and family 
norms features. Andalusia has a high rate of first-employment seeking men aged 20 to 29 
(9%), but it has a high rate o f  rented dwellings (20%) and a high rate o f agricultural daywork- 
ers (18%), which means that it has a difficult labour market for young people becoming inde­
pendent, but this is compensated by a favourable housing market and a significant presence of 
people with family norms which favour early emancipation. Catalonia presents very good eco­
nomic conditions with a low first-employment seeker rate (4%), and a high offer o f  rented 
dwellings (27%). Family norms are not shaped by a high proportion o f agricultural dayworkers
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(0.5%), but Catalonia has the second highest rate of consensual unions (2.7 % of all unions), 
many Catalans are o f Andalusian origin and liberal and secularised values have a long-lasting 
tradition.
The group of late-leaving regions has to be divided into two subgroups. First there is Navarre, 
which displays a low unemployment rate (5%). but also a low offer of rented dwellings (13%) 
and a low significance o f agricultural dayworkers (1.2%). Its low rate of independence is an 
outcome o f negative housing market conditions and a low weight o f  early family formation 
traditions. The remaining four regions, the Basque Country, Cantabria, Asturias and Castile- 
And-Leon also have traditions of small-sized and family-based agricultural production (day- 
worker rates all under 1.5%), high rates of first-employment seeker (7-10%) and low to me­
dium rates o f rented dwellings (13-17%). Asturias is an exception with respect to housing 
market conditions, for it has a high rate of rented dwellings (23%), and acquisition o f dwellings 
require an average effort, but it's unemployment rate is the second highest of all regions. Diffi­
cult housing markets and a tradition of long-lasting cohabitation o f children with their parents, 
due to the important weight of family-based small agricultural production, explain the negative 
influence of these contexts on young men's social independence. The position o f Galicia with 
respect to the regional indicator leads to the expectation o f finding it among the group o f late 
leavers, and in fact, men in Galicia leave late, but this low probability of social independence is 
the outcome o f  a composition effect o f activity, age, education, class and urbanisation struc­
tures as was shown above.
The situation o f women is very similar, but with two exceptions which present some major 
problems, if they have to be explained within the terms o f the theoretical model. The regional 
indicators o f unemployment, housing market and family norms point to a positive effect o f 
Andalusia and Canarias for women's probability of living independently, but the result o f the 
logistic regression shows a non-significant regional effect for Andalusia and a negative effect 
for Canarias. The lack o f these effects cannot be explained as an outcome of composition ef­
fects due to activity, age, education, class or urbanisation structures, since these regions did 
not appear to be significant in the bivariate models discussed above. These two exceptions 
show the limits of the model, which in the future will have to be revised to be able to explain 
away these exceptions.
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9.3 Conclusion; Cultural Mediation o f  Socio-economic Situations
The question at the beginning of this chapter was to asses how far regional differences in 
young people's living arrangements are due to socio-economic composition effects or to re­
gional "culture" effects. Some composition effects were found in France and Spain, but on the 
other hand contextual effects also emerged after control o f individual-level variables. Thus>. 
many regional effects, in particular in Spain, are not the result o f  composition effects due to 
activity, age, education, class or urbanisation structures.
For France few regional effects were found with the exception o f students whose differential 
regional chances to be living away is related to migratory processes linked to decisions about 
where to study. French non-students, instead, show different probabilities o f social independ­
ence according to their rural-urban context and very few in relation to their regional .context. It 
was argued and partly shown that a rural context means more traditional values with respect to 
household formation through marriage in contrast to cohabitation, a selective emigration of 
young people and a housing market dominated by owner-occupied housing. Thus varying fam­
ily formation patterns and housing market structures are identified as explaining variables and 
the Spanish findings point to the same factors.
The Spanish regional analyses with regional indicators of family norms, labour and housing 
markets have shown that the in the model with the highest predictive power the labour market 
situation exerts the strongest effect on social independence o f young Spanish people who have 
finished their education. A high rate o f men searching for their first employment has a negative 
effect for men's and women's chances to be socially independent, the effect being stronger for 
women than for men. Family norms, as measured by the rate o f agricultural dayworkers, and 
housing markets have a smaller influence on young people's living arrangements, but a larger 
influence on men's probability of social independence than on women’s. In spite o f these differ­
ences the precariousness, the high-property-low-affordability and the hypothesis about the 
importance o f specific family norms have all been confirmed to some extent. Three configura­
tions o f this triad were found for Spain:
1. Precarious-Agricultural-Daywork Regions with precarious youth labour markets, but 
more favourable housing markets and family norms favouring early family formation: An­
dalusia.
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2. Stable-Non-Agricultural-Daywork Regions with less precarious youth labour markets 
housing markets with high rates of rented dwellings and relatively high rates of consensual 
unions: Catalonia, Baleares and País Valenciano.
3. Precarious-Non-Agricultural-Daywork Regions with precarious youth labour markets, 
housing markets with low to average rates of rented dwellings and no early family forma­
tion norms: Basque Country, Navarre, Cantabria, Castile-Leon, Galicia, Asturias. Asturias 
has a relatively favourable housing market, but because labour market features are more 
important than housing market characteristics it forms pan o f the late-leaver group 6‘'
Can we draw some conclusions from this regional analysis for the cross-national comparison o f 
France and Spain? A simple transposition o f  these regional results to the cross-national level is 
not possible, but it can be suggested that if regional contexts have an influence on young peo­
ple’s living arrangements in Spain and to some extent in France and in the latter also the rural- 
urban context has an influence, then it is very probable that at cross-national level context 
variations are also relevant. In fact, the cross-national models show that many Spanish-French 
differences persist after the control o f important socio-economic variables at individual level. If 
we further assume that contexts exert similar effects be they cross-regional, cross-rural-urban 
or cross-national, then it can be predicted that cross-national differences are primarily a result 
of differences in the labour market and in the second place a result o f differences in housing 
markets and family norms. If this hypothesis was to be verified in a larger cross-national study, 
then a final conclusion could be drawn: social policies aiming to ameliorate young people's 
chances to find an employment and an accessible dwelling would have a positive influence on 
young people's chances to reach social independence and they would diminish French-Spanish 
cross-national differences. Since different family cultures mediate socio-economic situations 
and culture is supposedly relatively autonomous from the economy, cross-national differences 
are not likely to disappear completely, even if socio-economic convergence was attained. 
However, it has to be remembered that family cultures are only relatively autonomous, since 
they depend to some extent on socio-economic characteristics, as was shown by the discussion 
of the relations between early family formation and the agricultural production mode and be­
tween consensual unions and housing market characteristics.
oî These three household formation models are more encompassing than those developed in a previous work based on five 
regions and they are able to explain regional differences with less variables (Jurado Guerrero 1997).
190
CHAPTER V:
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL POLICIES IN LEAVING HOME
10 The Social Construction of Social Rights Careers in France and Spain 1985* 
1992
Young people move through different phases of financial dependence according to the institu­
tions they depend upon. Before they attain legal maturity they primarily depend on their par­
ents and, only partially, receive indirect support from the state, for instance in the form of child 
allowances, or they receive a marginal market income due to holiday jobs, etc Young people 
move from a state o f primary dependence on the parents (chitdhood) to a state o f mixed de­
pendencies on family, market and Welfare State (youth) to a state of dependence on the market 
and the state (and less on the family), which is the normal status of an adult person in a Welfare 
State. This movement through different states of social status and sources of financial depend­
ence will be labelled the social rights career, which parallels to educational, employment and 
housing careers. The institutionalisation of the social rights career can be considered as a cru­
cial process for the understanding of the levels of financial and social dependence o f young 
people on their parents.
The dependence-diversification hypothesis affirms that social rights are crucial for the under­
standing of differences in young people's home-leaving, since they reduce dependence on par­
ents in a life phase, where young people lack financial autonomy and where uncertainty about 
the future is comparatively high. From this perspective, cross-national differences in young 
people's living arrangements emerge not only due to 1. variance in the timing of the phases of 
the social rights career but also due to 2. variations in the configuration of the market-family- 
state triad at the starting and ending point of the career.
The aim of this chapter is to describe the mechanisms through which the specific institutionali­
sation o f social rights affect differences in the financial and social dependence of young people 
on their parents.
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1. In a first step, the division of labour between the Welfare State and the family at the start­
ing phase o f the social rights career of young people is analysed through a description of 
the division of the tasks of caring and educating children.
2. Then the public definitions of age-limits o f childhood and social citizenship o f adults are 
treated through a comparison o f entitlement conditions to child benefits, health services 
and social assistance. This description o f the timing o f social rights career finds its final de­
velopment in the conclusion of the chapter.
3. In between, the study of entitlement conditions, of generosity and of coverage of social 
benefits for students, young workers and young people on the housing market aims to pro­
vide a comprehensive picture o f the extension and the timing o f social rights for different 
groups o f young people.
4. Finally, the two institutional forms of social rights careers and dependency diversification 
degrees in Spain and France are summarised.
With regard to the starting phase, it can be affirmed that some Welfare State regimes display a 
weak division o f labour between the family and the state in the fulfilment of family tasks, while 
others show a rather strong division o f labour. At the end o f the social rights career, differ­
ences in universality and generosity o f  the Welfare State affect the financial dependence o f 
adults on the state and the market, and to a lower or greater extent also on the family (cf.
10.6). Financial transfers from the family or the state towards young people can operate in two 
forms, as allowances and as benefits in kind/services. Both types o f benefits have to be studied 
in order to asses the degree of dependence-diversification young people reach in a given Wel­
fare State. This chapter concentrates on the period of 1985 to 1992, because these are the ears, 
during which the young people analysed in this work were likely to leave home. Because in 
France and Spain there have been no structural reforms which have changed national configu­
rations o f social rights for young people since those years, it can be assumed that the analysis is 
also of relevance for the current moment.
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10.1 Degrees o f  State Intervention into Family Tasks
In most societies children's upbringing is a task families have to fulfil, but the way this is or­
ganised is subject to state regulation and is facilitated through state intervention. Family law is 
the favoured instrument for public regulation of family affairs, but, besides, the state helps 
families through a wide range of measures, namely through the provision o f public institutions 
for general and vocational education, through family benefits, and through helping parents in 
the combination o f paid and unpaid work. For the purpose o f studying young people’s liv ing 
arrangements an analysis of public provision of education and o f family benefits has to be un­
dertaken. Family law can be important insofar as it regulates parents' and young people's recip­
rocal obligations in cases o f need, but it is considered to be less relevant for people's decisions 
to leave or to stay in the parental home than welfare regulations about child maintenance and 
education.
The French state provides public education at all levels o f general education and, in addition, it 
offers a wide range of publicly financed vocational training institutions. In all educational areas 
private institutions complete this educational offer. At some levels up to 20 per cent of enrolled 
pupils go to private institutions (cf. Table 17), yet over 90 per cent of the students enrolled in 
private institutions are part o f schools, whose teaching staff is paid by the French state (DEP
1 9 9 5 ) .
Education in France is divided into three main levels:
1. primary education from age six to eleven;
2. secondary education, which lasts until age 15 in the lower level (collège) and until age 17,
18 or 19 in the upper level depending on the path taken;
3. tertiary education until approximately age 20 to 28 depending on the levels, which go from 
short-cycle technological courses lasting two years until certain medical specialisation and 
doctorates which last approximately ten years. A specificity o f the French system is the dual 
system of universities formed by public and private elite institutions named Grandes Écoles 
(OECD 1996).
In France, compulsory schooling goes until age 16 and until this age parents do not need to 
pay for education. Even private schools, which are publicly recognised, do not require a major
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financial effort from parents, since they are publicly subsidised (Dienel 1993). Tertiary educa­
tion foresees the payment of academic fees, which are low at universities, higher at the C gran­
des Écoles and very high at the private Grandes Écoles (Eurydice 1993). The dominance of 
the state as provider o f education is also reflected in the relatively small number of apprentice­
ships, even if great efforts have been undertaken in order to increase the dual system elements 
of French vocational education. It can be stated that the French state helps parents considera­
bly in matters o f education through the provision of a wide net o f public and publicly subsi­
dised institutions.
Table 17: Public and Private Education by Level in France and Spain, 1991/1994
Students in France 1994-95 (thousand)* Students in Spain 1991-92 (thousand)
Public Private Total Private as % 
ofTotal
Public Private Total of Private
Primary Educa­
tion
5643 900 6.543 13.8 3.016 1.634 465 35.1
Secondary
Educaron:
4.828 1.146 5.974 19.2 1.799 708 2.507 28.3
• General 3.793 992 4.785 20.7 1.185 447 1.631 27.4
• Vocational 1.035 153 1.189 12.9 619 262 881 29.8
Tertiary Educa- 
non
1.975 133 2.108 6,3 1.154 40 1.194 3.3
Notes: General education of secondary level in France includes "1er cycle secondaire" and "2e cycle general et technologique". 
* university enrolment for 1993-94. Sources: DEP 1995. Consejo de Universidades 1992. MEC 1994.
Like the French state, the Spanish Welfare State provides its citizens with public schools at all 
levels of compulsory education. This situation is rather new, since for a long time the Catholic 
Church was the main provider of education. During the transition to democracy (1978-1982) 
and in particular during the period the socialists were in power, public educational offer was 
enlarged, its quality increased and private schools were subjected to rather detailed regulation. 
Unlike in France, the Spanish education system has experienced several structural reforms: the 
LODE in 1986 (regulation o f right to education) and thzLO G SE  in 1990 (new educational 
system). Many private schools persist, in particular in primary and secondary education, but 
since 1985 they are strongly regulated by the Spanish state, in particular at the compulsory 
level. As in France, the state offers subsidies to private schools according to some conditions, 
such as cost-free admission o f students according to the norms o f the public schools. There are 
two types o f subsidies to private schools: 1. subsidies which cover all the costs (concierto gen­
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era!) and which secure cost-free education for all pupils, and 2. subsidies which cover only 
some part of the costs of private schools (concierto singular). so that these are allowed to take 
tuition fees within given limits. In 1985-86. over 90 per cent o f  private schools of priman- level 
received some state support, most o f them the most encompassing type. Private secondary 
level institutions receive only the second type o f subsidy, since free education at these levels is 
not guaranteed by the Spanish state (MEC 1988). Thus, despite increasing subsidies for private 
schools throughout the last decade, in 1993, the rate of non-state subsidised private schools of 
primary and secondary level in Spain was higher than in France (OECD 1995, Fernández Mel­
lizo-Soto 1997).
The young people o f this analysis went to school in the system as it was designed by the L G E  
(General Law on Education) in 1970, since the step-wise implementation of the new education 
system began only after 1990. As in France, education can be divided into three levels;
1. Primary school {Enseñanza General Básica, EGB), which ends at age 14, and which was 
the age-limit for compulsory education until the reform o f  1990.
2. Secondary school with its general path {Bachillerato Unificado y  Polivalente, BUP  and 
Curso de Orientación Universitaria, COU) and with its professional education path (For­
mación Profesional, FP) of first and second level. The complete general path, which gives 
access to university, lasts until age 18 and the professional path of first degree finishes 
normally at age 16 and the second degree at age 18.
3. Tertiary education goes until age 21 if somebody follows a short course and until age 
23/24 if a five-year path is aimed at. Clearly, it frequently lasts longer than the theoretically 
foreseen time and if somebody undertakes doctoral studies. Unlike in France, there is no 
system of elite universities, even if private universities are increasing in number in the last 
years.
Like in France and even more than there, in Spain formal vocational education is dominated by 
the school system and dual-system vocational training is mostly non existent. Education at pri­
mary level is free in the public system, whereas fees have to be paid in private schools at sec­
ondary level. Enrolment in tertiary education is not free, and relatively high tuition fees have to 
be paid. For children from low income families and from large families exemption from fee 
payment is granted. The Spanish Welfare State helps families considerably in their education 
tasks. This has been one of main developments in the Spanish Welfare State in the last decades.
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Yet, in secondary and tertiary education Spanish families have to pay, on average, more than 
French families (cf. section 10.2)
Another well-known indicator o f public help for families is the rate o f very young children in 
child care. France belongs, together with the Scandinavian countries, to those societies which 
have the highest rate o f  children aged 3 to 5 covered by public child care services (Duncan
1996). In France in 1993-94, 35 per cent of children aged 2 were enrolled in public child care 
and 99 per cent o f those aged 3 (DEP 1995). This French environment o f early public care of 
children in combination with a high rate of employed mothers might have long-term conse­
quences on young people's values about independence from parents and on their degree of 
individualism, and thus indirectly influence young people's decisions o f leaving home.
One important Welfare State shortcoming in Spain is the lack of child-care services for very 
young children (0-3) and the inadequacy of most child care services in terms of quality and 
time schedules so that it is difficult for women to combine family and work. In 1992/1993 only 
around 8 per cent of children aged 2 were enrolled in a pre-school, while the enrolment rate of 
older children is higher and attains a maximum of around 100 per cent at age of 5 (Eurydice 
1996). The number of children under age 2 cared for in public centres was in 1991-1992 one of 
the lowest among EU countries: 0.1 per cent for those under I year; 0.5 per cent for 1 year old 
and 1.4 for 2 years (MEC 1994, Valiente 1995). Thus, compared to France the Spanish Wel­
fare State cares less for very young children, and for employed mothers help from family mem­
bers is very important.
To sum up, children in France are not only a private affair, since the state recognises their fi­
nancial support and well-being as a priority o f  public social policies, in particular through pre­
school education and education in general. State intervention in education and in family policy, 
as described below, socialises the tasks o f bringing up children to a much greater extent than in 
countries with poor family policy. Let us illustrate this further by describing the role of child 
benefits in France and Spain.
Family benefits are social rights of parents, who receive allowances due to the assumption that 
children depend on their parents and that the state aims to redistribute child costs horizontally. 
Child-related social rights will be described for two reasons: first, to clarify which are the cate­
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gories of young people, for whom parents are entitled to benefits: and second, to look for the 
public definition o f  dependent childhood.
Family policy in France is a very developed and differentiated strand of the Welfare State with 
a long history and high levels o f generosity from a comparative perspective (Lenoir 1991, 
Commaille/Singly 1996). Around twenty different family and child allowances exist in France 
nowadays, which can be divided into four different types: 1. income-maintenance allowances. 
2. birth and young-child allowances; 3. one-parent allowances; 4. housing allowances.64
1. Universal child allowances from the second child onwards (allocations familiales); means- 
tested child allowances for families with three or more children (complément familial), 
means-tested allowances for children in school (allocation de rentrée scolaire).
2. Allowances for very young children, which are universal until the child is three months old 
and means-tested until age three (allocation pour jeune enfant); universal allowances for 
mothers with three children, who have left the labour force (allocation parentale d'éduca­
tion)', universal allowances for employed parents who employ someone to take care o f their 
children aged under three (allocation de garde d'enfant à domicile); universal allowances 
for paying a publicly recognised mother’s help (aide à la fam ille pour l'emploi d'une assis­
tante maternelle agréée).
3. Means-tested allowances for single mothers or fathers with children under age three (allo­
cation de parent isolé), allowances for single parents (allocation de soutien familial).
4. Universal housing allowances for families receiving child allowances, for young married 
couples and for families with a dependent old-aged relative (allocation de logement famili­
ale); means-tested housing allowances (allocation de logement sociale), (cf. 10.2.1)
In addition, the French state concedes tax exemptions for families with children (quotient fa ­
milial). Income tax is based on a progressive rate and on the household unit, and it takes fam­
ily obligations into account through a mechanism whereby the taxable income is divided 
through a factor representing the number of dependent family members. A single, divorced or 
widowed person without a child is assigned factor one, a married person factor two, a married 
or widowed person with one dependent child scores factor two and a half, with two dependent
64 T his descrip tion  o f  social security benefits re fe rs  to  the general regim e o f  th e  F rench  social security , w h ich  pro tects 
around 80 per cen t o f  the inhabitants o f  F rance. F o r the situation  in o ther reg im es, cf. Ju llio t 1991.
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children factor three, and so on. For the calculation of the taxable income of a couple with two 
children, for instance, it means that first the total household income is divided by factor three in 
order to calculate the tax due to one part taking advantage o f the lower tax rate for lower 
amounts, and then this amount of income tax is multiplied by three to obtain the total tax 
amount. This very specific form of tax income, which was introduced in 1946 and only slightly 
changed since then, has some drawbacks in terms of vertical redistribution, since it offers fami­
lies with high income and children relatively better tax conditions than families with low in­
come and children (Trotabas/Cotteret 1990, Glaude 1991, Villac 1993).
Universal benefits for all families are lacking in the Spanish social security system, as are bene­
fits for specific family problems such as one-parent families, and advance maintenance pay­
ments for separated mothers and their children. Since the creation o f child benefits in 1938, the 
goals of Spanish family policy have undergone major change. Initially, pro-natalism and hori­
zontal redistribution following family criteria through wage supplements and social security 
predominated, whereas since 1985 an anti-poverty policy with special focus on poor families 
has been enforced. From 1971-85 social security family benefits were nearly non-existent in 
quantitative terms, partly due to the ideological connection o f family policy to the dictatorship. 
Non-recurrent benefits and benefits for dependent spouses, which had lost most o f their real 
monetary value during the 1970s, were discontinued in 1985. At the same time a monthly sup­
plement o f 1050 Ptas for every dependent child was created for retired employees and for 
those receiving unemployment benefits (Coll Cuota and Martin Jadraque, 1993). This supple­
ment meant that in 1990, an unemployed family head with two children received child benefits 
worth 5% of the minimum wage. But for other recipients the value o f the child benefit for two 
children decreased to 1% of minimum wage in 1990.
With the introduction o f non-contributory social transfers in 1991, family benefits changed 
completely : benefits for dependent children {prestación familiar por hijo a cargo) were intro­
duced, and all legal residents o f Spain with dependent children under 18 are eligible, whether 
or not they are enrolled in social security.65 But this benefit is subject to a means test that takes 
the number o f  children into account. In 1991 income ceilings for recipients of child benefits 
were fixed at 1 million Ptas per year for one child (1,123,084 Ptas in 1996) and increased by
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15% for every additional child (INSS 1996). Children under 18 received 36.000 Pta per year 
(1996). For a family with two children this represents benefits equivalent to 10% o f the mini­
mum wage. Benefits for disabled children are not subject to a means test and vary with the 
degree o f handicap. After the age o f 18 child benefits are restricted to children with a handicap 
over 65% or more. In 1995 a new law on large families was passed to include families with 
three children into the category o f large families. As of October 1995, the main benefit for 
large families was a 50 per cent reduction in children’s university registration fees (El Pais, 2 
October 1995). Like in France, the Spanish state concedes tax exemptions for children. In 
1991 parents could deduce 18,100 Ptas for each child, which represents less than 3 per cent of 
the annual minimum wage. In a comparative European study on family policy, Spain ranked 
among the lowest positions in generosity in child benefits for a couple with children (Bradshaw 
et. al 1993). Again, the conclusion is that in Spain families have to cope with more tasks than 
in France. Last, the definition of childhood by the state is to  be analysed, to see how the two 
states define the timing o f the social rights career.
In France, we find three age-limits for children's entitlement to any family allowance. General 
entitlement to child benefits lasts until age 16, if the child is effectively enrolled in education. 
Children can continue to be entitled until age 18 if they are out of the labour force or their 
market income does not exceed 55 per cent of the national minimum wage (SMIC). Allow­
ances can be received until age 20, if  the child accomplishes an apprenticeship, a vocational 
training stage, is enrolled in education or if he/she is unable to enter the labour force for rea­
sons of illness or handicap (Julliot 1991). Tax exemptions for a dependent child display a very 
similar regulation of age-limits. Children until age 18 are taken into account; children until age 
21 can be considered as if they are single, studying or fulfilling their military service; and for 
children in education the age-limit goes until 25 (Trotabas/Cotteret 1990).65 6 To sum up, the 
French social security system offers parents entitlement to child benefits during the children's 
period of transition into social independence, since by age 20 around 50 per cent o f  young 
people had already left home once. The French Welfare State does not consider children aged 
25 as depending on their parents, but as citizens with entitlement to means-tested social bene­
fits (cf. below).
65 Law  about ch ild  allow ances (L ey  26 /90 ,20  d e  d iciem bre sobre  P restaciones no  contributivas). All c itiz en s  living in Spain 
and disposing o f  sm all incom es a re  en titled  to these allow ances. In 1991 a  Royal D ecree specified th e  L aw  (Real De­
creto 356/1991, 15 de marzo).
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In Spain, means-tested child benefits can be obtained whilst the child is under 18 years old, 
while tax exemptions for children go until age 30 (25, in 1988), if the child does not have his or 
her own family (since 1989, or if this new family has an annual income under 618,000 P ta s ) 
and if the child's income does not exceed 123,000 Ptas (1991). Older handicapped children 
with an income under 123,600 Ptas (1991), who are part o f family unit can benefit from tax 
exemption without age-limit (Delgado Diaz et al. 1989). In contrast to France the age-limit for 
entitlement to child benefit is lower in Spain, but instead it is higher for tax exemptions. On the 
one hand the Welfare State does not consider young people over 18 as dependent on their par­
ents, but on the other hand it is as if tax exemptions for children had been designed taking into 
consideration that leaving home in Spain is a long process which lasts frequently until age 30, 
and which entitles to tax reduction if the child's income is low. Further on it will be shown that 
the Spanish Welfare State defines childhood in most cases as a situation which lasts longer than 
in France (cf. 10 6).
Another important field, where the definition o f childhood can be studied is entitlement to 
health services. What are the conditions that have to be met in order to be entitled to health 
services as dependent child or as citizen? In general in France, young people are entitled to 
health care services until age 20 in the frame o f their parents’ insurance. Indirect entitlement to 
health services is not linked to the fact o f sharing the household with the parents, but it de­
pends on age-limits and enrolment in education. The following differences in entitlement can be 
listed:
1. Young unemployed people receiving an unemployment allowance continue their previous 
affiliation to social security automatically and are directly entitled to health benefits. First- 
employment seekers, who have not contributed to social security, are directly entitled to 
health services in case o f illness and maternity. The unemployed, who have finished their 
unemployment benefit period are also directly entitled to health services for an unlimited 
time period as long as they continue seeking employment. Thus, the fact of entering the la­
bour market, be it as employee or as unemployed makes young people become citizens.
2. Students under 20 are entitled to health services indirectly through their parents, while 
young apprentices are entitled directly, since they have a labour contract giving right to so-
w For children over 18 years th e  fac to r for tax exem ption  m oves from  one to half. M arried  children  until 2 1 or 25, i f  study­
ing, can also be  considered  for tax  exem ptions in  the  h o useho ld  o f  one o f  th e  parents.
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rial security affiliation. Students from 20 to 26 enrolled in a university or a preparatory cta^ 
for a Grande École have access to a special social security scheme for students and are thu* 
directly entitled to health services.
3. Economically inactive young people over 20 can sign up to a special health insurance 
scheme which is open to all people living in France who have no right to another type of 
health insurance (assurance personnelle). If they are not able to pay the contributions them­
selves, then the social assistance assumes the costs (Dupeyroux 1988) In July 1992 a new 
law on cost-free health services for needy people has increased the conditions for access to 
health services (Delhoume 1995).
Unlike in France, in Spain in 1990 there was no age limit which restricted children's indirect 
access to health services. The conditions were to live with the insured father or mother, to be 
maintained by them and not to receive an income higher than twice the minimum wage Also, 
no other entitlement to health insurance should exist. But, young people enrolled in education 
or unemployed people with unemployment protection are also entitled to health services
1. Young people enrolled in secondary or tertiary formal education institutions and who are 
younger than 28 are automatically insured by a special school insurance (seguro cscalar). 
which entitles them to health services.
2. First-employment seeker have no direct entitlement to health services, but the unemployed 
receiving unemployment benefits continue to be covered by a health insurance. Unem­
ployed people who have finished their unemployment protection can benefit from health 
services if they pass a means-test, continue searching for employment and arc not entitled 
to health services by other means (MTSS 1991).
3. Since 1989, every citizen resident in Spain whose annual income is the same or below than 
the minimum wage is entitled to health services under the same conditions as those insured 
through social security (MTSS 1991).
In contrast to France young people who live with their parents and who depend on them can 
be insured with them in their health insurance as long as necessary. As is the case for tax law, 
long-lasting cohabitation o f young people with their parents is recognised by the Welfare State 
Dependent childhood depends less on age and more on the current financial situation and living 
arrangement.
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Finally the question o f  social assistance for young people will now be dealt with. Besides, fam­
ily and housing benefits, which to some extent serve as social assistance measures, a specific 
social assistance exists in France. The minimum allowance for integration (revenu minimum 
d ’insertion or RM l) was created by a law o f December 1988. To be eligible the individual has 
to be aged 25 or under with family obligations, and he has to live alone or in a couple. It is a 
means-tested measure for people with very low resources. The aim of this benefit is to guar­
antee an income o f 2,000 FF for one person and 600 FF for a child (1988), i.e. around 50 per 
cent of the minimum wage. An individual entitled to RMI is also automatically entitled to 
health services and to APL housing allowance (cf. 10.5.4). People who receive RMI can profit 
from specific subsidised employment measures and special loans for housing (cf. 10.3.2 and 
10.5.4). The profile o f  beneficiaries goes from marginalised young people, some unemployed 
young people and many old people. At the beginning of the 1990s a third of the beneficiaries 
were under 30 years old (Raymond 1995, Delhoume 1995). There are also other social assis­
tance benefits under regional and municipal responsibility, but which are directed towards old- 
aged people and handicapped people (Delhoume 1995).
Unlike in France, there is no national social assistance scheme, but by 1996 all regions (Cornu- 
nidades Autónomas) had enacted laws guaranteeing a minimum income for families (rentas 
minimas de inserción or salarios sociales), and by 1990 the regions o f The Basque Country, 
Navarre, Andalusia, Cantabria, Catalonia, and Madrid had introduced this new ‘social assis­
tance’, financed by the regions (Estivill 1993, Sanzo 1993). Despite the differences between 
the various regional social assistance programs some common characteristics can be pointed 
out. Like in France, these allowances are for very poor people and all these programs relate the 
allowances to activities o f re-integration into society, mainly through work requirements. In 
addition, and most importantly for this research, nearly all regions have two age conditions, 
age 25 as minimum age-limit or to be under 25 with family obligations.67 As in France, benefi­
ciaries have to live alone or in a new family unit. The basic allowance for one person in 1993 
amounted on average to 34,337 Ptas. per month, representing, like in France, 50 per cent of 
the minimum wage. At the beginning o f the 1990s and based on a sample of five regions, the 
rate o f households headed by a young person aged 16 to 24 who received some benefit in rela­
tion to the total households benefiting from an allowance ranged from 5 to 19 per cent (Agui- *
* Tw o regions have d iffe ren t ru les : 1. A ndalusia h a s  no ag e-lim it for young peop le  if  th e se  do not live alone, if  they  live 
alone they have to  be over 3 5 , an d  Aragon ap p lies  the sam e ru les  as  the m ajority  b u t w ith  a m inim um  age-lim it o f  18.
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lar et al. 1995) In France and in Spain young people aged 25 can benefit from social assis­
tance, but only if they live independently.
To conclude, the French Welfare State does not relate indirect and direct social rights for 
young people to the condition of living in the parental home, but to age-limits and handicap 
only.68 Child benefits last until age 20/25 and direct social rights to social assistance are ac­
quired by age 20/25. A possible gap without rights exist between 20 to 25 years for young 
people without family obligations, who live independently, have not yet entered a job with so­
cial security and who do not seek employment. These people have no right to income mainte­
nance. In consequence, young people do no receive incentives to live with their parents, since 
living away does not reduce their parents’ transfer income nor does it reduce the range of social 
rights available to youth. Instead, having an one’s dwelling allows young people to claim 
housing benefits (cf. 10.5.4).
In Spain child benefits are so low that, even if health services and tax exemptions for children 
are related to living and being maintained by parents, they do not represent any incentive to 
staying at home. Indirect rights to health services through coresidence with parents could be a 
more important incentive, but health services are universal in Spain, so that everybody on a 
low income has access to them, independently o f their living arrangement.
Let us now move to the acquisition o f direct social rights according to the category a young 
person belongs to. Social rights for students, young employees and young unemployed people 
have to be studied separately.
10.2 Multiple Social Benefits fo r  Students
Students in France receive state support in the form of services (halls o f residence, health in­
surance, refectories, reduced costs for public transports and some cultural activities) and in the 
form of allowances (grants and housing allowances). As discussed previously this state support 
is supposed to help students to set up an independent household during the week while passing 
the weekends in the parental home. For female students the dependence-diversification hy­
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pothesis has been confirmed by the empirical analysis, in the sense that the combination of 
market income and public benefits is the most determinant combination of resources to explain 
the likelihood o f students living independently (cf. section 8.3). It was also shown that many 
more French than Spanish people left home in order to live in a hall o f residence, that full-time 
students in France are more likely to live independently than their Spanish counterparts and 
that a great number o f  French young people living in one-person households are students. In 
this section public benefits for students will be described for the period from 1986 to 1992 by 
looking at entitlement conditions, coverage rates and their generosity.
In March 1991, a reform of public benefits for students was undertaken in France, which re­
sulted in an increase in the number and in the amount of student grants and in the institution o f 
a system of loans, which are guaranteed by the state. In 1992, 16.6 per cent of the students o f 
the tertiary education system received a grant, which represented five times more students than 
in 1960 (Massit-Follea/Epinette 1992).
In Spain in 1991 the law in force, which regulated university grants, dated to 1983. In 1991 17 
per cent of students received some form of grant, but many of them o f a very low amount. In 
1989/90 a new type o f  grant was created for those students whose parental home is so far 
away from the university town that they cannot commute every day, but have to live away 
from home. In November 1998, a new benefit for students was created. The Ministry o f Edu­
cation and Culture offers students in the last year o f their studies the possibility to ask for a 
loan with a veiy low interest rate (approximately 1.3 %). The loan can reach the maximum 
annual amount o f 630,000 Ptas and will be paid monthly for a length of nine months. It means 
a maximum monthly amount of 70,000 Ptas, i.e. around 419 ECU.68 9 The only condition to be 
fulfilled is to have passed all the previous academic courses successfully. These loans are in­
tended to facilitate the finishing off o f one’s studies and the search for a first employment 
(Mercado de Trabajo, 27.11.98).
68 One exception is  young w ork ers ' en titlem ent to  A LS housing  allow ance, w hich  is incom patib le w ith h is /h e r paren ts  en ti­
tlem ent to child  benefits (cf. 10.5.4).
04 The current exchange ra te  o f  ] E C U  is 167 P tas.
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10.2.1 Public-funded Housing for Students in France
An important help for French students are the public halls o f residence. In France, two institu­
tions are responsible for the social and economic well-being o f students. The Centre National 
des Oeuvres Universitaires et Scolaires (CNOUS) at national level and the Centres Régionaux 
des Oeuvres Universitaires et Scolaries (CROUS) at regional level. These institutions have a 
tradition that goes back to 1920, a time when young people from lower social class origin be­
gan to enrol in university, and different university towns therefore created some help for them. 
By law the CNOUS and the CROUS exist since 1955. The CROUS provide three different 
types o f student accommodation:
1. residence halls of old and new construction,
2. subsidised social flats, and
3. information about private accommodation.
Students' entitlement to housing benefits depends on the student's income, on the income of 
her or his parents, the distance of the university from the parents' residence and on academic 
performance. Places are primarily reserved for students with limited financial means. Students 
pay only for the running costs (heat, electricity, water and staff) and, thus, they have to pay 
rather low rents. The contracts for rooms in the halls of residence are, in general, concluded 
for a period o f 9 months, since it is assumed that students will stay at their parents' home dur­
ing holidays. Instead, apartments in halls of residence can be rented for a period o f 12 mouths.
At the beginning o f the 1990s around 240 halls o f residence were administered by the CROUS 
and some additional places were available in subsidised social flats (Schaferbarthold 1993). In 
1996 the places offered were: 96,000 rooms in halls, 45,500 apartments, 6,750 dwellings in 
public social housing {Habitation a loyer modéré, HLM), and 1,450 beds in associated halls 
(CNOUS 1998). In 1988, the sum o f places in halls o f residence, HLM  dwellings and associ­
ated halls was 116,833 places, which divided by the number o f students in the academic year 
1988/89 (1,477,077) yields a coverage rate of 8 per cent (OECD 1989).
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In 1992 and in 1997, the average rent for a room (9 n r) in a hall built in the 1960s was 700 FF 
per month, which represents 12% of the national minimum wage in 1992 and 100 PPS 7t' Since 
1991 students living in a hall can apply for a housing allowance {allocation de logement a car­
actère social ALS), which in 1997 amounted to 285 FF per month and by this means the final 
rent for a room was 415 FF per month.70 1 In 1997, an apartment (18m2) in one o f the new halls 
had to be paid 1,700 FF per month, but this rent could be reduced to around 700 FF per month 
after subtraction of the housing allowance. Students under some conditions can receive an 
APL-housing allowance {aide personnalisée au logement), which according to the zone of 
habitat amounted from 1,102 to 1,227 FF per month in 1997.72
Social flats, named habitations à loyer modéré, are owned by semi-public institutions, but fur­
niture is provided by the CROUS. In 1992, the monthly rent for a social flat amounted to ap­
proximately 1,200 FF, i.e. 27% of the minimum wage and 173 PPS.73 These flats are aimed at 
young couples and these can ask for an APL-housing benefit.
In addition, the CROUS informs students about private accommodation in town and they ad­
vertise in the press to find additional rooms for students. In 1992, the rent of a private room 
amounted to around 1,200 to 2,000 FF (27-44% of the minimum wage) depending on the 
town (Schaeferbarthold 1992, CNOUS 1998).
With respect to the coverage rate, two representative surveys and one quasi-representative 
survey on students at the beginning o f the 1990s offer figures on the use of public housing by 
students. In 1992, the CREDOC {Centre de Recherche pour l'Étude et TObservations des 
Conditions de Vie) conducted a survey directed towards French students in universities and 
technological university institutes {Institut Universitaire Technologique or IUT). This survey 
reports that 36 per cent o f students were living in the parental home, 13 per cent in a hall o f 
residence and 51 per cent in a private dwelling. Two other surveys, conducted by the Socio­
logical Observatory o f Change in 1992 and by the Observatory of students' life in 1994, show 
very similar results. The percentage o f students living with their parents is much higher in Paris
70 PPS=Purchasing P ow er S tandard , In 1992, 1 P PS  w as w o rth  6.94 FF.
71 The ALS-housing a llow ance ex ists  since 1971, b u t s tuden ts w ere not en titled  to  apply for it until 1991/93 (cf. 10.5.4).
72 The student has to  live  in  a n  appartm en t or a  room  in a  h a ll o f  residence regulated  by  the  state. The dw elling  has to  be
the official residence and h as  to  fulfil certain  norm s concern ing  the surface o f  the dw elling  (cf. 10.5.4).
^  The monthly SM IC  w as ca lcu la ted  by taking the  SM IC p e r  h our before social con tribu tions and m ultip ly ing  it w ith  169, 
which are the w ork ing  ho u rs  in  a m onth  (39 h ours w eek) (IN SEE  1993).
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(63%) than out o f the area o f the capital (33%). This difference is related to the high rents in 
Paris, which are around two and a half times higher than in other parts of the country. Univer­
sities in regional capitals, instead, receive students coming from municipalities that are rather 
far away from the university town, which forces these students to find a dwelling outside the 
parental home. One third o f the students who come from provincial towns of middle to large 
size have their parents at more than 100 km from the location of their university. Conse­
quently, students of provincial origin live more often in halls o f residence. Students who live in 
halls are also more frequently from lower social class origin and they are more likely to receive 
a public grant (Galland/Oberti 1996). Following my own elaboration with the Enquète Jet nes 
1992, 9 per cent of the full-time students who lived independently were living in a rented and 
furnished dwelling or hall o f residence, 9 per cent had rented a HLM dwelling, 10 per cent 
were in a dwelling given by relatives, friends, etc., 28 per cent were living in a self-owned 
dwelling (by them or their parents) and 44 per cent had rented a dwelling on the private mar­
ket. Irrespective o f the type of dwelling, as much as 80 per cent of the students who lived in­
dependently were receiving a financial help form their parents, since those were paying the 
rent, the mortgage or were allowing their children to stay in a dwelling owned by the family.74
10.2.2 Halls of Residence in Spain
In Spain, there is no equivalent to the CNOUS nor is there another type o f central institution 
responsible for students' social affairs. All facilities and services except state grants are pro­
vided by the universities themselves. This results in scarce statistical information on the socio­
economic situation of students. However, some general information and figures can be pro­
vided. In most university towns two different types of halls o f residence for students can be 
found: 1. ColegiosMayores and 2. Residencies. The first have a long tradition, they are main­
tained by universities, by public or by private organisations and they offer students half or full- 
board. In 1998 there were 163 Colegios Mayores. 15 per cent were public, 25 per cent de­
pended on non-religious institutions and 60 per cent on religious organisations. Most of the 
halls are uni-sex, since only 38 halls accept female and male students together. There are long 
waiting lists for acceptance into the Colegios Mayores and there can be up to 300 applications
74 T hese calculations a re  based on the  France86 sam ple, which m eans tha t th e  base o f  calculation  are those  young people 
who in  1986 w ere  living in the  parental h om e and who faced the  opportunity  o f  leaving d u ring  a six -year tim e period 
until 1992.
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for 30 available places. Applicants are chosen according to their qualifications. Students have 
to re-apply every year and they can live in the hall of residence during the nine months o f the 
academic year, like in France. In 1992. the monthly rent oscillated between 32.000 and 60.000 
Ptas, which means 273 to 512 PPS. These amounts are much higher than the 100 PPS a French 
student had to pay for a room in a hall o f residence. In Spain, some special scholarships (ap­
proximately 15% o f places) are awarded for students of the Colegios Mayores, where aca­
demic performance is the main selection criterion. The other type o f halls of residence, the 
Residencias are most o f  them private commercial enterprises. Rents in these places vary 
greatly. In 1998 they ranges from 60,000 to 90,000 Ptas (Schaferbarthold 1992, El Pais 
13.10.1998).
Table 18 shows the number of places in halls o f residence in France and Spain and the respec­
tive coverage rates. In Spain, the most dominant hall of residence is the Colegio Mayor. The 
coverage rate in Spain is less than half that o f France, though the Spanish figures are from 
1991, while the French are from 1988.
Table 18: Halls of Residence in Spain 1991/France 1988
Spain France
Type of residence Number Places Places Type of Residence
Colegios Mayores 155 21.060 102.760 cité universitaire
Residencias 50 5.555 10.778 H.L.M
3.295 foyers agréés
Total 205 26.615 116.833
Students 1.137,228 1.471.900 Students
places/students * 100 2.3% 7.9% places/students * 100
Source: Consejo de Universidades. 1991. 1992; INSEE 1993. OECD 1989.
It has already been mentioned that the Spanish sociodemograpic survey used for this research 
ioes not offer an accurate information on students living out o f the parental home during their 
itudy period. Valenzuela Rubio (1994) offers some data on the situation of students who left 
tome in order to  study in another town. According to these figures in 1991/92 the proportion 
)f students living away from home o f  all students in their respective university reaches a maxi- 
num of 62 per cent in the university o f  Castile-La Mancha, 48 per cent in Valladolid and only 
> per cent in Seville and 11 per cent in the "Universidad Autónoma" in Madrid. The propor- 
ions of these students living out o f the parental home in relation to places offered in halls of
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residence go from 3 per cent in the university of the Basque Country to 26 per cent in the 
"Universidad Complutense" in Madrid The expansion of enrolment in higher education it. 
Spain has been characterised by the creation of universities in many regions, so that uni\etMiio 
have got closer to young people's homes, instead of sparking off geographical mobilns in ordet 
to study at a university (Garrido/Requena 1996).
At the beginning of the 1990s some public efforts were made to augment the number of halls 
of residences for students, but they are of limited number and of a rather erratic nature A first 
example is the central plan of the Ministry of Social Affairs of 1990 The Ministry' devised a 
programme for the construction of housing for students who left the parental home to go to a 
university town. The Ministry signed conventions with regions, municipalities and universities, 
which foresaw the construction of housing to be used by students during the academic yc-r 
and by other people during the summer. Entitlement to places in these halls of residence would 
follow criteria o f income, distance to parental home and academic achievement This plan fore­
saw the construction of halls of residence in nine university towns and the creation of 1200 
places per year, around 3000 places in total (MAS 1994) Another example is the construction 
of a hall of residence in the Universidad Autonoma of Barcelona In 1992 the municipality of 
Barcelona organised the Olympic Games, and it decided to construct accommodation for the 
participants o f the Games at some distance from the city in a place easily to protect by the po­
lice. After the Games, it was decided that this building should be transformed into a hall of 
residence for students, professors and employees of the above-mentioned university
To conclude, public housing is especially important for those students, whose parents have low 
resources and who live in rather rural areas. In Spain public provision of halls of residence is 
more or less non existent, but also private institutions are not very diffused Thus, French stu­
dents can afford to study in a town far away from their parents’ home, more easily since they 
receive public help for accommodation and for maintenance.
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10.2.3 G rants for Students
The French Welfare State offers two types o f grants for students:
1. grants according to social criteria {bourses sur critères sociaux) and
2. grants following academic criteria (bourses à  caractère spécial).
The first group of grants are thought to be a complement to the family help a student receives 
in order to be able to maintain herself during the period o f  studies. Entitlement to the first type 
of grant depends on resources and expenditure o f the student and o f her/his parents, on age, 
school certificate, type o f tertiary studies to be followed and performance during study time. 
The potential beneficiary has to be under 26 years old when asking for the grant the first time 
and every year he/she has to show some progress according to established criteria. Grants 
cover the study phase o f nine months a year and they are granted for the first and second 
phases of studies, i.e. until the level o f Licence. Beneficiaries are exempted from tuition fees 
and from contribution to students' social security system. Normally, they have priority for ob­
taining a place in a hall of residence and also to obtain a job as school assistant in secondary 
schools {surveillant scolaire).
The second type o f grants are assigned following the academic performance and by proposition 
of the president of the university. These grants are mainly used by students of the third phase 
of studies (DEA and DESS) and to some extent also by students who prepare a competition to 
enter the public administration, such as the competitions for l'agrégation (examination to be­
come a teacher in a public secondary school), for l'ENA {Ecole Nationale de l'Administration), 
etc. (cf. Table 19). These latter grants are named grants for the public service (bourses de 
sennee public). Students who continue their studies after the completion of the third phase can 
apply for a research grant (allocation de recherche).
In addition, students, who do not receive a grant, can apply for special loans (prêts d'honneur), 
which are interest-free. Their amount is similar to the amount of a grant, but their number is 
rather small (OECD 1989). In 1993, in addition to the grants system, academic assistance 
funds for specific urgent cases (aides individualisées exceptionnelles, AIE) were offered for 
especially needy students like students who bring up children (EURYDICE 1993, Schàferbar- 
thold 1992). Since 1991 the state guarantees additional loans given to students by banks. Due
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to the rather unattractive interest conditions, the total number of loans in 19 91 92. 3tvOOo. u  a > 
rather low (Massit-Follea/Epinette 1992).
In 1992 in France, the level of a grant ranged from 4,680 and 16.236 FF a year and between 
6,210 and 17,442 for students who had committed themselves to work in the public sector for 
ten years, i.e. 670-2323 PPS and 888-2495 PPS respectively. The highest possible monthly 
amount for normal scholarships was thus of 335 PPS. Following the CREDOC surv ey the a\* 
erage monthly amount of a grant was 1,460 FF in 1992, i.e 210 PPS (Richter 1992. 
EURYDICE 1993, Galland/Oberti 1996). The exact distribution according to type and amount 
o f grant and the main beneficiaries are illustrated in Table 19 for the academic year 1993/94 In 
this year many beneficiaries o f means-tested grants (around 43%) are found among those w ho 
receive the highest grant amount, which is nearly the same distribution as in 1987/88 (OECD 
1989).












1er échelon 6.588 12,6 Licence 17.442 0.1
2e échelon 9.882 13.7 Service public 17.766 4 5
3e échelon 12,744 15.8 DEA 19.440 52 4
4e échelon 15.498 14.7 DESS 19.440 28 1
5e échelon 17.766 43.2 Agrégation 21.006 14 9
total 100 total 100
number 374.380 number 12.693
Source: DEP, 1995
In Spain in 1991, grants for students were regulated by a royal decree o f 1983 and annually a 
government decree specifies the details of the grants. Two types of national grams can be dis­
tinguished:
1. Grants based on a means test and on academic performance {ayttda compensatoria) and
2. scholarships for an assistantship with a professor, lecturer or for co-operation in research 
projects during the final two years of the longer licenciatura studies and for the final year 
o f the shorter diplomatura studies (proyecto fin  de carrera or becas de colaboración).
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In addition to national grants, regional authorities award various scholarships to students from 
their respective region. Both types o f national grants are conditioned by academic achievement 
and family income (Scháferbarthold 1992). Like in France, beneficiaries of grants are exempted 
from tuition fees. In addition, there are also students, who do not get a scholarship, but who 
are exempted from paying tuition fees (EURYDICE 1993).
In Spain in 1990/91, students applying for an ayuda compensatoria were entitled to 214,000 
Ptas for the academic year, that is 1824 PPS. This grant could be complemented with a travel 
grant depending on the distance (cf. Table 20). If the distance o f the student's home residence 
from the university town required living away from the parents' home, an accommodation 
benefit could be awarded (208,000 Ptas). Also, students received an annual amount o f  20,000 
Ptas for study materials and of 50,000 Ptas for a project at the end o f their studies. Students 
entitled to a grant are exempted from payment of study fees, which in Spain are relatively high 
(around 44,000 to 62,000 Ptas in Í990), Students who received a beca de colaboración were 
entitled to annua) grants of 300,000 Ptas (1992), if they were studying in their home town, and 
500,000 Ptas for other, i.e. 2,558 and 4,263 PPS respectively (Schaferbarthold 1993, Consejo 
de Universidades 1992). Thus, a student who received a grant with accommodation and study 
material supplements, received in 1990/91 an annual amount o f436,200 Ptas which is equiva­
lent to 3,717 PPS and to 310 PPS per month. Table 20 shows that from all beneficiaries only 
21 per cent received a maintenance grant and 38 per cent a residence grant. Instead, all benefi­
ciaries received a grant for material. In 1990-91, the average annual amount of a grant 
awarded to the beneficiaries was 181,398 Ptas, i.e. 129 PPS per month (Consejo de Universi- 
dades I992).75
7' The average amount includes the amount for tuition fees.
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Table 20: A m ount and  Distribution of Means-tested Grants. Spain 1989'91
Annual amount (Pus)
1989/90 1990/91 •ó beneficíanos of total. 1990 41
Ayuda compensatoria 200.000 214.000 2o 4"
Transport 5-10 km 13.000 U.OOOj 4 '2
10-30 km 30.000 32.0(H) 15 22
30-50 km 63.000 67.000 7 09!
> 50 km 75.000 80.000 2 8i
urban 12.000 12.000
_
Residence 195.000 208.000 37 5!
Material 20.000 20.000 I00j
End of studies project 50.000 o<!
Total beneficiaries 161.446'i
Source: MEC 1992. Consejo de Universidades 1992.
It has become clear, that French grants and Spanish grams are organised in different ways This 
makes it necessary to compare average amounts or highest amounts The average monthly 
amounts in France and Spain, as published by the CREDOC in 1992 and by the Consejo de 
Universidades in 1991 are 210 PPS and 129 PPS respectively. This means the French average 
amount is nearly twice as high as the Spanish one. Instead, the difference between the highest 
possible amounts in Spain (1991) and in France (1992) is very small. The highest monthly 
amount in Spain is 310 PPS and 335 PPS in France. This means that the French means-test 
allows more students to receive a rather generous grant, while this is not the case in Spain 
Finally, the question of how many students receive a grant will be looked at.
. t
Due to the differences in the organisation of the grants system in both countries, the calculation 
of comparable coverage rates presents several problems First, one has to distinguish which 
types o f scholarships are considered in the total amount. The Spanish Ministry of Education 
calculates the rate including all types of grants, it means exemptions of tuition fees, benefits for 
the acquisition o f books, support for transport, grants for living outside the parental home and 
allowances for maintenance. This rate reached approximately 20 per cent in 1992 and it is very 
frequently compared with the rates calculated in other countries (Eurydice 1993, Scháferbar- 
thold 1992). But, the French grants system is different and the calculation of the coverage rate, 
is too. In France different types of grant exist, but these are all aimed at helpin the student to 
cover maintenance costs, there are no specific transport or book benefits Thus, if one wants to
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compare Spain with France, only allowances for maintenance have to be considered in the 
Spanish case. A second problem lies in the definition of student, which is taken as denomina­
tor. In both countries the respective ministries take the current number of enrolled students, 
but in the above-mentioned publications the base for France are only those students who de­
pend on the Ministry o f  Education. Students who depend on other ministries or who are in 
private institutions are excluded. This yields a coverage rate o f 18 per cent in 1992/93 
(EURYDICE 1993). Instead, in Spain public and private university students are all included in 
calculations. To solve these problems my own calculations were necessary, where differences 
were made according to  type o f grant and students in all types of tertiary institutions were 
taken as base.
Table 21: Grants and Coverage Rates of Grants in Spain, 1988/89-1990/91





Residence Other* Tuition fees Beneficiaries Students Compen­
sation
Residence All
1988-89 37,781 102,925 - 159.335 1,032 191.395 1,027,018 3.7 - 18.6
1989-90 38,388 81,531 59,960 169.311 34,976 201,836 1,067,874 3.6 5.6 189
1990-91 32,886 79.301 60,233 163,894 36.231 197,677 1,140,572 2.9 5.3 17.3
Notes: Students in Spain means enrolled students in all types of public and private tertiary education excluding doctoral students. In Spain, 
students who receive a grant arc also exempted from tuition fees, but some students are exempted from fees, while they do not receive a grant. In 
addition, students can accumulate different types of grants. * In 1988-89. "other" includes benefits for material and plane. In 1989-90. "other" 
includes material, plane and general allowances. In 1990-91, it includes those of the previous year and benefits for end of studies project. Sources: 
Consejo de Universidades 1990, 1991. 1992.
Table 21 shows for Spain that the coverage rate o f students who receive the most generous 
grants -compensation and residence grants- oscillates around 4 per cent (1990/91), which is a 
much smaller percentage than the usually published coverage rate o f  18-20 per cent.
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Coverage (Coverage ! Coverage 
Special ¡Means- iati grams 
in% ¡tested in “« iin “ «
1987-88 8,643 188.177 3.640 200.460j 1.417.487 0.6j 13.3 14.1
1988-89 224.344 1.477.077 15.2:
1989-90 248.228 1.585.300 15.7:
1990-91 272.996 1.698.716 loi :
1991-92 303.071 1.840.307 16.5
1992-93 337.792 1.951.994 17.3
1993-94 12.693 347.380 33.381 393.454 2.074.591 0.6 16.7 ! 9 . o j
Notes: Students in France refen to all enrolled students in all types of public and private tertiary education without overseas regions ‘'Special 
grants include "allocataires d'études, boursiers d’agrégation, boursiers de service public", which are all grants depending on academic potlomi- 
ance. * other includes "prêts d'honneur" (loans), grants for "lntsituts Universitaires de Formation des Maîtres". Sources: OKCD I9K9. DMP. 199?; 
INSEE 1993.
If the coverage rate is calculated with all students, then in 1991/92 and 1992/93 the French 
coverage rate is 17 per cent (Table 22). This coverage rate is near to the 18% reported above, 
which takes only students in institutions administered by the Ministry o f Education into ac­
count. Coverage rates differ by type o f tertiary institution. According to administrative 
sources, in 1988/89 15 per cent o f university students, 32 percent o f  IUT students and 16 per 
cent of classes préparatoires students received a grant (Richter 1992). The previously men­
tioned representative survey conducted by CREDOC in 1992 found 23 per cent o f students 
who reported that they were receiving a scholarship, which is about the same rate as reported 
by administrative sources, since the survey did not include students o f the classes prépara­
toires (Galland/Oberti 1996).
To conclude, it can be said that the French grants system is more generous and that it covers 
more students than the Spanish system. In 1990/91, French maintenance grants covered around 
16 per cent o f all students, while Spanish maintenance grants covered around 4 per cent of all 
students. In France, on average, students can pay 30 to 50 per cent of their expenses with the 
amount of the grant, since they live frequently in subsidised halls of residence.76 There is no 
official estimation of the living cost o f students in Spain, but for 1991 an amount o f  between 
55,000 and 75,000 Ptas, excluding fees, can be assumed (Schaferbarthold 1992). This means 
that on average students could finance 20 to 28 per cent o f their maintenance costs. Besides
215
public help most parents of students have to help their children financially and they do so in 
both countries, but in Spain financial support o f parents is more necessary than in France.
Public housing for students in combination with grants facilitates French students leaving home 
in order to study, whereas Spanish public help is very limited, so that Spanish parents have 
necessarily to finance most of the costs. Mobility of students in Spain is a very costly affair, 
and it is a burden mainly financed by the family. Thus, public social policies for students in 
France are more extensive and more generous. Let us next describe the situation of young 
people who left school or university and entered the labour force.
10.3 Public Regulation o f  Integration into the Labour Market
Labour market careers o f young people are regulated by the State through active employment 
policy. The interesting aspects of this regulation for the leaving home process are twofold.
First, there is the question of whether active employment policies affect young people's income 
level and income stability and thus facilitate their financial autonomy; and secondly, whether 
these policies increase the velocity o f  young people's entrance into a long-term employment 
and in consequence provides them with a stable income at an early age. The second point has 
to be postponed until the end of this section.
The answer to the first question is that young people have access to income through employ­
ment measures, but that their income level is not always sufficiently high to enable financial and 
social independence. Caussat (1995) performed a logistic regression analysis with survey data 
on French young people aged 15 to 29 receiving a market income in order to estimate the like­
lihood of living in the parental home.76 7 After having controlled for sex, age, educational level, 
professional category o f  the father, type o f parental family, region o f residence, duration o f 
employment, occurrence o f unemployment and short-term employment spells, he found that 
young people with an apprenticeship contract, a subsidised contract, a short-term contract or a 
job as family help were more likely to live in the parents' home than young people with another 
type o f job in the market sector. This supports our findings that people with short-term jobs
76 For 1992, the average monthly living costs for French students were estimated to be on average 4,200 FF for students 
benefiting from CROUS services living in Paris and 3,800 for those living in other parts. Students without acces to
CROUS services had higher expenses, 4,800 and 4,400 FF respectively (Schaferbarthold 1992).
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tend to stay in the parental home more than those with a long-term contract (cf. section S.2) It 
will be shown for France and Spain that subsidised jobs are paid very little in comparison to 
non-regulated jobs especially compared to long-term employment. Since market-income is not 
the only resource, on which young people rely, it is important to see access to employment in 
combination with access to transfer income as described in section 10.4 and 10.5.4. The ques­
tion of the stability of market income is dealt with when discussing the role o f unemployment 
benefits and some data has already been presented in the section on labour market charactei is- 
tics.
The scope o f this part is to present the range of public measures available from 1985 to 1992 in 
Spain and France focusing on their quantitative importance, their generosity, their relation with 
social rights and the evaluation o f their effects on young people’s way and pace o f integration 
into stable employment relations.
In France during the period of 1986 to 1992, the state created three different types o f employ­
ment measures for young people. First, subsidies for employment in the market sector in the 
form of contracts of alternation between work and training; second, subsidies for jobs in the 
non-market sector; and third, since 1989 the comprehensive programme for individual training 
(crédit formation individualisé or CFJ), which includes various kinds o f employment meas­
ures. Besides these programmes targeted at youth there are general employment measures to 
which young people can also have access, and which are described in section 10.3.2 (Charraud 
Ses 1993).
In Spain for the period under study, 1985 to 1991, four main types of employment measures 
for young people can be distinguished. These have been in place in part since 1981, were re­
vised in 1984 at the time o f  a general labour market reform in Spain, and were partly created in 
1985 . Of these four types, two were specific types of labour contracts in the market secto; for 
young people from 16 to 28 years (contratos en prácticas and contratos de formación); one 
type consisted in grants and specific contracts for training in public institutions (Escuelas-taller 
and casas de oficios); and the third type consisted o f subsidies for the conversion o f temporary 
contracts into long-term contracts {contratos indefinidos para trabajadores jóvenes). In addi­
tion to these specifically youth-oriented contracts, the labour market reform of 1984 eased the
v  He used the Enquête Jeunes J 992.
217
use of short-term and part-time contracts, which had a significant effect on young people 
(Florez Saborido 1994). In 1992 exemptions from social security contributions for the first tw o 
types of contracts {contratos en prácticas y  formación) were ended and in 1993-94 a new la­
bour market reform changed these forms o f contracts (Cachón Rodriguez 1997). In October 
1991 the competent authorities dealing with occupational training were decentralised: first to 
Catalonia, in 1992 to Valencia, in 1993 to Galicia and Andalusia, and in 1994 to the Canary 
Islands.
It is not the aim of this work to analyse the behaviour o f  the political actors and their aims, but 
it is worth mentioning that in 1988 the Spanish government tried to implement a plan for youth 
employment, which it had to shelve due to  a general strike organised by the Spanish trade un­
ions in 1988. The result o f this strike was the increase o f  expenditure for unemployment pro­
tection and the withdrawal of the plan for youth employment (Márquez 1992, Gar- 
rido/Requena 1996).
10.3.1 Special Employment Contracts for Youth
In France, the most important group of employment measures for young people are those that 
aim to provide young people aged 16 to 25 with a vocational qualification through an employ­
ment contract alternating work in an enterprise with theoretical training in public or private 
education courses. Four types o f contracts can be distinguished:
1 Practical training for initiation into professional life {stage damnation à la vie profession- 
elle, SUP, following a collective agreement in 1984 and in place until 1991), orientation 
contract {contrai dorientation  following a law of December 1991) and long-term contract 
for low qualified young people ("exo-jeunes" since October 1991);
2. Qualification contract (contrai de qualification following a law o f February 1984);
3. Adaptation contract (contrai d'adaptation following a law o f February 1984);
4. Apprenticeship contract (contrai d'apprentissage as reformed in 1987).
With respect to the length o f the contract, the apprenticeship contract is the most generous, 
since it can be signed for one to three years and, in general, it lasts two years. Next comes the 
qualification contract, which lasts six months to two years and which aims to provide a profes­
sional qualification for young people with little fromal education. The “adaptation” contract 
exists in two forms, one offering a contract for a period o f  six to twelve months and the other
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offering a long-term employment. People applying for an “adaptation” contract have to alreadx 
have a professional qualification and have to be able to integrate into a job very quickly The 
shortest contract time, six months, is provided by the orientation contract, whose aim is to 
provide a first experience o f professional life for young people aged 16 to 22 without a profes­
sional qualification and with a relatively low general education. Its predecessor, the practical 
training for initiation into professional life (SVIP), had the same scope, it lasted between 3 to 6 
months but was not an employment contract and had no training aims. (Juès 1996, 
Bouder/Mansuy/Werquin 1995, Charraud Ses 1993). In October 1991, a new contract called 
"exo-jeunes” was introduced as a provisional project with the aim of filling the gap that ap­
peared after the elimination of the SVIP. Young people with low qualifications aged 18 to 25 
can benefit from this subsidised long-term contract (Tuchszirer/Gélot/Zilberman 1993).
All these first five measures entitled their beneficiaries to social security benefits and in all 
cases, except for the “adaptation” contract, the state paid the enterprise's social security con­
tribution. In the case o f "exo-jeunesM the state pays all social security contributions during the 
first year and half o f the contributions for the following six months within the limit o f 120 per
cent of the minimum wage.
The non-market measures for young people under 26 have only a marginal interest in providing 
some kind of qualification. In 1984, the state created jobs collective utility (travaux d'uîilité 
collective or TUC). Young people had the legal status o f a stagaire (person in practical train­
ing) of vocational training and were employed in part-time jobs in associations or in the public 
administration for a period of 3 to 12 months (later increased to a maximum of two years). In 
1989 the TUC were replaced by employment-solidarity contracts (contrats emploi-solidarité 
or CES). Unlike the TUC, this new measure is a real employment contract and the beneficiar­
ies' pay is subjected to greater regulation. These contracts have a length of 3 months to one 
year - for some groups even three years - and are part-time. The state pays the entrepreneur’s 
social security contribution with exception of unemployment insurance (Nicole- 
Drancourt/Roulleau-Berger 1995, Meron/Minni 1995, Abbrosimov 1995).
The individualised training loan programme (CFI) is targeted at young people with few qualifi­
cations and it attempts to create a new training trajectory including practical training in enter­
prises, alternation contracts and CES contracts (Charraud Ses 1993).
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Table 23: Contract Duration and Monthly Earnings o f People Aged 16 to 25 by 
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30-65(1) 1,250 FF (- 










( 1 ) % of SMIC. (2) % of minimum fixed by collective agreement • for young people aged 16 to 21. Sources: Juès 199b. 
Clémençon/Coutrot 1995, Abrossimov/Gelot/Roguet 1993, Catala 1989, Tuchszirer 1993, Villalard 198b.
Table 23 provides a summary of the wage amounts and the duration of the employment meas­
ures for young people for the period of interest for this study. France has a statutory national 
minimum wage {salaire minimum de croissance or SMIC), which can be improved by collec­
tive agreements. In 1986 the system was modified to enable young workers with integration 
contracts to be paid 45 to 90% of the national minimum wage (OECD 1994). As can be seen 
from Table 23 young people's wages differ from one contract type to the other and also in re­
lation to. age and duration of the contract. Nearly all young people with an alternation contract 
attain three quarters o f the national minimum wage by the end o f their contract, i.e. on average 
after two years, in particular those with an apprenticeship, an adaptation and a qualification 
contract. The TUC contract offered a low income, for it offered only part-time employment 
and this was paid under the minimum wage level. The CES contract increased the wage level 
to the SMIC norm, but since it offers only part-time employment, it provides half o f the mini­
mum wage. The statistical information on "exo-jeunes" measures shows that these young peo­
ple earned on average less than 6.000 FF, which is an amount somewhat over the SMIC.78
Forgeot (1997) analysed the income levels o f  first jobs o f young people interviewed in the En­
quête Jeunes 1992 and his analysis confirms the previous institutional information. In general, 
72 per cent o f those interviewed received a salary equal or inferior to the SMIC in their first 
job. The overwhelming majority o f  young people with an apprenticeship contract earned less 
than the SMIC and the majority o f  those with another type of subsidised contract also earned 
less than the the SMIC. Instead, most young people who did not have these contracts or a
78 The SMIC in 1991 was of 32,30 FF gross per working hour, which corresponds to 4500 FF net per month (INSEE 1993).
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part-time contract received a wage at SM1C level, many had a salary over this level and a mi­
nority earned less than the minimum wage. In other words, more than 60 per cent o f first jobs 
that are paid below the minimum wage level correspond to  an apprenticeship or a subsidised 
contract. Youth-specific employment is important in order to get into contact with the profes­
sional world - around half o f the first jobs of young people in 1992 were youth-specific jobs 
(Forgeot 1997) - but it cannot insure a subsistence income by itself.
In Spain, there are four specific types of publicly regulated measures for the integration of 
young people into employment. The majority were modified by the labour market reform of 
October 1984:
1. contract for practical training (contrato en prácticas, royal decree 1992 of 1984) for > oung 
people aged 16 to 28,
2. contract for qualification (contrato para la formación, royal decree 1992 o f 1984) for 
young people aged 16 to 19,
3. grants and contracts for workshop-schools and training houses (programas de Escuelas- 
Taller y  Casas de Oficio, since 1985/88),
4. long-term contracts for young people under 26 years and young people with short-term 
contracts (contratos por tiempo indefinido de trabajadores jóvenes y  de otros colectivos, 
since 1985 until 1988, from 1992 onwards).













tracts < 26 
1985-1988
range of earnings or fixed by collective 80% of SMI in first 1. phase: 550 PTA p. day of normal wage cor-
average earning agreement, but not year (2) course respondent to
lower than minimum 100% of SMI in 2. phase: practical training enterprise and
base (1) second year or qualification contract work
legal duration 3 months -  3 years 3 months -  3 years 1 .phase: 3 -6  months 
2. phase: 6 -3 0  months
long-term
0  duration 1987 16,8 months 14,5 months no information
Note: ( l ) minimum base of the correspondent social security contribution group of the enterprise. In 1991, for workers aged 17 or less it was of 
1.367 Ptas per day and for others it ranged from 62.130 to 92.820 PUs per month according to professional situation. (2) Only the hours of work 
are paid, not those of qualification. SMI* minimum wage, which in 1991 amounted to 33,230 Ptas a month for those aged 18 or over and 33,160 
Ptas per month for those aged under 18. Sources: Cachón Rodríguez 1997, Segura et al. 1991, MTSS 1991, RD 1992/1984 de31 de octubre.
Getting a practical training contract is subjected to other conditions besides age. First, one has 
to be officialy registered as unemployed and one has to have obtained a formal education cer­
tificate (secondary or tertiary level) in the four years preceding the beginning o f  the employ­
ment. The programs of workshop-schools and training houses allowed the financing o f projects
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of public employment or jobs in non-profit organisations with the granting of some qualifica­
tion. In a first phase the beneficiary received some theory lessons and in the second phase she 
or he signed a practical training or qualification contract with a public or non-profit employer. 
The state subsidised the qualification part o f the employment, the grants and salaries o f  the 
beneficiaries and teachers, and if necessary, costs for accommodation and transport. The Euro­
pean Social Fund co-financed these two types o f employment-qualification programs, At the 
end of a period of practical training, o f a qualification contract or o f another short-term con­
tract young people's long-term employment was subsidised by the state for some years. From 
1985 to 1988, if employers hired young unemployed people under 26 or young people having 
passed through an employment measure, the state subsidised these new contracts. In 1992 a 
similar measure was reintroduced for young people under 30 (MTSS 1988, 1991, Florez 
Saborido 1994).
Qualification and practical training contracts give rights to social security protection, but they 
are not subjected to contributions for old-age pensions. Also, practical training contracts o f 
under 6 months of duration do not entitle to unemployment insurance (Segura et al. 1991). 
Practical training and qualification contracts exempt the employer from paying all or a part of 
the social security contributions. In the case o f practical training the employer is entitled to an 
exemption of 75% of the contribution79, and in the case of qualification contracts to 100% for 
small enterprises and to 90% for large enterprises. In addition, according to the National Plan 
for Qualification and Professional Integration (Plan FIP) in 1988, employers could receive 
subsidies, if the employed young person in practical training had been unemployed for at least 
two years, as well as subsidies for the theory courses in the programme of qualification con­
tracts. The enterprise was entitled to 90 Ptas per worker and hour/day of theory course (Royal 
decree of 1990), if a qualification project was presented to the INEM (Spanish Institute for 
Employment). Long-term contracts for young people under 26 enabled employers to pay a 
social security contribution of 12 per cent instead o f one o f 24 per cent for the whole period o f 
the contract (MTSS 1988).
In 1993 the practical training and qualification contract were changed. The use o f the first was 
limited and the wage to  be paid was lowered to the minimum wage. The second contract form 
was replaced by an apprenticeship contract (Florez Saborido 1994, Cachón Rodriguez 1997).
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Also, young Spanish people could and can participate in a variety of programs of vocational 
training, which were created and co-ordinated by the National Plan of Qualification and Pro­
fessional Integration (PlanFJP) o f 1985 and prolonged afterwards Some of these qualification 
measures allowed young people to receive a gram for the time of the course Table 25 shows 
the courses targeted at young unemployed people or at young people in rural areas Young 
people over 25 or with family responsibilities received, in general, a gram for the time of tne 
course of 75 per cent of the SMI without supplements and, if necessary, they w ere also entitled 
to some supplementary amount for transport, maintenance and accommodation Furthermore, 
courses or practical training for other groups were offered: young people under 16 w ho had 
not completed formal education, young people in formal vocational training (FPII)  or in the 
last two years o f university, young men in military service, self-employed people, women with 
family responsibilities and in a difficult economic situation, etc. In general in 1091. courses 
lasted at least 200 hours and grants were paid at the end of the course (MTSS 1991 ) Thus, if 
one estimates a five-day week with 5 hours of course per day, it means that courses would last 
on average two months and so too the grant. This is clearly a very temporary possibility of 
receiving some income and it gives no right to affiliation to social security
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( l year)
Youth under 25 \  nuth in rural areas
Conditions unemployment low 
qualification
never worked more than 
3 months
income ■ ■ SMI without 
supplementary payments
practical training alia 
completion of courte





75% o f SMI (2)
+ 19.390 Ptas/month 
for transport and 
maintenance* 1)
75% of SMI without 
supplementary payments 
-*■ 19.390 Ptas. month for 
transport and mainte­
nance (1)
) 2.620 Pla* month if age
75*» SMI iffamilv responsi­
bilities or ’•25 (3) ♦ 19.390 
Ptas. month for transport and 
maintenance ( 1 )
12.620 Ptas month 
75*.of SMI (2)
* 19.390 Ptas month 
for transport and 
maintenance* I )
12.620 Plas month 





Notes: (1) If the young person has to live outside of the current residence in order to take pan in the course she he can receive a help of J.'O l Pu* 
a day instead of the 19.390 Ptas a month. (2) Amount conceded to young fust employment-seeker with family responsibilities (3) SMI without 
supplementary benefits for holidays, Christmas and so on (4) If aged over 25. Source. MTSS 199).
It is difficult to know exactly the wage young people were earning in the above-mentioned 
regulated employment contracts. More or less they earned the minimum wage (more in the 
practical training contract and less in the first year of a qualification contract), which in 1991 79
79 Only if it is a full-time employment.
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was 1,775 Ptas a day or 53,250 Ptas a month for those aged 18 or over and 1.172 Ptas a day 
or 35,160 Ptas a month for those aged under 18. The amount could be increased if the em­
ployer paid supplements for long appartenance to the enterprise, for holidays, Christmas, and 
so on. All in all including supplements the annual minimum wage could not fall under 745,500 
Ptas for those aged 18 or over and 492,240 for the younger ones. Assuming a young person 
aged over 18, working full-time and earning the minimum wage, the monthly wage was around 
62,125 Ptas including supplements, it means 484 ECU and 530 PPS.80 Compared with 75 per 
cent of the French minimum wage, which is the amount young people attained in the third year 
of an apprenticeship contract, on average young people in regulated contracts for integration in 
France earned 482 ECU and 488 PPS in 1991.81 Thus, in absolute terms and within the limit of 
an institutional -  not statistical -  analysis, it can be stated that French and Spanish young peo­
ple were entitled to similar wages in their entrance jobs, but in relative terms the Spanish 
amounts were more generous than the French.
The remaining question is how long these situations in regulated short-term contracts and in 
temporary employment in general persist in both countries. That is if  on average in both coun­
tries young people need the same amount o f time to acquire a long-term contract. The com­
parison of the activity structures in section 8.1.4 suggests that young people in Spain stay in 
unstable employment conditions for longer than in France. This question is treated further on, 
in section 10.3.4
10.3.2 O ther Em ploym ent M easures Affecting Youth
In addition to measures for young people the French state encouraged other employment con­
tracts by subsidising employers or private households who employed people. Households who 
employed individuals for domestic work, for instance, could profit from a tax reduction. The 
state also subsidises enterprises (entreprises d'insertion, since 1982) and associations (asso­
ciations intermédiaires, since 1987) who offer service or public utility jobs in the form o f 
short-term contracts to unemployed people (Abbrosimov 1995). The stock of young people in
80 To compute the ECU amount the annual average exchange rate was used, which in 1991 was 128.47 Ptas for one ECU
and 7 FF for one ECU. The PPS are also annual averages, whose rates were 6.92 FF and 117.3 Ptas (EUROSTAT 
1995).
81 The same was done for the conversion of the Franc to the ECU, in 1991 6.9 Francs for one ECU (INSEE 1996).
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entreprises d'insertion was o f 5,000 people in December 1992 and it is. thus, a measure of 
minor numerical significance (Abrossimov/Gelot/Rouget 1993),
Another measure not directly targeted to young people is the total exemption of the employer's 
contribution to social security for two years if a first employee is hired. This subsidy was intro­
duced in January 1989 in order to provide an incentive to self-employed people who offer a 
long-term contract to a first employee. In December 1991, the possibility o f exemption from 
social security contributions for one year in case o f employment o f a second or third employee 
was added to the first measure. Around 72,000 people were hired taking advantage of these 
subsidies in 1991, and 31 per cent were young people under 25 years and 22 per cent were 
aged 25 to 29 years. This yields a rather small absolute number of young people (22,176). but 
is still higher than the SIVP practical training measure (cf. Figure 39) (Gaye 1995).
As already mentioned, nearly all youth-specific employment contracts are short-term contracts 
(exceptions are adaptation and exo-jeunes contracts). In addition to the whole range of th?se 
specific contracts, in 1986, the legislative restrictions to general fixed-term contracts were re­
duced. Short-term contracts did not need to follow specific reasons anymore, but a maximum 
duration of 24 months was fixed. In 1990, the law again regulated the use o f fixed-term con­
tracts, restricting them to cases o f seasonal work, o f replacement o f another employee or of 
temporary increase in work load. In addition, the general duration was reduced to 18 months 
(only under certain circumstances to 24 months) (OECD 1994).
In December 1989, a contract for re-entrance into employment (contrat de retour à l'emploi or 
CRE) was created for the RM1 beneficiaries and for long-term unemployed. Its duration could 
be from 6 to 18 months and the wage was fixed by collective agreement. The state liberates the 
employer from social security contributions and it offers a premium for each CRE employee 
(Clémençon Coutrot 1995, Raymond 1995). In December 1992, 10,300 young people under 
25 benefited from a CRE contract, which is a smaller number than that o f the beneficiaries of 
exemption for a first employee (Abrossimov/Gélot 1994).
Unlike in France, subsidised employment measures not directly targeted to young people were 
and are of great quantitative relevance for young people's employment in Spain (cf. Figure 40). 
The labour market reform of 1984 enlarged the conditions under which fixed-term contracts
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are allowed. Short-term contracts were more clearly defined than before, the maximum dura­
tion of given fixed-term contracts was shortened and a new short-term contract for the crea­
tion of new activities was introduced. The most important innovation was the possibility to hire 
unemployed people through a short-term contract independently o f the type o f employment. In 
this way, in practice short-term contracts can be concluded with all types of workers. Unlike in 
Spain, fixed-term contracts in France (1990) are restricted to extraordinary conditions o f the 
enterprise and limited to two years. In Spain in 1991, one could find nine different types of 
short-term contracts, a first group restricted to special circumstances of the enterprise (ordi­
nary short-term), a second group targeted at the unemployed (promotion short-term) and a 
third group (specific short-term).
Ordinary short-term contracts:
1. service contract (obra y  servicio),
2. temporary for production circumstances (eventual por circunstancias de producción);
3 interim contract (interinidad)-,
4 for new activity (nueva actividad).
Promotion short-term contracts:
5. temporary for augmentation of employment (temporal de fom ento de empleo);
Specific short-term contracts:
6. job sharing (relevó)-,
7 practical training (de prácticas);
8. qualification (de formación);
9. substitution for retirement at 64 years (sustitución por jubilación a los 64 años).
In both countries short-term contracts convert themselves into long-term contracts, if the em­
ployee continues working for the enterprise after the time-period foreseen in the fixed-term 
contract (Segura et al. 1991).
In Spain, short-term contracts increased substantially after the labour market reform at 1984.
In the second trimester o f 1987 1,225,800 employees had temporary contracts and they 
reached the number o f 3,927,400 in 1991. In this same year they represented 32 per cent of all 
employees (Segura et al 1991, AEL 1992). The administration which registers fixed-term con­
tracts does not distinguish them by age, but only by type, which does not permit us to under­
stand the number o f young people in ordinary and promotion short-term contracts. The expert
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committee o f the report on temporary employment in Spain (Segura et al. 1991) had access to 
information which permitted them to estimate the number o f young people in ordinary and 
specific fixed-term contracts. For 1989 they estimated that in the under 20 age-group 18 per 
cent o f those who had a short-term contract had a general contract not specifically directed to 
young people, while 82 per cent had a contract for training or for qualification. In the group of 
young people aged 20 to 24, 72 per cent had a general temporary contract and in the group of 
those aged 25 to 29 as much as 83 per cent had a general fixed-term contract, while 16 per 
cent had a contract for practical training. Thus, unlike in France, Spanish young people from 
age 16 to 24 profited mostly from short-term contracts not targeted at young people and, con­
sequently, without a qualification content (cf. Figure 39 and Figure 40). The average duration 
of short-term contracts was o f 15 months during the period 1987-1995 (Garcia Polavieja 
1998), which means that they were rather unstable, but also that most were entitled to unem­
ployment allowance.
10.3.3 Beneficiaries of Active Employment Policy for Youth in France and Spain
The comparison o f the respective national effort on active employment policies for young peo­
ple can be undertaken through an estimation of expenditures or through an estimation of bene­
ficiaries. In this work the second option was chosen, since these figures allow for a better rep­
resentation o f  the significance o f these measures for young people's lives. However, the quan­
titative comparison o f different employment policies has to overcome problems o f  definition 
and data availability. This section is a first attempt at this comparative task.
The quantitative significance o f special contracts for youth in France and their development in 
time can be seen from Figure 39, where the annual stocks o f  contracts were measured. In 
1987, special employment measures for young people under 26 years reached a peak and af­
terwards they dropped until 1991, but at the same time they reached similar absolute levels 
than the number of unemployed young people (aged 15 to 24). At the beginning o f the period 
the two most important contract types were apprenticeships and TUC contracts, while at the 
end a third contract form, the qualification contract became similarly significant.
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Figure 39: Special Employment Contracts for Young People Aged 16 to 25. 
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Note: unem ployed as m easu red  by labour force surveys (aged  15 to  24). Sources: for em ploym ent m easures 1986-1991; 
M inistère du T ravail, de l'E m ploi e t de la Form ation professionnelle  in: M ero n /M m n il9 9 5 . for 1992; estim ation  o f  stock in 
D ecem ber 1992 in: A brossim ov/G elot/R ouget 1993; figures on unem ploym ent: INSEE 1994.
The quantitative importance of the Spanish employment measures can be observed in Figure 
40. The figure provides complete data on the number of registered youth-specific and general 
promotion short-term contracts until 1989. Published figures for later years were not available. 
Unlike the French stock data, Spanish figures refer to registered contracts, which in general are 
significantly higher than stock figures. This means that Spanish figures cannot be compared 
with the French figures, but are to be compared only with each other. In Spain, the most ex­
tended contract types are promotion fixed-term contracts for young people under age 25 and 
qualification contracts, which are for people aged 16 to 19. O f less quantitative importance are 
promotion short-term contracts registered by people aged 25 to 29 and practical training con­
tracts, which can be used by young people until age 29. Thus, state subsidised contracts are 
more important for the younger age group (16 to 24) than for those aged 25 to 29. Unlike in 
France, young people have found more regulated jobs in non youth-specific promotion meas­
ures than in youth-specific programmes.
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Note: Young people in subsid ised  short-term  contracts are estim ations m ade by Segura el al (19 9 1 ) for th e  years o f  1985 to 
1989, therefore lack  o f  data for 1990 and 1991. Unemployed a s  m easured  by labour force surveys (aged 16 to  24 ) Sources 
for em ploym ent m easures: Cachón R odriguez 1997; Segura e t al. 1991; M T S S  1991. For unem ployed: B EL 1994.
In order to estimate the public involvement in employment measures for young people and to 
make it comparable with French figures, existing stock statistics of the Spanish Labour Force 
Survey have been compared to the number of unemployed young people (Figure 41). The 
comparison is to be interpreted taking into account that the very important group o f young 
people in general promotion fixed-term contracts is lacking and that the unemployed taken into 
account include only young people aged 16 to 24, though youth-specific contracts are available 
for people aged 16 to 29. All these differences are not very important, since the emerging rela­
tionships are very clear. The stock o f youth-specific contracts oscillated around 60,000 people 
during 1986 to 1991. If we multiply this figure by three82 to more or less obtain an estimate of 
the total number of young people in subsidised contracts, the result is still a very small number 
(18%) in comparison to the average one million unemployed people aged 16 to 24. Thus, 
Spanish public effort to supply subsidised employment contracts for young people is much 
smaller than the French. This result corresponds with comparative estimates about expenditure 
on active employment measures made in a study for the European Parliament. This study esti­
mated that in 1992/93 France invested one per cent of its GDP in active employment policy, 
while Spain invested half per cent o f  its GDP for it. Of these amounts France spent 35 per cent 
to young people, while Spain spent only 15 per cent for youth-specific measures (Parlamento 
Europeo 1995).
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Sources. Segura et al. 1991, BEL 1994. EPA. H trim. 1991.
To conclude, in the period from 1985/86 to 1988 the number o f young people benefiting from 
a regulated short-term contract in comparison to the number of unemployed people aged 14/16 
to 24 was higher in France than in Spain, that is the effort o f the French state in active em­
ployment policy for youth was greater. The next paragraph explores the average time young 
people need to wait until they earn on average a subsistence-level income.
10.3.4 Short French Queues: Financial Autonomy at Age 25
What role do all these public employment measures play in the integration of young people into 
employment? The evaluation of employment and training measures for young people is a very 
controversial field. Some French analysts have found that vocational training measures such as 
SI VP and TUC have no statistically significant effect on the transition into a long-term em­
ployment, in particular they are not able to help women and young people whose father has a 
low educational level to find a stable job (Magnac 1997). Other studies have found that certain 
types of employment measures do help young people to enter a stable employment or in 
avoiding unemployment, while other types o f measures do not change their probabilities o f 
doing so (Clemen9on/Coutrot 1995). 82
82 This estimation is based on the relative distribution of youth-specific contracts registered in the INEM in 1991 (cf. Figure 
40).
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For the comparative question of why French young people leave home earlier than Spaniards it 
is important to know if young people in France receive a subsistence income earlier than in 
Spain and if they have a better chance to receive over a long period. The condition o f benefit­
ing from a subsistence income and from financial autonomy through market income is consid­
ered fulfilled when an individual receives at least the minimum wage. This occurs mainly when 
a young person moves into a non-regulated job. Three French studies provide information on 
the timing of moving into an employment providing at least the minimum wage. First, there are 
the results of a study on the labour market career o f young people leaving school at the end of 
the academic year 1988-89 (Werquin 1997).*3 This analysis is limited to young people who left 
school without a maturity certificate, but with a professional qualification and it reports on 
their activity situation in December in the years 1990, 1991, 92 and 93, and in January- 
February 1995. By the time o f entrance into the labour market in December 1989 around 20 
per cent of young women were unemployed, 30 per cent had an employment, 8 per cent were 
economically inactive and around 40 per cent had a subsidised employment contract, most of 
them a CES contract. Two years later, in December 1991, more young women had an em­
ployment (around 50%), less were in a public measure (25%) and similar proportions were 
unemployed or economically inactive. At the same time, in December 1991, men were very 
frequently doing their military service and they profited less from public measures; around 15 
per cent of men were unemployed, 55 per cent had a job, 15 per cent were economically inac­
tive and 15 per cent were in an employment measure. Hence, women profited more from pub­
lic employment contracts and they found a unregulated job less quickly than men. A compari­
son with a previous study o f the same author shows that for a previous cohort, those who left 
school in December 1986, employment measures were even more important for the transition 
into employment, since the unemployment situation was worse. Thus, French public employ­
ment measures seem to have helped young people with secondary educational level to receive 
some income during their first period in search o f a first employment, to make contact with the 
professional world and they were especially important for women's access to an income. With 
respect to the timing question it can be stated that half o f these young people had a unregu­
lated job two years after their entrance into the labour market, that is when they were 18 to 20 
years old. Did these jobs provide people with a subsistence income?
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In 1993, the CEREQ again asked a sample o f people who entered the labour market in 1989 
about their trajectories during these four years.84 This sample includes youth who had no gen­
eral maturity certificate, who had left school before finishing the lower secondary education, 
those who had attained a certificate of vocational competence (CAP), who had attended a pre­
paratory apprenticeship class (CPPN) or had a diploma o f vocational studies (BEP) or an 
equivalent certificate, people with a vocational maturity certificate (BAC pro) or with a techni­
cian's diploma (BT) and young people who had already completed an apprenticeship. These 
people were on average between 16 and 18 year old when they entered the labour market and 
four years later they were between 20 and 24 years old. By this age 75 per cent of all young 
people and 60 per cent o f young women had reached financial independence, for they earned at 
least the minimum wage (SMIC) for full-time employment (4,500 FF). To begin the labour 
market career with an alternation contract seems to have positive effects on improving the em­
ployment situation, since 77 per cent o f these young people reached financial autonomy after 
four years, even if on average they earned less than those who began with a normal fixed or 
long-term contract. Instead, having begun the career with a CES or TUC employment measure 
allowed only 52 per cent to reach financial autonomy after four years. There is almost no dif­
ference in the attainment o f financial autonomy if one has gone through long-term or fixed- 
term contracts. Frequently, young people interrupt long-term contracts, while short-term con­
tracts seem to be used by large enterprises, which after some time offer long-term contracts 
and relatively high salaries (Bordigoni/Mansuy 1997). To conclude, by age 20 to 24 three out 
o f four French young people without a general maturity certificate and without university 
qualifications had reached financial autonomy and some o f them had already reached it before. 
Does this picture change when young people with higher educational levels are included?
By including young people with a higher educational level the age limits to obtain financial 
independence through market income move upwards. Based on the Enquête Jeunes 1992, 
Moncel et Rose (1995) found that there is a cutting line at age 25 with respect to  the position 
youth occupy on the labour market. Nearly half o f  young people under age 24 are unemployed, 
in an employment measure or have a short-term contract, while from age 26 to 29 young peo-
8:1 The study is based on three phone panels undertaken by the CEREQ (Centre d'études et de recherches sur les qualifica- 
tions). These surveys suffer from a relatively high panel mortalitiy of around 20 per cent at each wave. To solve the bias 
problem a weighting procedure was applied and a supplementary sample was taken (Werquin 1997).
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pie are less likely to be in these positions. Correspondingly, 50 per cent of the aged 18 to 25 
earned less than 5000 FF per month, i.e. the minimum wage or less (714 ECU and 720 PPS). 
while those aged 26 to 29 received on average 6500 FF (929 ECU and 937 PPS).*' The access 
to a job, in particular to a stable job with at least a minimum wage, can be perceived in terms 
of a queue, in which young people have to wait for a given time until they access such a job. 
Some of them, moreover, do not arrive at the end o f  the queue and remain in a chronic situa­
tion of precariousness. In 1992 in France, it would appear that on average the queue lasted 
until age 25 (Moncel/Rose 1995).
In Spain there are nearly no evaluation studies about the effects o f employment policies for 
young people as well as a very small number of studies on income and wages of young people. 
A review of the statistics and reports published by the National Employment Office (INEM) 
reveals that there are no analytical studies on the integration o f young people who benefited 
from some employment measure into the labour market. The INEM offers only some cross- 
sectional analysis o f people who followed a vocational training course and the percentages of 
those who then entered a regulated job or another type of job. The INEM describes the situa­
tion of those pupils 11 months after they had finished the courses. In 1991, from 206,449 un­
employed who had finished a course successfully 37 per cent had an employment, 50 per cent 
were searching for employment and 14 per cent were no longer registered in the INEM (INEM 
1992).
For the region o f  Catalonia there are some retrospective and panel studies, which follow young 
people in their trajectories from school to work, but they do not analyse as a specific group 
those who had benefited from a regulated job. One study analyses the integration of young 
people who have finished university into employment. Catalan university leavers were asked 
retrospectively in 1989/90, 1991/92 and 1993/94 about their career after their graduation in 
1986, 1987 and 1988/89 respectively. O f interest here are the results concerning the economic 
independence o f these young people, whose age at the moment o f the interview ranged from 
25.9 years to 30.7 years and from 21.9 to 26.7 when they finished university. The percentage 
o f those still economically dependent on their parents at the moment of the interview ranges 
from 0.8 for Engineers to 27.5 for agricultural technical engineers. If we take a group in be- 84
84 This survey is of retrospective nature and it had the form of personal interviews undertaken by interviewers of the INSEE 
(Bordigoni/Mansuy 1997).
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tween, for instance those who finished with a law qualification, it can be observed that 10. 5 of 
them were still economically dependent on their parents three years after having obtained their 
degree and of those who were already independent, the average age of becoming economically 
independent had been 23.7 years (Masjuan et al. 1996). Catalan young people with university 
degree seem to stay in a similarly long queue for economic independence as French young 
people in general, but a real comparison is rather difficult to make.
In Spain, studies on earnings o f young people are scarce, mainly because of a lack o f data, 
since in the regular surveys on wages the units o f analysis are enterprises and not individuals, 
which prevents an analysis by age. There are few other surveys, which have been used for a 
more detailed study. In 1985 a large survey on informal employment and other related matters 
was conducted and this is the source o f many studies (Segura et al. 1991). In one article based 
on this survey, Toharia and Muro (1988) analysed the wage distribution o f people with long­
term contracts according to age. In 1985, on average young people aged 20 to 24 in long-term 
jobs earned 50,000 Ptas per month and the group aged 25 to 29 earned 60,000 Ptas, while the 
age-group with the highest average wage were people of 35 to 39 years, who earned around 
70,000 Ptas. This study is of very limited value, since it excludes many young people, namely 
those in fixed-term jobs. Another study based on the same survey estimated a wage equation 
taking into account age, sex, educational level, civil status, anciennity, type of contract, eco­
nomic sector and region into account. They found that there was a wage differential o f 8 per 
cent in favour o f long-term employment, but this was a study of the situation in 1985 when 
short-term contracts were not yet very diffused (Segura et al. 1991). Finally, Jimeno and To­
haria (1992) had access to an experimental labour force survey o f the Spanish National Statis­
tical Office (INE) conducted in 1991, where questions on income were asked. They found that, 
if one controls for age, sex, occupation, educational level, years passed in the enterprise, sector 
and activity o f the enterprise, and region of residence, workers with short-term contracts earn 
approximately 11 per cent per hour less than long-term workers (cited and reproduced in Gar­
cía de Polavieja 1998).
Apart from these general studies on wages, there are two other ways o f studying young peo­
ple's earnings. First, some youth surveys have asked about income and earnings and second, 
family budget surveys provide some information on age. Comparative data on wage levels of 85
85 Survey informations on earnings have always to be taken with caution.
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young people in Spain and France can be obtained by comparing the Spanish Youth Survey of 
1992 with the French Youth Survey of 1992 w. More than 15 per cent of young people aged 
20 to 29 earn less than the Spanish minimum wage (Table 26). In France, more than !7°o of 
this age group earn less than the French minimum wage. Yet, if one takes the wage category of 
403 to 604 PPS as subsistence level for both countries, then it can be observ ed that 15 per cent 
of Spanish young people with a market income receive a wage below the subsistence level, 
while only 10 per cent o f the French do so. Sixty-one per cent of Spaniards earn 805 PPS or 
less, while only 43 per cent of the French fall into this wage category. In addition. 48 per cent 
of the Spanish young people aged 20 to 29 said they were employed and received an income, 
while 55 per cent of the French said the same. These figures correspond more or less to the 
respective employment rates of 48.6 and 52 per cent in the Spainall and Francca/f samples To 
conclude, young Spanish people are not only less present in the paid labour force, but, those 
who receive a market income also receive less than their French counterparts. The Spanish
HI
waiting queue for obtaining of a subsistence wage is longer than the French one.
Table 26: Monthly Wage as Reported in Spanish and French Youth Surv eys« 1992
Wage in PPS88 Spain
% of aged 20-29
France
% of aged 20* 29
Spam
cum % of aged 20-29
France
cum % of aged 20-29
<403 15.1 10.0 15 1 10 0
403-604 18.7 7.1 33.8 17 1
604-805 27.0 25.4 60 8 42.5
806-1,006 17.4 24.7 78.2 67.3
1,007-1,207 9.9 16.2 88.1 83 5
>1,208 11.9 16.5 100 0 1000
100.0 100.0
Total with wage 1.509 4233
Total sample 3,131 7.703




Sources: own elaboration according to Navarro Lopez/Mateo Rivas 1993 and Franceatl.
w The Spanish figures have been taken from the publication, table 2.17 and they have been re-elaborated to obtain the 
wages only for those aged 20 to 29 (Navarro L6pez/Mateo Rivas 1993), Then the wage levels of the publication have 
been transformed into the Purchasing Power Standard. The resulting wage groups have been reproduced with the 
Franceall sample in order to make both surveys comparable.
*7 This is also supported by the comparative findings on financial independence published by Barailler ( 1997). 
w In Ptas the wage groups are as follows: <50,000; 50-75,000; 75-100.000; 100-125.000. I25-!50,000, > 150,000. In FF 
they are: <2,795; 2,795-4,193; 4,193- 5,591; 5,591- 6,989; 6,989- 8,386; >8,386.
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10.3.5 Conclusion
In France and Spain important efforts have been undertaken in the period from 1985 to 1992 
to integrate young people into the labour market. Yet, the relative effort compared to the 
number o f unemployed young people was much greater in France than in Spain. Generosity o f 
youth-specific employment measures, as indicated by the average wage amount regulated by 
law, was greater in Spain than in France. However, the relative weight of these youth-specific 
jobs compared to all fixed-term jobs was much lower in Spain than in France. Average wages 
of young people aged 20 to 29 measured in PPS are lower in Spain than in France. Given the 
importance o f income stability for leaving home, are there adequate insurance schemes for go­
ing through periods o f unemployment? Does public unemployment protection mitigate the 
problem of job rotation?
10.4 Young Unemployed and State Support, 1986-1992
It is nothing new to state that job security is becoming a scarce commodity, which does not 
necessarily constitute a problem in terms o f  financial autonomy, provided that the unemployed 
young person receives a subsistence level benefit until she or he finds a new job. Young unem­
ployed people are not a homogeneous group, neither in terms o f their socio-economic condi­
tion nor with respect to social rights. To understand their position in the Welfare State they 
have to be divided into four groups:
1 first-employment seekers;
2. unemployed who had a job, which did not entitle them to benefits;
3 unemployed who had a job with social security affiliation;
4. long-term unemployed who had a job with social security affiliation.
The guiding questions are two: 1. which o f these four groups of unemployed are entitled to 
which unemployment benefit within the respective Welfare States? 2. are the levels o f unem­
ployment benefits and their duration adequate to guarantee financial autonomy between jobs?
10.4.1 First-em ploym ent Seekers And Very Short-term  W orkers
In France, first-employment seekers and young people who were dependent workers for a 
rather short period, from 3 to 6 months, or who had a job without unemployment insurance, 
e.g. CES-contract or an informal job, had the right to a means-tested unemployment allowance 
called integration allowance {allocation d*insertion or A/), if they fulfilled some conditions 
Young people had to be aged 16 to 25 and they had to fulfil one of the following three condi­
tions:
1 they had to have finished a practical training programme (stage de formation profession- 
nelle), had to have obtained a professional training qualification or they had to have finished 
a complete cycle in secondary or tertiary education in the 12 months preceding their enrol­
ment as job seekers;
2. not more than six months should have passed since the end o f their military service*
3. they had to help their family financially and the family had to have a monthly family income 
lower than 200 times the daily SMIC amount (i.e. lower than 6,460 FF or 923 ECU in
1 9 9 1 ) 89
The monthly income of the person should not exceed 90 times the daily amount o f the Al, i.e. 
an income limit o f 3,726 FF or 532 ECU per month, and if  the person has a partner, their in­
come should not exceed 180 times this amount.90 Young people had to complete a given wait­
ing time until they received the allowance: young men who had finished their military service 
had to wait for one month, those having gone through a practical training course lasting 3 to 6 
months had to wait for 3 months and those entitled to AI due to their educational qualifications 
had to wait for 6 months. Once they had reached the entitlement moment they received a fixed 
daily allowance of 41.4 FF for the duration of one year (Dupeyroux 1988). This amount was 
not increased after 1985 and in January 1992 the AI for young people was abolished (Bolot- 
Gittler 1992, Amira 1996). In 1991 the monthly AI amount o f 1,159 FF represented 26 per 
cent o f the minimum wage, 166 ECU and 163 PPS. From the point of view o f financial auton­
omy the problem with this allowance was the waiting period, during which the person had to 
live from savings, form an informal job income or from family help and from the low allowance 
amount.
M Daily gross SMIC in 1991 was 32.3 FF.
90 Daily AI amounted to 41.4 FF in 1991.
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The extension of this allowance can be roughly estimated using published statistics. Figures on 
the beneficiaries o f the AI allocation include not only young people but also other entitled 
categories, for instance single mothers, refugees and ex-prisoners. Since in 1992 single mothers 
and young people were no longer entitled to Al, the number o f the other beneficiaries can be 
approximately calculated and deduced from the whole number for the previous years in order 
to obtain an idea on the volume o f young beneficiaries. In 1986, there were around 165,000 
young people and single mothers who benefited from AI and this number decreased over the 
period until it reached approximately 80,000 in 1991 (Amira 1996). This means that around 12 
to 17 per cent of young unemployed people (15-24) were covered by an AI allowance during 
the period under observation.
Following the previously mentioned study o f  Werquin (1997) around 25 per cent of the unem­
ployment periods o f young women, who left secondary school without a maturity certificate in 
1989, were immediately after they left school, while this was the case for circa 15 per cent o f 
men. The first unemployment spell lasted on average seven months for this cohort o f young 
people, which means that most of them would in theory be covered during their unemployment 
by the AI allowance.
In Spain, no public unemployment benefit is foreseen for first-employment seekers. They can 
only be entitled to an occupational training course for a limited time period (cf. 10.3.1).
In addition, the second group o f unemployed, namely young people in informal jobs or in jobs 
that in total did not exceed six months of contribution to unemployment insurance during the 
four years preceding unemployment, have no rights to unemployment benefits, with the excep­
tion o f those with family responsibilities (MTSS 1991). This is not like in France, where young 
people without family duties who contributed for three months to unemployment insurance, 
could receive an unemployment allowance {allocation de base minorée or ABE), provided 
these three months o f  contribution concentrated in the last year preceding unemployment (cf. 
following). I f  one takes the worse case, i.e. somebody in an employment contract of only three 
months, she would have been entitled to unemployment benefits in France after the end o f her 
employment, but not in Spain. There she would have to find another contract o f at least three 
months duration in the following four years in order to be able to benefit from protection. In 
Spain in 1987 the average duration o f regulated short-term contracts was around 15 to 17
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months, which means that on average short-term employed people had access to unemploy - 
ment benefits after the end of the contract (Segura et al. 1991, Polavieja 1998)
10.4.2 Unemployed with Entitlem ent to Contributory Unemployment Allowance
The third group o f unemployed young people, those who had had an employment contract and 
who had contributed to unemployment insurance for at least three months are entitled to un­
employment benefits within the insurance scheme in France. They have to fulfil the general 
conditions o f  having lost their job involuntarily and of being in search o f employment through 
the local agency for employment (ANPE).91 Entitlement duration and the amount of the allow­
ance depends on the contribution time and on age (cf. Table 27): people over age 50 received 
more generous benefits than those under this age. There is no waiting period for the allow - 
ances originating from the insurance scheme.
Table 27: Duration and  Am ount of Allowances by Type of Unemployment Benefit for
Beneficiaries under Age 50, France 1992
Contribution
time
during last 12 
months






duration amount1 Min (Maximum duration amount'
3 months 3 months (alloca­
tion de base mi- 
nore'ee, ABE)
30% of SR: + 32.9 
FF per day 
(30.3%/37.1 FF)3
Min: 79 FF p dav 
Max: 56.25% SR: 
Min: 89 7 FF p.d.3
0 0 3 months
6 months 8 +(2 months 
prolongation)







Min: 105.5 FF p. 
dav Max: 75% SR2 
Min: 119.8 FF p.d.3
6 +(1 month 
prolongation)
64 FF per day1 
76.6 FF3
15 months
12 months 14 +(5 months 
prolongation)




during last 36 
months
21 +(12 months 
prolongation)
15 +(9 months 
prolongation)
45 months
Note: 1 the rate and fix amounts refer to 1986. They have been increased until 1992 (cf. Bolot-Gittler 1992) 2Amounts m 
1986. SR = reference salary. 3Amounts in 1990. Sources: Bolot-Gittler 1992, Commission of the EU 1991.
Again, according to Werquin (1997) the second and third unemployment spell o f  young people 
who have left the education system without a maturity certificate lasted longer than 7 months 
on average, but not more than nine months. Those young people who had had a regulated em­
ployment contract, which lasted at least three months, will normally have contributed to unem-
91 For a good reason voluntary loss of employment can also not block entitlement to allowance (M1SSOC 1992).
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ployment insurance for three months and are thus very likely to be entitled to the reduced basic 
unemployment allowance (allocation de base minorée or ABE). These unemployed people will 
be protected for a duration o f three months, which on average seems to be too short a time to 
bridge the period o f  unemployment. In addition, they will receive a very low amount in terms 
of a subsistence income. Those unemployed people who have contributed for 6 or more 
months to the insurance scheme were better off in terms o f duration and of income substitu­
tion, but here again, if the young person was earning only a minimum wage or less, the substi­
tution income will be too low to be considered at subsiste level. According to the previously 
mentioned study o f Forgeot (1997) very young employees and workers are very likely to earn 
the minimum wage or less and, hence, if they become unemployed they will receive the mini­
mum amount of the unemployment allowance, 3,594 FF per month in 1990, and will thus have 
less than the minimum wage. In addition, a high percentage of unemployed young people have 
no coverage o f this sort, either because they are first-employment seekers or because they can­
not fulfil the conditions o f the insurance allowance or because they do not ask for benefits. In 
1990, around 35 per cent of the unemployed under age 30 were covered by the unemployment 
insurance scheme (EC 1992)92
-y
The duration o f the allowances is quite long for people having contributed at least 6 months 
during the last year. If they have contributed more than six months a commission of employees 
and employers’ representatives decides over the possible prolongation of the allowance, which 
cannot, however, surpass a maximum duration (cf. Table 27). If no prolongation is conceded 
and the basic allocation is exhausted, then the unemployed person is entitled to an allocation of 
"end of rights” (AFD), which consists o f a flat-rate for a given duration which depends on pre­
vious contributions as can be seen from Table 27.
In Spain, laws and decrees about unemployment insurance and benefits have changed continu­
ously since 1978 and so, I have decided to describe the situation only for 1991 (for a detailed 
description cf. Jurado Guerrero 1995). In this year, young people could have access to the 
contributory unemployment allowance, if they had contributed for at least six months to the 
insurance.93 Compared to  France this is less favourable, in particular for the short-term em­
ployed who worked for less than six months. According to their contribution time they could
92 This figure comes from the labour force survey and not from administrative information, which makes it less reliable but
also more easily comparable with Spanish figures.
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receive the allowance for up to 24 months. Afterwards, they could get a prolongation in the 
form of a non-contributory allowance until 18 months if they had exhausted a duration period 
of the contributory allowance o f at least 3 months If they had been entitled to a contributory 
allowance for at least 6 months the prolongation could last up to 24 months. Yet, non­
contributory unemployment allowance is restricted to the unemployed with family responsibili­
ties and it is means-tested. This allowance is not an individual right, but is a son o f family al­
lowance for low-income one-eamer couples, where the family head is unemployed
As in France the unemployed have to fulfil the general conditions of having lost their job invol­
untarily and o f being in the process o f searching for an employment through the public agency 
for employment (INEM). Entitlement duration and the amount o f the allowance depends on 
the contribution time and on age (cf. Table 28): people over aged 45 or over receive more 
generous benefits than those under this age. There is, in general, no waiting period for the al­
lowances originating from the insurance scheme (MTSS 1991).
95 In 1992 it was changed to one year (MTSS 1992).
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Table 28: Duration and Amount of Allowances by Type of Unemployment Benefit for




(Prestación de nivel contributivo)
Non-contributive Allowance (subsidio por deseinplcoj 
for Unemployed With Familv Responsibilities1
during the last 
four years
duration amount1 Minimum/ Maxi­
mum
duration or prolongation amount
3 months 3 months 75 % of SMI
4 months no right 4 months
4 months 5 months
6-12 months 3 months 80%ofBR' SMI+1/6 SMI/ 
170% SMI + 1/6 
SMI:
6-18 months
12-18 months 6 months idem 6-24 months
18-24 months 9 months
24-30 months 12 months 70 % of BR1
30-36 months 15 months
36-12 months 18 months
42-48 months 21 months 60 % of BR1
48 months 24 months
Note: 1 BR= base reguladora (regulatory base), which is the average of the contribution base for the unemployment lasurance during the last 1 KO 
davs preceding the legal situation of unemployment or at the moment of cease of contribution. '  if  the unemployed has dependent children the 
maximum amount is increased to 195% for one child, to 220% for two or more.3 familz responsibility means to be responsible for the mainte­
nance of the spouse or another relative up to the second degree of kin relationship inclusively, who lives with the unemployed and if the total 
family income divided by the number of dependent members docs not exceed the SMI. Sources: MTSS 1991.
In Andalusia and Estremadura, a specific means-tested unemployment allowance for agricul­
tural dayworkers was created in 1983, These people have to have contributed at least for 60 
real working days to the specific agricultural social security scheme during the previous 12 
months before unemployment. In these cases they can receive an unemployment allowance for 
maximum 20 days a month or 180 days a year and of 75% of the correspondent minimum 
wage. The duration o f  the allowance depends on age and family responsibilities. Within the 
group of young workers, the worse protection is given to those under 20 years without family 
responsibilities and the best to those aged over 25 independently o f  their family duties. Means- 
test is not individual, but it depends on the components o f the household. A single person 
should not have an annual income over the annual SMI and if this person lives with another 
person over 16 years the limit is fixed at two times the SMI. If he or she lives with two other 
people then it is 2.75 times the SMI, and so on. As a consequence, young agricultural day- 
vorkers over age 16 living with their parents and perhaps siblings, have worse unemployment 
protection than those living alone or with a partner, and in addition they reduce the amount o f 
illowance the father will receive, if he was to be requiring to it. The amount o f  the allowance is 
is high as the amount o f  the non-contributory unemployment allowance, but it is limited to 180
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days a year (MTSS 199). The type o f  work organisation, the particular form of family forma­
tion and institutionalisation of the unemployment allowance for dayworkers pushes young 
dayworkers towards an early home-leaving. These particularities find its reflection in the re­
gional variance o f leaving home (cf. section 9.2.2).
At this point it is time to compare the generosity o f the contributory unemployment allowance 
of France and Spain. Considering that the average duration o f qualification and practical rain­
ing contracts in Spain is about 15 months (cf. Table 24), it means that on average young peo­
ple who became unemployed after such a contract were entitled to six months o f contributory 
unemployment allowance. Assuming further, that the young unemployed person had had a spe­
cial employment contract, was 18 or over and that on average she will have contributed ac­
cording to a regulatory base similar to the minimum wage if not less, it means that she will be 
entitled to the minimum amount, which is the minimum wage plus supplements (the latter are 
1/6 o f SMI). In 1990, the SMI was 50,010 Ptas a month and with supplements it reached 
58,345 Ptas. In France a young person with the same contribution time was entitled to a mini­
mum allowance of 119.8 FF per day in 1990, which is equivalent to 3,594 FF per month.94 
Thus, for 1990 in purchasing power parity units, the Spanish allowance reached 496 PPS and 
the French one 505 PPS, which means that they were of similar generosity.9*
With respect to coverage in 1991, approximately 16 per cent o f young Spanish unemployed 
under 25 were covered by the contributory unemployment insurance scheme, 16 per cent by 
the non-contributory allowance and 33 per cent were covered by one o f the two allowances 
(AEL 1992).96 In 1995 the correspondent Spanish rates were: 7 percent, 8 per cent and 15 per 
cent correspondingly, which is much lower than in 1991 (BEL 1996).97 Labour force survey 
figures show for 1990 a rate of young unemployed people under 30 covered by some unem­
ployment allowance of 18 per cent. In any case, the comparison of rates o f coverage for 1990
94 Assuming the pa>Tnent for 30 days per month. The French unemployment insurance covers all days of the week.
95 The exchange rate in 1990 was of 117.7 Ptas for 1 PPS and of 7.12 FF for 1 PPS (Eurostat 1995).
96 These figures are provided by the national employment agency (INEM) in different way. The INEM publishes the total
number of beneficiaries by type of allowance in annual averages, but the table on beneficiaries by age and type of al­
lowances contains only percentages and refers to beneficiaries in December. 1 have estimated the coverages rates with 
these figures and with the number of unemployed as published by the Labour Force Survey. The numbers of beneliciar- 
ies of the non-contributory allowance include the beneficiaries of the agricultural dayworker allowance.
97 Since October 1996 the INEM publishes the total annual average number of beneficiaries by age and type of allowance
for 1994 onwards, which permits to know' the rates of coverage for young people more accurately. The numbers of bene­
ficiaries of the non-contributory allowance include the beneficiaries of the agricultural dayworker allowance.
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shows that the French coverage o f 35 per cent of unemployed under 30 receiving some allow­
ance is higher than the Spanish rate (EC 1992).
Again, this ideal-typical young person who had contributed 15 months to the unemployment 
insurance (average o f  youth-specific contracts and of short-term contracts, cf. 10.3.1 and 
10.3.2), would have the right to 14 months allowance with a possible prolongation o f 5 months 
in France, whereas in Spain the same person would receive the allowance for only a period of 6 
months without the possibility of a prolongation. In terms of length, the French system is more 
generous than the Spanish system, and this applies also to long-term unemployed people out­
side the contributory scheme, as shown below.
Yet, published data show that in 1992 the average length of the contributory allowance in 
Spain was 11 months for those aged 20 to 24 and 14 months for those aged 25 to 29. This 
means that the younger age-group might have contributed between 18 to 30 months on aver­
age and the older group between 30 to 36 months (AEL 1991). It seems, thus, that on average 
most young people with entitlement to contributory benefits have worked before for a period 
of around two years. This does not change the fact that under the same conditions their French 
counterparts will be entitled to longer periods of unemployment insurance.
10.4.3 Long-term Unemployed Youth
The forth group, long-term unemployed people, who have lost entitlement to unemployment 
allowance due to its expiry, might be eligible for a means-tested unemployment assistance {al­
location de solidarité spécifique or ASS) in France. The beneficiaries must prove they have 
worked as a dependent worker for five years during the last ten years preceding the entrance 
into entitlement to unemployment allowance and they have to pass a means-test. The unem­
ployed person's income has to be lower than 90 times the daily amount of the ASS, and if liv­
ing with a partner, it has to be lower than 180 time the ASS. The assistance is paid for six 
months and can then be prolonged without limit every six months (Dupeyroux 1988). This 
allowance is rather insignificant for young people given its contribution conditions: in 1996, 
only 15 per cent of its beneficiaries were under age 35 (Amira/Favre 1996).
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In Spain, young people who have exhausted their entitlement to contributory unemployment 
allowance can benefit from a non-contributorv allowance according to the months they origi­
nally contributed to unemployment insurance under two conditions: I. to pass a means-test and 
2. to have family responsibilities. Only in these cases can young long-term unemployed profit 
from a prolongation of the unemployment allowance (cf. Table 28).
10.4.4 Social Security of Unemployed
The last question to be treated is whether unemployed people receiving some kind of benefit 
have other social rights as well. In France, an unemployed person who receives an allowance is 
normally obliged to pay a contribution for health and old-age insurance. All unemployed re­
ceiving a benefit are at least entitled to health services. After the expiry o f unemployment 
benefits the right to health services is prolonged for one year, after which they do not lose en­
titlement if they can prove that they are still searching for employment, otherwise they have to 
rely on a personal insurance and social assistance. Also, those unemployed people who were 
not affiliated to an insurance scheme before and are not entitled to unemployment benefits have 
to rely on cost-free medical help. Besides general unemployment benefits, other measures have 
been created to help unemployed people to find a job: allowance for training-reclassification, 
allowances for taking up part-time employment, local allowances for long-term unemployed, 
etc. (Dupeyroux 1988).
In Spain, the National Institute for Employment pays the contributions o f the employer and the 
dependent worker to the main social security insurances (old-age, family, transitory illness, 
health, and so on), so that the beneficiary of the contributory unemployment allowance remains 
insured. The beneficiaries o f  the non-contributory unemployment insurance are automatically 
insured against health risks and for family reasons, but lose other insurances. In addition, fbose 
unemployed who have lost the right to any unemployment allowance and whose income does 
not surpass the minimum wage continue to be entitled to health services and to child allowance 
(MTSS 1991). Apart from these general entitlements, there is the right for unemployed people 
with entitlement to contributory allowances to receive the total amount o f the unemployment 
allowance and a part of the compulsory social security contribution, if she wants to become 





Unemployment benefits in France and Spain in their institutional form of 1991 provided a sta­
ble income to a minority of young people. The amount o f allowance young people could re­
ceive was structurally low, since many young people either had not worked before or had paid 
a low contribution to the unemployment insurance scheme. The same is true for the duration of 
the unemployment allowance. The comparison of the French and the Spanish situation yields 
the following results:
1. First-employment seekers were entitled to a means-tested allowance in France, while in 
Spain there was no such allowance. The French allowance amounted to 26 per cent o f the 
minimum wage in 1991, i.e. 166 ECU or 163 PPS per month, and it covered around 12 to 
17 per cent of the unemployed aged 15 to 24 in the period from 1986 to 1992.
2. Young people with a job and a contribution time of under six months during the previous 
year were entitled to a reduced basic allowance in France, but in Spain they had no entitle­
ment to unemployment allowance if they had no family duties. But, if the Spanish young 
person had accumulated six months of contributions within the last four years, then she was 
entitled to unemployment benefits.
3. Young people with entitlement to contributory unemployment allowance and who had 
earned low wages received similarly generous minimum unemployment allowance in Spain 
and in France. In 1990 it stood at 496 PPS per month in Spain and 505 PPS in France. But, 
contributory unemployment allowances last twice as long in France than in Spain in the 
case of 15 months o f contribution payment to the insurance.
4. Non-contributory and means-tested allowances in Spain are restricted to young unem­
ployed people with family responsibilities, while in France young people without family ob­
ligations can benefit from them.
5. In 1990 and according to labour force survey data, unemployment allowances covered 
around 35 per cent o f unemployed people under 30 in France, while in Spain they covered 
around 18 per cent o f the same age-group o f unemployed.
To conclude with respect to the significance o f these policies for income stability and for leav­
ing home, it can be stated that the French unemployment insurance might have favoured early 
leaving home by providing first-employment seeker with a low unemployment subsidy of one- 
year’s duration. For young people who had contributed for at least three months to the insur-
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ance scheme the system guaranteed an income stability of three months at a lo w  lev cl hu! to: 
those who had contributed for at least 6 months a maintenance income at quasi s u b s i s t e n c e  
level was guaranteed for at least 14 months In France more young people are covered h\ tin- 
contributory unemployment insurance than in Spain
In Spain, only those who had had a job and who had contributed for at least si\ months were 
granted a transfer income at quasi subsistence level for six months After this period young 
people without family duties, no longer had public help. The main problem with the Spanish 
system for income maintenance is, thus, the short duration of the unemployment allowance for 
young single people, the lack of help for first-employment seeker and the lower coverage of 
the young unemployed.
10.5 Helping Young People on the Housing Market
Young people's decision to leave the parental home is supposed to be influenced by the supply 
of dwellings. An exception are young people who decide to undertake studies, mostly univer­
sity studies, which are not offered at the place of residence of the parents, and which require 
leaving the parental home. These students have to adapt to the supply of housing in the univer­
sity town. For all other young people the evaluation of the affordability of a dwelling is a major 
element in their decision to leave against to stay at the parental home The low afTordability- 
high property hypothesis presented in section 5 states that on housing markets with high 
prices, low vacancy rates and low supply of rented housing, two-gcncration households w.l! be 
more frequent and the diversity of one-generation households will be low In section 8 4a 
more simple version of this hypothesis was tested with two logistic regression models for Spain 
and France. These models estimate the probability of those young people who live independ­
ently to live in a rented dwelling compared to the likelihood of living in an ow ned dwelling It 
was found that cohabiting couples and individuals in one-person households arc more likely to 
rent than to own a dwelling compared to married young people, and younger people live more 
frequently in rented dwellings than their older counterparts.
Thus, housing policy favouring young people's early home-leaving is mainly housing policy 
favouring an adequate supply of rented accommodation through the private or the public sec­
tor and financial help for people who are not able to afford the rent without a subsidy Next, a
comparative framework for the comparison of Spanish and French housing policies is elabo­
rated.
10.5.1 Increasing Income and Rented Accommodation
The degree to which the state helps students on the housing market is one element for under­
standing cross-national differences in home-leaving patterns (cf. section 10.2.1 ). The state also 
helps young economically active people on the housing market. The forms o f public housing 
policy are manifold and not all have the same relevance in helping young people.
Studies of housing policy normally distinguish between governmental action in regulating the 
supply of housing by home constructors and towards regulating the demand o f households by 
increasing the affordability of housing for needy social groups. In France supply side interven­
tion receives the name o f aide à la pierre (bricks and mortar aid), while demand side housing 
benefits are referred as aide à la personne (personal aid)(Blanc/Bertrand 1995). In Spain this 
difference is often referred to in the same way or through the distinction of ayudas de carácter 
personal (help for people) and ayudas a la oferta de vivienda (help for the supply o f housing) 
(Rodriguez 1993). Lundqvist (1990 in: Boelhouwer/Van derHeijden 1992) proposes an inter­
esting framework for comparative research on housing policies, which helps to determine 
which regulations governments opt for and which they do not. He conceptualises the demand 
for housing through the household’s purchasing power, which in its turn is influenced by gen­
eral income policies, income transfers, and in particular by housing allowances. On the supply 
side, Lundqvist depicts the dwelling price, which depends on the costs of dwelling production, 
as the most important element. The state might intervene in home production through capital 
cost subsidies, through rent, access and sales price regulations, and through the financing of 
management, repair and maintenance costs. Both, household purchasing power and dwelling 
price are, in addition, influenced by possession regulations, and income, property and sales 
taxation. For the scope o f  the present study a more simplified model is thought to be adequate 
(Figure 42).
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Figure 42: Housing Policy Favouring Very Y oung People Leaving Home
The previous discussion and results have shown that renting is the housing arrangement that 
most facilitates an early leaving of the family of origin and setting up informal living arrange­
ments. Formal family formation through marriage, by contrast, is more strongly related to ac­
quiring a dwelling and thus depends more on the investment capacity of young people. Conse­
quently, the central housing policy benefits to be studied are housing allowances for tenants of 
rented housing, regulation o f rents, and public incentives for the construction of dwellings to 
be rented. Thus, tax exemptions that seek to help the buying o f a dwelling and public subsidies 
directed towards building houses to be sold to owner-occupiers are of minor relevance. Even 
though these might help people who leave home in order to marry and, indirectly, help single 
young people to leave home by giving incentives to their parents to acquire a dwelling for their 
child. Since this research focuses on the French particularities in contrast to Spain, it is impor­
tant to analyse those mechanisms that help very young single people to leave home and which 
differ from one country to the other.
10.5.2 Overview of French and Spanish Housing Policies In 1985-1992
Boelhouwer and Van der Heijden (1992,1993) in their comparative housing policy study char­
acterised French housing policy from 1985 to 1990 as a policy o f great emphasis on housing 
quality, on problems o f housing distribution and on targeting specific groups. In 1986, meas­
ures for the deregulation o f the housing market had been implemented with the election of a 
Liberal government: firstly, through relaxing rent controls; secondly, through easing the sale of
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social rented housing; and finally, by reforming the system of housing finance. In spite ot this 
liberalisation of housing policy, the state increased its involvement due to the reappearance o f 
quantitative and qualitative housing shortages. Housing construction in the private rented and 
owner-occupied sectors was favoured through state benefits Financial conditions affecting the 
private rented sector were eased and tax exemptions were granted to those who bought a 
dwelling and rented it out for more than six years.
Grants for social housing construction were increased in 1990 by 17 per cent and rent subsidies 
(APL) by 7.6 per cent. In 1990, the Ministry o f Equipment and Housing had a budget which 
was second in size after the budget of the Ministry of Education and it represented the most 
important public investment programme. It is in this housing policy context that the young 
people studied with the Enquête Jeunes 1992 left the parental home. With regard to rent con­
trols, a new Rent Act was passed in 1986, by which more freedom was conceded to landlords. 
They were obliged to offer tenants a contract for three years, instead of the average six years in 
1982, and after the expiration of the contract they were allowed to give notice without giving 
reasons for it. As a consequence, enormous rent increases going from 51 to 180 per cent were 
witnessed, particularly in large cities. In 1989, the Rent Act was amended to limit rent in­
creases for sitting tenants, and since then, rent regulation has passed under the control o f  the 
regions. In May 1990, a bill relating to housing vacancies was approved in order to enable 
HLM institutions (non-profit organisations who offer social rented housing) to purchase pri­
vate housing and to rent it out at low rent levels. In addition, low-income households and those 
receiving social security benefits became entitled to a housing allowance enabling them to pay 
their rent.
In Spain housing policy was for a long time strongly dominated the goal of favouring economic 
growth through public intervention into housing construction. This situation changed in 1987 
when a construction boom took place. Public intervention into housing construction was re­
duced and, instead, goals of redistribution and equality were given more weight. Spanish 
housing policy of this period has been centred firmly on the availability of and access to  home- 
ownership (Ghékiere 1991, Coll Cuota/Martin Jadraque 1989, Alberdi/Levenfeld 1996).
Since 1983/84 housing policy began to be decentralised in Spain, while in France regions did 
have few competencies. The Spanish constitution of 1978 defined housing policy as a matter o f
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regional competence, but the transfer o f the highly centralised housing directorate was slow 
and accompanied by many conflicts. The current state o f decentralisation o f Spanish housing 
policy can be described as a situation, in which the central state fixes the norms o f public help 
for housing, the frame of their implementation by the regions and exerts financial control 
Every year the central state and the regions sign a convention on housing policy. But, housing 
policy o f a fiscal and monetary character is not decentralised, since regions do not have any 
competencies in these areas. Despite the importance of central housing policy design, regions 
do carry out self-financed housing policies specific to their territory, in particular public hous­
ing, and they administer public housing benefits. Municipalities constitute the third administra­
tive level o f housing policies. Their role is to design plans o f  urbanisation and to assure the 
land necessary for new housing construction. The institutional change from a centralised 
housing policy to a partially decentralised one had negative consequences on the overall effi­
ciency of Spanish housing policies (Leal 1992, Trilla et al. 1998).
In Spain, there are three important pieces of legislation for the period 1985 to 1991 : a new rent 
act in 1985, a housing plan in 1984 and single measures in 1987.
• First, like in France rent controls were changed in 1985 after many decades o f very strict 
public regulations on rent contracts. Since the end of the Civil War and until 1964 a freeze 
on rents was decreed. In 1964 a new law on leasing was enacted, which only affected con­
tracts signed after the law. New leases allowed for annual revision of rents according to in­
flation, but the rent contract period was not fixed. In practice this meant that dwellings 
once rented remained normally in the hands of the tenant even over one or two genera­
tions. In 1985 a royal decree liberalised the rent sector to a very great extent, since price 
and duration were to be decided totally freely.
• Second, in December 1983 the government decided a four-year plan on housing (1984- 
1987), whose results were an increase of the economic activity of the housing sector, a 
rather insignificant construction o f publicly developed dwellings and a deviation of public 
subsidies to second residence acquisition contrary to the theoretical aims of the plan.
• Last, a royal decree of December 1987 changed housing policy in order to establish a 
clearer differentiation o f public policy by type of beneficiary instead o f  by type o f  con­
structor as had been the case before and by the amount o f  resources o f households. Yet, in 
fact these measures meant the disappearance o f a housing plan until 1991 and the quasi 
ceasing o f subsidised housing construction (cf. 8.1.7).
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Basic changes were also introduced after 1991, but this does not affect the young people stud­
ied in this research. Out of the new measures o f the 1992-95 housing plan two are o f relevance 
for young people: the creation of a specific benefit for the acquisition of a first dwelling, the 
application o f tax exemptions for the payment o f a rented dwelling and new subsidies for 
rented housing with regulated rent. But, in November 1998 tax exemption for rented housing 
was abolished after just nine years o f existence (Valenzuela Rubio 1994, El Pais 13.11.1998). 
There are other important legal reforms that affect the housing market in this period, but which 
are not looked at here. The application o f a new house census (catastro) (1984-89) and a new 
law on housing transactions in order to bring informal activities and camouflage o f real housing 
values into public light. Other laws were enacted in the fields o f urban and ground administra­
tion and on investment funds for housing (1992). An important step on the rented housing 
market was a new reform of the Rent Act in 1994 (cf. Valenzuela Rubio 1994, Cortes Alcala 
1995).
In the second half o f the 1980s, the financing o f Spanish housing policies had a stable distribu­
tion according to the sources. Around 40 per cent of the costs were financed via the budget o f 
the central state and the regions and directed towards direct housing benefits, 50 per cent 
originated from tax exemptions and 10 per cent were financial costs supported by financial 
institutes. Together they amounted to 1.1 per cent of the GDP in 1987, while in France hous­
ing policy expenditures accounted for 2 per cent of the GDP in the same year. Also, the struc­
ture of housing policy expenditure in France was less biased in favour of tax exemptions, since 
in 1987 these stood at only 27 per cent of public housing expenditure, while brick and mortar 
subsidies and personal benefits accounted for up to 73 per cent o f total expenditure. In contrast 
to Spain, where no personal benefits exist, France invests around 26 per cent o f its housing 
budget for the three different housing allowances (Leal 1992, Levenfeld 1990, Alberdi 1993).
10.5.3 Converting Young Spanish People into Proprietors and Helping Tenants in 
France
It is not the aim of this work to undertake a comprehensive analysis of housing policies in 
France and Spain, but to draw a rough picture on the main similarities and differences between 
the two policy models. As has already been argued public benefits for young people in rented 
accommodation represent the main public incentive for leaving home and therefore these bene­
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fits will be described for the French case Since in Spain there are no direct housing a'Unv 
for tenants, existing direct, financial and fiscal benefits will be discussed from \oung pcopc * 
perspective and possible reasons for the non-existence of housing allowances for tenants \*r.: 
be proposed.
10.5.4 Housing Allowances in France
Unlike in the Spanish section on housing benefits, the description of French housing benefits 
excludes all bricks and mortar aids, and benefits for the acquisition or rehabilitation of dwell* 
ings, for they are of less relevance for young people. It should suffice to mention that the 
French housing policy comprises a wide range of these measures (Guckicrc 1991 )
The French state provides three different types of housing allowances
1. allocation de logement à caractère familial (housing allowance for families or AI.F)
2. allocation de logement à caractère social (housing allowance for social reasons or AI.Sl
3. aide personnalisée au logement (personal housing help or APL)
The ALF housing allowance was created in 1948 and the group of eligible beneficiaries was 
enlarged in 1972. The aim of this allowance is to reduce the real housing expenditures of fami­
lies. The following categories of beneficiaries were eligible for the A1.F in 1991
1. beneficiaries o f a family allowance (cf. 10.1);
2. households and individuals with only one child and without family allowance entitlement.
3. young family heads without children for a period of five years from the beginning of the 
marriage onwards;
4. households with old-aged dependents;
5. households with handicapped relatives.
The individual has to fulfil three other conditions, which are to occupy the dwelling as the main 
residence, to dispose of a certain number of square metres and to have a minimum of general 
infrastructure (toilette, etc.). The amount of the allowance depends on resources, rent and 
family obligations. The allowance is not thought to reach the total amount of the rent, since the 
beneficiary has to  pay a part of the rent by him or herself {loyer minimum) The amount of the 
loyer minimum is fixed by decree and takes number of children or other regularly cohabiting 
people into account. Consequently, ALF is paid only in those cases where the rent exceeds the
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loyer minimum. In addition, a ceiling for rent expenditures, which enter the calculation o f the 
allowance amount, exist.
The second type of housing allowance, ALS, exists since 1972 and was modified in 1985,
1988, 1991, 1992 and 1993 in order to include, first, the long-term unemployed as a new 
group of eligible beneficiaries; second low-income people receiving the public minimum in­
come allowance {revenu minimum d'insertion or RMI); third, individuals living in the region o f  
Paris and overseas regions and not eligible for other housing benefits; fourth, individuals from 
municipalities of over 100,000 inhabitants; and fifth, all other individuals not eligible for other 
housing benefits. By 1993, the ALS had become a universal means-tested allowance, since all 
individuals living in France are eligible for this benefit. The winners of this progressa. \ten- 
sion of eligibility criteria have been students, who before had to have family obligations to be 
entitled to ALF or had to live in a public regulated dwelling to be entitled to APL. Unlike the 
ALF, this allowance does not derive from family obligations, but from a situation o f need. In 
1986, at the beginning o f the period under analysis, there were seven categories of social 
groups eligible to the ALS:
1 people over 65 years old (in some cases over 60);
2. handicapped individuals not able to work;
3. young dependent workers under 25 with a regular contract giving right to social security 
affiliation and living out of the parental home;
4. long-term unemployed, who had lost entitlement to the basic unemployment allowance;
5. beneficiaries of an integration allowance {allocation d'insertion, AI) (cf. 10.4);
6. long-term sick living in health institutions;
7 individuals having their dwelling in the départements Paris, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint- 
Denis, Val-de-Mame, Seine-et-Mame, Yvelines, Essonne, Val-d'Oise and in the over-sea 
départements.
Entitlement conditions are very similar to those of the ALF with three specific characteristics. 
Firstly, ALS can be received if the dwelling is a hall o f residence (logement-foyer); secondly, 
people renting a dwelling from a relative are not eligible to ALS; and thirdly, old people being 
kept in a household for payment following the conditions o f the social security law are entitled 
to ALS. A young person cannot receive the ALS allocation if his/her parents receive child al­
lowances for him/her. In these cases the parents have to renounce to the child allowance in
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order to allow their child to benefit from ALS. The amount o f the allowance is calculated in a 
similar way than for the ALF (Rassat 1995, Julliot 1991).
At the end o f the 1970s the French government redirected housing policy from a supply side 
policy towards more demand side oriented benefits. The cornerstone o f this reform w as the 
creation o f a new personal housing benefit (aide persotmalisee an iogement or APL) in 1977 
It is the aim o f the APL to replace progressively the other two housing allowances. The APL 
aims to facilitate the acquisition o f  a dwelling, the improvement o f the quality of existing 
housing and to help tenants to pay their rent.
The basic condition for entitlement to APL is that an agreement between the state and the con- 
structor/owner exists. Only in these cases can people become beneficiaries of the APL under 
certain conditions. All individuals are eligible to APL independently o f age, family situation or 
nationality. One of the following housing conditions have to be fulfilled by tenants of rented 
housing in order to receive APL.
1. The dwelling has to be the main residence, which means that it has to be occupied for at 
least 8 months a year. This condition might affect some students, but in general they w'U 
stay at least 8 months in a hall o f residence.
2. The dwelling has to be owned or administered by a HLM organisation or other organisa­
tions having an agreement with the state.
3. The accommodation was built, acquired or improved after 1977 with public subsidies or 
under conditions fixed by the state.
4. The individual lives in a hall o f residence for young workers (foyers de jeunes travailleurs) 
or in a similar housing following public norms.
5 Individuals who have a rent-acquisition contract according to the 1984bill.
6. The amount of the housing allowance is calculated according to a complex formula, which 
takes three elements into account: 1. resources of the beneficiary, her/his spouse/partner and 
all other persons living regularly in the dwelling; 2. monthly rent; 3. individuals maintained 
by the beneficiary (children, old-aged parents, handicapped relatives).
The rent is considered only within the limits of a ceiling fixed by decree according to family 
obligations and geographic location o f the dwelling. In addition, as for ALF and ALS a mini­
mum rent is fixed, which represents the rent amount the tenant has to pay him/herself after 
resources and family obligations have been taken into consideration (Julliot 1991).
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As summarised by Table 29, in 1992 all young people were eligible for APL if they fulfilled 
two main conditions: to live in a publicly regulated dwelling and to have limited resources. In 
addition, nearly all young people were entitled to ALS if they passed a means test. Young peo­
ple with dependent children and those married recently formed the group of individuals with 
the greatest support through housing allowances This shows clearly how two important fea­
tures of the French Welfare State work together, assistance for the needy and assistance for 
those with family obligations. Housing policy is rather unconnected with the social security 
mechanism of the French Welfare State, since regular employment is not a criterion to receive 
housing benefits and hence it helps to alleviate the typical support gaps inherent in social secu­
rity provisions.
Table 29: Entitlement to Housing Allowances by Year of Institution and Type of 






















Co iiti.i in. under 25 years.,! Condition: to live in certain départements. 3 Condition: to live in certain munici 
lalities. An individual has to choose one housing allowance in those cases she or he is entitled to different 
lousing allowances. Source: own elaboration.
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With regard to the coverage of the three housing allowances it is possible to find genera! sta­
tistics, while figures related to young people are published writh scarcity. At the beginning of 
the 1990s one in four households were receiving a housing allowance (APL, ALS or ALF)
The highest rate o f beneficiaries was found among people living in HLM and other social- 
rented housing. At the end o f 1988» forty four per cent o f  HLM tenants received an allowance, 
most o f them an APL benefit» while 32 per cent o f the tenants o f a private-rented dwelling 
without furniture received a housing allowance (Curci/Taffin 1991, Blanc / Bertrand 1996). In 
1992, the beneficiaries o f ALS amounted to 1,309,620, o f which 21 per cent were students. 
Out o f all students receiving housing benefits 78 per cent received ALS, 20 per cent APL and 
2 per cent ALF (Rassat 1995). At the end of the 1980s the foyers de jeunes travailleurs (halls 
of residence o f  young workers) in France were estimated to be 450, which meant around 
50,000 places. Most of the young people taking advantage from this living arrangement were 
students of vocational training and o f tertiary education, while one third had an unstable em­
ployment, and around one tenth, respectively, were unemployed or in an apprenticeship (Guide 
1990). In the Enquête Jeunes 1992 young people were asked in one question if they received 
family allowances or housing allowances, which means that it is difficult to know how many 
were receiving only housing allowances. If young people with children are not taken into ac­
count, it can be stated that all others answering positively to this question were receiving a 
housing allowance.98 Out o f all young people without children and living independently in 
1992, 9 per cent were receiving a housing allowance and out o f all young people living on their 
own 30 per cent were receiving a family and/or housing allowance.99
The quantitative importance of housing allowances within general housing policy can be de­
duced from figures on public expenditure. In 1986, the amount spent for housing allowances 
amounted to only 37 per cent o f total expenditure and APL represented 45 per cent of the ex­
penditures for housing allowances. Later, in 1992, 46 per cent o f total public expenditure for 
housing was for housing allowances, and more than half o f it was directed towards APL.100 
The increase o f the relative importance of the expenditure for housing allowances has meant a 
parallel decrease of the State’s expenditure for supply side benefits (Geindre 1993).
98 This is based on the fact that family allowances are given for having dependent children (cf. 10.1).
99 These figures were calculated with the Franceall sample.
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Different surveys conducted by the national statistical office (INSEE) in 1984 and 1988 permit 
some calculations on the relative amount of housing allowances in relation to the disposable 
income of beneficiaries. Tenants without allowance paid on average 17 per cent of their in­
come for rent and related housing costs, while tenants receiving a housing allowance paid on 
average 14 per cent. Tenants of private-rented housing received the highest amount o f housing 
allowance in relation to income (18%), while tenants of HLM dwellings received the less 
(15%). Tenants can pay, depending on the type o f allowance, one third to half o f their housing 
costs with public help. (Curci/Taffin 1991).
10.5.5 Housing benefits in Spain
Spanish housing policy subsidises nearly exclusively owner-occupied accommodation through 
direct and fiscal benefits. Subsidies for rented accommodation are very scarce and were subject 
to frequent changes. I f  one distinguishes public regulation o f the housing market following the 
type of tenure for which benefits are designed and according to the beneficiaries, then we ob­
tain a fourfold distinction: 10
100 The 46 per cent spent in housing allowances include allowances for rent and for acquisition of housing. Housing allow­
ances directed exclusively to subsidise rents are estimated to represent around 26 per cent of public housing expenditure 
(Levenfeld 1990).
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T ab le  30: Types o f H ousing Policy M easures in Spain 1985-1991
Beneficiaries: families/individuals Beneficiaries: enterprises
Benefits for owner-owned accommodation
1984-87 1984-87
Financial and direct benefits:
a benefits for acquisition of new constructions (for family incomes 
under 2.5 SMI. between 2.5 and 3.5 SMI. and over 3.5 SMI): loan 
subsidies, regulated interest rales
* subsidies in form of regulated loans for constructors 
of new dwellings for ownership.
■ benefits for rehabilitation of owned dw ellings: loan subsidies, regu­
lated interest rates
Tax benefits:
• Reduced VAT for new dwellings
■ Tax deduction o f loan interests from tax bill for acquisition of dwell­
ing (until 800.000 PTA annually, since 1986)
■ Tax deduction from tax quota for repayment of loans (15% for main 
residence. 10% for other residence with a limit of <■ 30°n of tax sum. 
in 1988)
new in 1989-1991 new in 1989-1991
a benefits for acquisition of used dw ellings 
* families with income over 2.5 SMI are excluded from direct benefits 
and with income over 5 SMI from any benefits.
■ no tax deduction for secondary residence (since 1991) and house- 
saving accounts are considered like loans
• subsidies in form of regulated loam for enterprises 
that rehabilitate used dwellings;
i
Benefits for rented dwellings
1984-87 1984-87
■ benefits for tenants of newly constructed public housing; allowances
■ benefits for rehabilitation of rented dwellings: loan subsidies, regu­
lated interest rates
• subsidies for constructors of new dwellings for rent: 
regulated loans
new in 1989-1991
• no benefits for tenants of public housing
a tax deduction of 15®o for payment of rent with a maximum o f75.000 
PT As per year and an annual income limit o f2.000 Mio Pias. (Law 
from June 1991. applicable first time in May 1992)
new in 1989-1991
■ subsidies for enterprises that rehabilitate used 
dwellings for rent
Sources: MOPU 1987; BOE 224/1998.3.3.1989; Alberdi/Levenfeld 1996; Delgado Diaz. José el al. 1989; Levenfeld 1993; Ley 18/1991. 
6.6.1991.
Table 30 shows that in Spain most housing policy measures are directed towards home- 
ownership, be it as benefits to families who purchase a dwelling or as benefits for construction 
enterprises. Measures are threefold: 1. financial measures in the form o f  state-regulated mort­
gages below market rates; 2. direct benefits in order to reduce interest-rates or down pay­
ments; 3. fiscal benefits in the form o f tax reliefs for the acquisition of housing. Spanish hous­
ing policy from 1985 to 1987 was very strongly biased towards the construction o f new 
dwellings, since mainly the constructors of these and the families in these new dwellings were
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entitled to some type o f housing benefit. Also, families who wanted to restore their rented or 
owned dwelling could benefit from some public help.
From 1989 until 1991, public support for restoring dwellings was increased, people with an 
income equal or over five times the minimum wage were excluded from entitlement to public 
subsidies and for the first time subsidies were given for the acquisition of used dwellings. Fi­
nally in 1990, tax exemptions for a second dwelling were lifted and in 1991 house-saving ac­
counts were considered like mortgages and entitled to tax deductions. For the first time expen­
diture for rent gave the right to tax deductions if certain conditions were met.
It becomes clear, as mentioned before, that the logic of housing policy o f this period was to 
subsidise the economic activity of the housing sector. Housing policy during the 1980s did not 
primarily follow a social policy logic o f helping families who could not afford a dwelling on the 
free market, but was mostly an economic policy for the benefit o f  the construction industry and 
for employment in this sector (Valenzuela Rubio 1994). A further indicator of this conception 
is the fact that the Ministry o f Housing did not publish any statistics on number of families 
benefiting from housing benefits, but offers only figures on subsidised dwellings (cf. Ministerio 
de Fomento 1996, 1992). Moreover, tax deductions for the acquisition or restoring o f  owner- 
occupied dwellings have a regressive character and subsidise higher incomes more than lower 
ones.101 This had an effect on the distribution of the total amount o f tax exemptions for hous­
ing according to income groups. In 1989, 70 per cent of the total tax sum, which the state lost 
due to exemptions for housing were accumulated by the three highest income decimal points 
(Levenfeld 1993, Cortés Alcalá 1995). Housing policy changed its economic policy character 
with the housing plan o f 1992-1995 and became more oriented towards social redistribution 
aims (Rodriguez 1993).
What did this policy mean for young people who wanted to leave home in the period 1985 to 
1991? First o f  all, only young people with a sufficiently high income able to benefit from tax 
deductions were entitled to public benefits, while young people without income or with an in-
101 In 1991, two tax deductions were possible in Spain. First, one could deduce mortgage interests from income before tax 
rate application. This means that people with lower income received a higher tax benefit relative to their income but a 
lower public subsidy in absolute terms than people with higher income, due to the progressivness of the tax rate. Sec­
ond, 15 per cent of some investments for housing could be deducted from the tax sum after tax rate application with a 
limit of 30 per cent of the taxable income. Again, people with lower incomes benefit from lower absolute benefits than 
people with higher incomes (cf. Coopers & Lybrand 1993).
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come under the taxable income level did not have any access to housing benefits. Second, 
young people who rented a dwelling could not apply for any public help until 1992. when for 
the first time rents gave right to tax exemptions. Third, since young people earn, on average, 
less than older people and tax exemptions have a regressive character, young people tend to 
receive less subsidies than older people. Spanish housing policy is designed for adults and for 
people who want to acquire a private dwelling, but it ignores the needs of young people with 
low and unstable incomes, who cannot afford to buy a dwelling.
10.5.6 Social Housing, Construction Incentives, and Regulation of Private Renting
In France in the 1960s, social housing construction was very important in solving the housing 
problems of migrants and it took almost exclusively the form o f large housing estates. From 
1984 to 1993 the proportion of social dwellings in the French housing infra-structure has sta­
bilised at around 17 per cent (Blanc/Bertrand 1995). In 1977, a new system of grants and sub­
sidised loans for rent purposes (prêts locatifs aidés or PLA) was set up. These subsidies are 
mainly given to HLM institutions in order to construct or renew social dwellings. Tenants of 
these dwellings are entitled to the APL housing benefit. In addition, the state offers subsidised 
loans for the construction o f accommodation for very low-income households (prêts locatifs 
aidés ''très sociaux ' or PLATS). Since the mid-1980s, grants for the restoration o f the existing 
HLM housing stock were created (prime à Vamèlioration des logements à usage locatif e à 
occupation sociale or PALULOS). In addition, HLM institutions can profit from tax exemp­
tions, for instance, they pay lower VAT, lower duties on the sales of dwellings, and lower land 
taxes. Also, they do not need to pay corporate taxation (impôt sur les sociétés). Constructors 
of housing for private renting are freed from land tax for two years and private landlords can 
deduct a part o f their expenses for their rented housing from their income tax. In 1991 a law 
was passed by which towns of over 200,000 inhabitants were required to organise social 
housing construction through building new social dwellings or through paying a special tax for 
the increase o f the whole social-rented stock in the town (Blanc/Bertrand 1996).
In contrast, social housing plays a very insignificant role in Spanish housing policy, because 
many of them have been sold to their tenants and because few new public dwellings were con­
structed, so that Spain has a very small sector o f social housing for rent. Cause and effect of 
this situation is the small number o f  organisations and enterprises dedicated to the construction
261
and administration o f social housing. Around 50 such institutions at local, regional and central 
level act in this field in Spain, whereas in France there are around 300 H.L.N1. institutions. 
These few institutions have large problems o f administration o f their social accommodation 
units, they work without profits, their target population is exclusively composed by very low- 
income groups and they normally have to bear higher construction costs than private con­
structors (Leal 1992, Prats 1992).
Rent regulation in France can be divided into three periods from 1948. The rent act o f 1948 
offered tenants of rented housing security o f tenure and tightly controlled rents In 1988 14 per 
cent of all private rented dwellings which were dwellings built after 1948 were still subjected to 
this rent act. In 1982, a new rent act was passed, which stipulated the obligation of a w'ritten 
rent agreement and which regulated the duration of the tenancy, the increase o f  the rent, the 
possibilities to give notice, the right o f renewing the contract and o f  buying the dwelling if the 
landlord wanted to sell it. A private landlord was allowed to choose between a contract o f at 
least six years (with the possibility o f  giving notice to the tenant) and one of three years (with­
out the possibility of giving notice within this period). After the expiry of the tenancy period 
the contract had to be renewed, if the landlord was not able to put forward one of the follow­
ing three reasons. Firstly, that he intended to live in the dwelling; secondly, that the tenant had 
failed to comply with the terms of the tenancy agreement; or thirdly, that he intended to sell the 
dwelling. Rent levels were determined by a national commission composed by tenants, land­
lords and municipalities. In 1986, the third rent act was passed with the aim o f deregulating the 
private rent housing sector and it was slightly modified in 1989. Rent levels can be freely de­
cided by landlords at the beginning and at the end of the tenure agreement, and in addition the 
duration o f rent contracts was reduced to three years and the conditions to serve notice were 
abolished. In case o f  an end of the rent contract the tenant has six months to search for an al­
ternative dwelling. Landlords having signed the contract in 1986 or later were allowed to re­
vise rents after the three-year lease period had expired (Boelhouwer/Heijden 1992,
Curci/Taffin 1991). In 1994 the INSEE estimated that 80 per cent o f  all rent contracts were 
written contacts as stipulated by a law of 1982 (Cases 1995).
Three years later than in France a new rent act was passed in Spain. The innovations o f  this 
decree of 1985 was the abolition of the automatic prolongation o f the contract, the free choice 
o f the length and rent increases of the tenancy, the possibility to adapt the dwelling to eco­
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nomic activities and the extension o f fiscal exemptions to the second and third dwelling The 
consequences on the supply of rented accommodation was insignificant, since in 1991 this de­
cree affected only 18 per cent of dwellings. These dwellings display high rents and short con­
tract periods (on average one year) (Valenzuela Rubio 1994) This decree and the new Rent 
Act of 1994 did not solve a problem that prevented and still prevents many property-owners to 
rent out their dwellings. In Spain it is difficult to get redress through the courts in cases of non­
paying tenants. It is only now that a new law on civil process will try to increase the rapidity of 
effective court decisions in cases o f  non-paying tenants (El Pais 31.10.98). The current tenan­
cies can be divided into three groups: those previous to 1964 with very low rents, the contracts 
signed after July 1964 with free prices but with long-term contracts and those described above 
from May 1985 onwards. In 1989, 26 per cent of rented accommodation were long-term con­
tracts without price revision, 52 per cent were long-term contracts with price changes and 22 
per cent were leases with price and length of contract freely agreed by the parts (Al- 
berdi/Levenfeld 1996).
In Spain, in the last years a few isolated and innovative projects have been started aiming to 
ease young people's access to rented dwellings. In Madrid and Barcelona special services have 
been created, where young people get information and help in order to find a dwelling to rent. 
In Barcelona this service was created in May 1996 and it expanded in June 1997 (Servei 
d'Habitatge i Allotjament per alsJoves i Grups Juvenils). It is financially supported by the 
regional government of Catalonia and around 18,000 persons had passed through it from 1996 
to 1998. Young people aged 18 to 35 can search a database of rented dwellings in order to 
find an accommodation to live alone or if they are under 31 they have access to a specific offer 
of flats to share with others. The service controls the dwellings before they are included in the 
database and it offers the landlord a free insurance against the risk of non-payment for the first 
ten months and a liability insurance during the first year. In 1998 young people could find in 
this way rooms for around 25,000 Ptas per month. On average young people taking advantage 
of this service are around 27 years old, are highly qualified and have temporary contracts.
More women than men asked for a orie-person dwelling. In addition, the service also helps in 
searching for places in halls o f residence for students and for lodgings.102
101 Information was personnally communicated by the director of the service in November 1998 (cf. 
www.habitatgejove.com).
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The municipality o f Barcelona has another specific project, which consists in the building of 
431 dwellings for young people on ground expropriated by the municipality for the construc­
tion of a road. This project forms part of the municipal action program (PAM) of 1996-1999. 
Young people under 31, with income not exceeding 2.5 times the minimum wage, whose in­
come comes mainly from employment and who normally live in Barcelona will be able to apply 
for these dwellings. It is foreseen that young people will be able to  rent those dwellings for 
24,000 to 41.000 Ptas -depending on the number of rooms- at the beginning o f 1999 (CJB 
1998, El Pais, Catalonia, 9.11.1998).
To sum up, young people in France receive help in the form of housing allowances and indi­
rectly through the offer of social housing. In particular those young people who do not reach 
the subsistence income level because they are students or young workers with short-term con­
tracts can profit from housing allowances. This, undoubtedly, helps young people to leave 
home despite a low market or transfer income. Unlike in France, Spanish young people cannot 
receive any direct housing allowances for rented accommodation and they also do not have 
access to social housing, since it is almost non existent.
The negative effects o f Spanish housing policy on young people's ability to find a dwelling has 
been noted and commented on by many Spanish experts and even by a former Minister o f 
Housing (cf. Borrell 1992). Nonetheless little had been done until 1992 and afterwards too no 
structural change took place. To conclude, I would like to reflect on the possible reasons for 
the existence and permanence of the specific Spanish housing policy.
First, housing policy has been conceived of as a sort o f economic and fiscal policy, but within 
the social security system no benefits similar to the French ALS or ALF were created. The 
historical importance and the separate administrative institutionalisation of an encompassing 
family policy is surely one factor, which facilitated the creation o f these housing benefits in 
France. In addition, in 1977 the French housing administration created a new housing allow­
ance for acquisition and rent o f accommodation. Unlike France, Spain did not pursue any ex­
plicit and significant family policy from 1978 and thus has no specific administration in this 
field. Moreover, the Spanish Welfare State had to be constructed and extended in the 1980s, 
which means that the most basic social needs were given priority: universalisation of old-age 
pensions, of health and education services, and the extension of unemployment benefits.
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In 1992 the committee for the reform of the Spanish housing policy pointed to the necessity of 
structural changes but also to the difficulties of eliminating existing tax advantages. One prob­
lem lies in the necessity of creating a costly administration able to administrate and control new 
direct benefits, while the fiscal administration could continue administering new types of fiscal 
benefits without additional costs. Another problem was considered to be the heavy social costs 
and possible conflict a structural change of the fiscal housing policy could create, since the 
acceptance o f the existing income taxation system by higher income earners was and is partly 
based on tax exemptions for housing. In 1989 over 24 per cent of tax payers benefited from tax 
deductions for investment in housing (Leal 1992, Cortés Alcalá 1995).
A third reason can be searched for in the belief that there is a cultural preference o f Spanish 
citizens for home-ownership and against renting, which induces politicians to design housing 
policy accordingly. This might be true, but there are other arguments which help to understand 
these presumable cultural preferences. First, there is the significance o f the informal economy 
in Spain which might be favouring saving for old-age through house acquisition instead of 
through social security contributions. Second, there were for a long time scarce alternative 
investment opportunities in the Spanish financial market, which nowadays has changed, but at 
the same time the liberalisation o f the bank sector created a very dynamic mortgage market (cf. 
Ferrera/Castles 1996, Gomez 1989). Last, under the old rent acts before 1985 and 1994, pro­
prietors had low incentives to rent dwellings out, while the Spanish state had a very limited 
supply of public housing.
10,6 Conclusion: Differences in Diversification Not in Timing
The aim of this chapter on the social rights career of young people in France and Spain was to 
describe the mechanisms through which social policies might be contributing to early home­
leaving in France. It was shown that cross-national differences in the timing of the social rights 
career are less important than differences in the range o f social benefits. Social benefits help 
young people to take the decision to leave home because they reduce uncertainty through the 
promise of maintenance allowances and services under given conditions. These social rights 
reduce the risk o f leaving home and they disconnect the standard of life to some extent from
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the availability of market income or family help. This dependence diversification mechanism 
works only if three conditions are fulfilled:
1. if social benefits cover the main needs o f young people leaving home, that is stability of a 
minimum income and access to a dwelling (extension condition);
2. if coverage occurs in an adequate way, which is that maintenance allowances are relatively 
generous and subsidised dwellings are accessible without any requirement of previous in­
vestment (generosity condition);
3. if entitlement conditions are not restricted to a minority of young people (coverage condi­
tion).
The first question o f this chapter was about the timing o f the social rights career Do French 
young people loose their child status and acquire adulthood earlier than Spanish young people? 
The French Welfare State defines children as dependent family members, which have to be 
supported as such, up to age 20/25, when they are supposed to reach adulthood. The French 
state provides some special rights for young people aged 16 to 25 and then it opens the door to 
full social citizenship by age 25. The process o f acquiring full social rights is guided by age 
criteria and it ignores the fact if young people live with their parents or independently. At age 
25 young people have social rights through their contribution to social security insurance or 
through a means-test. Instead, the Spanish Welfare State cares less for children and it assumes 
that children depend mainly on family solidarity. The family is supposed to take care o f  their 
dependent children as long as necessary, frequently without any age-limit, but in any case 
longer than in France. The Spanish Welfare State conceives its beneficiaries frequently in terms 
o f family units and not in terms of individuals and, in consequence, age-limits mark resource­
sharing realities less.
Table 31 illustrates this conclusion through a summary of entitlement conditions to child bene­
fits and to social rights for young people. It shows very clearly that the definition of dependent 
child in different social security laws varies in France and Spain. In France a child is considered 
dependent on her parents if she is not employed, but studying. But this sort of dependence 
cannot last for a long time, since at age 20 the young person's enrolment in education loses 
significance and the young person is no longer considered to be dependent on her parents. 
French fiscal law is somewhat more generous in defining childhood, since until age 24 a young 
person can be considered as a child. Instead, in Spanish social security law childhood is defined
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in two ways: 1. a child is a child until age 18 and 2. a child is a child as long as he is financially 
dependent on his parents. The first definition applies only to means-tested child benefits. v hilt* 
the second definition applies to health services and non-contributory unemployment benefit^ 
Fiscal law defines childhood as lasting until age 29. if the child is financially dependent on her 
parents. Despite the heterogeneity o f the Spanish legal definitions of childhood, it clearly is a 
state which lasts longer than in France. In Spain, financial dependence on parents is a fact 
which makes young people into children, while this infantilisation is something French law 
conceives as possible only until age 20/25.
Table 31: Parents' Rights to Child Benefits in France and Spain, 1991
Public Benefits Students Dependent Workers T arm ployed In w oM rilli S u fih r
ALS-housing allowance up to age 20 (F) up to age 18 if income 
under J6SofSMIC(F)
up to age 16 (f | up to age llH ll
APL and ALF-housing allow­
ance
up to age 20 (F)
Child allowance up to age 20 (F) up to age 1H if income under Î6** of SMIC (l 1 up to age 16(11
up to age 18 (E) up to age 18(E) up to age IN (I )
Health services up to age 20 (F) up to age 16(F) up to age 16(1 )
dependent child without 
age-limit (E)
dependent, without igc-limit hut income limit
( E )
dependent c h i l d  with.ml 
■gc limtl (1 )
Non-contributory unemploy­
ment assistance
no dependent child supplement (F) dependent child supplement, no age-limit ( I )
Tax exemptions up to age 25(F)
up to 29. if low income (E)
up to age 21 (F) up to age 29 if low income <1 >
Note; F = France. E = Spain. For handicapped children and young people there are special ruin, which are not considered m th»» table 
Sources; Julliot 1991. Trotabas-Cotlcrct 1990. Raymond 1995. MJSSOC 1992. Aguilar et al 1995. MTSS 1991.1 tKVDtCI. 199.1
The other side o f the coin is the age from which young people have access to the two types of 
existing social rights. Young people can be entitled to 1. specific rights for youth and 2 to 
general social rights for adults. The latter can be of contributory, universal or of means-tested 
nature.
Specific rights for young people exist as means-tested and universal rights (cf. Table 32)
These are social rights related to enrolment in education: a special health insurance for students 
and means-tested scholarships. In France these benefits are regulated according to age, white in 
Spain they are only regulated according to the fact of being enrolled in education In France
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two other specific means-tested social benefits exist(ed), which are not available in Spain: 1. 
housing allowance for young workers and 2. non-contributory unemployment allowance for 
first employment seekers. These are benefits for young people aged 16 to 25 trying to enter the 
labour market.
Table 32: Range of Social Rights of Young Single People W ithout Children, Aged 20-29,
in France and Spain 1991






in certain regions (F) 
no (E)
Under 25 yean in
certain regions (F) 
no (E)
if benefit period exhausted 
or if AJ beneficiary (F) 
no (E)
if able to pay 












if able to pay 
minimum rent or 
if receiving RMI 
( F ) 1 no (E)
ALF-allowance 
means-tested
no (F and E)
* Public dwellings 
means-tested
yes (F) / very limited (E)





no (F and E) 3 months contribution (F) 
6 months contribution (E)




no (F and E) 16-25 yean old, other 
conditions (F) / no (E)














in practice incompatible with 
integration measures (F. E)







es C ontributoiy and universal
health services
from 20 yean upwards (F) 
from 15 yean to  27 (E)
if contribution to social 
security (F, E)
if contribution (F. E) means-tested (F, E)
Note: grey background means specific rights for voung people. AJ = allocation d‘insertion. Sources: Julliot 1991. Trotabas/Cotteret 1990. Ray­
mond 199?. MISSOC 1992. Aguilar et al. 1995.'MTSS 1991. EURYDICE 1993.
General contributory benefits are independent o f age, since the condition is to have contributed 
to an insurance scheme. In these cases age plays an indirect role through young people's 
chances of finding an employment with social security coverage. Means-tested benefits such as 
housing allowances and health services are, in general, not limited to  any age, yet general social 
assistance is conditioned to a minimum age o f  25 years in both countries. Thus, social rights 
for young people are in both countries related to an employment with contribution to social
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security and to a means-test. Unlike cross-national differences in the definition of childhood, 
nearly no cross-national differences exist in the definition o f an adult citizen with social rights 
In both countries adulthood is related to an employment with social security and to the attain­
ment o f age 25 All in all, thus, differences between Spain and France in the legal timing of the 
social rights career are small.
The second conclusion of this chapter is not unexpected: the French Welfare State fulfils more 
tasks o f care and maintenance o f children and young people than the Spanish Welfare State. As 
shown in Table 32, in France the extension condition is better complied with than in Spain. In 
Spain, young people are entitled to contributory and means-tested income maintenance pro­
grams nearly to the same extent as their French counterparts. Only a Spanish means-tested 
unemployment benefit for first-employment seekers is missing, but this benefit was abolished in 
France 1992. Health services in Spain and France are organised according to the contributory 
scheme, but in fact they are universal. The great and crucial difference between the two coun­
tries are housing benefits. No housing allowances and scarce public social housing supply exist 
in Spain, while a wide range of housing benefits are accessible to French young people.
The Spanish Welfare State does not fulfil the extension condition adequately nor the generosity 
and coverage conditions either. Relative generosity of different public benefits measured in 
Purchasing Power Standards are reported in Table 33. Spanish average wage in youth-specific 
contracts and the minimum amount o f contributory unemployment allowance for somebody 
who contributed for 15 months to unemployment insurance are even more or as generous than 
the equivalent French measures. The problem with the Spanish allowances is their lower gen­
erosity in terms o f the length of time the allowance can be payed. Rooms in halls o f residence 




Table 33: Comparative Generosity (benefit amounts in monthly PPS), 1991/92
| France Spain
Average wage in youth-specific 
contract
488 530
Minimum amount of unemploy­
ment allowance (15 months contri­
bution)
505 496
Minimum contribution time 3 months (last year) 6 months (last 4 years)
Benefit length (15 months of con­
tribution)
14 months 6 months
Room in hall of residence (costs) 100-246 273-512
Average grant amount 210 129
Source: own elaboration with information of the chapter.
As has been already referred to, calculation o f  coverage rates is a rather difficult task due to 
differences in benefit systems and due to a lack of good administrative statistics. Yet, some 
estimates were possible and they are summarised in Table 34. In general, benefits for students 
and young people in the labour force cover fewer young people in Spain than in France.
Table 34: Indicators of Coverage in France and Spain, 1991/92
France Spain
% of students with grant 17% ca. 8 %
Places in halls per 100 students 7.9 % 2.3 %
% unemployed (under age 30) with 
unemployment coverage
ca. 35 % ca. 18 %
% youth-specific contracts per 100 
unemployed (16-24)
ca. 100% ca. 1S%
____________________________ 1
Source: own elaboration with information of the chapter.
Young Spanish people in their transition into adulthood have to rely mainly on the market and 
on the family, while French young people are able to diversify their income across the market, 
the family and the state. This lower degree o f income diversification in Spain does not favour 
an early home-leaving o f  Spanish people. Most likely it also obstructs geographic and social 




11 Conclusion: Alleviation o f Employment and Housing Problems through Social 
Policies
There are many popular beliefs about why, since the 1980s, young people tend to stay longer 
at home in West-European countries and many people offer ad-hoc explanations for interna­
tional differences. Since the family is something everybody is familiar with from their own ex­
perience, it is an area in which sociological thinking has to compete with popular beliefs. Dur­
ing the research, I heard many opinions of non-sociologists about why young people in Spain 
stay longer with their parents than in France and I would like to conclude this research by con­
trasting these opinions with the results of this work. Popular beliefs can be divided into four 
statements.
1. In Spain Catholicism is still strong, which explains the dominance of marriage and the poor 
development of consensual unions. Thus, in Spain people stay at home until they marry and 
this delays leaving home (Traditional-values statement).
2. The difficult employment situation of young people and the obstacles on the housing market 
are the reasons for so many young people staying at home with their parents for so long 
(Socio-economic statement).
3. The creation of universities all over Spain explains why students do not need to leave home 
for study reasons (Students-particularity statement).
4. In France students receive many public benefits and this helps them to leave their parents 
early (Social-policies statement).
First of all and obviously, there is no mono-causal explanation for understanding the diversity 
of living arrangements in Spain and France. There are specific configurations o f  social factors 
which favour high staying home rates and other which make these less likely. What a sociolo­
gist can do is to explore which factors are irrelevant and analyse relevant factors systemati­
cally, and try to falsify current explanations or put them into a broader context. In this conclu­
sion the research strategy and the main results are summarised, and lastly possible future de­
velopments of young people’s living arrangements are discussed.
In this research an optimal research design could not be applied, since not all the necessary 
information was available. Some information was available at individual level for both coun­










only be found at regional or national level. This situation prevents a strict statistical multivari­
ate test, but it does not prevent a systematic interpretation of the situation and a confrontation 
o f hypotheses with statistical evidence. This analysis followed three strategies o f hypothesis 
testing:
1 Parameterisation o f socio-economic characteristics at individual level through statistical 
multivariate analysis (French and Spanish individuals from representative samples).
2. Parameterisation o f some context variables through a systematic choice of cases (France 
and Spain, Spanish regions, French regions).
3. Descriptive comparison o f some very specific subgroups of young people (young people 
living independently in Spain and France).
4. Statistical test of hypotheses in only one unit o f analysis (France).
5. Descriptive comparative institutional analysis of social benefits in two contexts (France, 
Spain).
The first strategy allowed for the confirmation o f the stability, the low-quality-of-Iife, the 
low-expectation and the precariousness hypotheses at individual level for Spain. In addition, 
for Spanish men the m arket-incom e hypothesis was confirmed. For France the precarious­
ness and the pluralisation hypotheses were confirmed. The second strategy holds some inde­
pendent context variables in Spain and France constant and thus excluded them as possible 
explanative factors: Catholic denomination, strength of intergenerational solidarity, average 
age at first marriage, school-based vocational training system, enrolment rates in universities, 
perception of youth unemployment as social problem and importance o f agricultural produc­
tion in the national economy. The third strategy permitted the confirmation of the high- 
property hypothesis for Spain and France. The fourth strategy partly confirmed the depend­
ency-diversification hypothesis for France at the individual level and tested how the consid­
eration o f income increased the predictive power o f the logistic regression models for France. 
Lastly, the fifth strategy discussed through which mechanisms and to what extent cross­
national differences in social policies might be related to variations in intergenerational coresi­
dence and provided in this way arguments in favour of the dependency-diversification hy­
pothesis at the macro-sociological level.
This work does not test any causality relations, but it proposes a causal interpretation of cor­
relations and an explanation in terms o f configurations favouring intergenerational coresidence 
and those favouring early nest-leaving. If one takes the frequently used concepts in youth re­
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search of status transitions, then the results of this research can be summarised as follows The 
comparatively late Spanish social transition is not an outcome of a late school-to-work transi­
tion nor o f a late entry into marriage, since the former occurs earlier than in France and the 
latter at similar times. The late Spanish social transition, instead, is the result o f a late financial 
transition and a late and incomplete social rights acquisition.
It was shown that the socio-economic theoretical model and, in particular, its statistical appli­
cation can reduce the unexplained variance in social independence patterns by 12 to 29 per 
cent, depending on gender and relation to studies. The statistical models explain student's pat­
terns better that non-students living arrangements and men’s social independence better than 
women’s. In the future the operationalisation o f the socio-economic model has to be improved 
in three ways: First, information on income (from market, state and family) and on expendi­
tures has to be introduced. Second, the time spent in a job has to be added to the income level 
and income stability. Third, more information on on the socio-economic situation of stable and 
informal partners has to be introduced in order to explain women’s behaviour better. Probably, 
an event history technique would also increase the explained variance.
Figure 43 summarises the findings o f this research by relating different contexts with each 
other and by showing the influence o f these configurations on individuals' strategies and on 
national living arrangements o f young people.
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Figure 43: Configurations Favouring and Hindering Early Nest-Leaving, 1985-1992
F R A N C E
Labour Market: 
j High unemployment and !




■ Extensive youth-specific short-term 
jobs and medium coverage rate of 
unemployment benefits.
■ Extensive social housing and housing 
allowances.
■ Medium coverage rate of halls of 
residence and grants for students, elite 
universities and centralisiation.
Income:
^  medium average 




• Early financial independence.
• No need to save for setting up a 
household.
■ Difusion of independent household 
formation of women and of nonfamily 
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■ Precariousness strategy possible.
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j High rate of rented dwellings, of 
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Labour Market:
Very high unemployment and 
! short-term employment rates.
/
Income:
<4* low average income 
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Individual Strategies:
■ Late financial independence.
■ Need to save and to take a mortgage 
for setting up a household.
* Difusion of dependent household 
formation of women and of marriage.
■ Stability strategy is required.
/
Housing Market:
High rate of owner-occupied 
dwellings, social housing rare 






Late Nest-leaving in Spain is an outcome of lower income levels of Spanish youth compared to 
French young people. Financial Independence is reached earlier in France and this is the result 
of earlier entrance into subsistence-level guaranteed jobs and of a more extended access to 
more generous public allowances: grants for students, unemployment benefits and housing 
allowances. Income stability is a resource, which French young people also attain earlier than 
their Spanish counterparts, while Spanish young people show high rates of rotation from one 
short-term job to the next. These lower Spanish chances in the attainment o f an early stable 
and adequately paid job have a deep impact on young people’s likelihood to be socially inde­
pendent, because Spanish youth is surrounded by a housing market and housing policy context 
which exasperate their difficulties on the labour market. Spanish short-term employed people 
are more likely to rent than to buy a dwelling, since a precarious income situation in a context 
of poorly developed social policies for young people makes the taking on of a mortgage a risky 
enterprise. Also, the Spanish housing market offers few rented dwellings and the few available 
ones were very expensive during the period o f 1985 to 1991. Even with parental help for the 
down payment of an owner-occupied dwelling, the acquisition of an accommodation was a 
very costly affair after Spain's entrance into the European Community. By contrast, in France 
young short-term employed people had access to extensive subsidised social housing and 
housing allowances. In this respect the Spanish Welfare State neglects Spanish youth totally: 
housing allowances do not exist and social dwellings for rent are nearly impossible to find. If 
socio-economic opportunities to leave home early are so rare for Spanish young people aged 
20 to 29, does it make sense to pose the question of national differences in preferences and 
social norms?
For most young people in Spain social independence is an alternative with very high opportu­
nity costs, but what about young people who one might expect to have enough resources to 
leave home early? First, one thinks of children o f service class origin with high resources, a 
high educational level and a long-term job. The logistic regression models have shown that in 
Spain there are nearly no class differences in the probability of living independently and that 
"privileged" Spanish people tend much more to live in the parental home than their French 
counterparts. What counts a lot in Spain are age differences, much more than in France. Let us 
interpret these findings for students and non-students separately.
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For students, parents' resources are expected to be of some relevance for their chances to be 
socially independent. In fact, French students from the service class and from the petty bour­
geoisie have a high chance at being socially independent compared to working class children, 
because they frequently emigrate for study reasons and they can combine family help with mar­
ket income and sometimes even with public benefits for students (housing allowances). In 
Spain, students have to rely mainly on market income and family help, since public benefits for 
students are restricted to few students and less generous than in France. Yet, Spanish students 
from service class origin are not more likely to  live independently than those from other social 
classes. There seem to be two reasonable explanations for this cross-national difference. First, 
the Spanish university system is less centralised and there are no elite universities, which means 
that migration for study reasons is less important than in France. Second, young people o f 
service class origin do not seem to want to live away while studying, even if it is in the same 
town as their parents, and/or their parents do not conceive of the possibility o f helping them 
economically in a way other than allowing them to remain at home. The findings for Spanish 
students point to strong social norms connecting enrolment in education with living in the pa­
rental home. Since students living away might not be adequately recorded in the Spanish sur­
vey, this lack of social class differences in the likelihood o f social independence needs further 
confirmation. The fact that few students live away in Spain also has an influence on the diffu­
sion of nonfamily living arrangements, since these are traditionally more frequent among stu­
dents. In most countries the expansion of consensual unions in the 1960/1970s was largely due 
to their diffusion in the student subculture. Later cohabitation diffused into other social groups.
The situation o f non-students is somewhat different, since they are supposed to depend less on 
parents' resources and mainly on their own resources. The Spanish "privileged" non-students 
have lower chances o f being socially independent than their French counterparts. Different 
answers -  cultural and socio-econonic- are possible. The socio-economic explanation affirms 
that social dependence o f "privileged" young people is the result o f the specific Spanish labour 
and housing market. Young people in Spain attain financial autonomy later than in France, 
mainly because their wages are lower. Wages are lower because Spanish young people enter 
long-term employment later than their French contemporaries and it might be that a long-term 
employed Spanish person earns less than her French counterpart. The latter question was not 
answered here, because it requires use of income data in the statistical models for both coun­
tries. Apart from this labour market question, there is clear evidence concerning housing mar-
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ket differences. Spanish young people with adequately paid long-term jobs have access to pub­
lic incentives to buy a dwelling, but there is no public help for renting an accommodation and 
tax exemptions are useless for people with low earnings. Besides, rented accommodation was 
as expensive as a mortgage during the period of observation (1985-1991). To buy a dwelling is 
for most young people more rational than to rent one, but this implies the need to accumulate 
some savings. In its turn, this requires not only a long-term job but also some time in such an 
employment. In fact, the cross-national logistic regression results have shown that young peo­
ple with few qualifications are more likely to be socially independent, partly because they have 
passed more time on the labour market than their counterparts with a higher education. For 
young people out of education there are few opportunities to receive adequate public benefits, 
subsistence-guaranteeing employment is a scarce resource for which one has to queue a long 
time and acquisition o f a dwelling requires some savings. In this context it seems rational for 
Spanish "privileged" young people, who very often have passed a long time enrolled in educa­
tion and who normally have to pass through a phase o f short-term employment before entering 
a long-term job, to stay as long in the parental home as less "privileged" people. If there were 
more long-term jobs, more extensive and more generous public benefits for young people and 
rented dwellings were more accessible, then one could expect to find more Spanish young 
people in social independence and more people moving out of home in order to live in consen­
sual unions and less in a married couple.
It has been shown that there is a larger number o f young people stating that they approve of 
consensual unions and that they would like to move in with a partner to form a consensual 
union than the real number of young people doing so. Thus, there is some potential for nonfa­
mily living arrangements, but these people are hindered from fulfilling their wishes for three 
reasons. First, because o f the low supply of rented housing. There is a strong correlation be­
tween consensual unions and rented dwellings, whose causality might go in both directions, but 
a difficult housing situation clearly affects young people's decisions. Second, young Spanish 
people might face more social pressure against consensual unions and in favour of marriage 
from their parents than in France. This social pressure is strengthened by the fact that young 
people in Spain need their parents' economic and emotional help more than in France, since 
they receive less public benefits and they have to face more adverse and unstable employment 
conditions. Third, the particularly difficult labour market situation for women is strengthening 
the institution o f marriage.
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High rates of unemployment, o f irregular work and of short-term jobs have particularly nega­
tive effects on women's social independence. If  one assumes that as many of them would like 
to have a job and to choose an independent household formation as do their French counter­
parts, it is much more difficult for Spanish women than for French women to enter a job and, 
in particular, a long-term employment. Hence, a higher rate of male-breadwinner families are 
found among Spanish than among French young people. French women rely more than French 
men on public benefits in order to be able to live independently. In Spain women cannot count 
on public benefits as French women do and thus cannot counterbalance their bad employment 
prospects with public help. Spanish regional labour markets with high male unemployment 
rates influence women's chances of social independence more than they do male's. The Spanish 
labour market favours dependent family formation of women through marriage and reinforces 
in this way the institution o f marriage. Spanish young couples might face social pressure o f 
their parents to marry, more than French young people do, but even so, a Spanish couple of 
young people with short-term jobs, in addition, has to face the problem of more difficult acces­
sibility of an owned and a rented dwelling. It means that a different housing market situation 
and housing policy would most probably reduce the rate o f young people moving out to marry 
and increase the number of consensual unions and nonfamily arrangements. This does not ex­
clude that in such a context, different social norms about consensual unions might persist be­
tween France and Spain, but they would be smaller than in the current configuration.
Young people in Spain choose a stability strategy in order to leave home, i.e. men's likelihood 
to live independently depends strongly on an employment, in particular on a long-term em­
ployment and women's probability is strongly linked to setting up a household with an em­
ployed partner. Employment or, in other words market-income, is less relevant for French 
men's chances to be socially independent, since they often combine market income with public 
benefits and even with family help, for instance from a female partner, and this increases their 
chances of living independently compared to men who only rely on market income. Thus, 
young French people do not follow as frequently as Spanish men a stability strategy, but can 
more frequently afford to  leave home under precarious conditions, due the more favourable 
housing market and social policies context.
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It is not necessary to argue in terms of different family cultures and social norms in order to 
explain cross-national differences in intergenerational coresidence in Spain and France, since a 
large part o f the differences are related to very different opportunity structures .10 ' So, coming 
back to popular explanations about long-lasting intergenerational coresidence in Spain, it can 
be stated that the traditional-values statement might explain a part of the cross-national differ­
ences, but the socio-economic statement already explains a large amount of the French-Spanish 
variation. The students-particularity and the social-policies statements are important explana- 
tive factors, but they have to be embedded into their respective contexts, since they can explain 
cross-national differences only in relation to other factors.
One can speak o f the relevance o f  differences in social norms with respect to the institutionali­
sation of the division o f labour between the Welfare State and the Family. An important argu­
ment throughout this work has been that social policies affect young people's life chances, in 
particular their chances to become socially independent. It was shown for France that public 
benefits influence young people’s living arrangements more than parental help does. However, 
public benefits do not eliminate social class differences, as shown in the results for France. 
More research on social policies for youth has to be done, in particular with respect to South­
ern Europe. The mechanisms through which social policies affect young people's life chances 
and social class differences within youth have to be clarified.
The Spanish Welfare State is based on the assumption that children are mainly an affair of the 
parents and that they might depend on their parents as long as they live with them in one 
household. Social policies for young people focus on active employment policy through flexi­
bility at the margin, which means a flexibility concentrating exclusively on new entrants into 
employment. These measures created a specific youth labour market with high job rotation and 
low earnings, which is not being alleviated through adequate housing benefits and only to a 
small degree through unemployment benefits.
Social policies can alleviate problems related to crowded labour markets, but they cannot be a 
remedy against the difficult labour market integration o f young people. They can help young 
people to maintain their income through phases o f unemployment and to reduce housing costs,
103 It is not clear if this statement also applies to students, since the limited evidence found in this work makes it more 
reasonable to see social norms as the main cause of students' social dependence.
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they can help them to come into contact with the labour market or to acquire more employ­
ment-related qualifications and they might reduce general uncertainty about future con>c- 
quences of leaving home under economically precarious conditions. It has been shown for 
France that public benefits affect young people’s life chances mainly in combination with mar­
ket income and they affect women more than men. Thus, the problem of employment shortage, 
especially in Spain has to be solved in the first place by the creation o f more employment, be it 
due to economic growth or due the redistribution o f paid work. It was shown that, if one 
wants to favour social independence o f young people, employment has to be o f long-term na­
ture. In France and in Spain young people in fixed-term jobs have more difficulties to live inde­
pendently. The main conclusion of this work is that an alleviation o f employment and housing 
problems of young people through adequate social policies will increase the Spanish rate of 
socially independent young people and, hence, wall accelerate young people's nest-leaving.
If social policies for young people and young families will not be developed more intensively in 
Spain or should be further restricted in France, then several problems related to long-lasting 
intergenerational coresidence might increase and emerge.
1. The fertility decline in Spain might still go on for some years with all its subsequent future 
problems for the economy and the Welfare State.
2. Patriarchal gender relations will be more difficult to change or will even be reinforced, if 
the Welfare State does not support families in their tasks and a large majority of women 
have to pass from economic dependence on the father to economic dependence on the 
spouse.
3. The transition from intergenerational coresidence to marriage will persist in Spain, which
reduces young people's experimentation with different forms o f living arrangements and 
their capacity of social innovation. v
4. Young people's frustration about their incapacity to manage an important part of their own
lives and become economically, socially and emotionally independent will persist or even 
increase. v
With respect to social policies for young people in Spain there is still a long way to go in order 
to change the strong assumption about the division o f labour between the Family and the Wel­
fare State. Political decisions or absence of these are the main factors which determine the 
form of this division o f  labour. It can be argued that in some socio-economic contexts there are
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more limits to redistribution of resources through the Welfare State than in others, but within 
these limits Welfare States are able to organise them differently and they do so. Like social 
policies for young people, family policies have not only vertical but also horizontal redistribu­
tion aims and there are large differences in how family policies are organised among similarly 
“rich" and developed Welfare States. It is sufficient to compare French and German family 
policies in order to observe these differences (Kaufmann et al 1997, Neubauer 1993)
The Spanish Welfare State is a late comer, which experienced its expansion phase when in 
other countries Welfare State expansion was coming to an end and the crisis o f the Welfare 
State was proclaimed. In a context o f high unemployment, Spain had to develop basic public 
benefits which did not exist before, such as universal health care, unemployment benefits, 
minimum old-age pensions and a comprehensive public education system. The current chal­
lenge of the Spanish Welfare State is to support families in their tasks with respect to children's 
maintenance and socialisation and to lower the costs o f children, young and adult children. 
Spanish young people's access to  income maintenance allowances through scholarships, unem­
ployment benefits and state-regulated youth-specific employment measures increasing the pace 
of entrance into adequately paid jobs has to be ameliorated. The most important dimension o f 
this new social policy orientation should be to change and develop housing policy in a direction 
that helps more youth and young families to rent their first dwelling than to support adults' 
acquisition o f a second dwelling.
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1. Description of Encuesta Sociodemografica 1991 and Enquête Jeunes 
1992
L I  French Survey
The French survey ’’Enquête Jeunes 1992" was conducted in March 1992 by the French 
Statistical Office among 10,000 young people who were leaving the general French Labour 
Force Survey sample, after having been interviewed for three consecutive years. Thus the 
information o f the specific “young people” survey can be complemented by the information 
these young people gave one to two weeks before in the Labour Force Survey. The survey 
was aimed at young people aged 18 to 29 and bom between January 1963 and December 
1974 inclusively. The survey asks detailed information for the professional and family 
situation and for retrospective information since the young person’s 16th birthday (Meron 
1993).
2
The sample o f the Enquête Jeunes is a sub-sample of the Labour Force Survey and it excludes 
people who live in halls o f residence. In order to have at least some representation of this 
population in the survey the interviewers were instructed to interview people who live out of a 
family dwelling but who can still be considered as members of the household and thus to 
interview them (cf. Villeneuve-Gokalp 1997). They form 4 per cent o f the Franceall sample 
(cf. 1.3.1). However, the retrospective part of the Enquête Jeunes allows one to know the 
number o f young people who left home for the first time and went to a hall o f residence.
Since the Enquête Jeunes is a sub-sample o f the Labour Force Survey, the sampling method 
o f the latter has to be described. The French Labour Force Survey is conducted by the French 
Statistical Office (INSEE) in March of every year and in 1992 it had a sample o f around 
65,000 households and 135,000 individuals. The INSEE applies a three-stage sample 
(échantillon aréolaire) with stratification in the first-stage units (LASMAS 1998). The first- 
stage sample units are 210 zones including municipalities and urban agglomerations, which 
are the outcome of crossing 21 regions with 10 categories o f municipalities. The second-stage 
units are the result of the division of the former zones in groups of areas of ca. 200 dwellings. 
O f these groups one group of every 60 groups is chosen with the same probability and then 
the latter groups are divided in 5 areas of around 40 dwellings. The third-stage units are all the 
dwellings o f the chosen area. This method (méthode aréolaire) prevents a sub-registration o f 
informal households.
For the chosen household information on all members is collected. Within one household one 
household member can answer for all the other, so that the interviewer is not forced to 
interview all members personnally. The informant is chosen randomly from the whole sample 
following the “Kish” method (LASMAS 1998). In cases o f non-response the chosen 
household is replaced by another household with similar characteristics. For the 1990 Labour 
Force Series, the non-response rate varies from 2 to 3%. Weighting in order to make up for 
random errors is done with the help of census information and the same coefficients are used 
every year.
L2 Spanish Survey
The Spanish survey is called "Encuesta Sociodemografica 1991" (further on called ESD) and 
it was conducted by the Spanish Statistical Institute during October, November and December
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1991. The universe o f  the survey are all people having their residence in Spain, aged 10 or 
over and registered in the Population Census of 1991. People living in halls o f residence were 
not taken into consideration, but we have some information on them in the retrospective part 
of the survey.
The Statistical Office applied a three-stage sample with stratification in the first-stage units 
(INE 1993, 195). The first-stage sample units are the census enumeration districts o f the 1991 
census and the second-stage units are the main family dwellings and fixed dwellings. The 
third-stage units are the individuals living in fixed family dwellings and who were bom before 
the first january 1982. The first-stage units were stratified using a geographic and habitat size 
criterion following the province and the number of inhabitants o f the municipality. Given that 
there is a different distribution o f municipality size among different provinces, a not uniform 
stratification was applied, excluding for instance the category o f  very small municipalities in 
regions were they are insignificant. The sample consists o f 7,969 census districts and 20 
second-stage units in each district. This results in 159,154 dwellings and, because in each one 
individual was selected, the same number o f interviewees is the result.
The distribution o f the sample among the different Comunidades Autónomas (CCAA) was 
done following a compromise between an equal sample allocation and a proportionally 
allocated sample giving a higher weight to small CC AA composed of only one province 
(Asturias, Cantabria, Murcia, Navarra, Rioja) with the aim of obtaining a representative 
sample. Within each CCAA the allocation by province and district followed the criterion of 
the proportionality o f  the population.
The selection of the sample followed a random procedure at the first-stage unit, a systematic 
procedure for the selection o f dwellings and a random selection o f individuals. Two reserve 
samples were chosen following the principles o f the general sample. This permitted for the 
substitution o f  dwellings in given cases where it was not possible to conduct the interview. 
The census information was used to ameliorate the estimation and to establish weighting 
factors with the aim o f  correcting for possible bias due to non-responses.
1.2.1 Interview process
The information was collected via a personal interview o f the selected person (INE 1993, 
219). The dwelling and the individual to be interviewed could be substituted by a reserve
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dwelling or a reserve individual only in cases o f an erroneous selection or when it was
impossible to conduct the interview. In the following cases a substitution was admitted:
1. Dwelling could not be found;
2. Dwelling could not be reached (due to weather, etc.);
3. Dwelling no longer existed;
4. Dwelling was a collective establishment instead of a family dwelling;
5. Nobody was living in the dwelling;
6. A household different to that o f the individual to be interviewed was living in the dwelling;
7. If  all residents of the household were absent and would continue to be absent during the 
whole period of the field work;
8. If at the end of the field work it had not been possible to contact a member o f the 
household;
9. If  all the members o f the household refused to answer;
lO.If the household did not have its main residence in the dwelling.
In all these cases a reserve dwelling was chosen. In some other cases the dwelling was not
substituted but another member o f  the household was interviewed (selection by random). 1
1. If  the individual to be interviewed had died after the time of the census interview;
2. If the individual was absent and would be absent during the whole time o f the field work.
In this case another family member was asked to give information about the absent 
selected individual;
3. If the individual had changed dwelling since the time of the census;
4. If  the selected individual was not able to answer to questions because of a strong illness or 
handicap;
5. If the individual was aged under 16 years;
6. If the individual refused to answer. In case he/she did not refuse that another family 
member answers for him/her, another member could give the information about her/him. If 
the refusal was total a new household was selected;
7. If no adequate substitute informant was found or another family member did not have 
sufficient knowledge to answer all the questions about the selected individual;
8. If  the individual was not ten years old at moment o f the interview.
In 76,3% of the cases the interview was done in the originally selected dwelling and with the 
selected individual. In 15,8% of the cases the interview was conducted in a first substitute 
dwelling, in 5,2% in a second substitute and in 2,8% in a third substitute dwelling. In some 
CCAA substitution was more frequent than on average. This was the case in Baleares.
Can arias and Madrid.
In 10,2% of the cases a substitution was necessary because of a refusal to answer and in 8.3% 
of the cases because o f a long-lasting absence. In the CCAA o f  Madrid, Navarra and the Pais 
Vasco the refusal to answer was higher than in other CCAA (16,6%, 13,4%, and 13% 
respectively). If one takes the total sample as basis (as in the French case) the non-response 
rate amounts to 2.4%. It is important to notice that the over-proportional refuses occurred in 
highly urbanised CCAA like Madrid and Pais Vasco which for our study could mean that 
young people living in informal living-arrangements tended to refuse the interview and thus 
could be underrepresented.
1.2.2 P roblem s d u rin g  the field w ork
1.2.3 W eighting
The INE offers two weighting factors, one for the estimation o f the real population and one 
for the dwelling. They not only estimate the whole population but also correct for bias. A 
comparison o f the weighted and non-weighted sample o f  young people aged 25 to 29 years 
show the following corrections:
Some CCAA increased their weight (Galicia 0.4%, Cataluña 2%, País Valenciano 1.4%, 
Andalucía 1.9%, Castilla-León 0.3% and Madrid 1.8%). HSpainall is weighted then it can be 
observed that by this procedure men become up-weighted (2.8%), while women were down­
weighted. Full-time students and unemployed become up-weighted (2.1% and 0.2% 
respectively) while economically inactive become down-weighted (2%). Young people living 
with parents increase their percentage by 12.2%. Despite the weighting procedure the results 
of the ESD differ from those o f the census o f 1991, not only if compared to the total 
population but also compared to the population living in family dwellings.
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1.2.4 Estim ation  of th e  E xcluded Y outh Population
For the study o f leaving the parental home the survey presents two sons of problems. First, 
the ESD did not take into account people living in residences and this is in particular a 
problem for analyses o f the youth population due to the fact that students might live in 
residences. It is absolutely necessary to estimate this population to be able to make some 
affirmation on the overestimation o f young people living with their parents in Spain. Different 
sources permit estimating this figure. The census of 1991 counted 7,826 young people aged 
25-29 years living in residences o f  different types (hotels, students' halls of residences, 
hospitals, prisons, etc.)(INE 1994, 385). This means that 0.3% of young people o f  this age 
group are not represented in the ESD. In the age group between 20 and 24 years the 
percentage is only 0.2% despite the fact, that it is the age group with the highest proportion of 
students. These figures suggest that the ESD does not really underestimate the youth 
population due to the low figures o f young people living in halls of residence. According to 
the 1991 census, the total number o f people who live in a hall of residence for students, for 
workers or in a education institution amount to 2625. This number represents 0.08% o f all 
young people aged 20 to 24 and 0.3% of those young people in this age group enrolled in 
education (INE 1994). Another possible estimation is to see how many places in halls of 
residence there are in Spain in relation to the registered student population. Table 18 in the 
main text shows that in 1991 there were 2.3 places per hundred students.
The second problem is probably a sub-estimation of informal living arrangements in the sense 
that young people living with flat mates or with a partner but officially still registered as 
living with their parents will not have been adequately interviewed. If  such a person was 
chosen at random two possibilities exist.
1. They were absent from their parents' home during the whole field work period and 
somebody else, e.g. the mother, was asked to inform about the young person or the person 
was replaced by another member of the household. In the first situation the young person 
counts as living with the parents and in the second situation he or she is eliminated from 
the sample.
2. They were interviewed during the time of a visit to the parents, e.g. during the week-end, 
and thus they were classified as living with their parents.
To sum up, we cannot know how many young people live in informal households with a 
survey which bases its selection process on official registration information. Other types of
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surveys such as youth surveys can give some information, but even these ones have other 
types of problems, such as problems related to quota sampling. The published report of the 
youth survey of 1992 permits only a rough estimation o f these informal living arrangements, 
because it contains aggregated information on young people aged 15 to 29 years. According 
to this survey there are 2% of young people living alone, 2% living in cohabitation and 5% 
living with friends (Navarro/Rivas 1993). The respective figures o f the ESD for young people 
aged 20 to 29 are: 5%, 4% and 7% (cf. Figure 12). Since in Spain those aged 15 to 29 live 
mostly at home, the figures of the ESD suggest a similar recording of nonfamily households 
than the Youth Survey.
1.3 Samples o f  Logistic Regression
Both surveys were reduced to smaller samples following theoretical and technical reasons o f 
the research question as described in section 6.
1,3.1 French Samples
The sample used in this research includes only individuals aged 20 to 29, that is 7,734 young 
persons, o f whom 3,838 aged 20 to 24 and 3,906 aged 25 to 29 (Franceall). The decision to 
concentrate only on those aged 20 to 29 and thus to exclude the 18 and 19 years old has its 
reason in that in this way all young people in the analysis have reached the legal maturity as 
well as the age by which the maturity certificate is obtained in most of cases.
For the logistic regression analysis a sub-sample of Franceall was used by selecting only 
those young people who in 1986 were living with their parents. The information of the 
retrospective part o f the survey was used (calendrier) and those who in 1986 were not yet 16 
years old and thus had not given any information for 1986 were supposed to live with their 
parents and counted as such. The question o f the first leaving home moment could have been 
used alternatively, but since in France it is rather frequent that young people who left home 
come back again, the retrospective question o f the calendrier was preferred. In addition and 
for comparative reasons, young people living in halls o f residence like students’ halls, army 
barracks were treated as missing values. By this 258 young people were lost, that is 4.8 per 
cent of the new sub-sample.
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This new sub-sample (France86) misses the individuals who left their parental home before 
1986 and at an age under 23 years, and it contains 5.393 cases. By this procedure 30% of the 
Franceall sample is excluded from France86 and the sample is not more representative for 
the age group 20 to 29 years, since it under-represents some young people. Compared to 
Franceall France86 over-represents the age-group of the 20 to 24 years old by 15%, men by 
2%, those living in the parental home by 12%, young people in education by 7% and finally 
young people with maturity certificate by 3%. Individuals in employment are 
underrepresented by 5% and economically inactive people by 2%. Thus, many young people 
in France left before age 23 and most of them were in employment or economically inactive 
in 1992. However, France86 is representative o f young people aged 14 to 23 w ho in 1986 
were living at home. Thus it can be used to estimate age-specific conditional probabilities of 
leaving home for all ages from 14 to 29.
I decided not to weight Franceall since the weighted results are very similar to the non- 
weighted results. In the non-weighted sample the variable IND92 counts 34.9% young people 
living with their parents, while in the weighted sample it aims 35.2% young people at home. It 
was decided not to weight France86 for the logistic regression neither, since the coefficients 
of the regression with the weighted sample and those with the non-weighted sample were 
almost the same.
1.3.2 Spanish Samples
From the general Sociodemographic Survey only those individuals aged 20 to 29 were 
selected for the same reasons as in the French case (Spainalf), which results in a sample with 
25,557 cases. For the logistic regression only those young people who in 1985 were living 
with their parents were selected (n=21,748). This new sub-sample (Spain8S) misses 
individuals who left their parental home before 1985 and at an age under 23 years. By this 
procedure 16% of the Spainall sample is excluded from Spain85 and as a consequence it over­
represents the group o f people aged 20-24 by 6%, women by 3%, those staying with their 
parents by 9%, those in education by 2% and those with a maturity certificate by 4%. 
Economically inactive people are underrepresented by 3% and those with primary education 
by 4%. As in the French case Spain85 is representative o f young people aged 14 to 23 who in 
1985 were living at home. Thus it can be used to estimate age-specific conditional 
probabilities o f leaving home for all ages from 14 to 29.
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It was decided not to weight the sub-sample for the individual-level logistic regression, since 
the coefficients of the regression with the weighted sample and those with the non-weighted 
sample were almost the same. Only in the case o f men the coefficients of social origin, 
educational level and number of siblings differed somewhat, in particular the positive effect 
o f having two siblings becomes statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, the non-weighted 
sample was used in the individual-level models. In the context-level models, instead, the 
differences between the weighted and non-weighted samples were larger and thus it was 
decided to weight the samples. The weighted sample was used, also, for bivariate calculations 
and frequencies with Spainali, since there are rather large differences after weighting, as 
shown above. This is partly due to the explicit over-sampling o f some regions.
1.3.3 Spanish Activity Figures Compared
The figures on activity resulting from own calculations with Spainali were compared with the 
Spanish labour force survey figures in order to asses divergences between both sources.
Table 1: Comparison of own Elaboration of ESD and Results of Spanish Labour Force 
Survey, 1991
Labour Force Survey (EPA) % of population in 
family households
20-24 25-29 20-29 EPA ESD
Economically inactive 1045600 577800 1623400 26.9 27.6
Active 2145600 2189000 4334600 71.8 70.5
military service 69000 11800 80800 1.3 1.3
total population 3191200 2766800 5958000 98.7 99.4
Employed 1489700 1685800 3175500 52.6 48.5
not more employed, searching employment 417500 367200 784700 13.0 14.7
first-employment seekers 238400 136000 374400 6.2 7.3
total economically active 2145600 2189000 4334600 71.8 70.5
students 782400 138800 921200 15.3 16.8
other economically inactive 263200 439000 702200 11.6 10.8
total economically inactive 1045600 577800 1623400 26.9 27.6
long-term employment 399400 762300 1161700 19.2 16.1
short-term employment 880800 640700 1521500 25.2
not possible to classify 1000 600 1600 Û.U 0.6
total dependent workers 1281200 1403600 2684800 44.5 41.9
population in family households, EPA 3260200 2778600 6038800
total population without Ceuta/Melilla* 6318640
estimated population in ESD 6254861
Note: Students in ESD include those who only study and those who work and study. * Census 1991. Sources: 
Labour Force Survey (EPA), 4. Trimester 1991 and Socio-demographic Survey (ESD), own elaboration.
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2. Appendix: Logistic Regression Tables
Table 1
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in France in 1992 and in Spain in 1991
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1991/92 Who in 1985/1986 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1991/92 Were in Education
WOMEN 
Total Cases 
Cases in Analysis 
-2 Log Likelihood 
•2 LL initially 

















part-time student 180 664 part-time student
full-time student 730 y ïÇ lW l** 0.2202 1048 r > p m * * 0.1945 full-time student
Agegroup
25-29 year old 76 427 25-29 year o ld
20-24 year old 834 0,3035 1285 0.1843 20-24 year o ld
Completed Education
tertiary certificate 60 188 tertiary certificate
<=compulsory cert. 78 j7 3 3 T O * * 0.3840 169 0.0352 0.2961 <=compu!sory cert.
basic vocational cert. 141 -0.5201 0,3381 m -0.1098 0.3041 basic vocational cert.
secondary vocal, cert. 431 CI-OT39**' 0.2820 993 -0.347 0,3512 secondary vocat. cert.
maturity certificate 192 -0,2636 0,2026 10 '-0,5376* 0.2273 maturity certificate
missing 8 -0.1481 0.8114 241 0,1533 0.7694 missing
Father's Social Class
service class 317 442 service class
routine non-manual 114 -0.2092 0.2538 304 0.1305 0.2571 routine non-manual
petty bourgeoisie 53 p fT H W * - 0.4046 184 0,511 0.2812 petty bourgeoisie
fanners 43 7 1,1893** 0.4030 105 -0.2618 0.4398 farmers
skilled workers 266 \ -0,4824** 0.2039 267 •0,1456 0.2775 skilled workers
non-skilled workers 95 Y -0,8516** 0,3030 329 -0,1479 0.2632 non-skilled workers
agricultural workers 2 7,4782 25,6343 35 -0,5042 0.6083 agricultural workers
economic. Inactive 12 -6,5262 10.0438 20 0.3364 0.6462 economic. Inactive
missing 8 1,2138 0.8070 26 -6,1649 10.8356 missing
Siblings
no sibling 103 100 no sibling
one sibling 292 -0.2188 0.2665 550 0,19 0,4494 one sibling
two siblings 225 -0.1218 0.2777 528 0,5767 0.444 two siblings
three and more sibli. 242 -0.0007 0.2845 528 0.7688 0.4419 three and more sibli.
missing 48 -0,3836 0,4170 6 0,4816 1.2924 missing
Size of municipality
> 100.000 inhabitants 588 302 > 100,000 inhabitants
>=20,000 and < 100,000 80 -0,1705 0.2919 403 -0.2029 0.267 >= 20.000 and < 100,000
>=5,000 and <20.000 75 -0,4213 0.3108 476 0,1164 0.2506 >=5.000 and <20.000
< 5.000 inhabitants 167 ~T,1264** 0.2481 531 -0,1036 0.2745 < 5,000 inhabitants
Region
Ile-de-France 206 312 Madrid
Champagne-Ardennes 15 p  1,7423** 0.5969 105 0.1628 0 Galicia
Picardie 37 -0,0454 0,4754 56 •0.5223 0,5442 Asturias
Haute-Normandie 32 0,4434 0,4353 34 -0,1463 0.5914 Cantabria
Centre 36 frT 2 » 7 * * ; 0,4275 120 •0,7614 0,4514 Pais Vasco
Basse-Normandie 15 3 £  1,6873**, 0,5987 48 -0,134 1 Navarra
Bourgogne 36 ^2,1619** 0,4722 61 0,3632 0 Aragón
Nord-Pas de Calais 87 1.1,0226**. 0,2977 238 -0,0421 0,2835 Cataluña
Lorraine 31 b;:/J,0179* 0,4361 46 0,0726 0,4583 Baleares
Alsace 29 V.1^37** 0,4441 138 0,0116 0,3339 País Valenciano
Franche-Comté 7 1.6267 0,8921 47 -0,0867 1 Murcia
Pays de la Loire 39 -0,1862 0,4616 195 -0,5422 0,3391 Andalucía
Bretagne 73 03332 35 0,3068 l Extremadura
Poitou-Charente 10 0,1647 0,7963 60 -0.0597 0,4861 Castilla-La Mancha
Aquitaine 42 0,394 124 -0,7337 0,4595 Castilla-León
Midi-Pyrénées 26 0,4955 22 -5,6766 12,0852 La Rioja
Limousin 5 1,4387 0,9806 71 -0,1193 0,4798 Canarias
Rhône-Alpes 86 0,3827 0,3051
Languedoc-Roussi! Ion 26 m zm m 0,4764
Provence-Côte dAzur 57 -0,1102 03727
Auvergne 15 P T O 8 7 7 **; 0,6289
Intercept L - 1 ,3 2 7 5 " 0,394 -0,7225 0,5224
probability refer, categ. 0,79 0,33
rate of independence 0,42 0,12
Delta in % 53 36
* statistically significant at <= 0.05 ** statistically significant at < =0.01
Table 2
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in France in 1992 and in Spain in 1991
Young People Aged 20*29 in 1991/92 Who in 1985/1986 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1991/92 \ \  err in Education
MEN France
Total Cases 810
Cases in Analysis 727
*2 Log Likelihood 672.47
*2 LL initially 945.71
Diff. of *2 LL 29%
Cases Coefficients St Error Cases
Activity
part-time student 133 678
full-time student 5»4 r - i . T O y r 0,2798 1010
Agegroup 
25-29 year old 82 479
20-24 year old 
Completed Education
645 -0,6914 03186 1209
tertiary certificate 55
«■compulsory cert. 73 "T -2 J7 5 5 « : 0.4958 218
basic vocational cert. 124 L, -MÓI8**, 0.4204 156
secondary vocat. cert. 292 t '  -M 343*£ 0.3374 118
maturity certificate 163 ^ * ,7 0 2 9 * 5 03541 1023
missing 20 0.885 9
Father's Social Class 




petty bourgeoisie 45 0,4393 173
farmers 23 -0,0842 0.6267 104
skilled workers 220 rr-o ;*85ff?* 03511 285
non-ski! led workers 62 -13339V? 0,4557 302
agricultural workers » 1-V':C2,L281*J 0.9678 36
economic. Inactive 10 -7,4421 103073 10
missing 5 1.6815 13285 27
Siblings 
no sibling 64 108
one sibling 247 -0,1176 0,369 551
two siblings 189 0,2483 0.3842 506
three and more sibli. 188 0,2947 0,3874 519
missing
Size of municipality
39 -0,2494 0,5486 4
> 100,000 inhabitants 487 277
>« 20,000 and < 100.000 79 -0.5047 0,364 361
>■5.000 and <20.000 53 -” 0124« 0.4443 525
< 5.000 inhabitants 108 -1,6232?*. 0,3672 525
Region
Ile-de-France 170 317
Champagne-Ardennes 11 0,9087 0.791 111
Picardie 24 -0,1962 0,795 46
Haute-Normandie 23 r-1 ,5 1 3 7 * » ; 0,5837 38
Centre 29 1,0144 0,5487 108
Basse-Normandie 16 0,5079 0.7991 43
Bourgogne 15 £ 3 * 1 1 7 9 * * 0,9394 69
Nord-Pas de Calais 79 0,5083 0,3614 220
Lorraine 22 -0,0079 0,7031 42
Alsace 15 F i r  x&m 0,6852 145
Franche-Comté 9 \ < 3 2 2 I 0,871 54
Pays de la Loire 20 0,4057 0,6288 209
Bretagne 45 2 3 2 0 2 3 0,4405 30















Provence-Côte dAzur 54 -0,0989 0,4152
Auvergne 7 1,477 1,0207
Intercept 1,6218** 0,4916
probability refer, categ. 0,84
rate of independence 0.35
Delta in % 42

















0,4591 0 basic vocational ccrt.
0,5352 0.383 secondary vocat. cert.





0.1319 0.3432 petty bourgeoisie
0.0797 0,4243 farmers
0.3991 0.2861 skilled workers
0.12 0.2871 non-skilled workers
‘ 1,5161 ♦* 0,4952 agricultural workers





0,6022 0,4419 two siblings
0,8627* 0.4393 three and more sibli.
1,9572 1,2803 missing
-0,2131 0,2779
> 100,000 inhabitants 
>*20.000 and« 100,000
-0,4402 0.265 >■ 5.000 and < 20,000















-0,8788 0,666 Castilla-La Mancha
0,1636 0,4048 Castilla-León






*• statistically significant at < »0.01
Table 3
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in France in 1992 and in Spain in 1991
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1991/92 Who in 1985/1986 W ere Living in the Parental Home and in 1991/92 W ere on the Labour M arket
WOMEN
Total Cases 
Cases in Analysis 
-2 Log Likelihood 
•2 LL initially 
















Activity long-term employment 831 1354 long-term employment
short-term employment 225 £30,9729** 0,1678 2264 03576**, 0.0753 short-temi employment
economically inactive 187 (^1,207** 0.2513 1837 \ vt,0985** 0.0823 economically inactive
self-employed 21 0.3296 0.5811 298 “ 0.253 0.1364 self-employed
family help 14 0.4374 0,6869 150 -0.1896 0.1918 family help
unemployed 155 -0.3379 0,196 1860 0.0782 unemployed
first-job seeker 240 0,1645 1100 £ m»,5966**- 0.099 first-job seeker
Agegrou 25-29 year old 756 4708 25-29 year old
20-24 year old 917 £•0,5416** 0.1193 4155 TÍ298*«' 0.0498 20-24 year old
Completed Education
tertiary certificate 361 4696 tertiary certificate
<=compulsor>' cert. 713 0.2229 999 m r,4595~ 0.0803 <=compulsory ccrt.
basic vocational cert. 200 L¿),4922** 0.1975 636 feo>4074*r 0.0981 basic vocational cert.
secondary vocat. cert. 145 Í.4361 0.2388 1270 0.1731 0.1114 secondary vocat. cert.
maturity certificate 16 -0.4341 0.256 1158 0.1491 0.0933 maturity certificate
missing 238 0.1286 0,6357 104 E 3 7 8 8 6 2 0.2384 missing
Father’s Social Class
service class 246 863 service class
routine non-manual 263 0.2119 0,2159 1072 0.083 0.1022 routine non-manual
petty bourgeoisie 114 P~0,6067*: 0,2929 794 0.0825 0.1104 petty bourgeoisie
farmers 117 ’-0.1949 0.2729 840 -0.1047 0.1119 farmers
skilled workers 570 -0.2862 0,1838 1826 n ^ ’0,1982* 0.0945 skilled workers
non-skilled workers 306 -0.0196 0.21) 2747 0.0779 0.0903 non-skilled workers
agricultural workers 35 -0.417 0.4094 431 0.1508 0.1356 agricultural workers
economic. Inactive 20 -6.675 4,8226 159 r^'0,6572** 0.1915 economic. Inactive
missing 2 -0.5187 1,4521 131 "0.1713 0.2114 missing
Siblings no sibling 126 415 no sibling
one sibling 378 0.0185 0,2363 2293 r '0,4134** 0.1241 one sibling
two siblings 396 0.1716 0.2366 2416 j 0,5694** 0.1238 two siblings
three and more sibli. 714 0.1202 0,2282 3703 j 0,9041»* 0.1216 three and more sibli.
missing 59 0,5839 0.3799 36 0.4593 0,3924 missing
Size of municipality
> 100,000 inhabitants 778 1478 > 100.000 inhabitants
>* 20.000 & < 100.000 255 0,1306 0,1864 2027 0.0011 0,0777 >= 20,000 and < 100,000
>= 5.000 & < 20.000 182 0.0503 0.2059 2633 0.0509 0.0729 >=5,000 and <20.000
< 5.000 inhabitants 458 £ " ”-0,3003* 0,1565 2725 f* ^ ,1 5 9 4 * 0,0804 < 5.000 inhabitants
Region Ile-de-France 334 967 Madrid
Champagne-Ardennes 36 0,1633 0.4096 490 f£3U914* 0,1285 Galicia
Picardie 64 -0,0264 0.3282 248 " ^ - 0 .1 0 7 7 0,1619 Asturias
Haute-Normandie 63 f  0,8828* 0,3662 204 -0,3277 0.1771 Cantabria
Centre 66 0.0642 0,3123 564 n^5423*« 0,1294 Pals Vasco
Basse-Normand ie 42 0,4819 0.4078 211 " -0.294 0,1748 Navarra
Bourgogne 36 0.8975 0,497 285 0,1038 0.1495 Aragón
Nord-Pas de Calais 125 -0,113 0,2442 1114 pTïï,44t*;* 0.0984 Catalufta
Lorraine 71 -0,5204 0,3005 193 1 0,4398**.: 0,1743 Baleares
Alsace 57 ££0,7126«; 0,3687 790 g U T O » ; ; 0,1069 País Valenciano
Franche-Comté 31 6.6549 0,4722 337 0.0256 0,1417 Murcia
Pays de la Loire 92 rTt),<S53$* 0,2892 1616 -0.0319 0,0927 Andalucía
Bretagne 80 [^ 0 ,8 6 7 7 ^ 0,3282 343 0,0032 0,1423 Extremadura
Poitou-Charente 39 -0.1345 0,3895 442 0.0613 0,13 Castilla-La Mancha
Aquitaine 93 -0.1504 0,2797 512 r r * 3 4 0 6 * ^ 0,1257 Castilla-León
Midi-Pyrénées 73 0,3942 0,3239 lit 0.1709 0,2251 La Rioja
Limousin 19 0,0992 0,5394 436 OSE®5!*!! 0,1305 Canarias
Rhône-Alpes 158 0,059 0,2328
Languedoc-Roussillon 66 -0,1913 0,3187
Provence-Côte dAzur 99 0,0073 0,2713
Auvergne 29 -0,3688 0,4279
Intercept 1,549** 0,2836 o s » «
0,1708
probability refer, categ. 0,82 0,28
rate of independence 0,67 0.45
Delta in % 81 162
* statistically significant at <» 0.05 * * statistically significant at < =0.01
Table 4
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in France in IW I and in Spain in IMi
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1991/92 Who in 1985/1986 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1991/92 Were on the Labour Market
MEN France Spain
Total Cases 1726 9045
Cases in Analysis 1708 8997
-2 Log Likelihood 1980,35 9306.583
-2 LL initially 2367.64 11247.944
DifT. of -2 LL 16% 1736%
Cases Coefficients St. Error Cases Coefficients












basic vocational cert, 













Siblings no sibling 
one sibling 
two siblings 
three and more sibli. 
missing
Size of municipality
> 100,000 inhabitants 
>« 20.000 and < 100,0 
>- 5,000 and < 20,000 
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rate of independence 1 
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2308 long-term employ mcni
3341 K » -0J772** 0.0628 short-term employ ment
370 6 f  -1,8335« 0.1836 economically inactive
906 -03067* 0.0873 self-employed
296 -1.0603« 0.1645 family help
1316 S? -0 ,9Î91«‘ 0.0863 unemployed
460 -2Í907*** 0.2638 first-job seeker
50t0 25-29 year old
3987 g f f  -i;660jS** 0,0581 20-24 year old
5481 tertiary certificate
1060 C T  G 5$4«‘ 0.1068 «-compulsory ccrt.
701 J F' 0,5728« 0.1247 basic vocational cen.
1032 &.•' 03177* 0,1363 secondary vocat. ccrt.
641 V 03415«  0.1265 maturity certificate
82 [fs. 0,6227* 0,305 missing
752 service class
1046 -0,1132 0.1173 routine non-manual
829 0.0722 0.1231 petty bourgeoisie
957 r r  - -C398**_ 0.1233 fanners
1906 -0.1554 0,1074 skilled workers
2786 T T  '-03435*' 0.1041 non-skilled workers
477 -0325 0,1432 agricultural workers
113 •0.2088 0.2451 economic. Inactive
131 -0.0419 0,2352 missing
416 no sibling
2326 0.1291 0,1379 one sibling
2511 0.3659« 0,1365 two siblings
3696 0,7893** 0.1339 three and more sibli.
4 , 1̂  13913** 0.3489 missing
1479 > 100,000 inhabitants
2135 0.0268 0.0824 -20.000 and < 100.000
2698 0,0291 0,0781 >- 5,000 and < 20.000
2685 0.064 8 0.0863 < 5.000 inhabitants
944 Madrid
501 -0.2395 0,1404 Galicia
242 r  -03892* 0.1842 Asturias
196 ! -0,4088* 0.2002 Cantabria
560 -0,515« 0,1475 Pals Vasco
213 *0,5454«, 0,2003 Navama
306 -0,062? 0,1595 Aragón
1131 E T . ; 0 ^ « 7 * î 0,1053 Catalufla
249 0.2587 0,1668 Baleares
800 0.1927 0.1154 Pals Valenciano
353 0,1921 0,1496 Murcia
1608 RF?' 0,4043«: 0,1002 Andalucía
359 0,1812 0,1484 Extremadura
466 0,0506 0,1359 Castilla-La Mancha
575 -d?657«¡ 0,1338 Castilla-León
115 0,0388 0,2309 La Rioja







** statistically significant a t1
T ab le  5
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in France in 1992
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1992 Who in 1986 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1992 Were on the Labour Market
MEN
Total Cases 

















Activity long-term employ. 1033 long-term >5000 market income
long-term <=5000 HE9421** 0.1812 public benefits 0.5314 0.303°
short-term employ. 237 "4L908** 0,1689 short-term <=5000 ¡1,7001** 0.2656 family help -0.726 O.40Of*
short-term >5000 & 7522*m 0.2295 market and state 1.5872** 0.2353
economically inactive 25 -0,642 0,4559 enco. inactive <=5000 -0.9957 0.5352 market and family 0.2054 0.158
econ, inactive >5000 -0.1899 1.2539 state and family 0,9463** 0.2285
unemployed 124 *-0;4767̂ ; 0.2129 unemployed <=5000 [0,8581 ** 0.2568 market, state, family 0,7318** 0.1844
unemployed >5000 ^-0,62 0.4752
first-job seeker 195 3,3155**? 0,1919 first-job seeker <=500 3v520S** 0.2122
first-job seeker >5000 0.7981 0,8932
self-employed 77 -0,4242 0,2793 self-employed <=5000 0.4632
self-employed >5000 0.2998 0.4586
family help 17 2.0W5**: 0.8142 family-help <=5000 -6,3821 5.4851
family-help >5000 n n
Agegroup 25-29 year old 908 25-29 year old 25-29 year old
20*24 year old 800 Ï 7 5 5 V ? 0,1142 20-24 year old P36D2** 0.1226 20-24 year old 7.4029** 0,1168
Complete tertiary certificate 405 tertiary certificate tertiary certificate
<=compulsory cert. 908 -0,2876 0.2271 <=compulsory cert. -0.0102 0.2486 <=compulsorv cert. -0.3792 0.2318
basic vocational cert. 142 -0.1652 0.2047 basic vocational cert. -0,0346 0.2239 basic vocational ccr. -0.1237 0.2088
secondary vocat. cert. 75 -0.1279 0.2639 secondary vocat. cert. -0,0408 0.288 second, vocat. cert. -0.0375 0.2677
maturity certificate 171 0,0573 0.3181 maturity certificate 0,033 0.3513 maturity' certificate 0.0385 0.3314
missing 7 -0,1071 0.9586 missing 0.3433 1.1941 missing •0.0977 0.9012
Father's Social Class Father's Social Class
service class 239 service class service class
routine non-manual 209 -0.2583 0.2231 routine non-manual -0.2924 0.2383 routine non-manual -0.1237 0.2278
petty bourgeoisie 125 0.6689** 0.269 petty bourgeoisie F'0,5414* 0.2943 petty bourgeoisie 0;7304** 0.2752
farmers 146 -0,5927* 0.2693 farmers *.-Oj6166* 0.2946 farmers :0,6858** 0.2631
skilled workers 556 ’ -0.3502 0.1875 skilled workers j-0,4474* 0.2021 skilled workers ' -0.3065 0.1928
non-skilled workers 382 -0,4073*’ 0,2055 non-skilled workers '-0,4192* 0.2209 non-skilled workers -0.3665 0.2104
agricultural workers 31 -1,0886*, 0,4532 agricultural workers >1,0492* 0.4836 agricultural workers 0.4718
economic, inactive 19 33738** 1.0605 economic, inactive i33373** 1.0797 economic, inactive i -3,631** 1.0911
missing 1 -5,7043 13.5037 missing -6,5624 22.243 missing ‘ -5.3845 13.5042
Siblings no sibling 135 no sibling no sibling
one sibling 362 -0,1148 0,2288 one sibling -0,0952 0.2417 one sibling -0.2494 0.2364
two siblings 376 -0.0828 0.2272 two siblings -0,0541 0,2409 two siblings -0,1228 0,2354
three and more sibli. 740 0.3201 0,2144 three and more sibli. 0,3068 0.2274 three & more sibli. 0.1818 0.2223
missing 95 -0,0748 0.3055 missing missing -0.1014 0.3169
Size mun. > 100.000 inhabitants 750 > 100,000 inhabitants > 100,000 inhabitants
>= 20,000 & <  100.0 229 0.2983 0.1872 >= 20.000 &< 100.00 0,351 0.2013 >=20.000&<100,000 0.2393 0.1915
>= ¡.000 &< 20.000 171 -0.1567 0.2003 >= 5,000 & < 20.000 -0,0408 0.2164 >= 5.000 & < 20.000 -0.1421 0.2056
< 5,000 inhabitants 558 0,7322** 0,1523 < 5,000 inhabitants [0,7013** 0.1633 < 5,000 inhabitants 0.Í191**’ 0,1567
Region Ile-de-France 316 Ile-de-France Ile-de-France
Champagne-Ardenne 50 -0,059 0,3504 Champagne-Ardennes -0.1924 0.3859 Champagne-Ardenncs 0,0729 0.3606
Picardie 89 0,358 0,2939 Picardie [ 0,5991* 0,3328 Picardie 0.3438 0.3022
Haute-Normandie 67 0,5472 0,3106 Haute-Normandie ^ 0,6975* 0,3322 Haute-Normandie 0,4742 0.3187
Centre 61 -0,003 0,3233 Centre 0,031 0,3382 Centre -0,0332 0.3334
Basse-Normandie 54 0,339 0.357 Basse-Normandie 0,403) 0.3791 Basse-Normandie 0,2272 0,3691
Bourgogne 38 0,6762 0,4272 Bourgogne 0,7967 0,46 Bourgogne 0.5004 0.4286
Nord-Pas de Calais 137 •0,31 S3 0,2358 Nord-Pas de Calais -0,3437 0.2503 Nord-Pas de Calais ET-ww; 0,242
Lorraine 62 -0,2892 0,3226 Lorraine -0.2139 0,3389 Lorraine -0,1285 0,3325
Alsace 64 0,5613 0,3189 Alsace 0,6052* 0.3649 Alsace 0,328
Franche-Comté 36 -0,0557 0,4079 Franche-Comté -0,2415 0,4215 Franche-Comté -0,362 0,4489
Pays de la Loire 92 0.910$**? 0,286 Pays de la Loire C0 '8543* 0,2972 Pays de la Loire JO,7651**’ 0,2859
Bretagne 91 . 0,6931*. 0,2843 Bretagne [ 0,8058* 0.3064 Bretagne 0,2869
Poitou-Charente 44 0,5881* 0.3727 Poitou-Charente 1,0289* 0.4293 Poitou-Charente 0,6733 03861
Aquitaine 86 0.215 0.2894 Aquitaine 02177 0,3054 Aquitaine 0,1692 03025
Midi-Pyrénées 56 0,0148 0,3529 Midi-Pyrénées 0,056 0,4018 Midi-Pyrénées 0,1399 03568
Limousin 16 0,2455 0,5819 Limousin 0,4237 0,6091 Limousin 0,1029 0,5755
Rhône-Alpes 149 0,2894 0,2283 Rhône-Alpes 0,3284 0,2409 Rhône-Alpes 0,2114 03334
Languedoc-Ro uss. 45 0,5317 0,3675 Languedoc-Roussillon 0,5229 0,3947 Languedoc-Roussillo 0,5001 03757
Provence-Côte dAzur 115 0,2945 0,2499 Provence-Côte dAzur 0,1424 0.2688 Provence-Côte dAzur 0,0632 03617
Auvergne 40 0,7144 0,4019 Auvergne 0,6591 0,4542 Auvergne 0,6208 0.405
Intercept 12906**5 0,2875 Intercept ’T[359** 0,3086 Intercept £7857**: 03075
prob. of refer, categ. 0,78 0,80 0.68“
rate of independence 0,50 0,51 0,50
Delta in % 64 64 73
* statistically significant at <= 0.05 •* statistically significant at < *0.01
T able 6
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in France in 1992
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1992 Who in 1986 Were Living in the Parental Home And in 1992 Were on the Labour Market
WOMEN
Total Cases 
Cases in Analysis 
-2 Log Likelihood




Cases CoefTic. St. Error










long-term employ. 831 long-term >5000 ÏOT market income
long-term <-5000 Æ5063V. 0*247 public benefits r w 0*317
short-term employ. 225 & 72 0,1678 short-term <”5000 j-I*9Ô4** 0.2963 family help L5178** 0.3347
short-term >5000 H.1I38Í* 0*919 market and state 0.7203** 0*676
economically inactive 187 £ 3 2 2 0.2513 econ. inactive <=500 0.8489 1.0598 market and family ! 0,4285* 0.1887econ. inactive >5000 1.6605 0*362 state and family ¡0.5202** 0.1996
unemployed 155 -0.3379 0.196 unemployed <=5000 £0,6417** 0.5739 market, state, family 3.0969** 0*05
unemployed >5000 -0.626 0*01
first-job seeker 240 0,1645 first-job seeker <=50 £-1* 836** 0,707
ftrst-job seeker >5000 0,0153 0.8011
self-employed 21 0.3296 0.5811 self-employed <=500 0.4386 1.1914
self-employed >5000 -0*417 0.7161
family help 14 0,4374 0,6869 family-help <=5000 -0,0947
family-help >5000
25-29 year old 756 25-29 year old 25-29 year old
20-24 year old 917 0.1193 20-24 year old 0.1255 20-24 year old ,U.67I7r* 0.117
tertiary certificate 361 tertiary certificate tertiary certificate
<=compu!sory cert. 713 0.2229 <=compulsory cert. -0,4257 0*4 «-compulsory cert. .0,4905** 0*216
basic vocational cert. 200 6,4922**' 0.1975 basic vocational cert. -0*698 0*131 basic vocational ccrl. jo.4879*,*; 0.1984
secondary vocat. cert. 145 -0,4361 0,2388 secondary vocat. cert. -0*342 0*534 secondary vocat. ccrt. -0.4417 0,2374
maturity certificate 16 -0,4341 0.256 maturity certificate -0*914 0*747 maturity certificate -0*489 0*563
missing 238 0,1286 0.6357 missing 0,1782 0.6617 missing -0.0612 0.6202
service class 246 service class service class
routine non-manual 263 0,2119 0*159 routine non-manual 0*181 0*294 routine non-manual 0*025 0*144
petty bourgeoisie 114 XT,6067* 0.2929 petty bourgeoisie 0.4857 0*052 petty bourgeoisie r0,6696t 0*901
fanners 117 •0.Í949 0.2729 farmers -0,1119 0*908 farmers -0.0983 0*685
skilled workers 570 -0,2862 0.1838 skilled workers -0*407 0,1945 skilled workers •0*119 0.1831
non-skillcd workers 306 -0,0196 0.211 non-skillcd workers -0.032 0*218 non-skillcd workers -0.0272 0*087
agricultural workers 35 -0.417 0.4094 agricultural workers -0,4253 0.441 agricultural workers -0.4372 0,4038
economic. Inactive 20 •6,675 4.8226 economic. Inactive -6,7319 5,0261 economic. Inactive -6.9323 4.792
missing 2 -0,5187 1,4521 missing -0.4825 1,4527 missing -1.0533 1,4543
no sibling 126 no sibling no sibling
one sibling 378 0,0185 0,2363 one sibling 0,0821 0*437 one sibling 0,1624 0*35
two siblings 396 0,1716 0.2366 two siblings 0*549 0*45 two siblings 0*996 0*349
three and more sibli. 714 0,1202 0.2282 three and more sibli. 0*203 0*353 three and more sibli. 0*879 0*266
missing 59 0,5839 0.3799 missing missing 0,4711 0,3795
> 100.000 inhabitants 778 > 100.000 inhabitants > 100.000 inhabitants
>■ 20,000&< 100.00 255 0,1306 0,1864 >= 20.000 &< 100.0 0*004 0,1977 >= 20,000 &< 100.00 0,1276 0,1835
>= 5.000 & < 20.000 182 0,0503 0,2059 >= 5,000 &< 20.000 0,053 0*191 >= 5,000 & < 20,000 0,1015 0*02
< 5.000 inhabitants 458 [0*063* 0.1565 < 5.000 inhabitants [-0*606* 0.164 < 5.000 inhabitants -0*622 0,155
Ile-de-France 334 Ile-de-France 0,4323 Ile-de-France
Champagne-Ardenne 36 0,1633 0,4096 Champagne-Ardenne 0*595 0*742 Champagne-Ardennes 0.048) 0,407
Picardie 64 •0.0264 0.3282 Picardie 0*56 0*828 Picardie -0*189 0*254
Haute-Normandie 63 30*828* 0.3662 Haute-Normandie f 0,9746**. 0*396 Haute-Normandie 0.6116 0*571
Centre 66 0,0642 0.3123 Centre 0*65 0.4178 Centre 0.0246 0*092
Basse-Normandie 42 0,4819 0,4078 Basse-Normandie 0,4843 0,541 Basse-Normandie 0,2255 0,4091
Bourgogne 36 0,8975 0,497 Bourgogne r;co686* 0*585 Bourgogne 0,8348 0,4934
Nord-Pas de Calais 125 -0,113 0.2442 Nord-Pas de Calais -0,108 0*169 Nord-Pas de Calais -0*126 0*389
Lorraine 71 -0,5204 0,3005 Lorraine -0,526 0*996 Lorraine •0,5162 0*002
Alsace 57 0,7126*, 0.3687 Alsace 0,5011 Alsace 0,6099 0*712
Franche-Comté 31 0,6549 0,4722 Franche-Comté 0,8323 0*977 Franche-Comté 0*856 0,4649
Pays de la Loire 92 ¡0,6236*: 0,2892 Pays de la Loire i:0;6*7Z*: 0*451 Pays de la Loire 0*406 0*845
Bretagne 80 0,3282 Bretagne t 0,994**- 0,4027 Bretagne 0,5552 0*23
Poitou-Charente 39 -0.1345 0*895 Poitou-Charente -0,0795 0*926 Poitou-Charente -0*649 0*81
Aquitaine 93 -0,1504 0*797 Aquitaine -0.0248 0*419 Aquitaine -0,4048 0*776
Midi-Pyrénées 73 0*942 0*239 Midi-Pyrénées 0,6267 0,5462 Midi-Pyrénées 0,12)1 0*165
Limousin 19 0,0992 0,5394 Limousin 0*023 0*464 Limousin -0,1783 0,5243
Rhône-Alpes 158 0,059 0*328 Rhône-Alpes 0,1606 0*487 Rhône-Alpes -0,0345 0*297
Languedoc-Roussill. 66 -0,1913 0*187 Languedoc-RoussiUo 0,0273 0*869 Languedoc-Roussillon -0.4094 0*126
Provence-Côte dAzur 99 0.0073 0*713 Provence-Côte dAzur -0,0043 0,4543 Provence-Côte dAzur -0.0222 0*685
Auvergne 29 •0,3688 0,4279 Auvergne -0,2564 Auvergne -0,4936 0.4237
Intercept 0*836 Intercept H *704** 0*973 Intercept 2 2 2 2 3 0*066
probab. of refera cat. 0,82 0,83 0,68
rate of independence 0,67 0,68 0.67






Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in France in 1992
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1992 Who in 1986 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1992 Were in Education
WOMEN 
Total Cases 










730 gpW I*? 0.2202
Agegroup 
25*29 year old 




basic vocational cert, 
secondary vocat. cert, 
maturity certificate 
missing














three and more sibli. 
missing
Size of municipality 
> 100,000 inhabitants 
>= 20,000 & <  100,00 
>= 5.000 &< 20.000 
























prob. of reference cat 




























































Coe flic St Error
part-time >5 000 market income
part-time<=5000 -0.4614 0.4 public benefits -0.6 0.637
fiill-time<=5000 Fn4005*J 03652 family help -0.755 0.51 1 7
ful l-time>5 000 -0,1786 0.6608 market and state rvi;8209* 0.7535
market and family " -0.5773 0.4842
state and family T "*0,9234* 0.4604
market, state, family 0.1989 0.507
25-29 year old 25-29 year old
20-24 year old -0.5366 03123 20-24 year old r ^ ^ s * * ’ 0.3067
tertiary certificate tertiary certificate
<=compulsory cert 03907 <=eompulsory cert. [3),9801_** 0.3879
basic vocational cert. -03792 03441 basic vocational ccrt. -03027 03394
secondary vocat. cert. 0.2906 secondary vocat. cert. p^r,9722** 0.2915
maturity certificate -0.1674 0.2074 maturity certificate -0,1728 0.2091
missing -0,0158 0.8077 missing -0.289 0.8678
service class service class
routine non-manual •0.1664 0.2578 routine non-manual -0.2894 0.2619
petty bourgeoisie ri;5809*f! 0.4064 petty bourgeoisie F?T,6934*r 0.4129
farmers ¡ 1,438**! 0.44 fanners f"ri 0,9883* 0.4105
skilled workers { -0,433*; 0.2083 skilled workers V--0,4779*; 0.2091
non-skilled workers f-0,8427* *î 0.3042 non-skilled workers t -0,9396* * 03166
agricultural workers 7.6784 25.6603 agricultural workers 7,5847 25.655
economic, inactive -6.5132 10.4662 economic, inactive -6.4342 9.9751
missing 13065 0.941 missing 1.1984 0.8381
no sibling no sibling
one sibling -0.1952 0.2701 one sibling -0.2117 0,2713
two siblings -0.1629 0.2834 two siblings •0.1614 0.284
three and more sibli. -0.0099 0.2875 three and more sibli. -0.06 0 .2 9 2
missing •0,4394 0.43 missing -0.2974 0,4206
> 100.000 inhabitants > 100.000 inhabitants
>=20.000 and< 100.C -0.1741 0.2999 >= 20.000 and < 100.000 -0,1825 0,3008
>= 5.000 and < 20.00C -0.4258 03137 >=5.000 and <20.000 -0.5215 0,3211
< 5,000 inhabitants i-1,0936**' 0.2544 < 5.000 inhabitants r-0,9692*» 0,2496
Ile-de-France Ile-de-France
Champagne-Ardennes f-1,6263** 0.5976 Champagne-Ardennes PX7048**’ 0.6207
Picardie 0.0531 0.4842 Picardie Ó. i 329 0,4821
Haute-Normandie 0.5045 0.4494 Haute-Normandie 03579 0.4555
Centre riri725**; 0.4342 Centre FT35S5*£ 0,4275
Basse-Normandie i 1,4862*; 0.6243 Basse-Normandie •1,6165**; 0,6104
Bourgogne ¡ 2,0994**; 0.4737 Bourgogne p2ri767*_*. 0,4768
Nord-Pas de Calais H ,0026^ 03018 Nord-Pas de Calais 4̂1,0292**2 0.3059
Lorraine i 0,9574*4 0.4541 Lorraine Lr. 1,0448*7 0,4438
Alsace 1 '1,5237**5 0.4448 Alsace 0,4611
Franche-Comté 1,7438 0.9635 Franche-Comté 1,5865 0,9099
Pays de la Loire -0,1692 0.4631 Pays de la Loire -0,3359 0,5014
Bretagne |X7I22t1 0,3454 Bretagne E æ s s s 0,3424
Poitou-Charente 0,1546 0.8002 Poitou-Charente 0.2868 0,8235
Aquitaine n,i22i**i 0,3965 Aquitaine rn;o468*i 0,4104
Midi-Pyrénées L lÆ 5i 3 0,4995 Midi-Pyrénées 1,1068* 0,5015
Limousin 1,3804 0,99 Limousin 1,4962 0,9959
Rhône-Alpes 0,4225 03081 Rhône-Alpes 0,3726 03086
Languedoc-Roussillon 0,8962 0,4843 Languedoc-Roussillon 0,4734
Provence-Côte dAzur -0,138 0,3813 Provence-Côte dAzur 0,0248 03711
Auvergne 0.6312 Auvergne p ^ w s s 0,6525




* statistically significant at <= 0.05 •• statistically significant at < =0.01
Table 8
Coefficient Estimates and 
Young People Aged 20-29
Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in France in 1992
in 1992 W ho in 1986 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1992 W ere in Education
MEN Model without Income Model with Income Model with Income Diversification
Total Cases 810 810 810
Cases in Analysis 727 692 716
•2 Log Likelihood 672.47 610.7O M0.185
Cases Coefficients St. Error Coefficients St. Error Coe flic. St Error
pan-time>500u market income
part-time student 133 0.2798 part-time« *5000 r^TTJTO* 0.4874 public benefits F T ,« « * 0.7805
full-time student 594 full-iime<«5000 I ^0782** 0.4066 family help £2¿468**
~a78Ô9
0.7443
full-time>SOOO 0.367 0.9624 market and state 0.8841
market and family -1.1387 0.6217
state and family pn,627** 0.5934
market, state, family -0.5848 0.6549
Agegroup
25-29 year old 82 25-29 year old 25-29 year old
20-24 year old 
Completed Education
645 -0.6914 0.3186 20-24 year old -0,4912 0.3553 20-24 year old r-0,824_** 0.3182
tertiary certificate 55 tertiary certificate tertiary certificate
«■compulsory cert. 73
¿¡MOWS
0,4958 ««compulsory cert f:^!W 7** 0,517 ««compulsory cert. P2.03K3** 0.5167
basic vocational cert. 124 0,4204 basic vocational cert.  ̂' -1^222** 0,45 basic vocational cert. [¿1,1499*.* 0.4173


















service class 269 service class service class
routine non-manual 85 '^ ,8934^
tí > 1,548**
0,3483 routine non-manual 0.3687 routine non-manual r-0;7534* 0.3555
petty bourgeoisie 45 0.4393 petty bourgeoisie 1 “r 1,583** 0.4683 petty bourgeoisie ^1,4865** 0,4523
farmers 23 -0,0842 0,6267 farmers 0.05 0.6847 farmers 0.1677 0.6492
skilled workers 220 r-0,4868**1 0.2511 skilled workers ;'^ 5 4 0 3 * 0.2638 skilled workers r-0.5261* 0.2615
non-skilled workers 62 -1,3339** 0,4557 non-skilled workers f -1,3614** 0.4852 non-skilled workers H.5472** 0.4902
agricultural workers « [ 2.1281*1 0.9678 agricultural workers 1,2124 1.1641 agricultural workers 1.8762 LOI 73
economic, inactive 10 -7.4421 10.2073 economic, inactive *7.3201 10.5807 economic, inactive -7.9752 10.043
missing 5 1,6815 1,2285 missing 1,5689 1.2292 missing 1.6932 1.2122
Siblings
no sibling 64 no sibling no sibling
one sibling 247 -0,1176 0.369 one sibling -0.0052 0.3886 one sibling -0.2465 0.3826
two siblings 189 0,2483 0.3842 two siblings 0,4425 0.4073 two siblings 0,1785 0,4003
three and more sibli. 188 0,2947 0,3874 three and more sibli. 0.451 0,4065 three and more sibli. 0.2439 0.4008
missing 39 -0.2494 0,5486 missing -0,1538 0.5994 missing -0.4074 0.5591
Size of municipality 
> 100,000 inhabitants 
>= 20.000 & <  100,00 
>= 5.000 & < 20,000 

























53 r'-U 724* 0.4443
108 ¡ -1,6232** 0.3672
> 100,000 inhabitants 
>- 20,000 & < 100,0 -0,3669
>- 5.000 & « 20.000 T”TOS53** 





































probab. of refer, categ. 
rate of independence 
Delta in %






























































































•* statistically significant at < *0,01
> 100,000 inhabitants
20,000 &« 100.000 -0,6811 0,3792
>-5,000 &< 20.000 £1,2506** 0,4531 































































Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living in a Rented Dwelling in France in 1992 and in Spain in 1991
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1992 Who in 1985/1986 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1991/92 Were Living Independently
Total Cases 













Activity long-term employment “ T7ÜT Itiùu long-term employment
short-term employment 178 -0.0906 0.2639 7TU2503«: 0.0773 1684 short-term employment
part-time student 174 0.1001 0.3035 •0.Ì044 0.1424 289 part-time student
full-time student 376 0.5121 0.3261 -0.2596 0.2585 79 full-time student
economically inactive 170 -0.1917 0.2421 0.127 0.086 1221 economically inactive
self-employed 55 -0.5322 0.3515 0.0366 0.1126 518 self-employed
family help 11 -0.204 0.8605 -0.194 0.222 m family help
unemployed 153 -0.0023 0.2774 0.128 0.0851 1217 unemployed
first-job seeker 170 0.6052 0.3232 -0,05 0.1531 234 first-job seeker
Agegroup 25-29 year old 1247 5133 25-29 year old
20-24 year old 1247 0.1535 * 0,522P£ 0.0603 1820 20-24 year old
Completed Education
tertiary certificate 417 659 tertiary certificate
<=compulsory cert. 956 0,2943 0.2613 -0.1033 0.0992 4131 t=compulsory cert.
basic vocational cert. 255 0.04 0,2091 -0.2009 0.1175 796 basic vocational cert.
secondary vocat. cert. 375 0,3494 0,2759 'T-03399** 0,1367 453 secondary vocat. cen.
maturity certificate 24 -0.327 0.2489 -0,1849 0.1134 858 maturity certificate
missing 467 1.5304 1,08)9 0.0721 0.303 56 missing
Class service class 532 649 service class
routine non-manual 353 -0.2579 0.2315 -0.2138 0.1124 819 routine non-manual
petty bourgeoisie 253 0.2167 0,2786 • ^ ”-03918*?; 0,121 664 petty bourgeoisie
farmers 157 0.2599 0.311 -0,3602** 0.1244 628 farmers
skilled workers 736 -0.1116 0,2055 ; -0,3136**; 0.1041 I486 skilled workers
non-skilled workers 421 0.2806 0,2476 -0.3713** 0.1009 2110 non-ski lied workers
agricultural workers 31 -0.1785 0,5733 -0,2547 0.1424 379 agricultural workers
economic, inactive 1 5.7817 60,4347 -0,4042 0.2151 122 economic. Inactive
missing 10 4.8351 18.715 -0.1192 0.233 96 missing
Siblings no sibling 207 237 no sibling
one sibling 608 -0.2578 0,2731 0.0292 0.1542 1489 one sibling
two siblings 598 -0,0015 0.2783 0,0671 0,1524 1835 two siblings
three and more sibli. 968 0.2675 0.2718 0.1859 0,1491 3357 three and more sibli.
missing 113 •0,1682 0,3787 0.5768 0,385 35 missing
Living An. married 816 5943 married
cohabiting 838 f‘̂ 0,7333**: 0,1625 0,9687*?: 0,1299 281 cohabiting
one person 578 t 1,3931 0,2371 . .0,7336** 0,1193 336 one person
with peers 199 -0,136 0.2829 0,3456**, 0.1218 355 with peers
other -0,199 0,3781 0,7841** 0,34 38 other
Sizeofmun. > 100,000 inhabitants 1363 1157 > 100,000 inhabitants
>-20,000 and < 100.000 361 r^'0,6176*' 0,2714 0.0096 0,0836 1629 >* 20.000 and < 100.000
>- 5.000 and < 20.000 233 ‘ ^  -0-3353 0,2539 0.0187 0.0787 2145 >- 5,000 and < 20,000
< 5,000 inhabitants 537 [''"'1,0902** 0,1776 -0.1231 0,087 2022 < 5,000 inhabitants
Region Ile-de-France 495 752 Madrid
Champagne-Ardennes 53 -0.2909 0,4764 " 0,4628**, 0,1411 320 Galicia
Picardie 83 -0.2086 0.3746 1.9,5205**. 0.1821 160 Asturias
Haute-Normandie 104 ^0 ,9869* 0,4775 0,1201 0.2131 118 Cantabria
Centre 92 0,5136 0.4308 “"7-0,6064**; 0.1723 292 Pals Vasco
Basse-Normandie 62 0,6786 0,499 0.2231 137 Navarra
Bourgogne 83 0,0705 0.4249 0,2378 0,1562 247 Aragón
Nord-Pas de Calais 187 -0,4916 0,2729 0,0386 0.1039 1043 Cataluña
Lorraine 71 -0,6439 0,3463 ^ 5 6 6 4 ^ 0,1678 202 Baleares
Alsace 105 -0,1975 0,3189 . .-0,52021** 0,1208 690 País Valenciano
Franche-Comté 44 0,4629 0,5352 ^-0,3406^ 0,1586 279 Murcia
Pays de la Loire 131 -0,1137 0,3143 *0,0259 0,1004 1330 Andalucía
Bretagne 168 0,152 0,3221 m s ™ ® 0,1467 288 Extremadura
Poitou-Charente 51 0,0858 0,462 0,0876 0,1392 357 Castilla-La Mancha
Aquitaine 123 •0,2108 0,3337 0,6534*« 0,1365 340 Castilla-León
Midi-Pyrénées 101 0,0626 0,3521 0.45345■ i • - K * 0,2337 95 La Rioja
Limousin 28 1,5211 1,0724 0,2448 0.1442 303 Canarias
Rhône-Alpes 241 0,4588 0,3084
Languedoc-Rouss illon 77 0,3517
Provence-Côte dAzur 148 0,7232* 0,3587
Auvergne 47 5,9962 8.3628
Intercept E E 2 2 2 0,3281 "7^0,6222*^ 0,2021
probability refer, categ. 0,80 0,35
rate of renting dwelling 0,88 0^7
* statistically significant at <== 0.05 *• statistically significant at < *0.01
Table 10
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in France in 1992 (Regional Analysis!
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1992 Who in 1986 Were Living in the Parental Home And in 1992 Were on the Labour Market
MEN
Total Cases 











25*29 year old 




basic vocational cert, 



















































































three and more sibli. 
missing
Size of municipality 
> 100.000 inhabitants 
>- 20,000 and < 100,000 
>- 5,000 and < 20.000 







































































































































** statistically significant at < *0.01
-02583 
' ”0,6689* *' 
•0,5927* 
~ -03502 





























































































Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in France in 1992 (Regional A nalysis)
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1992 Who in 1986 W ere Living in the Parental Home and in 1992 Were on the Labour Market
WOMEN MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
Total Cases 





















short-term employment 225 ~ -1,0584** 0.1599 -0,9729** 0.1678
economically inactive 187 1,0684** 03395 1307** 0.2513
self-employed 21 0.4997 0.5687 6.3296 0.5811
family help 14 0,4557 0.6712 0.4374 0.6869
unemployed 155 ‘•0,46m* 0.1877 -03379 0.196
first-job seeker 240 39288** 0.1568 -0,7404** 0.1645
Agegroup
25*29 year old 756
20-24 year old 917 -0.5416** 0.1193
Completed Education
tertiary certificate 361
<=compulsory ccit. 713 •0,5646** 0.2229
basic vocational cert. 200 -0,4922** 0,1975
secondary vocal cert. 145 -0.4361 0.2388
maturity certificate 16 -0.4341 0.256
missing 238 0.1286 0.6357
Father's Social Class
service class 246
routine non-manual 263 0,2119 0.2159
petty bourgeoisie 114 ‘ ’ 0,6067* 0.2929
farmers 117 -0.1949 0.2729
skilled workers 570 -03862 0.1838
non-skillcd workers 306 -0.0196 0.211
agricultural workers 35 -0.417 0.4094
economic, inactive 20 -6.675 4.8226
missing 2 -0.5187 1.4521
Siblings
no sibling 126
one sibling 378 0.0185 0,2363
two siblings 396 0.1716 0.2366
three and more sibli. 714 0.1202 0.2282
missing 59 0,5839 0,3799
Size of municipality
> 100,000 inhabitants 778
>= 20.000 and < 100,000 255 0,092 0.1549 0,1386 0.179 0.1306 0,1864
>=5,000 and <20.000 182 0,0223 0.1763 0.0189 0,1981 0,0503 03059
< 5,000 inhabitants 458 -0,2101 0,1235 --03108* 0.1485 -0,3063* 0,1565
Region
Ile-de-France 334
Champagne-Ardennes 36 -0.157 0,3732 -0,0053 0,3991 0.1633 0,4096
Picardie 64 -0.4055 0,2827 -0,1653 0,3112 -0,0264 0,3282
Haute-Normandie 63 0.4026 0,3257 0,6635 0,3470 " 0,8828* 0,3662
Centre 66 -0.2244 0,2846 -0,08 0,3037 0.0642 0,3123
Basse-Normandie 42 0,0661 03619 03142 0,3916 0,4819 0,4078
Bourgogne 36 0,7591 0,4629 0,7928 0,4886 0,8975 0,497
Nord-Pas de Calais 125 -03775 0,2193 -0.2289 0332 -0,113 0,2442
Lorraine 71 ^ 7 0 9 1 « : 0,2663 - *̂ 03478*' 0,2859 -0,5204 0 ,3005
Alsace 57 ^"6,3691 0,3375 0,539 0.3563 03687
Franche-Comté 31 0,2059 0,4275 0,5405 0,4519 ‘ 0,6549 0,4722
Pays de la Loire 92 0,0814 0,2606 0,4639 0.2796 ' ‘0,6236*| 0,2892
Bretagne 80 0,3866 0,2932 T 3 S 0,3164 . 0,8677**1 0,3282
Poitou-Charente 39 -0,4872 0.3468 -0,2654 0,3772 -0,1345 03895
Aquitaine 93 0,2411 -0,3106 0,2644 -0,1504 03797
Midi-Pyrénées 73 ^-0 .0094 03817 03579 0,3079 03942 03239
Limousin 19 -0,3112 0,4904 0,0447 0,5174 0,0992 0,5394
Rhône-Alpes 158 -03228 03053 -0,0723 0,2217 0,059 03328
Languedoc-Rouss itlon 66 0,2762 -0,2559 0.3045 -0,1913 0,3187
Provence-Côte dAzur 99 -0,1112 0,2459 -0,077 0,2606 0,0073 03713
Auvergne 29 -0,6425 0,392 -0,519 0,4203 •0,3688 0,4279
Intercept E~0,7535*? 0,0769 T^8502*J 0,1195 7 ,̂9976*** 0,1292 549**1 03836
probability refer, categ. 0,68 0,70 0,82
* statistically significant at <= 0.0 ** statistically significant at < =0.01
Table 12
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in Spain in 1991 (Regional Analysis)
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1991 Who in 1985 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1991 Were on the Labour Market
MEN MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
Total Cases 
















short-term employment 3341 T? "03772** 0.0628
economically inactive 370 ^  -1.8335** 0.1836
self-employed 906 / ;  ;  03067* 0.0873
family help 296 -1,0603** 0.1645
unemployed 1316 V" ‘ -  0,9191 *• 0.0863
first-job seeker 460 4^-2,5907*» 0.2638
Agegroup
25-29 year old 5010
20-24 year old 3987 ~™i;6606** 0.0581
Completed Education
tertiary certificate 5481
<*compu1sory cert 1060 ^"^'0;654** 0.1068
basic vocational cert. 701 ■ -0,5728** 0.1247
secondary vocat. cert. 1032 ^  . . 03177* 0.1363
maturity certificate 641 03415**: 0,1265
missing 82 1..;,. 0,6227* 0305
Father's Social Class
service class 752
routine non-manual 1046 0.1132 0.1173
petty bourgeoisie 829 0.0722 0.1231
farmers 957 -“~~-0398** 0.1233
skilled workers 1906 -0.1554 0.1074
non-ski lied workers 2786 ~ -03455* 0,1041
agricultural workers 477 -0.225 0.1432
economic, inactive 113 -0.2088 0.2451
missing 131 0,0419 0.2352
Siblings
no sibling 416
one sibling 2326 0.1291 0.1379
two siblings 2511 " "  ' 0,3659* • 0.1365
three and more sibli. 3696 0,7893** 0,1339
missing 48 13913**. 03489
Size of municipality
>  100.000 inhabitants 1479
>-20,000 and < 100.000 2135 0.0503 0.0723 0.0268 0.0824
> -  5,000 and <  20.000 2698 0.0428 0.0692 0.0291 0,0781
< 5,000 inhabitants 2685 -0.0905 0.0698 0.0648 0.0863
Region
Madrid 944
Galicia 501 ’̂ 3588* 0,1251 03395 0,1404
Asturias 242 -03906*: 0.166 ”r *7~03892* 0,1842
Cantabria 196 -0,4181* 0,1825 V  : 0,4088* 03002
Pals Vasco 560 : ' -0,5783* * ; 0,1255 vi 0315**^ 0.1475
Navarra 213 ■0,4979**; 0,1794 ¿,-03454** 03003
Aragón 306 ^  0,0959 0,1433 0,0621 0,1595
Cataluña 1131 '[*702T85*’ 0,0932 03447** 0,1053
Baleares 249 0,2467 0,1485 0,2587 0.1668
Pais Valenciano 800 0,1284 0.102 0,1927 0,1154
Murcia 353 0,0237 0,1336 0,1921 0,1496
Andalucía 1608 ^TOP«!**? 0.0869 4043**! 0,1002
Extremadura 359 0,0749 0,1319 0,1812 0,1484
Castilla-La Mancha 466 0,0384 0,121 0,0506 0,1359
Castilla-León 575 o , i i 9 ( ^3)3657** 0,1338
La Rioja 115 0,2485 0,205 0,0388 0 3309
Canarias 379 0,0054 0,1307 -0,0405 0,148
Intercept 0,0558 0,0699 ^ $ 5 9 2 3 * *  0.1933
probability of reference categ. 032 032 0 3 6
* statistically significant at < -  0.05 ••  statistically significant at < *0.01
Table 13
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in Spain in 1991 (Regional Analyst«)
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1991 Who in 1985 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1991 Were On the Labour Market
WOMEN MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
Total Cases 8908 8908 ! 8908
Cases in Analysis 8908 8863 8863
-2 Log Likelihood 12259.619 12071.925 10479,962
Cases Coefficient St. Error Coefficients St. Error Coefficients St. Error
Activity
long-term employment 1354
short-term employment 2264 ”  ^f0^576** 0.0753
economically inactive 1837 ■ 1,0985** 0.0823
self-employed 298 0.253 0.1364
family help 150 -0.1896 0.1918
unemployed 1860 "TT7mJ^499** 0.0782
first-job seeker 
Agegroup
1100 7 -0,5966** 0.099
25-29 year old 4708
20-24 year old 4155 ' ~ ‘-1,2298** 0.0498
Completed Education 
tertiary certificate 4696
<=compulsory cert. 999 ~r~0¿595** 0.0803
basic vocational cert 636 0,4074** 0.0981
secondary vocat. cert. 1270 0, Í 731 0.1114
maturity certificate 1158 0.1491 0.0933
missing
Father's Social Class
104 ^ 3 ^ 8 8 6 * * 0.2384 .
service class 863
routine non-manual 1072 0.083 0,1022
petty bourgeoisie 794 0.0825 0,1104
farmers 840 -0.1047 0.1119
skilled workers 1826 " '"0 ,1 9 8 2 * 0.0945
non-skilled workers 2747 0.0779 0.0903
agricultural workers 431 0,1508 0.1356
economic. Inactive 159 0,6572** 0.1915
missing 131 " '6.1713 0.2114
Siblings 
no sibling 415
one sibling 2293 0,4134** 0.1241
two siblings 2416 0,5694** 0.1238
three and more sibli. 3703 0,9041**; 0,1216
missing 36 0,4593 0.3924
Size of municipality 
> 100.000 inhabitants 1478
>= 20,000 and < 100,000 2027 -0,0259 0.0687 0.0011 0.0777
>= 5.000 and < 20.000 2633 0,0642 0.0652 0,0509 0.0729
< 5.000 inhabitants 2725 *0.0076 0.0648 ' 0;i594* 0.0804
Region
Madrid 967
Galicia 490 ■w' 7 r' .0,2366* 0,1139 0.1285
Asturias 248 -0,1531 0,1454 -0,1077 0,1619
Cantabria 204 -0,2528 0,1591 -0,3277 0,1771
Pais Vasco 564 ;~~-0.3797**: 0,1102 ~^T^5423*f: 0.1294
Navarra 211 -0.0454 0,154 -6,294 0.1748
Aragón 285 0,2544 0,1351 0.1038 0,1495
Cataluña 1114 T7"~vrü,4189**! 0,0885 0.0984
Baleares 193 V! 0,3828*. 0,1581 ’ 0,4398**- 0,1743
País Valenciano 790 .íu,;':/. 0,3097**j 0,0964 0^702 **á 0,1069
Murcia 337 0,2123 0,1269 0,0256 0,1417
Andalucía 1616 0,1133 0,082 -0,0319 0,0927
Extremadura 343 0.1669 0,1262 0,0032 0,1423
Castilla-La Mancha 442 T rr rw 4 7 * í i 0,1152 0,0613 0,13
Castilla-León 512 1 , : ;  -0,2716*; 0,1126 ™ *.3406** 0,1257
La Rioja 111 0,1993 0,2008 6,1709 0,2251
Canarias 436 -0,0344 0,1168 —T30^57*í 0,1305




* statistically significant at <= 0.05 ** statistically significant at < =0.01
Table 14
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in Spain in 1M| (Regional AnalvsiO
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1991 Who in 1985 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1991 Were on the Labour Market
MEN MODEL 4 MODEL 12
Total Cases 9045 9045 Difference in -2 LI.
Cases in Analvsis 8997 8997 (Model 12 -4)
•2 Log Likelihood 9306.583 9321.824 15341
•2 LL initially 11247.944 11247.944
DifT.of-2 LL 17.26% 17.12%
Cases Coefficients St. Error Coefficients Si. Error
Activity
long-term employment 2308 long-term employment
short-term employment 3341 r  rrj(L5772** 0.0628 “T?r^),5867** 0.0626 short-term employment
economically inactive 370 0.1836 '7-5-1,8298** 0.1834 economically inactive
self-employed 906 1 A  -03067* 0,0873 a - ’;;-0 3 l5 7 * * 0.0869 self-employed
family help 296 j* - '-1,0603** 0.1645 tvV r-1,0708**. 0.1642 family help
unemployed 1316 -0,9191** 0.0863 :X £;-0,9221** 0.0861 unemployed
first-job seeker 460 0.2638 :yg£-Z 5921*¿ 03636 first-job seeker
Agcgroup
25-29 year old 5010 25-29 year old
20-24 year old 3987 n s & g z 0.0581 rgr-1 ,655?» 0,0580 20-24 year old
Completed Education
tertiarv certificate 5481 tertiary certificate
«■compulsory cert. 1060 firn w src s f 0.1068 ? f^ r0 ,6 5 í5 * * 0.1064 «■compulsory cert.
basic vocational cert. 701 A  0,5728** 0.1247 í- í ;V 0,5691** 0.1244 basic vocational cert.
secondary vocat. cert. 1032 h -m ; 0,3177*; 0,1363 r?. 03064* 0.1360 secondary vocat. cert.
maturity certificate 641 : .ri] o ^ 4 i5 * r 0.1265 03455** 0.1262 matqrity certificate
missing 82 f A N  0,6227* 0.3050 W & :  o.gn9*- 0,3042 missing
Father's Social Class
service class 752 service class
routine non-manual 1046 •0.1132 0.1173 -0.1115 0,1170 routine non-manual
petty bourgeoisie 829 0.0722 0,1231 0.0743 0,1227 petty bourgeoisie
farmers 957 "'"^398*** 0.1233 T^""-0,4285** 0.1218 farmers
skilled workers 1906 ..... "-0.1554 0.1074 -0.1564 0.1071 skilled workers
non-skilled workers 2786 0.1041 "^^03473** 0,1038 non-skit led workers
agricultural workers 477 -6.225 0.1432 -03271 0,1419 agricultural workers
economic, inactive 113 -0.2088 0.2451 -03101 0.2455 economic. Inactive
missing 131 -0.0419 0,2352 -0.0586 0.2347 missing
Siblings
no sibling 416 no sibling
one sibling 2326 0,1291 0,1379 0.1347 0,1375 one sibling
two siblings 2511 ► "  03659**: 0,1365 —TT 03692**- 0,1361 two siblings
three and more sibli. 3696 t 0,7893** 0.1339 "V ; 0,7861**. 0,1332 three and more sibli.
missing 48 l»2913**i 0,3489 ■ A '  13077** 0,3484 missing
Size of municipality
> 100.000 inhabitants 1479 > 100.000 inhabitants
>- 20.000 and< 100.000 2135 0.0268 0.0824 0,0377 0,0816 >■20,000 and < 100,000
>= 5.000and < 20.000 2698 0,0291 0.0781 0,0515 0,0774 >- 5,000 and < 20,000
< 5.000 inhabitants 2685 0,0648 0.0863 0,0663 0,0814 < 5,000 inhabitants
Region
Madrid 944 r r ” -0.0734** 0.0139 UNEMP
Galicia 501 -03395 0.1404 A -:- 0,022** 0,0065 TENRENT
Asturias 242 0,1842 ; 0,0427* *: 0,0047 DAYWORK
Cantabria 196 i  t". ' -0,4088*; 03002
País Vasco 560 i -0315*3 0.1475
Navarra 213 t  \  -0,5454*5 03003
Aragón 306 -0,0621 0,1595
Cataluña 1131 0.1053
Baleares 249 0,2587 0,1668
País Valenciano 800 0,1927 0,1154
Murcia 353 0,1921 0,1496
Andalucía 1608 P'T.IÍTOTOS 0,1002
Extremadura 359 0,1812 0,1484
Castilla-La Mancha 466 0,0506 0,1359
Castilla-León 575 E S 3 E S K 5 0,1338
La Rioja 115 0,0388 03309
Canarias 379 -0,0405 0.1480
Intercept E r r a r a 0,1933 T^rTT-CT,723**1 03541
probability refer, categ. 0,36 033'
* statistically significant at <** 0.05 • •  statistically significant at <« 0.01
T able 15
Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors of Logistic Regression of Living Independently in Spain in 199] (Regional Anilisisl 
Young People Aged 20-29 in 1991 Who in 1985 Were Living in the Parental Home and in 1991 Were on the Labour Market
WOMEN MODEL 4 MODEL 12
Total Cases 8908 8908
Cases in Analysis 8863 8865 DifT. in-2 LL (Model 12 -4 i
-2 Log Likelihood 10479.962 10505.475 25.513
-2 LL initially 12197.808 12197.808
DifT. Of -2 lL 14.08% 13.87%
Cases Coefficients St. Error Coefficients St Error
Activity
long-term employment 1354 long-term employ ment
short-term employment 2264 p -0 ,2 5 7 6 * * 0.0753 ^  - -0261** 0.0751 short-term employ ment
economically inactive 1837 \i,r 1,0985**. 0.0823 1,0901** 0.0818 economie, iiv inactive
self-employed 298 0.253 0,1364 " 0;2571 0.1360 scii-employed
family help 150 -0.1896 0,1918 -0.1728 0.1913 family help
unemployed 1860 0,4499* r 0,0782 43** 0.0779 unemployed
first-job seeker 1100 L L - « ? “ . " 0.099 - -0,6112** 0.0985 first-job seekerAgegroup
25-29 year old 4708 25*29 year old
20-24 year old 4155 £77-1,2298**' 0,0498 "-i?206** 0.0496 20-24 year old
Completed Education
tertiary certificate 4696 tertiary certificate
«^compulsory cert. 999 r^ '0 ,4595** :
L .J* » 4074**;
0.0803 ~ ~ F t),4 7 I* * 0.0798 <«compulsory cert.
basic vocational cert. 636 0,0981 ,, tj,4233** 0.0977 basic vocational cert.
secondary vocat. cert. 1270 0,1731 0,1114 0.1836 0.1111 secondary vocat. cert.
maturity certificate 1158 0,1491 0,0933 0.157 0.0930 maturity certificate
missing 104 FT^0.7886*r 0,2384 ^ -0 ,7 6 8 6 * * 0.2377 missing
Father’s Social Class
service class 863 service class
routine non-manual 1072 0.083 0,1022 0.0692 0,1019 routine non-manual
petty bourgeoisie 794 0.0825 0.1104 0.0766 0.1099 petty bourgeoisie
farmers 840 -0.1047 0,1119 -0.1285 0,1103 farmers
skilled workers 1826 r "  0,1982* 0.0945 ~ 0,2003* 0.0943 skilled workers
non-skilled workers 2747 0,0779 0.0903 '"0.0751 0.0900 non-skilled workers
agricultural workers 431 0.1508 0,1356 0,1309 0.1340 agricultural workers
economic, inactive 159 F  0,6572**: 0,1915 “ ‘ 0,6335** 0.1907 economic. Inactive
missing 131 0,1713 0.2114 0.1607 0.2117 missing
Siblings
no sibling 415 no sibling
one sibling 2293 0,4!34**; 0,1241 0,4118** 0,1239 one sibling
two siblings 2416 j - 0,5694** 0,1238 0,5617** 0.1234 two siblings
three and more sibli. 3703 ! ; 0,9041**: 0,1216 0,8791** 0.1209 three and more sibli.
missing 36 0,4593 0,3924 0'4461 0,3917 missing
Size of municipality
> 100,000 inhabitants 1478 > 100,000 inhabitants
>= 20,000 and < 100.00 2027 0,0011 0,0777 -0,0154 0.0769 >« 20.000 and < 100.000
>* 5.000 and < 20.000 2633 0.0509 0.0729 0.0726 0.0722 >= 5.000 and < 20.000
< 5,000 inhabitants 2725 r : -  0,1594*’ 0,0804 0,1506* 0,0752 < 5.000 inhabitants
Region
Madrid 967
Galicia 490 E T . - q W ; 0.1285 . -0,1057** 0.0126 UNEMP
Asturias 248 -0,1077 0,1619 0,0184** 0.0061 TENRENT
Cantabria 204 -0,3277 0,1771 . 0,0186** 0,0043 DAYWORK
Pals Vasco 564 I2;M)3423*t: 0,1294
Navarra 211 •0.294 0.1748
Aragón 285 0,1038 0,1495
Catalufla 1114 Fv~0,44i**, 0,0984
Baleares 193 f.; - 0,4398**< 0,1743
Pals Valenciano 790 f  -  0,2702*»’ 0,1069
Murcia 337 0,0256 0,1417
Andalucía 1616 -0,0319 0,0927
Extremadura 343 0,0032 0,1423
Castilla-La Mancha 442 0,0613 0.13
Castilla-León 512 fT'-03406**1 0,1257
La Rioja 111 o ,Ì7Ò 9 0.2251
Canarias 436 p^=03057**5 0,1305
Intercept 0,1708 F ~ ;-o .7 n 4 * * 0,2269
probability refer, categ. 0.28 0,33
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